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Thesis Summary
In January 2000 the United Nations Security Council met to discuss 
HIV/AIDS. It was the first time the Council had convened solely to 
consider the security implications of health, a non-traditional security 
issue. This thesis examines the Copenhagen School theory of 
securitization, a formulaic tool proposed to bridge the conceptual gap 
between traditional narrow definitions of security and wider, non- 
traditional interpretations of the concept. Following a review of the 
literature, two conclusions are offered; first, that at the heart of the 
'radically constructivist' process of securitization is the construction of 
an existential threat which employs the realist logic of threat and 
defence. The second conclusion is that this construction amounts to a 
suasive process in which fear of a proposed threat and its consequences 
m ust be invoked within an audience. The application of the theory to 
health issues, including HIV/AIDS, has facilitated im portant critiques of 
the ethical consequences of the security linkage and the invocation of 
fear related to infectious disease is problematic. Using data collected 
during 13 months in Southeast Asia, this thesis investigates whether 
securitization of HIV/AIDS took place within Thailand or Myanmar 
following the seminal events at the UNSC. Fifty qualitative interviews 
were conducted with elite actors in the HIV/AIDS response, including 
from the United Nations, and the thesis concludes that securitization at 
the domestic level did not occur in either country. Instead, HIV/AIDS 
securitization at the UNSC was part of a strategic campaign to mobilise 
resources for dealing with the epidemic from globally powerful actors. In 
Thailand and Myanmar, civil society organisations defined the domestic 
epidemic responses and, being largely comprised of PLWHA, assumed a 
rights-orientated approach to disease management and rejected the 
threat-defence logic of securitization that could jeopardise their interests.
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Chapter 1. Research Design and Methodology
This doctoral thesis investigates the management of HIV/AIDS in Thailand 
and Myanmar (formally known as Burma).1 Between 31.4 and 35.9 million people 
are currently living with HIV/AIDS, a disease that is uniquely stigmatised and 
difficult to control (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS [UNAIDS], 2012, 
p.8). HIV/AIDS is a politically sensitive subject; it is an infectious disease that is 
widely associated with drug use, discrimination, and deviance, but the real impact 
of the epidemic is far more complex and inspiring. Data collected during 13 months 
of fieldwork in Southeast Asia revealed a surprising and nuanced picture of each 
country response, one that was different from the official policy documents of 
Thailand, and one for which little official data currently exists in Myanmar.
HIV/AIDS has attracted an unprecedented financial investment by states and 
private sector actors. In 2014, the USA proposed annual spending of 29.7 billion 
USD on HIV/AIDS, of which 6.5 billion would be invested in global projects (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2014a). But despite massive funding since its clinical discovery 
in 1981, there remains no cure or vaccination for the disease. In addition to its 
incurability, two epidemiological qualities make the epidemic particularly 
problematic: first, the H um an Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), which causes 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), is primarily transmitted through 
sexual intercourse or transmission of blood, placing people who have sex more 
often, or who use injected drugs, among the most at risk. As a result, the virus is
1 In 1989, the newly installed State Law and Order Restoration Council of Saw Muang 
officially changed the English language name of the country from 'The Union of Burma' to 
'The Union of Myanmar'. The change was part of a nationalist campaign that altered more 
than 600 place names, including that of the capital city of Yangon (formally Rangoon) 
(Steinberg, 2010, p.10). As the Council attempted to distance themselves from the Colonial 
influence of the British (Philp & Mercer, 2002), they claimed that these versions better 
reflected the traditional, Burmese-language names used prior to British administration. 
Refusal to adopt the new names became a sign of political resistance and protest that was 
headed by Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition party, the National League for Democracy 
(Beyrer, 1998, pp.42-43; Steinberg, 2010, p.10). Following her release from house arrest and 
amidst political reform, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has referred to her country as Myanmar and 
so, acknowledging the political struggles it represents, this thesis also sees fit to adopt the 
new terminology.
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uniquely associated with 'deviant' behaviours and endemic stigma and 
discrimination create significant barriers to combating and controlling the disease 
(UNAIDS, 2007a). Second, the virus has a long incubation period, typically infecting 
people for many years before symptoms manifest. This means that an epidemic can 
take hold silently within a population, reaching high prevalence rates before 
detection and making efficacious responses difficult. These qualities have 
contributed to the pervasive fear that characterises the disease.
HIV/AIDS has played a major role in introducing health to the subject of 
International Relations, partially as a result of widespread claims that high 
prevalence could be responsible for state failure and regional insecurity, including 
in Southeast Asia (Elbe, 2006; Davies, 2009, p .16). Since the American CIA 
investigated the Implications of the AIDS Pandemic in 1987, the potential link between 
security and HIV has been studied by high-level political institutions and security 
analysts. Linking HIV/AIDS and security has both mobilised a massive global 
response to the epidemic and reflected a growing diversity in the types of issues 
that are considered under the banner of 'security'. This thesis uses as its theoretical 
foundation the Copenhagen School theory of securitization, by which any issue can 
be constructed as a matter of security (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998); through 
empirical examination of discourse, policy, and action on HIV/AIDS, it finds that a 
process of HIV/AIDS securitization took place at the United Nations Security 
Council Meeting on HIV/AIDS in 2000 and investigates whether the epidemic has 
also been framed as a security issue in Thailand and Myanmar.
The Thai national response to HIV/AIDS has been lauded by the UN for its 
pragmatic and effective policies (UNAIDS, 2000a, p.3; Fordham, 2004, p3; National 
AIDS Prevention and Alleviation Committee [NAPAC], 2009, p.35). In the 1990s, the 
rapidly developing Buddhist country invested millions of baht into HIV prevention, 
implementing nationwide policies that included a '100% Condom Programme' 
intended to prevent the massive commercial sex industry from becoming a conduit 
for the disease (Ainsworth, 2003, p.16). These early campaigns succeeded in 
curtailing a potentially devastating epidemic; today there are approximately 445,000 
people living with HIV or AIDS (PLWHA) in Thailand and 240,000 of these have
11
access to state-subsidized antiretroviral (ARV) treatment (Hahn, 2013). In 
neighbouring Myanmar, UNAIDS estimates that 216,000 people are currently living 
with HIV/AIDS, most of whom do not have access to treatment (Murphey, 2013). 
Surveillance in M yanmar is poor and official data are unreliable; however, after 
decades of oppressive military rule, newly implemented political reforms have 
facilitated access and research in the country and insight into the epidemic is much 
needed. Whilst Thailand has been recently classified as a middle-income country, 
M yanmar remains one of the poorest in the world; in 2000, the World Health 
Organisation ranked its healthcare system one of the worst globally, second only to 
that of Sierra Leone (Tandon, M urray & Lauer, 2000, p.21). Civil society 
organisations (CSOs) surveyed for this research estimate that up to 65% of PLWHA 
in Myanmar do not have access to treatment (Swe, 2012; de Groote, 2013), but it is 
likely that if the current reforms continue, new research and data will reveal a 
national epidemic more severe and far reaching than currently estimated.2
In the first part of this thesis, the conceptual framework for the following 
empirical investigation is outlined. The Copenhagen School theory of securitization 
forms the theoretical and methodological basis of this enquiry and in the first three 
conceptual chapters its utility and application is examined. Securitization theory is a 
formulaic tool to determine what constitutes a security issue, based on the radical 
idea that no issue is essentially a security problem but instead that security is a 
status created through a process of social construction (Buzan, et al., 1998). The 
theory holds that a securitizing actor m ust convince their audience that a certain 
issue (e.g., HIV) poses a threat to the survival of some referent (e.g., environment, 
global health, or state) that warrants an extraordinary, urgent response (Buzan et al., 
1998, pp.23-24). A securitized issue is one that is perceived as being so serious that it 
legitimises the use of extraordinary power, such as curfews, military intervention, or
2 Civil society organisations are defined as the array of non-governmental and not-for-profit 
organisations that include community organisations, unions, charitable groups, faith-based 
groups, and professional associations. In the context of Myanmar and Thailand, 
international and domestic non-government organisations are considered as civil society 
groups unless they are agencies of the United Nations, in which case they are referred to as 
such, or as INGOs (International non-governmental organisations).
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emergency rule. Thus, security is about invoking fear of an existential threat and 
legitimating extraordinary responses. Although it has been criticised for being Euro­
centric and for reinforcing paradigms that favour the most articulate, powerful 
actors (Hansen, 2000; Wilkinson, 2007), securitization theory has achieved enduring 
success, partly due to its applicability to both traditional and non-traditional fields 
of security studies (Buzan et al., 1998, p .195). However, the central role of fear, 
which must be invoked as part of the persuasive speech act and threat construction, 
lacks scholarly attention in the extensive existing literature. In conceptual Chapters 
2, 3, and 4, the current literature on securitization is reviewed and the thesis offers 
two conclusions; first, that securitization theory, although "radically constructivist" 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p. 35), has at its conceptual core a logic of threat-defence and 
survival that is manifest in the centrality of the existential threat to the securitizing 
process. It is determined that security according to the Copenhagen School is 
essentially about the construction of an existential threat and this construction is 
problematized in the application of the securitization framework to HIV/AIDS, 
which has ethical and practical implications that are outlined in Chapter 4. The 
second conclusion is one with which this thesis can contribute a new theoretical 
position to the literature; it is determined that the construction of the existential 
threat requires the utilisation of fear appeal rhetoric, more commonly studied in the 
psychological literature on advertising and public health management.
The second part of this thesis presents empirical research based on 13 
months of fieldwork in Thailand and Myanmar. To begin, the successful 
securitization of HIV/AIDS at the United Nations, an elite international 
organisation, is documented. The thesis then investigates whether this high-level 
securitization of HIV/AIDS translated into similar processes of securitization at the 
national and domestic level of the two country case studies, Myanmar and 
Thailand. These chapters are drawn largely from qualitative data collected during 
fifty semi-structured in-depth interviews with elite actors and leaders of the HIV 
response in each country. The research uses securitization both as a methodology 
and, drawing from Curley & Siu-lun's (2008) work on Southeast Asia, as a "point of 
departure for commentary and critique" (p.4) of security in the region. In this
13
function, securitization theory facilitates a depth of contextual analysis that gives 
rise to some of the more significant and original empirical research contributions 
made in this thesis, specifically those draw n from the fieldwork that is outlined in 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.
1.1. The Research Question
Since its development in the 1990s, the Copenhagen School framework has 
offered an enduring and stable foundation for the conceptual widening of security 
studies, facilitating the inclusion of myriad non-traditional issues into security 
discourse and analysis. These non-traditional issues include health and infectious 
disease, the most prominent of which is HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS was securitized in a 
process that culminated in January 2000, when the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) held a meeting dedicated to the epidemic. UNSC Meeting 4087 was the first 
time that the Council had met solely to discuss a specific disease as a threat to 
national and international security and it has been called a "watershed" event in the 
securitization of HIV/AIDS (Elbe, 2006, p.121). The meeting, at which securitization 
claims were articulated by authoritative and influential actors, was also a key event 
in the codification of the international HIV/AIDS securitization norm (HASN) that 
has been identified by Vieira (2007, 2011). Meeting Chair, US Vice-President Al 
Gore, told the Council that, "AIDS is one of the most devastating threats ever to 
confront the world community" while UN Secretary General Kofi Annan explained 
that, "AIDS is causing social and economic crises which ... threaten political 
stability" and linked the disease to poor governance and conflict (United Nations 
Security Council [UNSC], 2000, p.5). HIV/AIDS was explicitly presented to Council 
Members as being an urgent and severe threat to a range of referent objects 
including political, economic and social stability. However, there has been criticism 
of the empirical claims that were used to securitize HIV/AIDS at this meeting 
(Barnett & Prins, 2006) and doubts cast regarding the levels of persuasion achieved 
among Council Members (Rushton, 2010). Furthermore, despite conducting a 
securitization process within a prominent and influential international body, there is 
little evidence that the securitizing rhetoric employed at the United Nations affected
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or appeared in the national responses of member states, indicating a failure of norm 
internalisation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).
UNSC 4087 is widely regarded as a seminal point in the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS and the broader field of health (e.g., Feldbaum & Lee, 2004; Garrett, 2005; 
Mclnnes & Lee, 2006; Elbe, 2006), but there remains little application of the 
framework to empirical cases of F1IV/AIDS securitization at the UNSC or in national 
responses. In an attempt to contribute to the current literature, this thesis 
undertakes a detailed analysis of the external and internal conditions that affected 
this securitization, beginning with the following question:
i. Has the securitization of HIV/AIDS at the UNSC translated into 
securitization within Myanmar and Thailand?
The UNSC is an elite and high-level international organisation and norm-setter in 
global public health which possesses the authority and credibility to articulate 
securitizing claims and to influence world politics. The objectives of this research 
are to determine through empirical study whether the securitization of HIV/AIDS 
has taken place in Thailand or Myanmar following success at the UNSC, and to 
broaden the scope of inquiry by using the securitization framework for analysis; as 
Waever (2003) explains, securitization theory "does not point to one particular type 
of study as the right one. ... [It] operates as a conceptual apparatus and with this a 
number of different kinds of questions can be asked" (p.21). Accordingly, this 
research investigates the complex political and social dynamics that affect the 
process of securitization and in doing so, seeks to contribute to a deeper 
understanding of its effects and application outside of the Western liberal 
democratic system (Wilkinson, 2007; Bilgin, 2011). To conduct the empirical studies 
that are central to this thesis, it is necessary to further develop the research question 
and the following lines of inquiry are used to guide and facilitate the research:
ii. W hat constitutes securitization in practice?
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iii. W hat are the contextual and facilitating conditions that affect 
securitization?
iv. How does securitization of HIV/AIDS manifest in practice and what are its 
effects?
1.2. Securitization as a Methodology
To utilise these research questions, this thesis m ust first determine w hat is 
meant by securitization of HIV/AIDS, how it would manifest, and how it could best 
be identified in practice. The Copenhagen School theory of securitization is 
examined and its essential components are outlined in the conceptual chapters, 
from which a methodology for analysis can be drawn (Buzan et al., 1998). Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3 comprise a review of the psychological and security literature, 
finding that securitization is a form of fear-appeal. These chapters conclude that 
securitization consists of a performative suasive process in which fear is used to 
persuade audiences of the existence of an existential threat that faces a given 
referent object. One of the more significant findings documented in this thesis is that 
fear is an integral part of the securitization process, performing as a facilitating 
condition, an indicator of successful securitization, and a by-product of 
securitization. This is outlined in Chapter 3 and is problematized in Chapter 4.
A review of the literature on securitization and securitization of HIV/AIDS 
(Chapter 2 and 4) finds that the process can have both positive and negative effects 
on HIV/AIDS responses. The five "ethical dilemmas" of HIV/AIDS securitization 
identified by Stefan Elbe (2006, p.119) were used in the fieldwork as indicators of 
securitization in practice. These dangers are:
i. Framing HIV as a matter of state security risks pushing responses away 
from civil society and toward military and intelligence organisations that 
are not well suited to dealing with a health issue
ii. Securitizing HIV/AIDS could lead to violation of the civil liberties of 
PLWHA
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iii. Securitization could make international responses to HIV/AIDS the 
"function of narrow national interest rather than of altruism"
iv. Securitization could lead states to prioritize AIDS funding for their elites 
and armed forces because these agents play a key role in maintaining 
traditional security
v. Securitizing HIV/AIDS relies on the portrayal of the virus as an 
"overwhelming threat", and in doing so, "works against on-going efforts 
to normalize social perceptions regarding HIV/AIDS" (Elbe, 2006, p. 119)
These five issues served as a useful set of indicators for the identification of 
securitization in practice and provided the foundation around which interview 
prom pts and investigation could take shape. Where appropriate, interviewees were 
prom pted to consider these indicators by raising the issues with which they are 
associated. These include: issues of normalisation and perceptions of PLWHA; the 
role of the state and civil society organisations in defining responses; the civil 
liberties and hum an rights of people with or affected by HIV/AIDS; the allocation of 
funding and treatment of at risk groups; and the use of threat-defence logic and fear 
appeals in HIV/AIDS responses. The saliency of Elbe's proposed 'dangers' was 
confirmed by the responses of expert interviewees during fieldwork, many of whom 
independently raised similar concerns, particularly about potential violation of 
hum an rights and appropriation of national responses by (unsuitable) agencies of 
the state (see Chapter 7 and 8).
The use of securitization as a methodology provides a useful framework for 
identifying the securitization of a non-traditional issue in the field. However, like all 
methodologies, it is limited and key aspects of the securitization framework become 
problematic during methodological application. In their assessment of securitization 
and HIV/AIDS, Mclnnes & Rushton (2010) draw attention to the difficulty in tracing 
causal linkages as distinguishable from the effects of other influencing factors, 
which leaves many studies of applied securitization vague and "impressionistic" 
(p.240). Empirical application is also considered by Wilkinson (2007), who refers to 
the model as constrained by a 'W estphalian straitjacket' (p.10) that shapes its
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inherent normative dimensions; in addition, Wilkinson (2007) points out that the 
distinction between normal and extraordinary politics which is central to the 
securitization model is not clearly outlined by the Copenhagen School. This leads 
her, and other scholars, to debate the applicability of the framework outside the 
"liberal European-centric" democratic political system (Vuori, 2008; Emmers, 
Greener & Thomas, 2008, p.63; Curley & Herington, 2011, p.150).
This research offers a series of empirical case studies of securitization that 
take place outside the Western liberal democratic realm. Similar studies were 
conducted by Vieira (2007), who documented the unsuccessful internalisation of 
HIV/AIDS securitization in Botswana, Mozambique, and South Africa following 
successful securitization at the international level, and by Curley & Herington 
(2011), who investigated securitization of avian flu in Southeast Asia. Curley & 
Herington (2011) note that:
Vietnam and Indonesia provide useful contexts in which to interrogate the 
universality of the construction of security issues as is usually modelled in 
the paradigmatic version of securitization studies. Neither case is a liberal 
democratic state of the type frequently present in European securitization 
studies, (p.150)
Certainly, one benefit of adopting the case study methodology, as Curley & 
Herington (2011) do, is that case studies can provide a "richly detailed portrait of a 
particular social phenomenon" (Hakim, 1987, p.61); in this case revealing the details 
of social and political contexts that differ from state to state, and that differ from 
those of Western liberal democratic systems. Chapters 7 and 8 in this thesis 
investigate the national epidemic responses of Thailand and M yanmar and include 
contextual information about governance and societal values which, as in Vieira's 
study (2007), ultimately made the securitization of HIV/AIDS unsuccessful at the 
domestic level. The specific cultural conditions that make these cases a useful 
addition to the current literature also at times created a problematic research 
environment, or limited the applicability of the securitization model; this is explored 
in more detail below.
To begin the investigation, it m ust be established w hat securitization would 
Took like' in practice and outside of a liberal democratic political system; to facilitate
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this, the methodological approach advocated by Curley & Siu-lun (2008) is adopted. 
In this approach, securitization is used as a "departure point" for a wider analysis 
that allows the analyst to "build hypotheses around indicators of securitization" 
and to study resistance and resisting actors, assessing factors that determine the 
likelihood of securitization and desecuritization (Curley & Siu-lun, 2008, p.5). As 
Waever (2003) states, "a major importance" of securitization theory is "to show the 
effects" (p.21) of the process when it occurs, and through application of this 
framework it is possible to also address the third and normative part of the research 
question above, by asking: w hat are the effects of securitization of HIV/AIDS in 
these contexts?
Curley & Siu-lun (2008, pp.5-6) outline a framework of seven areas for 
investigation by researchers that would guide contextual analysis and reveal 
im portant conditions and power dynamics that accompany securitization in practice 
and that determine the significance of these effects. Their framework can be 
categorised into two parts: the first involves an investigation of the nature of the 
agents involved in a process of securitization; specifically, the nature of the threat, 
referent object, and perceptions of the existence of each; the nature and motivations 
of the securitizing and desecuritizing actors, and the nature of the frame or concept 
of security that is invoked (asking, for instance, is it human, traditional, or non- 
traditional security?); the second is the practical process by which that securitization 
takes place, its facilitating conditions, and its outcomes (Curley & Siu-lun, 2008, 
pp.5-6). This latter part of the framework prom pts researchers to ask whether 
securitization occurred and how its outcomes manifest and can be measured; it also 
leads the researcher to consider the normative implications of this securitization 
(successful or otherwise) (Curley & Siu-lun, 2008, pp.5-6).
By using this analytical framework as an approach to guide empirical 
research of the international system and of securitization in Thailand and Myanmar, 
this thesis investigates the practice and outcomes of HIV/AIDS securitization within 
each context and finds that in both cases, the internalisation of HIV/AIDS 
securitization norms was unsuccessful. Through the collection of primary 
qualitative data outlined in Chapter 7 and 8, it is revealed that the securitization
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process was curtailed in both Thailand and Myanmar by civil society and rights 
advocacy groups who feared the manifestation of the same dangers predicted by 
Elbe (2006). Thus, the power-laden political and social contexts are explored 
throughout the empirical chapters of the thesis, where securitization provides a 
"departure point" for wider contextual analysis, as intended by Curley & Siu-lun 
(2008, p.5). Also studied are the effects of securitization; those that are hypothesised 
(Elbe, 2006) and those that are avoided (Chapter 8).
1.3. Fieldwork
Data collection for this research took three forms; first, through reviews of 
the literature and secondary data. Preliminary research using secondary data 
comprised a review of security and securitization literature, which concluded in the 
identification of operational indicators by which to identify securitization in 
practice. This research also included a study of the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS (both 
social epidemiology and virology), and the political systems and history of Thailand 
and Myanmar, with an emphasis on civil society. This was essential prior to the 
fieldwork because interviews are "inextricably and unavoidably historically, 
politically, and contextually bounded" (Fontana & Frey, 2005, p.695); preliminary 
research was thus used to establish cultural and country-specific knowledge that is 
crucial for understanding the wider social and political contexts in which 
securitization could take place in Thailand and Myanmar. This equipped the 
researcher with knowledge that would prove essential for conducting successful 
data collection in the field.
Following this research, prim ary data for the thesis was collected during a 
period of extended fieldwork (13 months) in Southeast Asia, between May 2012 and 
June 2013. During this time, qualitative data was collected through fifty semi­
structured interviews with key informants, primarily in Bangkok and Yangon. This 
was transcribed into a digital document of approximately 50,000 words. The most 
authoritative primary sources of information are the key participants in the national 
and international response and, after a review of the literature, it is the voices of 
these key informants that provide the crucial data on the reality of what took place
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on the ground. Leaders of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and government policymakers were 
selected because they are authoritative decision-makers who both shape and 
witness the national response, and who are best able to provide an accurate account 
that will allow the researcher to determine whether securitization took place and to 
w hat extent, and the context in which this occurred (such as the facilitating 
conditions, or the necessity of desecuritization).
In order to investigate the securitization of HIV/AIDS at the international 
level via the United Nations Security Council and Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), elite interviewing was used in combination with a review 
of the academic literature and analysis of policy documents. Primary data consisted 
of written correspondence with Lord Malloch-Brown, former Administrator to the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), face-to-face interviews with the 
Country Coordinators of UNAIDS in Thailand and in Myanmar, and a telephone 
interview with Dr Peter Piot, founding Executive Director of UN AIDS.
Due to the time consuming and labour-intensive nature of in-depth 
interviewing as a method of data collection (Darlington & Scott, 2002, p.53), the 
sample size was limited by the resources available to the researcher. Initial 
estimations of the fieldwork schedule were subject to change once fieldwork had 
commenced and additional time in the field was required in order to establish a 
comprehensive sample size and to gain meaningful access to elite and other hard-to- 
reach participants. The process of chain referral sampling requires a significant 
investment of time but has beneficial results, such as access to elite sources that 
included the UNAIDS Country Representatives Eammon M urphey and Michael 
Hahn, and the director of the SWING sex-worker em powerm ent group, Surang 
Janyam.
Unforeseen factors affecting the fieldwork schedule included natural disaster 
and adverse weather conditions; a preliminary trip to Thailand in November 2011 to 
establish contacts was largely unproductive due to the severe flooding that made it 
impossible to access key informants in the capital and surrounding areas. Storms 
were also responsible for the loss of a hand written notation in Thailand during the
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monsoon season. Fortunately, the majority of the data had been transferred to 
digital records, but the personal notes of the researcher, which included additional 
and contextualising information regarding the fieldwork, were lost.
1.3.1. Qualitative Research Interviews
This research adopts a qualitative methodology on the basis that such an 
approach is best suited to data collection where the participant is more expert than 
the researcher, and where the research is driven by broad questions rather than 
testing of hypothesis or theory (Ware, 2012). Qualitative research methodologies are 
designed to discover what can be learnt about a phenomenon in which people are 
the participants or subjects; they typically generate results that are not generalisable, 
but that provide a deeper understanding of specific situations and of the 
experiences of participants who lived those situations (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, 
pp.39-40). Data collection in the "natural setting" through the use of interviews 
allows the researcher to "discover or uncover" w hat is to be known about the 
phenom enon under investigation in the context in which it takes place (Maykut & 
Morehouse, 1994, p.41). Such an approach suits the constructivist paradigm of the 
securitization theory at the heart of this research methodology.
Interviews are particularly useful when the phenomena under investigation, 
in this case securitization, cannot be directly observed but m ust be studied through 
the experiences or records of others; they are suited to retrospective investigation of 
events, such as the recollection of meetings or the effect of policy implementation 
(Darlington & Scott, 2002, p.49). Finally, interviews are "active", meaning that all 
interviews are interactional and interpretive, with a role for both researcher and 
participant (Holstein & Gubrium, 2000, p .140). Because interviews are active, they 
are also flexible; their "immediacy and relational quality afford considerable 
flexibility to the data collection process, both in terms of areas explored and the 
direction of the discussion" (Darlington & Scott, 2002, p.49). This flexibility is 
enhanced by the use of a semi-structured interview method.
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1.3.2. Structuring and Recording Interviews
Interviews for this research were semi-structured, allowing the direction of 
the discussion to remain flexible. This approach is best suited to elite interviews and 
to those that are likely to be single occasions that cannot be repeated with follow-up 
interviews (Bernard, 2006, p.212). During fieldwork, written interview guides were 
prepared in advance of interviews. These consisted of a set series of questions that 
was modified according to the participant interviewed, so that questions 
appropriate to their specific experience could inform the direction of discussion.
Interviews typically lasted between forty and ninety minutes and, with the 
exception of three telephone interviews, were m ade face-to-face. Interviews were 
recorded using audio-recording equipment where appropriate, when permission of 
the respondent was granted. In total, twenty-three digital audio recordings were 
made of interviews. No interviews were digitally recorded in Myanmar for practical 
and ethical reasons discussed below. In both countries, all interviews were recorded 
at the time of delivery using handw ritten notations. All interview records were 
transcribed by the researcher using word processing software as soon as possible 
following the interview, in order to maximise recall of additional information about 
the participant and their responses. This facilitated digital coding of the data and 
identification of themes and common subjects in responses, which subsequently 
guided further research and interview structure.
In Myanmar, due to the political sensitivity of both subject matter and the 
respondents' engagement with a foreign researcher, audio-recording equipment 
was not used. Ethically, it is im portant that "there is always power in the researcher 
role" and an inherent vulnerability of the interviewee (Darlington & Scott, 2002, 
p.51). This is of particular concern in the context of M yanmar where, until recently, 
cooperation with an external researcher could endanger the personal safety of the 
Burmese respondent, their associates, and the operation of their organisation. Whilst 
it is assumed that this risk has decreased following recent political reforms, 
including the dissolution of the main state censorship apparatus and an "opening 
up" of Myanmar to researchers (Renard, 2012), during the fieldwork in Myanmar, 
this researcher was subject to one incident of harassm ent from unidentified security
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personnel on the way to a prearranged interview, in which an armed man asked for 
personal identification and information about the researcher. No explanation was 
offered to explain the request, so there is no evidence to suggest this was specifically 
related to the research activities. However, this incident does indicate that, despite 
substantial reforms since 2010, research and access to information in Myanmar can 
remain challenging.
Data from a number of interviewees was anonymised at their request, and 
this is listed in Appendix B. In order to anonymise data, all interview sources were 
assigned a randomised order and allocated a number. When anonymous sources are 
referred to in the text, this number is used and associated information can be found 
in the appendix (e.g., Source 31, 2013). Otherwise, interview sources are listed by the 
name and their full associated data can be located in the appendix (e.g., Lancelot, 
2013).
1.3.3. Sam pling
Selection of participants for interview was purposive, as it was determined 
by the purpose of the research rather than strict methodological mandate (Marvasti, 
2004, p.9). This approach is particularly suited to research in which only a limited 
number of people are qualified to be interviewed (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, 
p.53). The time-consuming and labour intensive nature of qualitative data-sampling 
also limited the possible size and selection of the data sample (Darlington & Scott, 
2002, p.53). Additional influencing factors were that of language, access to 
interviewees through chain referral sampling, and the establishment of rapport.
A. Language. Participants were selected based on their experience of the 
topic under investigation and their ability to articulate this experience (Darlington & 
Scott, 2002, p.51). In the context of data collection in Thailand and Myanmar, this 
includes their capacity in English language. Although a Thai-to-English translator 
was used for two interviews (Muangmoonchai, A., 2013. a civil society activist in 
Thailand, and Ladaporn, K., 2013. at the National H um an Rights Commission), all 
other interviews were conducted in English.
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No formal exclusion of non-English speakers was made during the sample 
selection process, but in practice, interview participants were selected on the basis 
that they could communicate in English with the mono-lingual researcher. This 
selection was informal and arose from the process of chain referrals by which 
interviewees were selected; preliminary contact was made in English either by email 
or by telephone, thus limiting the initial respondents to those who could 
communicate in English. Where non-English participants were interviewed, these 
interviews were secured through referral from bi-lingual participants.
B. Chain referrals. The methodology employs chain referral, or 'snowball', 
sampling, in which participants are used to refer the researcher on to other 
respondents. Chain referral sampling methods are suited to conditions in which 
participants are hard to access, such as the socially stigmatised and elite (Atkinson 
& Flit, 2001). This research sampled from both, conducting semi-structured elite 
interviews as well as interviews with activists from stigmatised groups in key 
affected populations (KAPs). As a sampling technique, chain referral is particularly 
well suited to conducting qualitative research related to HIV/AIDS, in which key 
affected populations are often concurrently "hidden" and "illegal" populations, 
such as drug users and commercial sex workers (e.g., Faugier & Sargeant, 1997).
C. Rapport. The goal of interviewing is to understand the topic studied and 
development of trust between researcher and participant is an essential part of 
securing reliable and useful data (Fontanta & Frey, 2005, p.708; see also, Sulka (2007) 
for a discussion on ethnography and rapport). Building rapport is essential, 
particularly when addressing the culturally sensitive issues investigated within this 
thesis, but this rapport itself m ust be carefully managed. As Darlington & Scott 
(2002) observe:
There are times when a strong connection between the researcher and 
participant can, if the researcher is not careful, impede the data collection 
process. As a sense of shared understanding develops, participants may take 
it for granted that the interviewer understands w hat they are talking about 
and skip over im portant aspects of their story, (p.54)
Cultural protocol that inhibits Thai respondents from making negative statements 
presented a significant challenge to getting clear answers during interviews.
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Interviewees were often reluctant to be explicitly critical in the opening stages of the 
interview, especially of other groups working in their field. This form of 'politeness' 
could be partially overcome during the course of the interview, or interview 
sequence, as rapport was developed with the researcher. During the course of the 
fieldwork, mannerisms and culturally appropriate forms of behaviour were learnt 
and adopted by the researcher (such as the 'deep wai' used to greet superiors, 
gendered behaviour, and use of Thai language to supplem ent questions) to facilitate 
this process of rapport building. It was also useful to have conducted interviews 
with a number of civil society activists before gaining access to elite political actors, 
because during the course of the fieldwork it became apparent that civil society 
activists were more likely to be candid in their responses to politically sensitive 
questions, possibly because they were the leaders of their respective organisations 
and did not fear repercussions from political superiors.
1.3.4. Access
Myanmar has recently been called "probably the most obscure and obscured 
state in the contemporary world" after North Korea (Steinberg, 2010, p.l). This 
unenviable reputation stems from the military coup of 1962, which led to the 
installation of the military regime and authoritarian rule. According to regional 
expert Ronald Renard, after 1962, research in Myanmar stopped and research in 
Thailand started (Renard, 2012). Now, as the country experiences political reform, 
there is a new generation of early stage researchers operating in the field (Renard, 
2012). However, although it is often well hidden, essential research and data 
collection has been undertaken by CSOs and INGOs operating inside Myanmar 
even during the most authoritarian years of the military leadership. In order to 
protect the survival of their organisations (and their staff), this research has been 
covert. Speaking on this subject, one anonymous participant referred to an INGO
working in the country, saying: "good o ld  does a lot of research that they
don't call research, that they can't call research" (Source 19, 2013).
Whilst political reform and an opening up of Myanmar might be evident in 
some quarters, the oppressive societal fear that results from decades of systematic
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violence and authoritarian rule remains. In this research environment, face-to-face 
interviews are essential for data collection. Under the military junta, 
telecommunications surveillance and censorship was routine and often led to 
'disappearances' or incarceration of civilians. Some research participants did not 
feel safe in 2012-13 using email or telephones to communicate (this was noted by 
civil society activist Jamie Uhrig, who was interviewed in 2013). In this 
environment, where written records are still subject to distrust (see Chapter 8), 
anecdotal evidence becomes valuable; indeed, when potentially litigious 
information such as injecting drug use (IDU) prevalence cannot be recorded, 
sometimes the only evidence is anecdotal. The study of qualitative rather than 
quantitative data, and collection through interviews and chain referral sampling, 
was an effective way to address these limitations.
Interviews conducted in Yangon were with CSOs and INGOs. Outside 
Yangon, in Bangkok and by telephone to the USA, interviews were conducted with 
activists with extensive previous experience in the country and w ith former CSO 
leaders who no longer worked in the country (Seng Raw, 2012; Rahman, 2013; 
Uhrig, 2013; Wai, 2013). In Yangon, interviews were conducted with sensitivity to 
the concerns of the participants, particularly where these were Burmese nationals. 
One interviewee was visibly distressed by the use of the phrase 'national security' 
within an interview prompt, responding that HIV "isn't an issue [of national 
security], but if it was, we couldn't talk about it. Our leaders don 't see health as a 
security issue but [they] are guided by NGOs and INGOs" (Source 20, 2013). 
Foreign staff members of INGOs who were not subject to such concerns verified the 
respondent's answer that HIV/AIDS was not considered by the state to be an issue 
of national security, but this experience illustrates the extreme distress and fear that 
the military regime is still capable of inspiring, as well as the courage and generosity 
displayed by everyone willing to be interviewed and contribute to the research.
Research in M yanmar was possible because CSOs and INGOs were able, and 
willing, to provide expert accounts of the national response to HIV/AIDS that they 
had led. More than 30 government officials were contacted via email in the 
preliminary stages of this research in order to ascertain whether any could be
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approached at a later stage for interview. No emails were returned. W ithout 
recourse to reliable data for analysis of official discourse on the subject of security, a 
study of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar requires a different methodological approach that 
focuses on the available data, obtained from civil society and INGO representatives, 
and that investigates HIV/AIDS securitization from this starting point.
1.4. Analysis
Rather than adopting a narrow lens and studying elite discourse in either 
case study, this thesis utilises a broader framework of analysis, developed using the 
theory of securitization, Curley & Siu-lun's (2008) methodological approach, and the 
indicators of securitization outlined above (Buzan et al., 1998). By using this wider 
framework, and by identifying fear as a central component of securitization 
(Chapter 2), it was possible to identify both securitizing and desecuritizing moves in 
each country. The national responses of Thailand and Myanmar were investigated 
using lines of enquiry that were shaped by interviewees and that remained flexible 
through the data collection. Qualitative research is an inductive process in which 
analysis is ongoing throughout the research process; as Maykut & Morehouse (1994) 
discuss:
Analysis begins when one has accumulated a subset of the data, providing 
an opportunity for the salient aspects of the phenomenon under study to 
begin to emerge. These initial leads are followed by pursuing the relevant 
persons, settings, or documents that will help illuminate the phenomenon of 
interest, (p.42)
The process of collecting and analysing qualitative data is, to an extent, cyclical, 
flexible, and dynamic.
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Characteristics of Qualitative Research (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, p.43).
During fieldwork, this process of ongoing analysis shaped the direction of 
the research and of the data collection. Prior to commencing fieldwork, the 
emergent design of the data collection was based on preliminary research based 
largely on review of the relevant literature; using studies of the country-specific 
political, historical, and social context of securitization theory, and of the 
epidemiology of HIV/AIDS, the focus of inquiry was developed and a purposive
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sample for qualitative data collection was drawn up, based on the categories of 
interview participants listed below.
Fieldwork began in Thailand, where qualitative methods of data collection 
(semi-structured interviews) revealed that civil society organisations were 
instrum ental in shaping the direction of the state-response. In the initial stages of 
the epidemic, attempts by the state to securitize the issue in a traditional sense (e.g., 
by restricting movements of PLWHA, detailed in Chapter 7), served as a catalyst for 
the mobilisation of civil society groups who then, with the support of major donors 
from the international community (e.g., the Global Fund and UNAIDS), assumed a 
leading role in informing the direction of the state response. Early and ongoing 
analysis of this data was used in the selection of future interview participants that 
targeted the leaders of prominent civil society groups, including Raks Thai (Press, 
2012), Foundation for AIDS Rights (Nacapew, 2012), and The Thai Network for 
PLWHA (TNP+) (Kestkaew, 2012; Tenni, 2012; Muangmoonchai, 2013).
In Myanmar, initial literature reviews and interviews with key informants 
revealed in the early stages of research that the national response to HIV/AIDS was 
led by civil society and INGOs rather than the state. Purposive sampling thus 
focused on participants from CSOs, a selection that was informed both by the focus 
of inquiry and by the barriers to accessing official political informants discussed 
above. Following initial fieldwork conducted in Yangon, primary data revealed how 
fear of state appropriation of the national HIV/AIDS response led to a concerted 
effort by these CSO agents to keep the epidemic, and public health in general, a non­
political and desecuritized issue (Chapter 8). Following this first period of fieldwork 
in Yangon during November 2012, a relationship of trust was established with key 
members of prominent civil society groups. Significantly, initial contacts were made 
with a well-established Burmese CSO that enjoyed a prestigious reputation among 
INGOs as well as local CSOs and this facilitated access to a greater number of 
participants during the second period of fieldwork in Yangon, in 2013.
30
1.5. Reliability of Data
Analysts studying Myanmar are presented with data that vary significantly 
in their findings as well as their reliability; in Context-Sensitive Development, Ware 
(2012, p.23) illustrates this with an illuminating table comparing reported 
population figures for M yanmar that are published by various agencies, including 
the Asian Development Bank, World Health Organisation and UNICEF; their 
estimates for the year 2008 vary by more than ten million. The "paucity" of reliable 
data was only marginally improved by the concerted efforts of aid agencies 
attempting to deliver humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 
2008 (Ware, 2012, p.22). However, in light of recent political reforms, the opening up 
of the country to foreign investors and INGOs since 2010 should alleviate many of 
the barriers to reliable provision of data, particularly regarding demographic and 
economic data. Many international institutions are reviewing the available data for 
the country, including the World Bank that notes they, and other agencies, "are re­
engaging with the Myanmar government" in an effort to "address the scarcity of 
reliable data for the country" (World Bank, 2014).
The qualitative research methodology adopted in this thesis provides 
strategies for dealing with the lack of access and the lack of reliable quantitative 
data. Qualitative research is well-placed to accommodate the "informed hunches" 
that often guide researchers facing such barriers in Myanmar because it provides an 
approach in which investigation can be directed where necessary (Taylor, 2008, 
p.219). Qualitative research also provides the type of detailed, in-depth knowledge 
that is based on trust and that comes from face-to-face observation and conversation 
w ith those best placed to describe the 'real' situation that is studied.
Despite the value of qualitative research for social science, in order to plan, 
im plem ent and evaluate effective HIV/AIDS management, quantitative data m ust 
also be available. According to the CSO and INGO representatives sampled, 
M yanmar has in place a num ber of effective and comprehensive institutions that 
provide data and accurate reporting of the epidemic, as well as pragmatic 
coordination and implementation of response. These include the small state 
surveillance system established in 1992 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
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[UNODC], 2006, p.5), and the Myanmar Country Coordination Mechanism 
(MCCM), which hosts both state and non-state actors. From the MCCM, 
representatives from UNAIDS, Malteser International, Marie Stopes, and a local 
CSO were interviewed. Data from both the MCCM and UNAIDS were generally 
regarded as "good" or "reliable" by interview respondents (Lancelot, 2013; 
Murphey, 2013; Naing, 2013), but all interviewees expressed concerns about the 
reliability of data on the epidemic; as Peter Paul de Groote (2013), from Medecins 
Sans Frontieres explained, it is a "very difficult" subject.
Agencies dealing with HIV/AIDS use forecasting models that are based on 
the limited data available to predict wider epidemiological patterns, including 
national prevalence figures (de Groote, 2013). This is supported by international 
organisations, including UN agencies, as a method of best practise in research. 
However, in the restricted operational environment of Myanmar, "it is not easy to 
verify results" of interventions (de Groote, 2013), nor it is easy to assess the accuracy 
of predictions. Serious challenges to empirical data collection arise at every level: 
comprehensive surveillance requires the physical infrastructure of an extensive and 
operational healthcare system and is essentially non-existent in many rural areas. 
Social barriers (i.e., stigma and discrimination, and a lack of available treatment) 
also affect primary routes of HIV incidence reporting, as individuals decline to 
access healthcare services or institutions that could report their infection.
At the secondary level, CSOs and organisations who do collect data, or who 
have the capacity to do so, face disincentives to accurate reporting; one interviewee 
explained that accurate figures on HIV/AIDS were "not often" reported to the 
government by a leading INGO (Source 10, 2013), as part of a strategy employed by 
the organisation to protect its own operations. Staff believed that the military regime 
was particularly sensitive to the issue of HIV/AIDS and as a result, intentionally 
downplayed their (substantial) involvement w ith HIV/AIDS programmes. 
Following extensive em bedded fieldwork in the country, Ware (2012) also found 
"widespread suggestions that deliberate misinformation has been a regime survival 
strategy" (p.21), indicating that erroneous data reporting is institutionalised in both 
NGOs and in government offices.
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1.6. Interview Participants
Fifty key informants were interviewed during the fieldwork period. Most 
interviews were conducted face to face in Yangon, Myanmar, or Bangkok, Thailand. 
Participants can be categorised into the following groups:
i. Government officers. Senior government officers with direct experience 
of managing or coordinating the national HIV/AIDS response through 
policy or service provision.
ii. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Country 
Representatives or senior advisers to international non-governmental 
organisations that have direct experience of specific country responses.
iii. Civil society organisations (CSOs). Directors, founders, or senior 
advisers of CSOs directly involved in HIV/AIDS programmes in the 
country. Here, civil society organisations are defined as the array of non­
governmental and not-for-profit organisations that include community 
organisations, unions, charitable groups, faith-based groups, and 
professional associations.
iv. Activists. Independent or CSO affiliated activists with direct experience 
of the national response.
v. Media. Journalists with significant experience reporting on HIV/AIDS 
related issues in Thailand or Myanmar.
vi. Academics. Academics with expert knowledge of Thailand or M yanmar 
and issues directly related to HIV/AIDS in these countries.
vii. UN Agencies. Country representatives or senior managers with specific 
experience related to HIV/AIDS.
Participants represent a broad spectrum of key stakeholders in the national or 
international epidemic response to HIV/AIDS, although in M yanmar it was 
impossible to gain access to government officers for interview due to the sensitive 
nature of the research and the political system. The entire list of interviewees is 
attached in Appendices A and B; participants included:
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• Six academics with expertise in the region and issues related to HIV/AIDS, 
including the director for the Asian Research Center for Migration, 
Chulalongkorn University.
• Five activists prominent in the civil society response to HIV/AIDS in 
Thailand or Myanmar.
• Three Directors or former Directors of INGOs in Thailand or Myanmar, 
including the Director the Thai Red Cross AIDS Research Centre.
• Six Directors within prominent CSOs in Thailand, including the Director of 
the Service Workers In Group (SWING), a leading agency for the 
em powerment of male, female, and transgender sex workers.
• 12 Directors, Country Representatives, or expert staff members in CSOs in 
M yanmar that provide HIV/AIDS programmes and services.
• Two current Country Coordinators for UNAIDS (of Thailand and 
Myanmar), one former Administrator of UNDP, and the founding Executive 
Director of UNAIDS.
• Two foreign media journalists, including Andrew Marshall, Reuters special 
correspondent for Southeast Asia.
• Five Government Officers for Thailand, including an Ambassador for the 
Royal Thai embassy in Yangon, a National H um an Rights Commissioner, 
the Director for the International Health Policy Program (IHPP) at the Thai 
Ministry of Public Health, a former Senator for the Thai government and 
leading HIV/AIDS rights activist and the manager of the National Health 
Security Office Fund for HIV/AIDS and TB.
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Chapter 2. Fear and Securitization Theory
This chapter examines securitization theory, as proposed by the Copenhagen 
School, as a framework for post-Cold War analysis of security. Through an 
exposition of the theory, indicators of securitization are set forth and provide the 
basis for the following empirical chapters, in which 'real world' instances of 
securitization are sought. Securitization theory offers a formulaic tool for the 
determination of what is and is not a security issue and is the dominant framework 
employed to explore the widening of security agendas in the post-Cold War context 
(Jones, 2011, p.403). The Copenhagen School takes as its premise the principle that 
no issue is essentially a security problem and that instead, security problems are 
created through a process of social construction and persuasion. During this 
process, a securitizing actor proposes that a certain issue comprises an existential 
threat to a referent object; if the audience is persuaded by these claims and are 
convinced that the extraordinary responses are warranted to mitigate the threat, 
then securitization has taken place (Buzan et al., 1998). Of the Copenhagen authors, 
Ole Waever was the "primary supplier" of the securitization approach (Buzan et al., 
1998, p.viii) and in his own words, the model, "is an inter-subjective, political 
process of negotiating the possible acceptance of a specific kind of argument, a 
securitising move by a securitising actor" (Waever, 2003, p.12). Securitization is thus 
comprised of suasive speech acts and is essentially a process in which persuasive 
discourse is used to invoke a sense of "priority and urgency", framing an issue as an 
existential threat that requires immediate action beyond the boundaries of normal 
politics (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25; Waever, 2003, p.9). Through this suasive process, 
any referent object and any threat can, in theory, become a matter of security. Yet 
that is not to say that security does not have an essential quality; on the contrary, 
security is essentially about survival (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 2003) and 
specifically the fear of annihilation of the given referent object.
Crucially, security in this framework is the product of a constructive, 
discursive process of persuasion; an operation that resembles a process of 
negotiation between authoritative actors articulating persuasive claims about the
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existence of existential threats, and the audience that is the target of these suasive 
speech acts (Stritzel, 2007). This persuasion constitutes the construction of security, 
which occurs when the language of security is used to present an issue as being an 
existential threat to the survival of the referent object. An example is outlined in 
Chapter 6, which details the way in which HIV was presented as an existential 
threat to the security of states at the United Nations Security Council, prom pting 
Members to legitimise recourse to extraordinary action (UNSC, 2000).
The conceptual strength of the securitization model is that, given its radically 
constructivist approach to security, it is possible to consider a broad range of units 
as potential referent objects and threats (including infectious diseases like HIV) 
whilst still retaining a realist core at the heart of the theory. As a result, the theory 
has gained significant and growing attention within the security literature, proving 
an enduring formulation for the analysis of security in the post-Cold War 
environment. This chapter makes two conclusions that are central to the thesis; the 
first concerns the nature of security as defined by the Copenhagen School, and 
specifically its realist core. By examining securitization theory it is determined that, 
despite its credentials among wideners of the security agenda, the Copenhagen 
School model is based on a strict and narrow definition of what constitutes a 
security issue: at the heart of securitization theory is the concept of the existential 
threat and its inherent realist logic of threat-defence and survival.
The second conclusion of this chapter concerns the method by which this 
existential threat is constructed. According to the requirements of the theory, the 
successful construction of security occurs through a discursive process that invokes 
fear of a specific issue among the relevant audience and builds a shared, 
intersubjective understanding that the proposed threat warrants immediate and 
extraordinary action in response (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25; Waever, 2003, p.11). 
Rather than question the objective existence of any given threat in a securitization 
process, the Copenhagen School focuses analytical attention on the suasive process 
by which the audience comes to view an issue as a threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p.26). It 
is this social construction that provides the focal point of its framework and forms
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the core logic of securitization theory, in which fear is an essential but under- 
studied element.
The persuasive processes of presenting an issue as being an existential 
threat, which requires convincing an audience of its urgency and then convincing 
that audience of the need for an extraordinary response outside the realm of normal 
political procedure, are the essential components of securitization (Buzan et al., 
1998, pp.26-27). This chapter finds that the suasive acts inherent to existential threat 
construction are marked by their employment of fear, which is used as a tool by 
which persuasion can be achieved. The correlation between the psychological 
literature on suasive fear appeals and securitization is examined, with emphasis on 
the role of facilitating conditions that act as variables governing the likelihood of 
their persuasive success. Fear appeals are persuasive messages that employ fear as a 
means to invoke behavioural or attitudinal change (Witte, 1998, p.423) and their 
perceived efficacy has led to the substantial use of fear appeals in public health 
campaigns. In this thesis, the capacity to promote sustained risk averse behaviour 
through the application of fear appeals is problematized by examining the 
complexity of achieving the desired level and type of responsive action, in addition 
to the potential for negative outcomes specific to the management of HIV/AIDS, 
which is hindered by the invocation of unproductive fear.
Fear is pervasive in our expectations of governance and control, functioning 
as both a ubiquitous feature of daily life and as a means of political and security 
discourse; for instance, Altheide and Michalowski (1999) attribute the rise in the 
discourse of fear in popular media to its "taken-for-granted relevance as an 
appropriate feature of the effective environment" (p.477). Despite pervasive use, 
fear can retain its salience as a means of legitimating control and shaping social 
values, as well as a tool of governance, as examined by Robin (2004) in his study of 
political fear in authoritarian and tyrannical regimes. Security, conversely, derives 
its conceptual power from its exceptionality and removal from the everyday (Buzan 
et al., 1998). By identifying the construction of the existential threat as being the 
essential quality of the contested concept of security, this thesis examines the way in 
which fear is both a tool for achieving this construction and a mark of its success; to
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accept the existence of an existential threat, according to the logic of the 
Copenhagen School, is to fear the risk posed by its occurrence and to fear the 
consequences of inaction. Having elucidated these arguments, Chapter 4 
problematizes this fear where it occurs in relation to HIV/AIDS.
There exists a large body of literature concerning securitization theory; its 
conceptual strengths and limitations and its empirical applications have been 
investigated notably by critical theorist Jef Huysmans (1998, 2011), Bill McSweeney 
(1996), Michael Williams (2003, 2011), Lene Hansen (2000), and Stefan Elbe (2005, 
2006, 2008). Numerous scholars have proposed correctives to enhance the 
securitization model and to address both normative and conceptual shortcomings 
(for example, Hansen, 2000; Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007; Ciuta, 2009). Key concepts 
at the heart of securitization theory have been subject to much critique, with 
particular emphasis on the suasive speech act, context, and actor-audience 
relationship (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007). However, fear remains an essential part 
of the securitization process that warrants further analytical attention. With regards 
to HIV/AIDS, it is the fear component of securitization that has led to the most 
negative aspects of the epidemic response and thus the role of fear in securitization 
is particularly important. Whilst it is possible through securitization to gain crucial, 
high level political attention and financial resources, it can also have negative 
effects, such as the ethical dangers identified by Elbe above (2006). These are 
discussed in the following chapters which examine in detail the positive and 
negative outcomes of linking security, fear, and HIV. First, the current chapter 
examines the Copenhagen model of securitization and, in exploring the stages of 
this discursive process, highlights the essential role of fear in the construction of the 
existential threat and the suasive securitizing acts.
2.1. Securitization Theory
In the late 20th century, Barry Buzan, and later the Copenhagen School, made 
inroads into security theory that led to a distinct growth in the range of issues that 
could be legitimately perceived as matters of security (Buzan, 1983; Buzan et al., 
1998). Security discourse increasingly featured non-traditional issues such as
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identity, nationalism, religion, and environmental threats. The 'broadening' of the 
security agenda had been evident prior to the end of the Cold War, bu t following 
desecuritization of the bipolar conflict, the move to accept a wider range of 'non- 
traditional' security issues became more pronounced. Security has been called a 
"neglected concept" and an "essentially contested concept"; suffering from both a 
lack of conceptual analysis and enduring contestation over its meaning (Baldwin, 
1997, p.9, 10). The Copenhagen School emerged against a background of an 
increasingly polarised debate in security studies to contest the wide versus narrow 
concept of security (Waever, 2003, p.8). Securitization theory was developed by the 
Copenhagen School as a potential "viable middle position" (Waever, 2003, p.8), in 
response to a question that was emerging at the conceptual core of security studies: 
w hat is security? This fundamental enquiry introduces the theory in Buzan, de 
Wilde & Waever's seminal work on securitization, Security: A  new Framework for 
Analysis (Buzan et al., 1998, pp.21-47).
Inspired by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and with it the 
desecuritization of the East-West conflict, the Security authors sought to explain how 
and why societies came to accept certain issues as being, or no longer being, a 
security threat (Buzan et al., 1998). As Cold War tensions declined, the rhetoric with 
which each side presented the conflict changed and a different, non-securitized 
form of discourse emerged. Securitization theory accounts not only for the process 
of designating security threats, such as the competing superpowers of East and 
West, bu t also suggests that these issues can become de-securitized and can return 
to the "ideal" realm of ordinary or normal political discourse (Buzan et al., 1998, 
p.29). Williams (2011) makes a counterintuitive but convincing argument for the 
possibility of fear, usually associated with the increase of security logics, to act as a 
resource for desecuritization within liberal societies where it is viewed as a negative 
condition; this is supported in the following empirical chapters on HIV/AIDS 
responses, which detail the rejection of securitizing rhetoric by liberal civil society 
groups that were motivated by their desire to reduce fear of the disease.
In response to dem ands for conceptual engagement and calls to broaden the 
range of issues that could be considered 'security', securitization theory broke from
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traditional narrow definitions of w hat can or should constitute an issue on the 
security agenda. It logically follows that if a security issue, such as the East-West 
conflict of the Cold War, can become a non-security issue in a relatively short 
period, then security itself m ust be an adaptable concept that is at least in part a 
result of social perceptions. The narrow definition of security also came under 
pressure as the politics of migration and minority ethnicity increasingly became a 
feature of post-Cold War international relations (see Curley & Siu Lin, 2008). Whilst 
strict traditionalists regard security to be limited to "the study of the threat, use, and 
control of military force" (Walt, 1991, p.212), by identifying security as a result of 
process (rather than objective threat existence), the Copenhagen School proposed to 
explain both the securitization and desecuritization of potentially "any issue" 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p.24) on the condition that its status as a threat/non-threat was 
accepted by a relevant audience. This logic allowed non-traditional types of security 
issue, such as HIV/AIDS, to be considered with the application of securitization 
theory, which demanded only that their existence as existential threats could prove 
convincing.
The widening of security agendas to include non-military threats was 
contested by traditionalists, including those who feared loss of coherence in the 
subject (Walt, 1991, p.213). The traditional package of security that ties state, 
military, and sovereignty has been credited with practical as well as analytical 
advantages in the contemporary political system; Michael Williams (2003) argues 
that traditional narrow concepts of security allow the desecuritization of issues that 
may otherwise act as a flashpoint for violence, such as identity or religion, although 
these claims are challenged by Waever (2003, p.27). A narrow interpretation of 
security may not account for military engagement that takes place for reasons other 
than national security of the sovereign state; for instance, the deployment of troops 
for UN Peacekeeping missions might be considered a matter of foreign policy rather 
than altruistic security interests. Rejecting this tautology, Waever (2003) summarises 
the position in its most extreme form as "the circular argum ent that security is about 
the state and military and should not be extended beyond this, because security is 
about the state and military" (p.27).
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Instead of being confined to the narrow limits of military engagement or 
other traditional perspectives, w hat constitutes a security issue is, according to the 
Copenhagen School, a subjective matter based on the social values of the 
securitizing audience in any given context. As a result of this "radically 
constructivist" approach (Buzan et al., 1998, p.36), it follows that proponents of 
securitization theory m ust recognise that an objective conclusion to the question 
'w hat is security' is impossible to answer. Instead, "securitizing actors can attempt 
to construct anything as a referent object [emphasis added]" or threat, provided that 
the relevant audience can be convinced that an existential threat exists (Buzan et al., 
1998, p.36). However, as Waever (2003) states, "it is necessary to be able to 
discriminate and separate security issues from non-security. Actually, it is only by 
having a clear sense of what is security that it is possible to open up [the concept] 
w ithout being swept away" (p.8). According to the theory, security is a discursive 
practice that is distinguished by its specific rhetorical structure; it comprises an 
enunciation of survival in the face of existential threat and the priority of action 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p.26; Waever, 2003, p.10). By using this definition as an analytical 
tool, it is possible to locate security actors and practises outside the traditional 
military-political realm w ithout stretching the conceptual framework too far (Buzan 
et al., 1998, p.26). Thus, the radically constructivist theory maintains its conceptual 
coherence by focusing its definition of security in one essential quality, or 
component: the politics of the existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p.27). Using this 
essential core as the foundation for their studies, analysts are able to look beyond 
the traditionally narrow  agenda toward new sectors, "without debasing the concept 
of security itself" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.27). It is in this core of security that we locate 
the invocation of fear as an essential but under-studied component of w hat makes 
security in the post-Cold War era.
The conceptual value of securitization theory is found in two unique 
contributions made by the Copenhagen School: first, that security at its core is about 
existential threats, and second that these threats do not have to be real in any 
objective sense, but instead they must be socially constructed through a process of 
persuasion between securitizing actor and audience. Thus, securitization theory
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brings to the forefront of conceptual analysis a process that, in the traditional 
perspective, would be regarded as a mere "side effect, a secondary feature of 
security policy" (Waever, 2003, p.9). The persuasive process of constructing a 
security issue comprises the presentation of an existential threat to an audience and 
their acceptance of its nature as an issue that requires exceptional, urgent, and 
extraordinary action. This process could, from a traditional point of view, be seen as 
an inevitable characteristic of security engagement by the state but it is identified by 
the Copenhagen School as being the essential component of security. By identifying 
this core of security studies, the Copenhagen School develops a formulaic, analytical 
tool that can be applied to a wide range of "sectors" and used to identify security 
beyond that narrow military-political definitions employed by the traditionalists 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p.27).
The essence of the security issue is that it is a matter of survival and of 
exceptionality (Buzan et al., 1998, p.26; Waever 2003, p.9). At its heart, securitization 
is about persuading an audience of the existence of an existential threat to the 
survival of a given referent object and this persuasion is measured not by opinion 
polls or individual perceptions (Waever 2003, pp .9 ,12), but in the award of consent, 
tacit or explicit, for an issue to be handled using exceptional means beyond the 
boundaries of normal political procedures. In dealing with a securitized issue this 
exceptionality is logical because a securitized issue is defined by its legitimation of 
the extraordinary response (Buzan et al., 1998, pp.21, 24, 25), but its measurement is 
problematic. The flexibility of the securitization framework to account for a range of 
securitizing actors and audiences also leaves the analyst asking w hat best defines 
these actors in practice and how can persuasion or consent be measured unless 
extraordinary action is taken? Analytical purchase can instead be found in the study 
of the constructive process itself and it is here that the functionality of fear becomes 
apparent.
Preceding the publication of Security (Buzan et al., 1998), Barry Buzan 
published his seminal work People, States and Fear in 1983 (and the revised edition in 
2007) and is one of the first scholars to comprehensively address security as a social 
concept and to explore the implications of that perspective. In People, States and Fear
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Buzan (1983) sought to "offer a broader framework of security" (p.20) in order to 
address the lacuna in existing security literature that failed to engage with the study 
of security as concept and that instead treated it as a subject "too narrowly 
founded"(p. 14) in its traditional form. Writing during the Cold War, security studies 
"was composed mostly of scholars interested in military statecraft" for whom 
security and low-politics were dichotomous, issues that did not concern military 
force were not considered issues of security (Baldwin, 1997, p.9). To circumvent this 
dichotomy, Buzan et al., (1998, p.21) adopt for their framework the traditional 
military-political understanding of security in so far as it remains about survival; 
securitization theory recalls the traditional state-centric concept of security but 
widens the focus of the security lens to include non-state actors and referent objects 
(Vultee, 2010, p.34). The essentiality of the existential threat to the securitization 
process is tribute to this traditional threat-defence logic that underpins the theory. 
As Stritzel (2007, p.360) illustrates, the conceptualization of exceptionality as a 
distinct modus, invoked through the articulation of specific speech act rhetoric (see 
Buzan et al., 1998, pp.24, 28), reflects the realist distinction of security from other 
fields.
Abrahamsen (2005) critiques this distinction between normalcy and 
exceptionality (or emergency) that is at the heart of securitization theory by arguing 
that the essentiality of this binary serves to exclude "many of the processes and 
modalities whereby issues come to be feared and experienced as potentially 
dangerous" (p.59). Abrahamsen (2005, p.59) reasons that in most cases, issues are 
not likely to transition from (being perceived as) normal to exceptional in the direct 
manner fitting to the conceptual logic of the securitization model. However, the 
strength of securitization theory is its accommodation of a broader security agenda, 
made possible by the unique analytical focus of the Copenhagen School on social 
components of security and of the constructive process itself; the School advises 
analysts not to study what is security, but how security is made (Buzan et al., 1998). 
Abrahamsen's (2005) concerns that the more commonplace instances of security, 
including "mundane management of risk", are "not adequately captured" (p.59) by 
the securitization model recalls a critical approach from the Paris School, which
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holds that security is about everyday practices rather than the exceptional practices 
that characterise the Copenhagen School (see, Case Collective, 2006). It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to draw conclusions on the true nature of security, if such a 
meaning could be found, but by accepting the Copenhagen School's call to study its 
construction it is possible to reveal both the power-laden nature of securitization 
and the effects of fear invocation that lie at the heart of this process.
2.2. Three Stages of Securitization
According to securitization theory, any given issue can be constructed as a 
security issue (Waever, 2003, pp.10-11). To do so, the issue moves through a series of 
stages that can be envisioned as a linear progression of politicisation and 
prioritisation. In the initial non-politicised stage the issue is not dealt w ith by the 
state and is not in any other way made a feature of public debate or decision. For 
HIV/AIDS, this non-politicised status existed globally before the virus was formally 
identified by the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 
1981. Prior to its clinical observation, the virus existed in the wider population but, 
w ithout classification by the medical profession, it was not in any way an issue for 
political discussion (see, for example, Prins, 2004, p.931).
The second stage, which precedes complete securitization, is that of 
'politicisation'. A politicised issue requires government decisions and resource 
allocations; it is a feature of policy and of public debate and decision (Buzan et al., 
1998, p.23). Issues that are politicised are subject to the political logic of being 
weighed against one another, allowing decisions to be made about which merit 
greater attention or allocation of resources. A politicised issue is subject to the 
established rules and conventions of the specific context in which it exists; for 
example, a politicised response to HIV/AIDS currently exists in the United 
Kingdom, where disease prevalence is subject to some political debate and public 
resources are allocated by the government to address health-care provision and 
related issues.
The final stage, at the apex of the securitization model, is that of the security 
issue. The status of 'security' is a more extreme form of politicisation and security
44
arguments are built upon the foundation of the preceding politicisation of that issue 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p.29; Waever, 2003). Here, at the apex of the hierarchy of 
importance and priority, are issues deemed to be existential threats that pose a risk 
to the survival of the referent object. With the essential quality of survival at the 
heart of security analysis, the Copenhagen School claims that is possible to dig into 
the practice of security and to reveal "a characteristic pattern with an inner logic" of 
that practice (Buzan et al., 1998, p.27). That inner logic is the production of security 
through constructive speech acts which frame "the survival of collective units and 
principles" as at risk from an existential threat and as demanding of immediate and 
"urgent" attention (Buzan et al., 1998, p.27). Whilst the referent object can in theory 
be anything, one of the conditions likely to facilitate successful securitization is that 
the size of the referent object places it on the middle-scale, such as states, nations, or 
other limited collectivities (Buzan et al., 1998, p.36). The Copenhagen School 
proposes that it is more difficult to conduct a successful securitization where the 
referent object is too large, such as the entire global community as threatened by 
meteor strikes or global warming (Buzan et al., 1998, pp.36-37; Waever, 2003).
To progress from a politicised to a securitized status, securitizing actors 
must convince a relevant audience that the proposed issue threatens the survival of 
a referent object and warrants differentiation from other, merely political, issues. 
The securitizing actor(s) responsible for articulating security claims are thus 
engaged in a negotiation with their audience; they utilise fear and the rhetoric of 
security, which is the rhetoric of survival, urgency and panic (Buzan et al., 1998, 
p.28), as part of their argument to raise a proposed threat to the level of sanctioned 
urgency, claiming that it is more im portant than all other issues. The requirement 
for a proposed threat to be not just substantive but existential amounts to a dem and 
by the Copenhagen School that its severity should be so great as to w arrant not just 
recognition bu t fear. For instance, when framed as a risk to hum an health, seasonal 
flu of regular severity is recognised as a risk to both groups and individuals, but it 
does not inspire the fear that is required to place it "on the agenda of panic politics" 
that defines a security issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p.34). The threat is constructed 
through securitizing acts as being existential and as demanding "urgent" attention
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before a "point of no return" is reached, such as the securitization of environmental 
destruction that threatens the survival of a species, or hum an migration that 
threatens cohesion of national identity (Buzan et al., 1998, p.23). Thus, securitization 
theory demands that fear m ust be invoked and achieved in order for an issue to 
transition from being merely political to being considered as a matter of security.
An issue at the securitized stage is defined by the exceptionality of its nature 
and response; for a securitizing process to be complete, the audience of these acts 
m ust be persuaded that the existential threat is so great as to warrant breaking from 
normal political procedure in dealing with it (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25). Whilst a 
political logic entails weighing issues against one another in order to determine an 
appropriate level or mode of response, a security issue overflows this normal 
process of political assessment because failure to deal with an existential security 
threat will render future responses impossible. As the Copenhagen School explains, 
the logic behind this prioritisation is that "if we do not tackle this problem, 
everything else will be irrelevant, (because we will not be here or will not be free to 
deal with it on our own way)" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24). For securitization to occur, 
between the securitizing actor and audience,
The existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a 
platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency 
measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse 
not taken the form of existential threats. (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25)
Buzan et al., (1998) "do not push the demand as high as to say that the emergency 
measure has to be adopted; instead it is sufficient only that it could be adopted 
legitimately, given the preceding persuasion of the audience" (p.25; see also, 
Waever, 2003, p .11). Thus, securitization provides a platform from which it is 
possible to legitimise emergency measures or other steps, although the actual 
implementation of these measures is not a criterion necessary for securitization to be 
considered complete (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25). This nuance gives rise to analytical 
difficulties in assessing the success, or failure, of securitizing moves and leaves 
analysts to question: how is one to deem that emergency measures could be adopted, 
unless they are? (Stritzel, 2007, p.363). In practice, it is successful persuasion that 
defines completion of the securitizing process and without persuasion a discursive
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framing or presentation of the existential threat remains merely a speech act; a 
constitutive part, but not a complete process of, securitization (Buzan et al., 1998, 
p.25).
In addition to the difficulty of assessing legitimacy without implementation 
of emergency measures, the definition of w hat constitutes normal political 
boundaries is problematic. Securitization is a discursive process that is successful 
once a securitizing actor has managed to legitimise, through argument, a response 
that could break free from the normal procedures or rules of a given system; an 
acceptance of the security argum ent would "enable a call for urgent and exceptional 
measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p.491). Within different 
institutions or different political systems, the procedures and norms that constitute 
normal boundaries vary. In a liberal democratic system, the emergency measures 
legitimised by the acceptance of security status could include secrecy by the state 
and placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24). 
Contemporary manifestations of these measures invite criticism from western civil 
society and human rights groups who decry a break from normal procedures that 
protect civil liberties; for example, until 2009 the United States government imposed 
travel restrictions on visitors with HIV/AIDS and this was heavily criticised by 
hum an rights activists (Preston, 2009). Despite criticisms that its framework is 
overly centred on the western liberal democratic model (e.g., Wilkinson, 2007), the 
Copenhagen School seeks to allow for application of the theory to a variety of 
contexts and systems by stipulating only that emergency measures legitimise a 
break from "normal bounds of political procedure" and not what these "normal 
bounds" may be (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24). In empirical application of the 
securitization model, this thesis favoured a context-driven definition of political 
norms draw n from interviewee's own reported perceptions of w hat did and did not 
constitute a break from 'norm al' procedure when dealing with HIV/AIDS (see 
Chapter 7 and 8). Indicators of HIV/AIDS securitization were adopted to facilitate 
the identification of securitization actors and practices in the empirical studies. 
These indicators (outlined in Chapter 4) include the potential violation of civil 
liberties that can arise following HIV/AIDS securitization and thus, here too the
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influences of Western liberal political norms come into effect. To mitigate potential 
bias by the researcher, the definition of what constituted normal civil liberties was 
also defined as far as possible by the reports of elite interviewees with operational 
expertise in each of the case study countries.
The process of elevating an issue to the rarefied status of security entails an 
element of competition; it is a process in which issues or securitizing actors vie for 
attention and, as Waever notes, amounts to a sort of "trade-off against other 
concerns" (Waever, 2003, p. 12). In their empirical study of the securitization of avian 
flu in Southeast Asia, Curley & Herington (2011) point out that "attempts to 
securitise global health discourses involve the securitisation of multiple and 
possibly competing referent objects" (p.162) that range from global public health, as 
advocated by the WHO, to the national economy. Curley & Herington (2011, p.162) 
found that in a quest for political legitimacy, the Vietnamese state undertook 
securitizing moves and chose to present the national economy rather than public 
health as a referent object. This problematic trade-off is one of the reasons that 
Copenhagen School, and Waever in particular, advocates desecuritization and a 
return of issues to the "ordinary public sphere" (Waever, 2003, p.12). This is 
problematic in two significant ways: first, there is a risk of detracting resources 
away from another cause that is equally if not more worthy (Elbe, 2006; Davies, 
2009, p. 135); losers in the competition might lack an articulate or authoritative 
speaker to perform the securitizing claims, or might suffer "silencing" in some other 
form (see, Hansen, 2000). Second, by competing for resources in this way, the 
speaker is perpetuating an ethos of hierarchy that reflects the model's realist 
conceptual core. Logically, it follows that if threats are conceptualised as being more 
or less worthy of limited resource allocation, then so too are referent objects. One of 
the dangers of securitizing HIV/AIDS identified by Elbe (2006) is that this 
environment may result in states prioritising security elites, obtaining health 
services and security for the groups deemed most im portant to state survival at the 
expense of other more vulnerable communities. At the international level, this 
threat-defence logic could, Elbe (2006) proposes, manifest in the adoption by states 
of HIV/AIDS policies and responses designed to safeguard their "narrow national
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interests" (p.120) rather than any broader, altruistic concern for hum an welfare. 
According to Davies (2008, p.296), such dangers are already manifest in the World 
Health Organisation's response to pandemic disease, which amounts to containing 
infection in the poor world in order to protect the affluent West rather than the 
pursuit of global health security beyond the traditional parameters of the nation­
state.
2.3. Securitization and the Theory of Fear Appeals
The second theoretical foundation that is established in this chapter concerns 
the method by which the existential threat is constructed during the securitization 
process: that of the fear-imbued suasive speech act. The Copenhagen School does 
not explicitly emphasise the role of fear in its outline of the constructive process, but 
refers instead to the "drama", "urgency" and "priority" that characterise both the 
suasive acts and the threat (Buzan et al., 1998, pp.25-29; Waever, 2003, pp.9-12, 19). 
The invocation of fear is an essential part of the speech act which itself forms the 
core of securitization and as Waever (2003) states, "prioritising and dramatising 
effects are systematically involved" (p.9) in the securitizing process. This thesis 
examines the suasive construction of security and finds that fear acts as a tool for 
persuasion, as outlined in Chapter 3, and is created as a result of the suasive speech 
acts; to be persuaded of the existence of an existential threat the audience has 
accepted a heightened threat perception and acknowledged a source of severe 
anxiety. For this reason, securitization and increased security is attributed to 
increased fear amongst audiences, a correlation that is problematized by Williams 
(2011) in his examination of securitization and the liberalism of fear and within 
Chapter 4 of this thesis.
Fear, with its unparalleled capacity to inspire innate and extreme biological 
responses, is a potent weapon in the hands of the powerful elite in governance 
(Hedges, 2010, p.16). Fear appeals are "persuasive strategies" that invoke fear in 
order to bring about behavioural or attitudinal change in the audience and are 
"some of the most common and popular persuasive strategies" in contemporary use 
by public health officials, media, and politicians (Witte, 1998, p.423). Political fear is
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that which exists in the consciousness of the individual or collective (e.g., social 
groups, communities, nations) and influences their behaviour. The special 
properties required to evoke political fear are the same that are required of the 
existential threat in securitization; as Robins (2004) asserts, "to arouse us, the object 
of fear m ust belong to the realm of politics and yet somehow, in the m inds of the 
fearful, stand apart from it" (p.4). In the discursive act of securitization, this arousal 
forms part of the fear appeal made by securitizing actors who target their audience 
with the claim that the object of fear is one of exceptional quality; it seemingly 
dem ands urgency and m ust be prioritised above all others. Only by demanding this 
special attention can the audience recognise the proposed importance (real or 
imagined) of the securitized threat. In a case of securitization, the dem and for 
special attention takes the form of the suasive, securitizing, speech act that is 
essentially a fear-appeal; it is a claim in which an issue is presented as being an 
existential threat, as beyond the realms of day-to-day politics, as warranting a 
violation of normal political rules, and as requiring exceptional and immediate 
responses.
Although fear is always invoked in a successful securitization, it is not 
always manifest in a productive form. That is, the arousal of fear in an audience 
might lead to destructive behaviour, or aversion to the 'message' or claims of the 
securitizing actor. For fear to be manifest in a productive form, fear appeals must be 
accompanied by a set of responses that are offered to the audience as a means by 
which to mitigate or manage the fear that is invoked. For instance, whilst fear is 
invoked during the securitization process, in order to be useful as a political tool the 
audience must also perceive there to be a route or action by which the fear can be 
alleviated, such as the implementation of an emergency measure in response. This is 
outlined in more detail in Chapter 3, but here the following discussion of security 
construction through speech acts establishes a number of key similarities between 
the psychological literature on the Drive Theory of fear appeals and the 
Copenhagen School's theory of securitization. The "characteristic pattern" at the 
heart of securitization corresponds to typical drive-theory based fear appeals 
(Chapter 3; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27), where drives are bodily states that the subject
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attempts to reduce or eliminate through appropriate response; for instance, eating is 
a response to the innate drive of hunger. Drives can also be learned, like fear. 
W hether learned or innate, drive theories assume that subjects will attempt to 
reduce an experienced drive by adopting appropriate reduction strategies. 
Therefore, a fear appeal based on drive theory m ust both invoke fear in the 
respondent as a stimulus to action and also offer a solution with which the 
respondent can reduce the drive. In this respect, the conceptual logic of fear appeals 
is congruous to the logic of securitization theory, where the fear appeal takes the 
form of the suasive securitizing speech act and in which an extraordinary response 
can be advocated. The "specific rhetorical structure" of survival and priority of 
action that is the "distinguishing feature of securitization" thus mirrors that of 
successful fear appeals (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25), which invoke fear through 
propositions of dire consequences and offer solutions for the avoidance of these 
consequences.
Drive theory-based evaluations of fear appeals propose that reactions are an 
attempt by the audience to reduce the negative drive of fear that is elicited by the 
fear appeal; in securitization theory, the speech act or existential threat construction 
invokes fear as a drive that can be reduced through the legitimation of an 
extraordinary response. One crucial difference is that in the securitization process 
the adoption of response is not necessary for the act to be deemed a success (it is 
enough that the suasive claim has convinced its audience of the existence of an 
existential threat), whereas in the fear appeal literature outlined in Chapter 3, 
behavioural change is an indicator of success. Whilst there are contending 
psychological paradigms in the study of fear appeals, all drive theory models 
conclude that fear can elicit behavioural change among respondents who are 
seeking to avoid, manage, or minimise the perceived threat. Consideration of the 
nuanced variables affecting fear-appeal success would be useful in designing a 
successful fear-appeal, (and is essential according to Witte & Allen, 2000), but it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to engage with such a study of the psychological 
literature. It is sufficient, in considering the innate relationship between 
securitization and fear, to demonstrate the scholarly consensus that fear appeals can
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be an effective tool for informational and behavioural manipulation (Stemthal & 
Craig, 1974; Witte & Allen, 2000; Ygram Peters, Ruiter & Kok, 2012) and to illustrate 
the congruity between the essential characteristics of securitization and the 
enduring features of fear-appeals.
2.4. Securitizing Speech Acts
Fear appeals and securitization are suasive processes that are completed 
through discursive acts. The defining feature of the securitization process, and that 
which sets it apart from other theoretical frameworks in security studies, is that here 
security is constructed through articulation of securitizing speech acts in which a 
specific rhetoric is employed to claim a modus of exceptionality (Buzan et al., 1998; 
Stritzel, 2007, p.360). The speech act, the productive component of security in the 
Copenhagen School model, is a focal point for much of the existing critique within 
the academic literature. These critiques include concerns that are normative (for 
example, Hansen, 2000), conceptual (Stritzel, 2007), or that consider the application 
of securitization theory to "real situations" (Balzacq, 2005, p. 171; Stritzel, 2007; 
Curley & Herington, 2011). Both Balzacq (2005, p.171) and Stritzel (2007, p.367) 
argue that the functionality of the speech act within securitization theory is too 
limited to allow sufficient application to real world situations. Stritzel (2007) asserts 
that the situatedness of the speech act is undervalued by the Copenhagen School 
and that the theory employs a "too-static" (p.364) conceptualization of the speech 
act event. Balzacq (2005) offers a corrective in the form of reconceptualising 
securitization as an audience-centred process that is context dependent. These 
adjustments, it is hoped, will allow better application of the theory to empirical 
study.
The productive relationship between securitizing actor and audience is a 
characteristic undervalued in the Copenhagen School formulation of security; 
Stritzel (2007) calls for the authors to differentiate between the terms "process" and 
"speech act/utterance", which are employed "as if both were synonymous" (p.364). 
In reality, Stritzel (2007) points out, "the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single 
security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain
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the entire social process that follows from it" (p.377) and in practice securitization is 
"negotiated" (p.363) between the audience and securitizing actor. Furthermore, the 
utterance itself is not synonymous with the complete process of securitization which 
requires the persuasion of an additional body, the audience. Thus, the securitizing 
actor is made a dual entity of audience and enunciator (Stritzel, 2007, p.363).
A cohesive argument can be made for a w ider definition of the speech act 
than that offered in the Copenhagen School's original formulation of securitization 
theory. A study of securitization that focuses on the discursive speech act, or 
performative utterance, as the essential component of the process can lead analysts 
to neglect the im portant influence of the wider external conditions in facilitating 
securitization. It also enables an artificially narrow definition of securitizing acts and 
"an overly linguistic rule-generating approach to determining securitization" risks 
marginalising the im portant roles of audiences, curtailing the scope of discourse 
that could be considered as part of securitization, and limiting the utility of the 
model as a tool for analytical study (Curley & Herington, 2011, p .147). Thus, the 
case has been made for a broadening of the speech act to include communication in 
visual or non-verbal forms (see Williams, 2003; Campbell, 2008); in their study of 
securitization in Vietnam and Indonesia, Curley & Herington (2011) suggest that 
"the application of a purely linguistic analysis" (p.145) of security deprives the 
analysis of hermeneutic depth and further problematizes the role of the audience.
In their analysis of fear in news and media discourse, Altheide & 
Michalowski (1999) found that fear of AIDS is part of a trend in framing of the issue 
within popular media and news communication. These communication forms 
comprise an essential mode of establishing social expectations about order, 
governance, and control w ithin risk societies of the contemporary world (Altheide 
& Michalowski, 1999). Securitization is a process in which discourse generates 
security and is therefore affected by the external and contextual conditions in which 
it takes place; these conditions include non-direct speech acts that inform audience's 
interpretation of securitizing claims and that contribute to the success or failure of 
securitization moves. As Vultee (2010) concludes, there is a lack of scholarly
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attention paid to securitization within communication or media studies, despite the 
"implicit relevance of news media" (p.33) to securitization.
Securitization is studied in this thesis through the sociological approach 
identified by Balzacq (2005) in which it is best considered as a strategic or pragmatic 
process that takes place within a set of complex interrelated conditions that should 
be considered fundamental to understanding the construction of security problems. 
These circumstances include the context and social conditions in which securitizing 
actors and audiences exist, their power relations and the "psycho-cultural 
disposition" of each (Balzacq, 2005, p.l). Contextual conditions include popular 
perceptions and representations of the issue in news or other media and can be 
regarded as facilitating or hindering the success of suasive speech acts. As such, 
these conditions should be considered im portant both by securitization analysts and 
by actors who seek to implement their own process of securitization. However, 
these social and political conditions are understudied (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007; 
Vieira, 2006), although there is a growing body of literature which questions the 
ability of the Copenhagen School's framework to address the role of wider 
contextual conditions as a variable affecting securitization success, including the 
empirical study of flu securitization by Curley & Herington (2011, p.145). Such a 
study, the authors conclude, "must take into account local factors which impact on 
the process of securitisation", not least because "the coherency of a securitizing act 
is reliant on a shared context between speaker and audience" (Curley & Herington, 
2011, pp.148,164).
A greater attention to contextual conditions could advance the theoretical 
development of securitization; specifically, examination of contextual conditions 
might alleviate some of the difficulties that arise in applying securitization theory 
outside of the liberal democratic context. For instance, because Buzan et al., (1998) 
"do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency response has to be 
adopted" (p. 25), it is difficult to determine when exactly an audience is persuaded 
(Stritzel, 2007, p.363). Jones (2011) argues that this fixation on discourse rather than 
security practice is problematic when applied to Southeast Asian security analysis 
and identifies this as a reason why securitization theory cannot account for the gap
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between the rhetoric of widening security agendas that is employed by many states 
in Southeast Asia, including Thailand, and the actual lack of implementation of this 
widening in practice. The emphasis on speech acts also becomes problematic when 
audiences are not the em powered agents imagined by the Copenhagen School, 
which are typical of a free and democratic population; as Stritzel (2007) asks, "what 
if a dictator is the securitizing actor?" (p.363). The matter of persuasion was 
succinctly problematized by Hansen (2000), who demonstrates the practical and 
normative difficulties of applying securitization theory in contexts where coercion, 
oppression, and a lack of agency distort the dynamics of the audience-actor 
relationship. Hansen (2000) used the example of gender-specific honour killings to 
illustrate the inherent assumption of the Copenhagen School that threats could and 
would be articulated by those at risk. In reality, the articulation of insecurity might 
be impossible or serve to exacerbate the insecurity of the referent object (Hansen, 
2000). Empirical data collected from Myanmar shows this was evident with regards 
to HIV/AIDS; here, CSO leaders sought to minimise or avoid articulations of HIV as 
a security threat, fearing that doing so w ould invite intervention from the state 
which itself was a source of insecurity and threat (Chapter 8).
Speech acts within securitization theory are performative acts; as in the act of 
making a bet, through their utterance something is done (Austin, 1962, pp.5-6). 
Facilitating conditions are defined by the Copenhagen School as "the conditions 
under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act misfires or is 
abused" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.32). In the original work by Austin (1962), the 
external, social, and contextual conditions of a successful speech act were the first to 
be outlined in his lecture on performatives; according to his speech act theory, one 
of the facilitating conditions for the "smooth or 'happy' functioning of a 
performative [speech act]" is that "there m ust exist an accepted conventional 
procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the 
uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances" (p.14). Thus 
dependent on the alignment of favourable "facilitating conditions", the speech act 
"is deeply sedimented and structured, rhetorically as well as institutionally" 
(Abrahamsen, 2005, p.58). A study of securitization, attempted or realised, must
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subsequently include analysis of the contextual and external conditions in which it 
is located. Basing its model on the speech-act theory outlined by Austin (1962), the 
Copenhagen School considers conditions as im portant to the success of 
securitization processes and separates them  into two categories: the internal 
grammatical conditions of the speech act and the external contextual and social 
conditions in which that speech act can be articulated, including the power or 
authority of the speaker (Buzan et al., 1998, p.32). However, with the success of 
achieving flexible application, the securitization model has forfeited its ability to 
sufficiently account for contextual factors in the securitization process, leaving the 
model unable to satisfactorily answer questions as to why and when some 
securitizations are successful and others are not (McDonald, 2008, p.572). 
Ultimately, although facilitating conditions go some way tow ard offering an 
explanation of causality in securitization, the theory itself rests on the premise of 
securitization as a performative act that is never fully explained by its conditions 
(Waever, 2003, p.32). Thus, these external conditions remain conceptually 
problematic.
The lack of causality is addressed by Balzacq's (2005, pp.192-193) expansion 
of securitization theory, in which he suggests that analysts should focus on the 
relationship between a variety of facilitating conditions that constitute the broader 
context of the securitization and the degree of its success. However, Stritzel (2007) 
critiques the conceptual basis of the Copenhagen School by problematizing the 
proposed causal link between securitization, which rejects the logic of objective 
threats, and the apparent existence of externally located facilitating conditions. 
Stritzel (2007) advocates a greater analytical interest in the external and contextual 
elements of securitization theory on the basis that the securitizing actor and "the 
performative force" (p.360) of the speech act both derive power from their broader 
discursive contexts. McDonald (2008, p.580) also advocates greater analytical 
attention to context when evaluating the impacts of securitization, suggesting that 
the analyst should focus less on the discursive production of security (as suggested 
by the CS) and instead look tow ard context as an im portant factor in creating this 
intersubjective phenomena. Engaging a real world application of the model,
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Mclnnes & Rushton (2010, p.134) argue that the security threat presented by 
HIV/AIDS is dependent on wider contextualising features that have been widely 
ignored by the international community during the formation of knowledge norms 
that have aided and resulted from the securitization of the disease. In their empirical 
study of the securitization of infectious disease in Asia, Curley & Herington (2011) 
raised similar critiques, concluding that outside the liberal democratic arena, the 
processes of securitization (of infectious disease) rely on "fragile state legitimacy, 
use competing referent objects and utilise language that is heavily contingent upon 
the audience" (p.142). Their findings lend further, empirical, support to the 
proposition by Stritzel (2007) and Balzacq (2005) that the role of audiences in 
securitizing processes warrants further attention if the theory is to be empirically 
useful. Sjostedt (2008) also concludes that traditional mono-causal frameworks are 
not capable of assessing the complex nature of threat construction. Thus, proper 
analysis m ust consider "case sensitivities" and "intervening variables" (p.8); a view 
which has gained ground in recent years (Mclnnes & Rushton, 2010, p.244).
Facilitating conditions are particularly useful conceptual tools for studying 
securitization because "truth conditions" need not, according to the radically 
constructivist model, exist (Stritzel, 2007, p.361). According to the Copenhagen 
School, the success or completion of a securitizing act does not depend on the 
objective existence of a threat but instead on the intersubjective understanding 
created through a process of persuasive speech acts; as Buzan et al., (1998) state: "an 
objective measure for security can never replace the study of securitization, because 
the security quality is supplied by politics" (p.32). It is within these politics that an 
array of facilitating conditions come into effect to determine the likelihood of 
audience persuasion. The facilitating conditions of the speech act refer to:
The demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security; 
the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing 
actor - that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby 
the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing 
attempt, and... [the] features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or 
impede securitization. (Buzan et al., 1998, p.33)
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Drawing on the work of Balzacq (2005), Vuori (2008, p.70) adds an additional 
facilitating condition to the three outlined above by the Copenhagen School, 
proposing that the condition of the audience should also be considered as a factor 
determining the success or failure of the speech act. The causal role of external 
conditions suggested in the second and third of these conditions (the authority of 
the securitizing actor and the nature of the threat) is problematic for a post­
structuralist reading of the securitization theory (Stritzel, 2007, p.366). Indeed, as 
Waever (2003, p. 14) acknowledges, two of the main criticisms of securitization 
theory are located in the facilitating conditions of the theory; first that it ignores the 
question of power, and second that it underestimates the role of objective threats. 
However, whilst the importance of external conditions might create a tension with 
constructivist or post-structuralist interpretations of the theory, the social conditions 
do reflect those identified in Chapter 3 on fear appeals. Here, the condition of 
communicator credibility affects the success of both suasive articulations: fear 
appeals and securitizing speech acts. The third of these facilitating conditions, and 
specifically the features of the proposed threat, are explored in detail in Chapter 4.
Whilst the external conditions, or "empirical contexts", cannot ultimately 
determine the success of a securitizing move, they can "provide crucial resources" 
for actors attempting to persuade the audience of a securitizing claim (Abrahamsen, 
2005, p.58). Assessed as a suasive act, the securitizing claim relies on such resources 
to gain traction amongst its audience. Here we outline three categories of facilitating 
condition; the authority of the speech act enunciator, the perception of threat 
consequences, and the role of the audience. First, the success of securitization as a 
suasive process depends on the authority of the speech act enunciator (Buzan et al., 
1998). Despite the expansionist agenda of the Copenhagen School, in practice "it is 
not the case that anything and everything can be securitized" just as it is not so "that 
any 'securitizing actor' can attempt to securitize" (Abrahamsen, 2005, p.58). Instead, 
a securitizing actor must possess sufficient authority, though not necessarily in an 
"official capacity", to persuade the audience of the securitizing claim (Buzan et al., 
1998, p.33; Abrahamsen, 2005, p.58). This authority may be "delegated or enforced" 
and comprises the "ability to define meaning so that their power capacity may come
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close to a monopoly" (Stritzel, 2007, p.372; Curley & Herington, 2011, p.161). This 
relationship between authority and persuasion is problematized by Stritzel (2007), 
who advocates instead a theory of securitization in which power is conceptualised 
as "the ability to influence a process of meaning construction" that is both more 
structural and that allows an analysis of "hidden" (p.373) forms of influence. The 
"contested politics" of authority and the legitimacy to speak security is also shielded 
from analytical attention in certain contexts; within international forums such as the 
United Nations, states are favoured given the Westphalian assumptions upon which 
the international system operates (Curley & Herington, 2011, pp.161-2). From a 
normative perspective, the authority necessary for security articulation is also 
problematized by Hansen (2000), who critiques the securitization process as 
silencing and subsuming the articulation of non-dominant security narratives. 
Furthermore, Hansen (2000) concluded that securitization theory facilitates security 
analysis which fails to critically engage with power-laden systems of gendered 
insecurity.
The ability to articulate security is both a route to prioritising one's own 
agenda and also a mode by which an enunciator can reinforce their own power. 
Therefore, there is an inherent value in the ability of an actor being able to "speak 
security" (Vultee, 2010, p.34). This is evident in the international system where high 
level forums provide "fertile ground" in which states can make claims about their 
security interests, with no guarantee that these claims are motivated by concerns for 
hum anitarian principles or by political agenda, despite the intention of alternative 
securitizing actors (Curley & Herington, 2011, p.150).3 The "search for political 
legitimacy [to]...motivate securitizing moves" merits analytical attention (Curley & 
Herington, 2011, p. 161), and as Buzan et al., (1998) state, "in concrete analysis ... it 
is im portant to be specific about who is more or less privileged in articulating 
security. To study securitization is to study the power politics of a concept" (p.32).
Sternthal & Craig (1974) conducted meta-analysis of fear appeals in the
3 See Curley & Herington (2011, p. 162) for an explanation of competing securitization 
motivations; during the securitization of avian flu H5N1 in Southeast Asia, the Indonesian 
state securitized the virus in order to pursue its own national interests, contra to the agenda 
of the WHO which was also engaged in securitizing the virus.
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psychological literature, outlining a relationship between levels of credibility 
attributed to communicators delivering the fear appeal and reported resonance of 
those appeals amongst respondents. According to the Copenhagen School, a 
positive relationship is also evident between securitization success and authority of 
the securitizing actor (Buzan et al., 1998, p.33). Additional studies discussed in 
Chapter 3 also found a causal link between increased levels of fear, communicator 
credibility, and achieved levels of audience persuasion, although this relationship 
becomes complicated and, according to some authors, potentially inverted w hen 
considering the correlation between fear levels and actual behavioural change rather 
than persuasion (Hewgill & Miller, 1965; Stemthal & Craig, 1974, p.26). As 
securitization success is regarded as the tacit persuasion of audiences and not as the 
invocation of behavioural change, these findings correspond with the theory of the 
Copenhagen School, in which the authority of the enunciator, or securitizing actor, 
is a facilitating condition (Buzan et al., 1998, p.33).
The second facilitating condition outlined here is that of the consequences of 
a threat, as perceived by the audience. In addition to the authority of the speech act 
enunciator, in securitization theory the perceived severity of the consequences 
arising from a proposed threat are integral to the success of its construction (Witte & 
Allen, 2000, pp. 591-592). The suggested responses, or consequences arising from 
lack of response, to a securitized issue are proposed here as additional facilitating 
conditions. According to the internal grammatical logic of the securitization process, 
it is fundamental that the threat proposed is not just extreme but existential (Buzan et 
al., 1998). In constructing the existential threat, the criteria outlined by the 
Copenhagen School are that the threat be the most urgent, the most deserving of 
attention and priority, and that, "if we do not tackle this problem, everything will be 
irrelevant" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24). W hether or not the securitizing actor m ust offer 
or explain a defined course of action for response to the threat is not explicit in the 
model; instead, and in keeping with its intention to provide an applicable tool not 
restricted to specific contexts, the Copenhagen School simply concludes that 
recourse to extraordinary measures m ust be legitimated and not what those 
measures may entail (Buzan et al., 1998).
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The literature on fear appeals concludes that where behavioural change is 
the intention of a fear appeal, the proposition of action or mitigating response is a 
crucial variable to their success (Sternthal & Craig, 1974; Soames Job, 1988; Witte & 
Allen, 2000). Audiences who feel fearful following a suasive fear-appeal will seek a 
route by which to mitigate that fear and it is in this space that the emergency 
measure can be proposed and legitimised. However, if education or absorption of 
information is the measurable outcome of success, rather than the adoption of 
specific behaviours (such as the legitimation of an emergency response), then the 
suasive fear appeal or securitization act could benefit from invoking heightened 
levels of fear amongst the audience because, according to the literature, humans are 
more receptive to such claims when in this aroused state (Stemthal & Craig, 1974; 
Soames Job, 1988; Witte & Allen, 2000). The Copenhagen School is explicit in its 
statement that extraordinary measures need not be adopted for securitization to be 
considered a success; instead it is sufficient only that an issue reaches a "platform" 
from which extraordinary measures may be legitimately enacted (Buzan et al., 1998, 
p.25). Whilst it makes empirical measurement of real world securitizations difficult, 
this omission by the Copenhagen School does invite the logical conclusion that, 
given the psychological literature on fear appeals, increased fear invocation is a 
route to increased securitization success, because securitization comprises only the 
suasive fear appeal act and not of behavioural change. However, in practical 
application it seems likely that if one were to design a securitization process it 
would be with the intention of achieving legitimacy for extraordinary measures, for 
instance when a political leader seeks to implement a public curfew, or to gain 
approval to engage in war in order to curtail a threat to national security. In these 
cases, the surveyed fear appeals literature suggests that the suasive act and 
proposition of the existential threat should be presented to the audience in addition 
to a route by which the threat can be dealt w ith and the fear thus managed and 
controlled. This is expanded in the following chapter.
Finally, the audience is crucial in security construction; it is they who m ust 
be convinced of the existence and severity of an existential threat and "the central 
role of the audience underlines that the theory is basically about security in an inter-
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subjective sense" (Waever, 2003, pp.11-12). Despite this centrality, the power of the 
audience is left underdeveloped in the Copenhagen School theory and in the wider 
literature (cf. Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007, p.363; Curley & Herington, 2011). 
Although the actor-audience relationship is not fully developed in the articulation 
of securitization theory, it appears as if the Copenhagen School splits the 
securitizing actor into two parts: the speech act enunciator and the audience who 
chooses to accept this suasive act (Stritzel, 2007, pp.362-3). However, the pow er­
laden dynamic of this dual unit is not given serious consideration in the theoretical 
framework offered by securitization theory. Nor is the identity of the audience 
clarified in a comprehensive way; according to the sociological approach outlined 
by Balzacq (2005), the audience is considered to be neither fully constituted prior to 
the securitizing process, nor wholly a by-product of that process. In empirical 
studies, the neglect of the audience as an im portant and constitutive unit in the 
securitization model limits the applicability of securitization model to non-risk 
society contexts (Curley & Herington, 2011, p.144) and it is difficult to clearly 
distinguish which audience is most relevant in studies of securitization in practice 
(Stritzel, 2007, p.363).4
Balzacq (2005) critiques the speech-act centred philosophical approach to 
securitization and proposes instead that the audience is not considered a formal 
entity posed typically in a receptive mode, but that it would be better understood as 
an emergent category that is shaped by, and is part of, the securitizing process. 
Balzacq (2005) concludes that securitization is limited by its unsuitability to dealing 
with audience-centred security constructions and proposes that the model move 
away from speech-act theory. Whilst addressing the under-valued concept of power 
in securitization theory and the role of facilitating conditions, Balzacq's (2005) 
conclusion that the audience is an emergent category in part constituted by the 
process itself further complicates the analyst's task in identifying that audience in 
empirical cases. This difficulty in the empirical application of the model is further 
exacerbated by a narrow interpretation of the 'speech act' in certain contexts; for 
instance, Curley & Herington (2011) suggest that "the application of a purely
4 See Mclnnes (2005), for a more detailed explanation of risk.
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linguistic analysis in non-democratic and transitional East Asian contexts does not 
adequately take into account the specific negotiated relationships between the 
'audience' and political elites (or senders and receivers of speech acts)" and that as a 
result, the "corresponding analysis of empirical cases are devoid of hermeneutic 
depth and recognition of the situated audience" (p.145). As Waever (2003) points 
out,
Although one often tends to think in terms of 'the population' or citizenry 
being the audience (the ideal situation regarding 'national security' in a 
democratic society), it actually varies according to the political system and 
the nature of the issue, (p.12)
In data collection for this thesis, the political system of Thailand adequately 
resembles the ideal democratic model inferred by the Copenhagen School, 
particularly where it was possible to record the articulation of alternative political 
narratives by CSOs that were in dialogue with the government. In contrast, in 
M yanmar the political environment was not conducive to studying official 
discourse and the theory could not be applied in any meaningful way to high-level 
political discourse due to the opaque and insular manner in which the political 
system of Myanmar operates. Instead, discourse, policy, and action of NGOs and 
CSOs were studied. These organisations had orchestrated the national response to 
HIV/AIDS in the absence of significant state intervention and, whilst non- 
democratic, the institutional cultural and practices of these CSOs more closely 
resembled the mode of governance envisioned by the Copenhagen School than that 
of the military dominated state (see Chapter 8).
2.5. Responsibility of Securitizing Actors
Although securitization theory was developed in order to facilitate an 
understanding of how anything could become a security issue, an im portant 
qualifier is that, according to its authors, not everything should be considered as 
such (Buzan et al., 1998, p.29). If freedom from fear is a condition of security, then 
securitization becomes a source of insecurity. To illustrate this, Chapter 4 examines 
the specific, largely negative, outcomes of HIV-related fear that include increased
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barriers to health care services, stigmatization, and a loss of efficacy in 
prevention/treatm ent campaigns. By highlighting the nature of security as a socially 
constructed concept, the Copenhagen School imbues in securitizing actors a level of 
responsibility for their actions and emphasises the im portant feature of choice that 
underpins the decision to securitize an issue (Buzan et al., 1998, pp.29, 32, 212). The 
decision to deal with an existential threat is (by nature of the threat) removed from 
the realm of choice, because not to deal with it would be catastrophic (Buzan et al., 
1998, p.24); but crucially, it is the speech act and not the objective condition of the 
existential threat that makes a security issue. Thus, securitizing actors who articulate 
these speech acts m ust assume responsibility for the framing that ensues.5 This 
responsibility is awarded because, according to the Copenhagen School, "it is 
always a political choice to securitize or to accept a securitization" (Buzan et al., 
1998, p.29) and "it is politically chosen which of the possible futures are realised", 
i.e., whether or not to securitize an issue (Waever, 2003, p.20). This reflects the 
radical constructivism at the heart of securitization theory, which is based on the 
premise that no issue exists objectively as a security threat unless or until it is 
constructed as such and the relevant audience is convinced of its exceptionality; as 
Enemark (2007) points out, although there are at least 1,400 species of infectious 
microbe known to cause disease in humans, not all are securitized; instead, "every 
society tolerates a certain degree of illness such that not all infectious diseases may 
reasonably be considered a security threat" (p.l). Thus, "use of the security label 
does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is also a political 
choice, that is, a decision for conceptualisation in a special way" (Waever, 1995, 
p.65). Because security actors exercise choice in deciding when to employ the 
language of security and attempt securitization, a normative assessment of whether 
this is a fortuitous move can be conducted. It is to this end, "to ask with some force 
w hether it is a good idea to make this issue a security issue", that the Copenhagen 
School created the securitization model (Buzan et al., 1998, p.34; Elbe, 2006, p.126).
5 See Abrahamsen, 2005, for an account of Blair's securitization of under-development in 
Africa.
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The normative nature of the approach adopted by the Copenhagen School is 
evident in its warning against the tendency "to elevate security into a kind of 
universal good thing" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.4). The authors, and Waever in 
particular, also advocate a preference for desecuritization that returns the handling 
of an issue to the procedural realm of normal, established political rules (Buzan et 
al., 1998, pp. 4, 29; Waever, 2003); in this and other nuances, the liberal democratic 
bias of the Copenhagen School is evident (Wilkinson, 2007). Whilst a return to 
normal political procedure may be preferable when a state is governed by 
functioning democratic rule, at times 'norm al' means inept. This leads to the 
concern raised by Elbe (2006) in his exploration of the ethical consequences of 
securitizing HIV/AIDS, where he argues that one major benefit of securitization 
would be the power to force states otherwise reluctant to deal with HIV/AIDS to do 
so. In Chapter 6, the discussion of HIV/AIDS securitization by the United Nations 
realises Elbe's point and illustrates the significant gains to be achieved through 
tactical securitization of HIV/AIDS, although country responses outlined in 
Chapters 7 and 8 show that the good of securitization is not always evident.
2.6. Conclusion
This thesis problematizes the relationship between securitization, fear, and 
HIV/AIDS whilst highlighting the issue of securitizing actor responsibility for 
securitization outcomes. Those opposed to securitization of an issue can appeal to 
the audience to reject securitizing claims, or position their own competing claims as 
more deserving of the priority and attention of a security threat. For instance, the 
exceptionalism of HIV/AIDS has been challenged in M yanmar by civil society 
groups that feared appropriation of the issue by an authoritarian military regime 
would lead to violations of patient rights. These groups subsequently fought to 
oppose securitization and to keep HIV/AIDS in the 'neutral' space of health (see 
Chapter 8).
Securitization theory has been called "theoretically vague" and faced the 
charge that "it does not provide clear guidance for empirical studies" (Stritzel, 2007, 
p.368). The Copenhagen School does not propose that objective threats can be
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determined nor should they be; instead, securitization theory provides an account of 
threat construction which serves as a flexible and formulaic analytical tool. Whilst 
recognising charges of conceptual vagueness, this chapter outlines the utility of 
securitization theory as a point of departure for the wider analysis of 
contextualising conditions and it explores the qualities that account for its enduring 
success in the field of security studies. In outlining the theory, two conclusions are 
made that are central to the thesis; the first is that the Copenhagen School, despite 
its "radically constructivist" approach (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27) proposes a form of 
security that has at its core a realist logic of threat and survival. This is most explicit 
in the prominence of the existential threat, which is found at the centre of the model 
and its constituent speech acts. The second conclusion of this chapter concerns the 
method by which this existential threat is constructed; the suasive speech acts that 
constitute securitization are defined by their invocation of fear amongst the 
audience and, although the Copenhagen School does not refer explicitly to fear in 
the internal grammatical logic of the act, it does emphasise the role of "panic 
politics", the existential threat, and the "point of no return" (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 
24, 33). These rhetorical devices are found also in the psychological literature, in 
which they are referred to as Tear appeals', and it is their quality and conditions 
that are the subject of Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3, Manifestations and Applications of Fear
The purpose of this chapter is to examine fear as a drive that motivates and 
informs hum an behaviour. Having identified that fear is an essential yet under- 
studied component of the securitization process, it m ust now be established w hat 
form that fear takes, why it occupies a central role in the suasive construction of 
security, and how its effects are manifested. Central to this thesis is the 
understanding of fear as a drive. Drive theory holds that the hum an experience of 
fear is an aroused state that manifests in the need or desire for alleviation through 
adoption of appropriate action; similar drives include hunger and thirst, which are 
alleviated by eating or drinking. Humans experience three distinct 
neurophysiological responses to the drive of fear; to freeze, to flee, or to attack 
(Ellin, 1997, p.9; Ohman, 2000, p . l l l ) .  Fear acts as a stim ulant in all three responses 
and notably, even the freeze response is accompanied by increased attentiveness 
and hyper vigilance of the subject. This chapter explores the properties and 
manifestations of fear in both its productive and destructive forms and by 
illustrating the role of fear in political governance, the conditions determining 
productive fear responses are outlined. The psychological literature on fear-appeals 
is reviewed and it is here that the similarities between suasive securitizing speech 
acts and fear appeals in public health education are explored. The chapter concludes 
that fear-laden securitization can be destructive or productive and that in order for 
speech acts to be successful, they m ust both invoke fear and define responses by 
which the audience can mitigate that drive.
3.1. Fear as a Stimulus
The classic philosophical literature on fear identifies its two distinct 
manifestations in the action of individual hum an beings; fear as a productive force, 
and fear as a destructive or inhibitive force. It is in these forms that fear becomes the 
subject of this thesis, which attempts to delineate the conditions for invoking the 
drive in its productive form. Political theorists John Locke and Edmund Burke
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advocate fear as a tonic for the apathy of pleasure and attribute to it the capacity to 
motivate hum an endeavour and productivity (Robin, 2004, p.4). For Montaigne 
(1575, trans.1877), fear has the potential to lead us into frantic, irrational, and 
destructive behaviour that can paralyse a person or stimulate hysterical responses 
akin to “madness" (p.67). In such cases, Montaigne (1575, trans.1877) proposes that 
there is no greater source of irrationality than fear, because "there is no other 
[experience] whatever that sooner dethrones our judgement from its proper seat" 
(p.67). This conclusion is found also in the contemporary literature of psychology, in 
which the application of fear appeals to incite behaviour change is problematized by 
the duality of potential outcomes; in some cases fear appeals provoke rational 
reactions that mitigate danger, whilst in others, subjects are led to irrational or 
debilitating responses that are neutral or counterproductive (Dillard, 1994). Thus, 
fear can serve as both a motivation for action and inhibit effective responses. As 
Montaigne (1575, trans.1877) concluded, "sometimes it adds wings to the heels ... 
sometimes it nails them to the ground, and fetters them from moving" (p.68).
When stimulated by external triggers, it is the function of fear to act as drive 
and to provoke in the subject an aversion toward potentially harm ful situations, 
protecting the body from risky behaviour such as walking along a cliff edge or 
nearing a predatory animal. Physiological responses to fear are characterised by the 
activation of the autonomic nervous system which creates the powerful physical 
experience of arousal (Robin, 2004, p.4); within clinically normal humans, this 
arousal is recognised as fright. When presented with an imminent threat, the heart 
rate and blood pressure of the subject increases, usually accompanied by the release 
of adrenalin into the bloodstream, and it is this imbalance that characterises a drive. 
If the threat is not imminent, such as a stationary or distant predator, the common 
biological response is to freeze or become immobile, to increase attentiveness, and to 
experience a temporary decrease in heart rate (Ohman, 2000, p .l l l ) .  In this state of 
heightened awareness the threat can be assessed and the subject is able to decide 
upon an appropriate course of action. During this process, the subject will assess the 
predictability of the fear stimulus and their own ability to engage in aversive 
behaviour. If predictability and the potential for aversion are gauged to be high then
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fear is decreased, enabling action to be taken (Ohman, 2000, p.113). These im portant 
moderating factors are significant when evaluating the effectiveness of fear stimuli 
as a motivation for behaviour. In the psychological literature, persuasive messages 
that employ fear as a means to invoke behavioural or attitudinal change are called 
"fear appeals" (Witte, 1998, p.423). The use of fear appeals in public health is 
complicated by the difficulty of achieving the desired level and type of responsive 
action; for fear appeals to promote sustained, risk averse behaviour, they must 
invoke fear in the audience but also ensure that the audience is not paralysed or led 
to counterproductive behaviours, such as 'othering' or message rejection, through 
the mismanagement of this fear.
Fear stimuli usually threaten the physical or psychological integrity of the 
receiver and are classified within the literature into three categories; physical 
stimulus, animal stimulus, and social fear stimulus (Ohman, 2010, p.83). Physical 
stimuli encompass the intensification of any environmental phenomenon such as 
extreme temperature, noise, or sensation. The causes may be natural, for instance a 
thunderstorm, or manmade, such as violent conflict on a battlefield. Physical 
stimulation is of use when faced with an immediate threat, but once that moment 
has passed the initially productive reaction can become destructive and disabling 
for the subject. Depending on the individual response, extreme experiences of fear 
can result in trauma and psychological damage that outlast the experience of the 
stimulus itself, sometimes with severe consequences. For instance, subjects with 
post-traumatic stress disorder experience the potentially debilitating effects of fear 
in which initially beneficial physical responses to a stimuli manifest in long-term 
physiologically destructive effects beyond their control.
The second classification of fear stimuli is that of animal stimuli, which 
includes the fear of predation as well as contagion associated with microbial threat. 
Certain animal stimuli are believed to be innate to the hum an psyche, including 
poisonous insects or contamination with pests or disease (Ohman, 2001; LoBue & 
DeLoache, 2008), compared to fear triggers that are learnt through direct experience 
or through communication with other subjects. In this manner the final category -  
social fear -  is constructed. This form of fear is closely related to the negotiations of
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power and status that define social relations (Ohman, 2010, p.83); within hum an 
communities, this power determines our social status and brings tangible benefits 
such as access to resources and opportunities for reproduction and survival 
(Ohman, 2000, pp. 112-3).
Hum ans possess the ability to effectively communicate learnt fear triggers 
through our unique use of complex language. As a result, those wishing to control 
large numbers of people can do so by using fear messages as a means of eliciting 
behaviour en masse. Fear can be socially constructed and invoked as a tool for 
governance through the process of securitization, which entails articulation of fear 
appeals that use a specific, security-bound rhetorical structure (see Buzan et al., 
1998, p. 33); by conceptualising fear in this way, the properties of fear stimulus 
become significant because these stimuli must be harnessed in order to invoke the 
necessary reaction and to construct an effective fear appeal. As discussed below, the 
use of fear messages in health advertising has prom pted a wealth of behavioural 
studies, undertaken to assess whether the specific types of fear experienced as a 
result of these messages have proved to be productive (in stimulating positive and 
healthy behaviour) or destructive, such as alienation, disengagement, and feelings 
of hopelessness (Blumberg, 2000; Ruiter, Abraham & Kok, 2001; Batrouney, 2004). 
Characteristics of the threat determine the nature and strength of the fear response 
that it evokes in the subject, and the likelihood of that fear being utilised in a 
productive manner. The immediacy of the threat and its predictability correlate to 
the intensity with which the subject experiences fear; in general, the closer the fear 
stimulus the more intense the response, whilst the less predictable its behaviour, the 
more likely we are to fear it (Ohman, 2000, p. 113). This accounts for the heightened 
sense of fear invoked by situations or stimuli about which subjects have little prior 
experience or understanding. Fear intensity also correlates to the levels of control 
that the subject perceives itself to have over the threat; if this control is significantly 
low then anxiety becomes pervasive. However, if anxiety and uncontrollability 
continues for a sufficient am ount of time, it may diminish into lethargy and 
depression on the part of the subject (Ohman, 2000, p.113). For those wishing to
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utilise fear stimuli as a means of affecting subject behaviour, understanding the 
nature of fear triggers is of param ount importance.
3.2. The Sources and Manifestations of Fear
The fear of the unknow n is intrinsically linked to the hum an innate and 
biologically driven fear of death. Prior to the mainstreaming of evolutionary biology 
and clinical psychology, Hobbes (1651/1998) wrote that the fear of death is integral 
to the hum an condition, because death is "the chiefest of all natural evils" (p.xxix) 
which we avoid impulsively through our animal behaviour. Hobbes philosophised 
extensively on religion in society, critiquing the role of the Church and personal 
faith as a barrier to the authoritative sovereign, and earning himself a reputation for 
heathenism (Geach, 1981). Like many after him, including Albert Einstein, Hobbes 
(1651/1998) associated the basic hum an disposition for religion with our unique 
ability to comprehend that our lives and deaths consist of an unknowable future 
that is shaped by "good and evil fortune" (p.71), the causes and roots of which are 
often a source of mystery.6 The hum an desire to understand the causes of things, 
and especially of things that affect our lives in positive or negative ways, is "not to 
be found in any other living creatures", giving rise to the "perpetual fear" and 
unremitting anxiety which characterises hum an nature (Hobbes, 1651/1998, p.71). 
Hum ans share a need to understand or 'know ' the causes and consequences of the 
phenom ena that determine our existence and through our attempts to satiate this 
need, we find the presence of divinity. As Hobbes (1651/1998) wrote, "when there is 
nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse ... in which sense perhaps it was ... 
that the gods were at first created by hum an fear" (p.72). Here, Hobbes (1651/1998) 
refers to the gods of the Gentiles, which he later calls "ridiculous" but goes on to say
6 In his 1930 article for The New York Times Magazine, republished in his book The W orld A s  
I See It, Einstein (2007) wrote that "with primitive man it is above all fear that evokes 
religious notions - fear of hunger, wild beasts, sickness, death" (pp.25-28). He noted that 
such a "religion of fear" often serves a political purpose, being "stabilized by the formation 
of a special priestly caste which sets itself up as a mediator between the people and the 
beings they fear, and erects a hegemony on this basis ... [combining] priestly functions with 
its secular authority in order to make the latter more secure; or the political rulers and the 
priestly caste make common cause in their own interests" (Einstein, 2007, pp.25-28).
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that the "one God, eternal, infinite" (in which he may or may not have truly 
believed) is born "from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies" 
(p.71). For Hobbes (1651/1998, p.72), belief in the divine is a practical and reasonable 
strategy for dealing with the state of perpetual fear and anxiety in which we are 
destined to live and for dealing with our innate desire to know how worldly 
phenomena, and our lives in particular, come to begin and to end.
That humans fear w hat we do not understand is an essential quality of our 
nature, and one that can be harnessed by those wishing to utilise the power of fear 
as a political tool. When constructing fear stimuli, making it unknowable and 
therefore unpredictable is an effective means of removing control from the subject 
and heightening the fear response (Ohman, 2000, p. 113). When securitizing an issue, 
for which it needs to be presented as an existential threat, it is not uncommon to 
find that the rhetoric employed in speech acts echoes the language of "worst case 
analysis" commonly found in military planning (Edwards, 1999, p.312). W orst case 
analysis deals with unknown quantities and correlates to the securitization model in 
which "security is a dual statement about the future" dealing with hypothetical and 
counterfactual outcomes (Waever, 2003, p.20). The unknown quality of the future is 
a crucial part of building the saliency of a proposed threat issue. In On Fear, 
Montaigne (1575, trans.1877) referenced the Greek axiom of Epicurus, that "men are 
tormented by the opinions they have of things, and not by the things themselves" 
(p.315). That phenomenon of unknown character are most likely to inspire fear is 
established in the philosophical literature; as Burke (1792) wrote:
To make a thing very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary, 
w hen we know the full extent of any danger, when we can accustom our 
eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes. ... Those despotic 
governments, which are focused on the passions of men, and principally 
upon the passion of fear, keep their chief as much as may be from the public 
eye ... all is dark, uncertain, confused, terrible, and sublime to the last 
degree, (p.82)
This vision of a mysterious, unknowable despot is reminiscent of an Orwellian 
dystopia in which confusion and arbitrary punishm ent is as much a tool for
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cultivating political fear as any overt display of strength by the state.7 Such 
tyrannical use of fear was a feature of the traditional Thai and Burmese monarchies, 
in which the exercise of cruel power upon 'ordinary7 citizens was enabled by the 
conviction that royalty was a divine entity imbued with supernatural power 
(Quaritch Wales, 1931, p.21).
To lack knowledge about a source of threat or fear is to be disempowered; 
the rule of terror employed by M ontesquieu's imagined despot is buttressed by his 
mysteriousness (Robin, 2004). Fear of a threat or object can prevent engagement 
w ith that object and discourages critique or analysis of its components, enhancing 
the fearsome and unknowable nature of its character. Conversely, to learn about 
and understand the forces that impact upon our lives, be they a virus or tyrant, is to 
gain power. Through understanding, a critique and deconstruction of the proposed 
threat is possible. Such a critique could, in explicating the threat, make it less fearful. 
Measures that prevent critique, such as the lese majeste laws in Thailand or the 
secrecy and opacity of the military government in Myanmar, thus serve to enhance 
the inaccessibility and authority of these unknowable agents.
The terrible quality of the unknown is not limited to the realm of political 
governance; in the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the virus was a source of significantly 
greater fear before medical advances allowed experts to understand its modes of 
transmission and nature of infection. Even prior to the development of treatm ent 
(which allowed effective management of the virus by the HIV+ subject), knowledge 
alone could reasonably be expected to have reduced fear of the virus, partly by 
contributing to the enduring hope that treatments, vaccines, and cures may one day 
be found. For this reason, securitizing actors may see benefit in removing their 
proposed threat from the realm of public knowledge, presenting it as something too
7 Fordham (2004) suggests that "the world of Thai AIDS is truly an Orwellian world", in 
which surveillance and interventions have been directed primarily at the private lives and 
practices of the "underclass" (p.3). He notes the lack of critical engagement with these fear- 
based systems of control, which he compares to the authoritarian Thai leadership of the 
1960s and 1970s, pointing out that, whilst "the oppressive and unjust nature of these political 
regimes was clear to all, the oppressive nature of the regimes of surveillance and 
intervention engendered by the HIV/AIDS epidemic have been obfuscated by the power of 
biomedicine and public health, and by the claim that they are for the individual's own good" 
(Fordham, 2004, pp.3-4).
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complicated or too extraordinary for the audience to understand. This phenomenon 
is discussed by Goldacre (2009) in a popular account of what he terms "bad 
science", where he argues that the mystification of science is used by 
pharmaceutical and beauty industries as a means of enhancing the fear invoked 
through their marketing campaigns.
The fear of death and of the unknown can be attributed to the biologically 
innate fear of physical harm. There is also evidence to suggest that the common fear 
of snakes and spiders is genetically embedded as a precautionary mechanism for 
avoiding creatures that endanger our survival (Ohman, 2000; LoBue & DeLoache, 
2008). However, if an instinctive repulsion from biting insects is the manifestation of 
one type of fear, then at the other end of the scale is the complex, constructed type 
of fear that is bom  of and through cognitive conditioning and social training, and it 
is this learned, or shared, fear that is manifest in public discourse in contemporary 
society. Here, there is an "expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of 
the effective environment", and that fear will be experienced in daily life by the 
common populace (Altheide & Michalowski, 1999, p.476). Thus, fear as a learned 
and socially shared phenomenon can become part of the defining fabric of a social 
group and it is in this form that it is most easily manipulated as a tool of 
governance.
Fear as a tool for governance is rooted in complex manifestations of fear that, 
typically, do not make overt reference to the death or physical harm  of individual 
subjects. In this case, fear stimuli are complex and are constructed using shared 
understandings of power, behavioural norms, and consequence. For instance, 
w ithin established liberal democracies, sovereign power is still exercised through 
fear of capital punishm ent (e.g., in certain jurisdictions of the USA), but this direct 
correlation between submission to state law and avoidance of death or physical 
detainment is only one relatively small component of maintaining authority by the 
state. Instead, fear and fear stimuli are manipulated and embedded within the 
consciousness of subjects through subtle processes of shared experience and 
learning. Through these processes we learn to fear the authority of the state w ithout 
necessarily experiencing that authority or coercion directly. The unique hum an
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capacity for complex language facilitates this form of governmental control and in 
his classical study of the sublime and the terrible, Burke (1757, p.285) observes the 
significant power of words to affect and invoke our passions. It is our access to 
language that allows us to associate fear with a range of triggers far removed from 
the original stimulus (Ohman, 2000, p.113) and through a combination of shared 
and innate stimuli or triggers, fear becomes an effective and pervasive tool of 
political governance.
Significantly, not all hum an beings act to avoid death; some seek to advance 
death directly or indirectly through their actions and to end their existence through 
suicide or self-destructive behaviour. Observing fear in its destructive form, 
Montaigne (1575, trans.1877) wrote, "the many people who, im patient of the 
perpetual alarms of fear, have hanged or drowned themselves, or dashed 
themselves to pieces, give us sufficiently to understand that fear is more 
im portunate and insupportable than death itself" (pp.69-70); in doing so, he 
accounts for those among us who, contra to Hobbes' assertion, seek rather than 
avoid death. Both Hobbes (1651/1998) and Montaigne (1575, trans.1877) agree that 
fear is capable of inspiring either destructive or productive behaviour and the self- 
destruction of Montaigne's studies is an outcome of helplessness and depression in 
the face of pervasive psychological stress. This stress arises from sustained exposure 
to a fear stimulus perceived by the subject to be uncontrollable and unavoidable 
(Ohman, 2000, p .I l l) ;  as such, it fits with the logic of fear appeals outlined in 
contemporary psychological literature, which mandates that for fear to be 
effectively managed as a productive stimulus for behavioural control, it m ust be 
manageable by the subject and, crucially, the subject must be able to relieve the 
experience of fear by employing certain behaviours (see also, Dillard, 1994; Soames 
Job, 1998).
Self-destructive responses to fear are the very thing that Hobbes (1651/1998) 
hoped to avoid by the proposed management of fear within the Leviathan and are 
the reason that he advocates so strongly the implementation of a different, carefully 
constructed, and well managed form of fear to replace the pervasive and destructive 
sort that exists in the natural state. The distinction between destructive and
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productive fear is central to Hobbes' philosophy on fear as a tool of governance; by 
purposefully constructing certain types of fear responses within a population, the 
Leviathan can unite m ankind and prevent the chaotic state of competition, mistrust, 
and fear that makes life "nasty, brutish, and short", in the state of nature (Hobbes, 
1651/1998, p.84).
3.3. The Liberal Perspective
When Montaigne (1575, trans.1877) famously lamented that "the thing in the 
world I am most afraid of is fear, that passion alone, in the trouble of it, exceeding 
all other accidents" (p.69), he expressed his conviction that it is fear, rather than 
death, which is the insupportable burden to mankind. Fear of the unknown, and of 
death and loss, are identified as intrinsic characteristics of hum an nature by every 
scholar studied within this chapter; where their views diverge is in how best this 
fear can be managed and what role it should play in the good governance of society. 
For Hobbes (1651/1998), the universal and selfish fear of death that leads to chaotic 
insecurity in the state of nature can be countered by the constructed fear of a 
Leviathan. By Hobbesian reasoning, fears that relate to the loss of one's 'w orld ' also 
motivate hum an beings to cooperate and act in productive ways, allowing the 
creation of a peaceful and culturally rich society. For Montesquieu, terror was not 
the product of sovereign institutions of law and education, unlike the Hobbesian 
logic, but instead was the articulation of despotic desire, an aberration to be resisted 
and purged from society (Robin, 2004). Despite their diverging views on its origins, 
both Montesquieu and the counterrevolutionary Hobbes recognised the utility of 
fear as a tool of social control, and for both it was meant to "serve as the catalyst of 
political and moral awakening" (Robin, 2004, p.29). It is the obvious and unrivalled 
power of fear to stimulate emotional responses that accounts for its favoured 
application throughout history and in contemporary politics which have 
"internalised the culture of fear" (Furedi, 2005, p.131).
The management and utilisation of fear remains inherent to the construction 
of social expectations about security and about social order in contemporary society; 
fear communication is essential to the discourses of policing, control, and risk
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prevention that constitute governance in the m odern "risk society" (Altheide & 
Michalowski, 1999, p.476). Because they are suasive messages, the construction of 
fear appeals demands engagement by the audience and where the proposed threat 
is presented as being embodied in an enemy identity, there follows a process of 
'othering' that enemy from the audience. In the UK, groups on the far right of the 
political spectrum often engage in an 'othering' of migrants who are presented as a 
threat to security of native citizens in terms of their cultural values as well as more 
tacit concerns about job and personal security. In her study of Islamophobia, Fekete 
(2009) draws parallels between the securitizing discourse of the McCarthy era and 
contemporary Europe, in which Communist "subversives" have been replaced by 
"Islamic radicals" (pp.102-106) as the source and rallying point of political fear. 
During the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, the 
people of New York city experienced this 'othering' through the production of risk 
and discourses of blame, which attributed the disease to the population of 
Chinatown despite no cases in that area (Eichelberger, 2007). Ingram (2008) has also 
distinguished the ways in which foreign bodies are constructed in fear appeals as 
the source of HIV/AIDS infection in the UK, where an analysis of media coverage 
and migration reveals politicised discourse that attributes blame for infection to 
immigrants to the country. This is also evidenced in Chapter 7, which reports a 
similar process of external threat construction that took place in the early Thai 
response to HIV/AIDS, and in Chapter 8 where the same claims about the 
'foreignness' of HIV/AIDS were made in Myanmar. The construction of enemy 
bodies as a source of microbial infection is a common feature in discourse on 
infectious disease and is the basis for w idespread concern that securitization, which 
is based on fear appeals, leads to an 'othering' of hum an bodies and the construction 
of people rather than viruses as the source of threat (see Elbe, 2006).
The innate hum an desire for security lends itself to abuse by leaders willing 
to exploit fear as a means of gaining control. In his critique of contemporary 
American liberalism, Chris Hedges (2010) writes that fear "permits the government 
to operate in secret. [It] means we are willing to give up our rights and liberties for 
promises of security" (p.21). From this liberal perspective, the association between
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political fear and repressive governance is well founded in historical precedence. In 
Asia in the 20th century alone, the experience of Myanmar under the military junta, 
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, or Mao's China, all provide examples of state 
orchestrated fear manifest in its most socially destructive form. To invoke fear, 
construct a threat, and to seek or use extraordinary power are key features of the 
securitization process through which leaders seeks to legitimise an extraordinary 
level of power or recourse to emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998). The realm of 
security is the "agenda of panic politics", and in this realm of heightened priority 
and urgency, the checks and balances that exist to limit authoritative power are 
curtailed (Buzan et al., 1998, p.34).
In his sociological study of Thai monarchy and state, Quaritch Wales (1931) 
recounts the central role of fear in traditional governance that endured from the 
Ayutthaya Kingdom of the 14th century to the mid-19th century, ending only with 
the reforms of King Mongkut:
The absolutism of the monarch was accompanied and indeed maintained by 
the utm ost severity, kings of Aydhya practising cruelties on their subjects for 
no other purpose than that of imbuing them with humility and meekness. 
Indeed, more gentle methods would have been looked upon as signs of 
weakness, since fear was the only attitude towards the throne which was 
understood, and tyranny the only means by which the government could be 
maintained, (p.21)
The use of fear as a means of subjugating the population to absolute rule manifested 
in "the ingrained habit of fear and obedience [that] produced a deep reverence for 
all forms of authority" (Quaritch Wales, 1931, p.21). The effects of this traditional 
social organisation remain in force today and are critiqued by Andrew MacGregor 
Marshall (2011) in his essay Thai Story, an academic work that uses leaked American 
diplomatic cables to assess the political role of the supposedly apolitical modem 
Thai monarchy. In doing so, MacGregor Marshall (2011) violated Thailand's strict 
lese majeste laws "on a massive scale" (p.15). Lese majeste laws, under which at 
least two im portant sources for this research are banned in Thailand (MacGregor 
Marshall, 2011; Handley, 2006), are employed by some agents in the modern state as 
a political tool with which to quieten dissent and buttress the authority of 
traditional elites. The law is "increasingly used to prevent any questioning of
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Thailand's established social and political order" and to consolidate their power 
(MacGregor Marshall, 2011, p.10). Thailand's lese majeste laws are some of the 
strictest in the world and the fear they invoke serves to protect the monarchy and its 
affiliates from critique as well as criticism, to the detriment of furthering 
accountable governance as well as hindering academic and journalistic integrity in 
the country.
When done successfully, the construction of a threat is an extremely effective 
tool of governance because, through its use of fear, it both reinforces and enhances 
the authority of the constructor (or securitizing actor) and also inhibits its own 
deconstruction or defeat. Taking as his point of investigation the work of Senator 
McCarthy in the USA, Robin (2004) assesses the importance of restricting critical 
engagement with fear based messages if they are to remain effective as means of 
political control. In this case, Robin (2004) argues that the de-politicisation of fear 
during the McCarthy era freed intellectuals from their responsibility to question the 
repressive action of the state, which was engaged in securitization of communist 
ideology and exercise of extraordinary political power that critics later dubbed a 
'w itch hunt'. By defining the political fear felt by opponents to these events as being 
"the issue of an overheated imagination rather than a response to policies and 
practices" the need to question and oppose these policies was successfully ignored 
(Robin, 2004, p. 15). Furthermore, by failing to acknowledge that our fears are 
political constructs, we instead conceptualise them as "intractable foes ... [that] can 
only be killed or contained" (Robin, 2004, p.6).
The mechanisms to limit power consolidation, and the systems that could 
prevent the abuse of extraordinary powers, are found in institutions that exist 
beyond the bodies of the state. In those states where the government makes fear a 
"deadly condition of everyday life", liberals advocate for the power of the 
terrorising rulers to be checked by various means, including fragmenting the power 
of government, building a pluralistic society, toleration, and the rule of law (Robin, 
2004, p. 14). In Shklar's (2004) vision of the Liberalism of Fear, it is the power of public 
organisations, such as corporate businesses, that divides social power and thus 
limits the "long arm" (p. 158) of government. In Hedges' (2010) study of political
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society in the USA, it is the ideologically liberal class that has traditionally served as 
a check to the power of the state. When any of these liberal institutions are 
weakened, a vital mechanism for opposing the abuse of political fear is lost. This, 
according to Hedges (2010), is precisely w hat is occurring in contemporary America 
where "the timidity of the liberal class leaves [political fear] especially prone to 
m anipulation" (p.16). Hedges (2010) recounts the warning of C. W right Mills, that 
"a decayed and frightened liberalism" is vulnerable and open to attack by the 
"ruthless fury of political gangsters" and he cautions the reader; if political fear is 
pervasive within the very institutions intended to challenge state power, then "it is 
much safer to celebrate civil liberties than to defend them, and it is much safer to 
defend them as a formal right than use them in a politically effective way" (p.9).
Destruction of the liberal state can occur precisely because of the aura of 
exceptionalism, urgency, and priority that defines the construction of security 
within the Copenhagen model of securitization. When experiencing fear of 
existential threat, the maintenance of normal political rule becomes secondary to the 
necessity of dealing with that threat (Buzan et al., 1998). It was by framing national 
unity as an existentially threatened referent that the military of M yanmar led a 
successful coup against the fractious government in 1962, and during recurring 
political protests in both Thailand and Myanmar, the state has deployed military 
forces to the streets in order to suppress protesters. The nature of securitization is 
such that to define something as 'security' tends to imply that its solution can, must, 
or will, be provided by the securitizing actor, usually the state (Waever, 1995, p.63). 
Thus the securitizing process serves as a constitutive process in multiple ways; 
concurrently constructing security and buttressing the authority of the securitizing 
actor or responder. In application, to invoke fear through securitization serves to 
mobilize the state to deal with the supposed threat and grants the state 
extraordinary power, including the right to override civil liberties through the 
declaration of a 'state of emergency', whilst simultaneously undermining the very 
institutions that could limit the power of that state and ensure the return of normal 
(democratic) governance. For this reason, with their normative slant toward liberal
80
democratic governance, the Copenhagen School advocates that desecuritization is 
the "ideal" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.29).
3.4. Socially Productive Fear
In its destructive form, fear inhibits the lives of subjects rather than aiding their 
advancement or peace, and those who suffer perpetual or unproductive fear are 
already victims in some respects, as Montaigne (1575, trans.1877) explained,
Such as are in immediate fear of losing their estates, of banishment, or of 
slavery, live in perpetual anguish, and lose all appetite and repose; whereas 
such as are actually poor, slaves, or exiles, ofttimes live as merrily as other 
folk, (p.69)
M ontaigne's observation is reiterated four centuries later in Booth's (1991) theory of 
emancipation in hum an security, in which freedom from fear is a central tenant of 
social and individual well-being. Socially productive fear, however, will not blind 
the sufferer to the nature of the threat, or at least will not create the paradox 
experienced by Montaigne's subject above. For Benson (1914), morally and socially 
productive fear "is the beginning of wisdom" (p.70) that can trigger critical 
engagement with the issue at hand, unlike fear in its disempowering form that is 
discussed above. Through this critical engagement, a rational and knowledgeable 
examination of the threat can be made and subjects are able to construct personal 
opinions and make informed choices as to the appropriate response to the proposed 
threat (Benson, 1914, p.67). Behavioural change born of such understanding is a 
more sustainable form of governance than that born of blind terror, because subjects 
have drawn the conclusions themselves and, as Benson (1914) wrote at the turn of 
the 19th century, it is socially more desirable because it encourages the "tranquil" 
"moral courage" (p.67) that is of true value to society.
Fear in its productive form stimulates effective, efficient behaviour that has 
positive consequences for hum an society. In Leviathan, Hobbes described socially 
and morally productive fear as that which aids good governance and creates peace 
not only at the collective level, but also within the autonomous individual (Hobbes, 
1651/1998; Robin, 2004). But in order to be manifest in this desirable form, a fear
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stimulus must meet two criteria; first, it m ust not be perceived to be unpredictable. 
Hobbes placed great emphasis on the need for citizens to understand the laws they 
are expected to obey, and not to feel that punishm ent by the state is ever arbitrary or 
obscure (Robins, 2004). Unjustness is easily recognisable as a component of awful 
and unaccountable greatness (Benson, 1914, p.49). Secondly, in order to be a 
sustainable and productive force for governance, aversion from the fear stim ulus 
m ust be possible and exposure to the threat m ust be in some way within the control 
of the subject. Allowing the subject the opportunity to manage their behaviour in 
order to avoid the fear stimulus (for instance by choosing not to break a law and 
thus avoid punishm ent by the state), is crucial to both utilising fear as a method of 
controlling said behaviour and also to ensuring that fear does not transm ute into 
helplessness, depression, and self-destruction (Ohman, 2000, p.111). Subsequently, 
this thesis examines productive fear as a motivation for health-related behaviour 
through the employment of fear appeals.
3.5. Fear Appeals and Public Health
Fear appeals are persuasive messages that invoke threat or arouse fear; their 
use in public health and consumer marketing has been extensively studied, 
generating a wealth of literature and empirical studies in the field but w ithout 
significant analysis of how these appeals relate to securitization (see e.g., Witte & 
Allen, 2000; Ygram Peters et al., 2012). Fear appeals in psychological literature are 
almost exclusively concerned with public health issues, such as communications to 
reduce HIV/AIDS transmission, induce smoking cessation, or to improve dental 
hygiene (Dillard, 1994, p.302; Witte & Allen, 2000, p.592). For example, the 1987 UK 
'tombstone campaign' used a poster that stated: "AIDS. Gay or straight, male or 
female, anyone can get AIDS from sexual intercourse. So the more partners, the 
greater the risk. Protect yourself, use a condom" (Appendix C). In her appraisal of 
the use of fear-appeals in sexual health education, Susan Quilliam (2009) referred to 
this campaign as typical of a "Fright Night" (p.253) style approach, referencing the 
iconic 1985 Hollywood comedy horror film of the same name. Utilising the popular 
iconography of horror, these appeals are designed to provoke fear in its productive
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form in order to deliver information and prom pt prescribed behaviours, such as risk 
avoidance or healthy lifestyle practises.
Health orientated fear appeals are used in state sponsored anti-smoking 
campaigns in the UK, where cigarette packages include the words "Smoking kills" 
and "Smoking seriously harm s you and others around you" (Hammond et al., 2007, 
p.211). The conventional psychological literature on fear stimuli that is examined in 
this chapter determines that effective, productive fear is the product of stimulation 
accompanied by a possible recourse to evasive action (e.g., cessation of smoking). 
W ithout this 'way out', fear stimuli are likely to produce debilitating anxiety rather 
than adoption of positive behaviour. The possibility that fear may not be an effective 
means of producing risk-adverse health behaviour is of fundamental importance to 
the normative debate on political fear and public health, but one that suffers from a 
lack of inter-disciplinary attention between the psychological and political science 
literature. We must consider then, based on the explanations of fear stimulus and 
reactions outlined above, w hat characteristics distinguish a potentially destructive 
or productive response from the fear stimulus.
Dominant theories in the psychological literature hold that behaviour 
change is possible only when the audience of that appeal perceives there to be 
sufficient efficacy; efficacy refers here to the ability to negate harm through the 
proposed response, and the perceived ability for that response to be enacted (Witte, 
1998; Ygram Peters et al., 2012, p.9). Fear appeal theories are based on the original 
fear-as-drive theory that was developed in the Yale Communication Research 
program  during the last century. According to this paradigm, when fear is incited 
by a public health message it acts as a drive that the audience will seek to reduce 
through the adoption of avoidance measures, such as the practice of regular tooth 
brushing to avoid oral disease (Witte, 1998, p.425). In their seminal 1953 study of 
fear appeals in dental hygiene education, Janis & Feshbach of Yale University found 
that although appeals invoking stronger levels of fear were most effective at 
communicating facts about healthy dental behaviour, those same messages were 
more likely to affect positive behavioural change when they induced only moderate 
rather than strong fear about possible ill-consequences (Janis & Feshbach 1953; Hill,
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Chapm an & Donovan, 1998). Following this study, the professional medical 
establishment began to temper their use of fear appeals in the delivery of public 
health education and for decades there followed an institutional guardedness 
against their use (Stemthal & Craig, 1974; Hill et al., 1998). In addition, concerns 
about the ethical implications of invoking fear in public health campaigns may have 
contributed to the reluctance of many professionals to utilise overt or "gory" 
messages in their educational messages (Hill et al., 1998, p.5). However, as 
evidenced by the use of fear appeals in HIV/AIDS management that is documented 
in this thesis, the utilisation of fear appeals in public health continues.
Since achieving prominence in the mid-20th century, fear appeal theory has 
developed substantially. The influential theoretical frameworks informing fear 
appeals are outlined by Dillard (1994) as Drive Theory, the Parallel Response Model 
and the Subjective Expected Utility model, but im portant additional explanations 
have been offered, including Witte's Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte, 1998; 
Witte & Allen, 2000). The earliest to inform the literature of fear appeal study is 
Drive Theory, which predicts that information contained in a message evokes fear 
as an emotional reaction that acts as drive; the respondent seeks to alleviate their 
experience of this drive and that motivates a coping response which could, if 
steered, be the adoption of a healthy or productive behaviour (Craig & Sternthal, 
1974, p.24). Following the initial establishment of Drive Theory, Leventhal's Parallel 
Process Model (PPM) was developed during the 1960s and 1970s (Witte, 1998, 
p.426). With PPM came a greater analytical attention to the unproductive outcomes 
of fear appeals and an attem pt to locate the source of the irrational or "highly 
emotional response [that] may disrupt adaptive behaviour" (Stemthal & Craig, 
1974, p.26). The Parallel Process Model assumes that fear appeals invoke two 
independent processes within the respondent; an attempt to reduce the danger 
faced and an attempt to reduce the fear they experience. Building on Drive Theory, 
PPM offers an explanation for the nonmonotonic relationship between fear levels 
and persuasion that were noted by Janis & Fesbach (1953), whereby initial increases 
in fear increase persuasion amongst the audience but subsequent increases, from 
moderate to strong levels, results in decreased persuasion (see also, Stemthal &
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Craig, 1974). According to the PPM, the audience engages in both "fear control and 
danger control" as two separate processes, and fear control became "the scapegoat 
responsible for irrational actions" (Dillard, 1994, pp.298-301). For instance, "refusal 
to personalise the possibility of acquiring AIDS [sic] as a result of maintaining 
multiple sexual partners, lessens the fear of the virus, but not the danger" 
(Freimuth, Edgar & Hammond, 1987, p.39; Dillard, 1994, pp.298-9).
Although drive theory has lost some of its conceptual dominance in the field 
of clinical psychological studies (Witte & Allen, 2000, p.593), it remains a useful 
conceptual tool for understanding the utilisation of fear appeals in securitization 
processes which, unlike the empirical studies that inform the psychological 
literature, take place at the collective rather than individual level. The similarities 
are apparent in Dillard's (1994) explanation of drive theory, which mirrors the 
Copenhagen School's explanation of securitizing speech acts:
Fear-as-a-drive was aroused by exposure to a message that detailed the 
gruesome consequences of failure to behave in accordance with the 
advocacy. Cues were provided in the message as to the 'appropriate 
response'. In a public health setting, fear appeals range in topic from dental 
care to sexually transmitted disease, but display a significant uniformity in 
their suasory message: 'If you value your health, then you should change 
your behaviour', (p.302).
Such messages, when funded and delivered by the state (as in the cases studied by 
Hill et al., 1998; Wakefield, Freeman & Donovan, 2003), are examples of what 
Foucault dubbed the "era of govemmentalisation" in which the welfare of 
populations is governed through the exercise of sovereign and disciplinary powers, 
including anti-smoking legislation or the legal requirement to wear seat-belts (Elbe, 
2009, p.59). Despite criticism over their ethicality and practicality, fear appeals have 
remained prevalent in public health and a growing body of empirical research 
reporting a positive fear-persuasion relationship led to a resurgence in their use 
toward the end of the 20th century (Stemthal & Craig, 1974; Soames Job, 1988). This 
is particularly evident in Australia, where public health campaigns to reduce 
tobacco smoking have been much-studied for their use of fear appeals (e.g., Hill et 
al., 1998, p.8). However, the use of fear appeals to induce behaviour in the field of 
public health is a problematic and contested issue; public health researchers and
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practitioners continue to contend that fear appeals are liable to backfire without 
careful management (Witte & Allen, 2000, p.591; Ygram Peters et al., 2012). It is the 
issue of management that is most salient to this thesis; the research here concludes 
that in order for securitization of HIV/AIDS to be productive, and to avoid negative 
impact on HIV management, fear that is invoked through securitization messages 
must be controlled. In Chapter 6, the securitizing fear appeals employed by the 
Director of UNAIDS were productive because the audience, UNSC Member states, 
were able to take action to mitigate their fear of HIV-induced insecurity by 
instructing Peacekeeper troops to deal with the issue.
3.6. Criteria Determining Fear Appeal Success
Fear appeals have "great potential" for stimulating behavioural change 
when they are employed correctly (Hill et al., 1998, p.8). Growing research into the 
mechanisms of successful fear appeals led to increasingly sophisticated models for 
their application during the late 20th century. This interest was in part due to their 
applicability to the field of commercial advertising, in which health-orientated fear 
appeals are still frequently found in the marketing strategies of companies selling 
pharmaceuticals, cleaning products, and a range of lifestyle-related consumable 
goods. W ithout engaging in an extensive review of the scientific literature, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper, the most commonly agreed variables of the fear 
appeal are explained below. The most significant conclusion to be drawn from this 
review is that the success of a fear appeal is determined by three variables: the level 
of fear invoked; the audience's perceptions of threat severity, which also relates to 
their own perceived susceptibility; and the perceived efficacy of avoidance 
responses, which relates to their perceived ability to reduce the threat and mitigate 
risk (Witte & Allen, 2000, p.591). Intrinsic to this issue of perception is the crucial 
role of both audience and fear appeal communicator. Drawing from securitization 
theory, these variables are akin to the facilitating conditions laid out in Security: a 
New Framework for Analysis (Buzan et al., 1998, p.33), where the Copenhagen School 
identifies the socially granted authority of the securitizing actor as a facilitating 
condition of successful securitization. In the psychological literature, the credibility
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of the fear appeal communicator is also related to the level of persuasion they effect 
(Stemthal & Craig, 1974). Thus, audience perceptions are an im portant variable 
affecting success; the perceived authority of the fear appeal communicator 
determines the audiences' acceptance of their claims about threat severity, 
vulnerability, and efficacy of proposed responses.
3.6.1. Correlation between levels of Fear and Persuasion
Meta-analysis of fear appeal studies concludes that there is a positive 
correlation between increased fear levels and audience persuasion (Stemthal & 
Craig, 1974; Witte & Allen, 2000; Ygram Peters et al., 2012). Appraisals of fear 
appeals in the literature reveal that when appeals increase levels of utilised fear 
from low to moderate, persuasion of the audience also increases (McGuire, 1968; 
Stemthal & Craig, 1974). However, Drive Theory postulates that after a certain level 
of fear is reached, further increase in its intensity is likely to decrease the audience's 
acceptance of the message (McGuire, 1968; Stemthal & Craig, 1974, p.24). Thus the 
relationship is nonmonotonic; whilst initial increases in fear also increases 
persuasion amongst the audience, subsequent increases from moderate to strong 
levels of fear result in decreased levels of persuasion (see McGuire, 1968, p. 191; 
Stemthal & Craig, 1974). In the securitization process, fear appeals are employed in 
the construction of an existential threat and the success of this process is gauged 
according to the Copenhagen School not by the behavioural change induced in 
agents or audience, but by the levels of persuasion amongst that audience (Buzan et 
al., 1998, p.25). Therefore, securitizing actors seeking to complete a successful 
securitization and threat construction could be advised on the basis of these meta­
analyses to enhance the level of fear utilised in their construction of the existential 
threat, although they should be wary of invoking too great a fear, lest the audience 
reject the message (McGuire, 1968; Witte & Allen, 2000, p.593).
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3.6.2. Threat Severity
There are two dimensions im portant to threat perception in this context: the 
audience's own perceived susceptibility to the threat articulated within the fear 
appeal and their judgem ent of the severity of that threat, or the magnitude of harm  
expected (Witte & Allen, 2000, p.592). In a securitization process, the Copenhagen 
School dem ands that the threat m ust be presented as "existential"; threatening the 
very survival of the referent object (Buzan et al., 1998, pp.5, 21, 23-27, 33). In this 
regard, the claimed severity of the threat is assured in the securitization speech act, 
although the audience's acceptance of that claim is not guaranteed.
3.6.3. Specific Recommendations
Increased fear is linked to an increased persuasion effect from appeals, but 
the relationship between fear levels and behavioural change is problematic 
(Stemthal & Craig, 1974; Witte & Allen, 2000). Whilst there is some positive 
correlation between fear levels and behavioural change induced by fear appeals, this 
link remains weak (Witte & Allen, 2000, p.602). Behavioural change is indicated by 
measuring subsequent intention to change by the audience following a fear appeal, 
or their compliance with the position advocated in the persuasive appeal, such as 
cessation of smoking or practising 'safe sex'. Significantly, the likelihood of 
behavioural change can be increased if specific recommendations are included with 
the suasive fear appeal message, and the audience should perceive these to be both 
achievable and effective in reducing the physical threat (Sternthal & Craig, 1974; 
Soames Job, 1988; Witte & Allen, 2000). Perceived efficacies of the behaviours or 
responses that are advocated in the fear appeal are a significant variable 
determining the success of that appeal; these perceptions are categorised in two 
ways: the audience's perception of their own ability to fulfil the actions required, 
and the perceived efficacy of those actions in averting the threat (Witte & Allen, 
2000, p.592).
Whilst this thesis adopts the normative position that it is desirable for 
HIV/AIDS management to promote effective behavioural change and to mitigate the
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risk of infection or transmission among subjects, it should be noted that HIV/AIDS 
securitization might be conducted by actors seeking to implement measures of 
control over populations, or that seek to break the bounds of normal political 
procedure for other reasons. Where the end goal is not to promote subject health, 
the necessity of invoking sustained and risk averse behaviour among subjects is no 
longer relevant, as construction of the existential threat should be sufficient to 
legitimate recourse to an extraordinary response.
3.7. Conclusion
There is significant capacity for mismanaged fear to become unproductive or, as 
illustrated in Chapter 4, to enhance negative and destructive perceptions of people 
associated with the proposed threat. This is particularly salient in the case of 
HIV/AIDS, where unproductive fear leads to stigmatisation of PLWHA and directly 
undermines efficacious responses to the disease. To avoid unintended and negative 
consequences, fear appeals should only be used when pilot studies have shown 
them to successfully deliver high-threat messages and to enhance efficacy (Witte & 
Allen 2000; Ygram Peters et al., 2012). Dillard (1994, p.297) proposes that the fear 
appeal should have two components: a part of the message that instils fear and 
another that assuages it. W ithout these components and w ithout testing, fear 
appeals can backfire and invoke in the audience a defensive and counterproductive 
reaction (Witte & Allen, 2000, p.607).
This chapter has established that in order for fear appeals to be effective in 
prompting behavioural change or imparting information in a meaningful way, they 
m ust be accompanied by a set of actionable measures by which the audience can 
respond to the threat productively and mitigate the fear invoked. W ithout inclusion 
of suggested responses, such as smoking cessation, tooth brushing, or the use of 
condoms during sexual intercourse, the fear appeal is likely to backfire and provoke 
only anxiety and fear in its unproductive form. The productive fear appeal and 
response proposal m ust also be articulated by an actor with sufficient authority to 
persuade the audience of the severity of the threat and the efficacy of the proposed 
response. Chapter 6 explores a successful and productive process of securitization at
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the international level, where the securitizing actor, the Executive Director of 
UNAIDS, possessed sufficient authority to convince his audience at the United 
Nations Security Council to adopt the extraordinary responses that he proposed. 
Before moving on to the empirical studies of fear appeals in action, the following 
chapter outlines the specific ways in which unproductive fear causes harmful 
responses to HIV/AIDS by exacerbating stigma and creating barriers to effective 
responses.
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Chapter 4. Problematizing the Security-Fear-HIV Link
This chapter outlines the problematic nature of linking HIV/AIDS to security 
and the negative consequences of using fear appeals in HIV/AIDS related messages. 
Securitizing HIV/AIDS is problematized here and in the wider literature primarily 
because it undermines effective and ethical responses to the epidemic (for instance, 
see Elbe, 2006). HIV/AIDS is best managed through practical responses that are 
unhindered by stigma, discrimination, or unproductive fear and the most successful 
responses have been those that promote pragmatic and open discussion of the virus, 
that empower people living with or affected by it, and that recognise and meet the 
demand for socially and culturally appropriate interventions (UNAIDS, 2007, 
2012a). Each HIV/AIDS epidemic differs depending on its locality and the unique 
epidemiological and demographic conditions that it assumes (The Lancet, 2004), but 
all are shaped by the social and cultural factors that determine vulnerability and 
susceptibility to the virus. These factors include gender inequality, income 
distribution, legal status, socio-economic status, and education (Whiteside & Sunter, 
2000, p.38; Holden, 2003; Davies, 2009, pp.70-75). Perhaps most significantly, all 
epidemics engender stigma and discrimination that becomes a defining feature of 
their progression and mitigation. This chapter examines the reasons w hy it is 
possible to securitize HIV/AIDS and finds that the fear that is invoked by 
securitization is also a root cause for the 'exceptional' levels of stigma attached to 
the disease, which is intrinsically linked to the social aspects of the disease 
epidemiology (Parker & Aggleton, 2003, p .13). The utilisation of securitization 
rhetoric and fear appeals serves to enhance the processes of 'othering' that 
exacerbates stigmatisation and discrimination against PLWHA and it is an 
ineffective means of communicating educational messages about HIV/AIDS or 
promoting behavioural change and risk avoidance. After outlining the links 
between the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS and fear of the virus, the problematic 
relationship between fear and stigma is examined, emphasising the negative impact 
of stigma on effective HIV management.
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4.1. Facilitating the Securitization of HIV/AIDS
As established in the preceding chapters, securitization consists of the 
construction of an existential threat through the use of suasive fear appeals and the 
rhetoric of survival, threat, and defence. As a potential existential threat, HIV/AIDS 
possesses many qualities that are conducive to its successful securitization; qualities 
that would be referred to by the Copenhagen School as "facilitating conditions" and 
that are examined in the previous chapter (Buzan at el., 1998, p.33). The 
Copenhagen School outlines facilitating conditions that can be separated into two 
categories; those related to the internal linguistic component of the speech act and 
those related to the external social conditions (Buzan et al., 1998, pp.32-33). 
Linguistically, the speech act must employ the grammatical rhetoric of security by 
proposing an existential threat and invoking the logic of threat-defence and survival 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p.33). Externally, the social conditions concern the authority of 
the securitizing actor which is defined by the relationship between speaker and 
audience and the nature of the proposed threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p.33). An 
examination of the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS and the most prevalent HIV-security 
claims reveals that all of these conditions have been met. The grammar of security 
has been adopted when discussing HIV/AIDS in influential discourse, including 
meetings of the United Nations Security Council (see Chapter 6), in which the 
epidemic was framed as a threat to national and international security and was 
presented in terms of hum an security as well as more traditional, statist 
frameworks. These claims have been reiterated and propagated by authoritative 
actors who are leaders in the global AIDS response and who possess considerable 
political power, including the World Health Organisation (WHO), various heads of 
states, and international NGOs and civil society groups. Finally, our perceptions of 
HIV/AIDS, which is an infectious microbial threat (as discussed in Chapter 3), 
facilitate its securitization.
In 1992, a report commissioned by the United Nations Global Programme on 
AIDS (GPA) found that HIV/AIDS is a unique issue that dem ands a unique 
globalised response, concluding that, "although other diseases, both past and 
present, share common features with AIDS, no other disease presents the same
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threat to public health and challenge to science" (Knight, 2008, p.19). According to 
the report, the unique status of HIV/AIDS derives from a num ber of 
epidemiological and social factors: first, that "at least 75% of HIV transmission is 
through sexual intercourse, and that sexual behaviour is difficult to change and 
even to talk about" meaning that "moral and religious judgements have restricted a 
range of interventions, from public information and education in schools to condom 
promotion"; second, that the disease is "invariably fatal"; third, that "that AIDS 
prim arily affects young adults in their reproductive and economically productive 
years, with serious consequences for families and communities"; and finally, "the 
fact that, although no country is safe from AIDS, rates of infection are increasing 
faster in the low-income countries, underm ining the developmental and health 
gains of the past two decades -  especially those in child health and life expectancy" 
(Knight, 2008, p.19). In addition, HIV is a 'slow ' disease that typically takes years to 
manifest symptoms, making the epidemic hard to detect it its early stages. The 
unique epidemiological qualities of HIV/AIDS, which make it both threatening and 
difficult to manage, can thus be reduced to two facts: first, that it is spread sexually, 
and therefore engenders a great deal of stigma, and second that it has a long 
incubation period in which symptoms do not manifest but the host is contagious.
Epidemiologists refer to HIV epidemics as being Tow level', 'concentrated' 
or 'generalised', depending on prevalence (the percentage of people living with the 
virus) within the population. Low level epidemics are those in which HIV is largely 
confined to key affected populations, which are defined by their engagement in 
high-risk behaviour. "Very high transmission rates" are found in the following 
groups: people who inject drugs and who share needles, have anal sex, or have sex 
with many partners w ithout protection (WHO & UN AIDS, 2011, p.9). Thus, the key 
affected populations identified by the WHO & UN AIDS (2011, p.9) are sex workers 
(SWs) and their clients, people who inject drugs (PWID), and men who have sex 
with men (MSM). Transgender people are also at higher risk of HIV infection within 
Asia and the Pacific, where new infections are highest among these and other KA.P 
groups (UNAIDS, 2013, p .11); the enhanced vulnerability of these groups stems 
from both their increased exposure to the virus and from the social and economic
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marginalisation and lack of agency that exacerbates risk of infection (Davies, 2009, 
p.71). At the low level stage of an epidemic, prevalence has not reached significant 
num bers within these groups. In a concentrated epidemic, HIV has spread rapidly 
within at least one of these KAPs, fuelled by high-risk behaviour, but is not yet 
established within the general population (WHO & UNAIDS, 2011, pp.4-5). In a 
generalised epidemic, transmission of the virus occurs independently of the KAPs 
but if intervention is practised, it can be expected that prevalence will drop within 
KAPs before dropping in the general population (WHO & UNAIDS, 2011, p.5).
Increased susceptibility to the virus and subsequent increased surveillance 
amongst KAPs means that HIV epidemics are often detected first w ithin these 
populations but this is problematic; since the emergence of the epidemic, the stigma 
attached to HIV/AIDS has exacerbated existing social stigma and discrimination 
already directed toward KAPs, whose risky behaviours are often socially taboo 
and/or illegal. For example, UNAIDS found that Thailand and Myanmar currently 
legislate in ways that hinder the HIV response; both countries criminalise sex work 
in private or public (soliciting), maintain compulsory detention centres for PWID, 
and impose the death penalty for drug-related offences (UNAIDS, 2013, p.27). 
M yanmar also criminalises same-sex sexual activities between consenting adult 
males (UNAIDS, 2013, p.27) and possession of needles for drug injection is illegal. 
Punitive legal environments in both countries have a negative impact on the rights 
of KAPs and other vulnerable groups, hindering their access to HIV services 
including harm  reduction facilities (UNAIDS, 2013, p.26). Furthermore, people 
affected by HIV/AIDS often fear that their infection will lead them to be associated 
with these groups in the eyes of others, discouraging them from accessing support 
services or disclosing their status, making onward transmission more likely.
The epidemiological characteristics of HIV/AIDS make it a disease that is 
particularly likely to invoke fear; as a result, it is also suitable for securitization and 
is likely to invoke stigma and discrimination. In his 1987 address to the UN General 
Assembly, Jonathan Mann, the founding director of the WHO programme on 
HIV/AIDS, perfectly outlined the characteristics of epidemic infection that are so 
problematic: first, the virus enters a community "silently and unnoticed" and
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prevalence increases over many years before visible symptoms manifest; the second 
stage occurs usually after a number of years, when latent HIV infection triggers an 
epidemic of the visible opportunistic diseases that signify AIDS; the final stage is the 
political, social, economic and cultural response to the epidemic that is 
"characterised above all, by exceptionally high levels of stigma, discrimination and, 
at times, collective denial", and that Mann described as being, "as central to the 
global AIDS challenge as the disease itself" (Parker & Aggleton, 2003, p .13). This 
social response has existed since HIV/AIDS was first diagnosed in the 1980s. As a 
new  pathogen, it inspired great fear and dread among the global community for 
two reasons; first, the virus appeared to be extremely lethal and it attacked and 
killed patients in an apparently quick, painful, and visible way. Second, the virus 
was new and very little accurate information about its origin, modes of 
transmission, or any other epidemiological qualities was available. Compounding 
these factors, there was no cure, no vaccination, no treatment, and, for almost five 
years, no accurate or accessible diagnostic test available. HIV/AIDS embodied the 
innate hum an fears of contagion, death, and the unknown. As Enemark (2007) 
suggests, "the health threats most suitable for securitisation are outbreaks of 
infectious diseases -  specifically, those that inspire a level of dread disproportionate 
to their ability to cause illness and death" (p.8). Studying the psychological impact 
of HIV/AIDS, Philip Strong (1990) found that epidemics of infectious disease are 
often accompanied by a psychological epidemic of fear and initial reactions are 
often characterised by "waves of fear, panic, stigma, moralising and calls to action" 
(p.249). This was true of the early response to HIV/AIDS, and despite the concerted 
efforts of CSOs and activists, a pervasive and sometimes unproductive fear of the 
virus remains.
Exacerbating the fear and dread that characterised the early years of the 
emerging epidemic (see Shilts, 1988; Sontag, 1989; Strong, 1990), in Europe and 
North America the virus clearly affected members of already marginalised 
populations at a disproportionate rate, exacerbating stigma that has always been 
linked to the disease (Knight, 2008, p.8). Knowing now that HIV is transmitted 
through bodily fluids, and usually during sexual intercourse or via needle stick, it is
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understood why people who have more or riskier sex, or who use intravenous 
injection, are most at risk of infection. Furthermore, the complex socio-political and 
gender-based vulnerabilities that enhance risk are also now better understood 
(Holden, 2003; Davies, 2009, p.71). But at the outset of the epidemic, emerging 
patterns of infection were among poor, racially distinct communities, in gay males, 
sex workers and their clients, and drug users, and this only served to exacerbate the 
stigma already attached to the virus. Concerning the origin of HIV, discredited but 
pervasive theories that the virus was manufactured by Russian or American Cold 
War scientists, or as part of a neo-colonial attack on Africa, as divine retribution for 
moral deviation, or that it came from hum an sexual contact with apes, all illustrate 
the em bedded fear, stigma, and ethno-centric 'othering' that underpins much of our 
conceptualisation of the epidemic (see, for example, Whiteside & Sunter, 2000, pp.4- 
5; Knight, 2008, pp.8-9).
An additional epidemiological reason that HIV/AIDS is so likely to engender 
fear is that it is a "long wave" epidemic (Garrett, 2005). Once it has entered the 
body, HIV has an incubation period of multiple years, depending on variables that 
include health of the host and viral strain. In 2000, Whiteside & Sunter (2000, p.9) 
estimated that the incubation period in Africa was typically between six and eight 
years. During this time, people remain able to infect others through their bodily 
fluid and are particularly contagious following their own initial infection, before 
their body has recognised the invasive pathogen, and when viral load in the body is 
highest. This period, Pisani (2008, pp .132-133) observed, is likely to be the time in 
which the carrier is engaged with the high risk behaviours that exposed them  to the 
virus in the first place, such a period of frequent sexual intercourse w ith varying 
partners. At the population level, the asymptomatic bu t highly infectious incubation 
period of HIV means that the virus spreads silently throughout a community, 
undetected until many years later when HIV progresses into visibly symptomatic 
AIDS (Whiteside & Sunter, 2000, p. 27; Parker & Aggleton, 2003, p. 13). This makes it 
especially difficult to detect, to prevent, and to curtail an epidemic of HIV/AIDS.
In addition to the mode of transmission, patterns of infection, and the nature 
of the epidemic as a long wave event, the symptomatic manifestation of AIDS is also
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a significant contributing factor to its stigmatization. Once it enters the hum an body, 
the virus attacks and destroys the CD4 cells of the immune system that are normally 
responsible for destroying invading pathogens. W ithout functioning CD4 cells, the 
body is unable to protect itself from microbial threats and the immune system 
cannot function. If HIV infection is left untreated, the number of CD4 cells in the 
body will gradually decline, leaving the host increasingly susceptible to disease. 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is diagnosed following either the 
manifestation of an opportunistic infection or HIV-related cancer, or when the 
num ber of CD4 cells in the immune system drops below a certain level. In 2007, the 
WHO reported the clinical criteria for the diagnosis of advanced HIV (including 
AIDS) in adults and children over five as a CD4 cell count less than 350 per m m 3 of 
blood (WHO, 2007, p.9). A normal CD4 count in a healthy individual ranges from 
500 to 1500 cells per m m 3 of blood (WHO, 2007, p.14). From 2013, the WHO 
recommended that antiretroviral treatment should commence before CD4 counts 
dropped below 500 cells per mm3 of blood, following new evidence that early 
treatment is associated with reduction of viral transmission and lower mortality 
rates among subjects (WHO, 2013, p.92). Treatment using ARVs prevents or slows 
the destruction of the immune system and will reduce the likelihood of 
opportunistic infections in the host. Vulnerability to specific infections differs 
according to different stages of HIV infection, but the most common include 
bacterial diseases such as tuberculosis (TB) and bacterial pneumonia, fungal 
diseases such as candidiasis (causing yeast infections including chronic thrush and 
fungal meningitis), viral diseases such as herpes simplex and herpes zoster virus, 
and HIV-associated cancer such as Kaposi's sarcoma (Avert, 2013). Before treatment 
was developed, AIDS patients were visibly identifiable by the "enormous weight- 
loss" that typified the disease, often a result of "intractable, debilitating, inhuman, 
and humiliating" diarrhoea (Piot, 2012, pp. 131, 145), as well as the chronic fungal 
conditions and skin lesions that accompany advanced herpes and progression of 
Kaposi's sarcoma. The chronic and painful death that followed untreated infection, 
coupled by the "humiliating" and visible nature of both symptoms and the
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perceived "moral transgression" that leads to infection, exacerbates the 
stigmatization of the virus and the people it affects.
4.2. Framing HIV/AIDS as Security
Curley and Herington (2011, p.143) argue that existing literature on the 
securitization of infectious diseases places too great an emphasis on the facilitating 
conditions of the diseases themselves and not enough consideration of the socio­
political context in which securitization processes take place. In their study of 
HIV/AIDS vulnerabilities in post-conflict situations, Seckinelgin, Bigirumwami & 
Morris (2010) also conclude that meaningful analysis demands a "nuanced and 
multifaceted understanding of contextual conditions" (p.516). Although Buzan et 
al., (1998) suggest that both the "social conditions regarding the position of 
authority for the securitizing actor" and the "features of the alleged threats" (p.33) 
are facilitating conditions of the suasive speech act, other securitization scholars 
have criticised the lack of analytical attention awarded to the socio-political 
conditions that might determine securitization outcomes in practice (McDonald, 
2008; Balzacq, 2005). This thesis attempts to provide an examination of the socio­
political conditions in Thailand and Myanmar, as well the w ider context of 
international security studies that provide a backdrop for the responses to 
HIV/AIDS in each case. Since the end of the Cold War, particularly following the 
development of hum an security as a label, infectious disease and health have 
increasingly become a matter of attention for security studies, shifting from the 
realm of 'low politics' to the agenda of priority and urgency that characterises a 
securitized issue (see Ingram, 2008; Davies, 2009; Price-Smith, 2009, p.6). Following 
the seminal UNSC Meeting 4087 on the security implications of HIV/AIDS, the 
disease specifically has been "widely discussed in terms of national and 
international security" (Vieira, 2007; Mclnnes & Rushton, 2010, p.225; Seckinelgin et 
al., 2010, p.515).
In his address to the United Nations Security Council in January 2000, US 
Vice President Al Gore framed HIV/AIDS as a threat not only to hum an security but 
also, explicitly, to the more traditional referent of the state, telling members that:
98
No one can doubt that the havoc wreaked and the toll exacted by HIV/AIDS 
do threaten our security. The heart of the security agenda is protecting lives, 
and we now know that the number of people who will die of AIDS in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century will rival the num ber that dies in all 
of the wars in all of the decades of the twentieth century. When 10 people in 
sub-Saharan Africa are infected every minute; when 11 million children have 
already become AIDS orphans; when a single disease threatens everything 
from economic strength to peacekeeping, we clearly face a security threat of 
the greatest magnitude. (UNSC, 2000, p.2)
Although Gore went on to emphasise the "larger significance" of the meeting 
regarding its capacity to set "precedent for Security Council concern and action on a 
broader security agenda", in actuality the securitizing claims presented that day 
focused on the risk that HIV/AIDS posed in terms of statist, traditional frameworks 
of security (UNSC, 2000, p.2). This is a strategically sound approach for an actor 
attempting to securitize a non-traditional issue; Peterson (2002) found that when 
scholars articulate the link between disease and security from the hum an security 
perspective "their arguments remain at the margins of the security literature ... 
because their appeal to hum an security does not resonate with more traditional 
approaches to national and international security, which focus on physical threats to 
the state" (p.44). This traditionalist approach has been adopted by leading 
authoritative, norm-defining agencies like the UN and WHO, which frame 
HIV/AIDS as a threat to statist concepts of security using claims that have endured 
in the academic literature and that are outlined here; the first is that of HIV/AIDS as 
a threat to state stability.
Claims that HIV/AIDS poses a threat to state security are pervasive in the 
academic and policy literature on the disease (Price-Smith, 2002; Garrett, 2005; 
Enemark, 2007). The logic of these claims usually takes one of two forms: that high 
HIV/AIDS prevalence results in the "long-term depletion of hum an capital [that] 
will undermine national prosperity and effective governance, thereby diminishing 
the range of policy options available to the state" (Price-Smith, 2002, p.119); or that it 
will act as a stressor that exacerbates civil unrest, for instance as the population 
blames a failing political elite for inadequate management of the disease, or as 
infection in the labour force will cause economic decline (Price-Smith, 2002, p. 120; 
Garrett, 2005). Observation of the progression of the epidemic since the 1980s,
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including in the severely affected states of sub-Saharan Africa, offers no evidence of 
a direct link between HIV and civil unrest (Garrett, 2005, p .11). However, Garrett 
(2005, p.10) finds evidence that HIV is claiming the lives of parliamentarians and 
political leaders in countries that already experienced acute shortages of highly 
skilled personnel, such as lawyers, doctors, nurses, teachers, financial planners, 
managers, engineers, and technicians. Price-Smith (2009) also outlines empirical 
evidence in support of these claims, finding that the epidemic has the potential to 
"compromise prosperity, political stability and national security in seriously 
affected regions over the longer term" (p.93), especially in the context of poor 
governance. However, in their study of HIV in Africa, Whiteside, De Waal & Gebre- 
Tensae (2006, p.215) found that claims in which HIV/AIDS prevalence was linked to 
state insecurity were often based on the assumption that high prevalence reduced 
economic stability and that these assumptions were themselves based on economic 
models no longer suited to the contemporary context of many African states. 
Furthermore, in a review of the empirical evidence available, Barnett & Dutta (2007, 
p.217) found no conclusive evidence of a direct link between HIV and the fragility 
or economic vulnerability of states.
The second framing of HIV/AIDS as threat to statist security focuses on this 
purported link between infection rates and economic instability, which has been 
linked to wider insecurity both at the national and international level. HIV/AIDS 
disproportionately affects people in the professional classes and of a sexually active 
age, meaning that when prevalence exists in the general population it is usually 
highest within the most economically active sectors of society, creating a "youth- 
bulge" demographic through an accelerated death rate in adult populations 
(Garrett, 2005, p.11). This has led analysts to predict an adverse economic im pact in 
countries with high prevalence, resulting from both depletion of productive labour 
forces and from a diversion of personal economic resources away from savings and 
into care provision (Whiteside & Sunter, 2000, p.85). Garrett (2005, p .11) also 
reasoned that the rising labour costs in the export industries of affected developing 
countries, such as mining in Russia and African states, will have detrimental impact 
for (rich country) foreign trading partners.
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Another way in which fear of HIV/AIDS taps into prevailing anxieties about
developing world. Since 9/11, the USA has shown renewed interest in infectious 
diseases as a possible source of insecurity for the state, first in diseases in 
w eaponised forms, and second in the potential for severely disease-affected (poor) 
communities to become "breeding grounds' for terrorist recruitment. As Garrett
(2005) points out, "since 9/11, many political analysts have asserted that the 
projected 42 million children, cumulatively, who will have been orphaned by HIV 
by 2010, constitute a fertile ground for terrorist recruitment" (p.23) and these 
linkages have been reiterated by others (Peterson, 2002, p.46). Whiteside, et al.,
(2006) found "no empirical evidence" (p.215) for the postulated links between 
increased HIV prevalence and increased crime rates in a society. Furthermore, they 
found that "there do not appear to be any empirical links between AIDS and 
terrorism whatsoever — the idea of people living with AIDS flocking to volunteer as 
suicide bombers collapses at the first scrutiny" (Whiteside et al., 2006, p.216). 
However, this hypothesis has existed since the first recognition of HIV/AIDS by 
developed, rich nations. A recently declassified report reveals that in 1987, the CIA 
were investigating potential links between HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
national security concerns of the USA, finding that the epidemic could lead to "anti­
western" sentiment and increase susceptibility of affected communities to Soviet 
propaganda, leading them to "lash out at the West for what they view as inadequate 
assistance" (CIA, 1987). This logic endures; writing for the US Council on Foreign 
Relations, Garrett (2005) reiterated these concerns, finding that:
There is increasing concern that the nexus of poverty, HIV/AIDS, and 
alienation from the West could provide fertile ground for anti-Western 
violence, possibly terrorism. There is no support to date for assertions that 
people infected with HIV, or the families and orphans of those who 
succumbed to AIDS, are likely to be engaged in acts of terrorism. Nor is 
there any but abstract support for potential links between anti-Western 
terrorism and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As for the future, however, it is not 
inconceivable that AIDS-ravaged societies might spawn movements of 
strong anti-Western discontent, possibly leading to acts of violence. This 
would particularly be the case if the wealthy nations are perceived to have 
abandoned poor, HIV-afflicted states, (p.12)
global threats is the proposed link between terrorism and epidemic disease in the
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It is noteworthy that the epidemic infectious disease burden falls heaviest in the 
developing world and in populations affected by poverty. The disease-terrorism 
link fits with the belief that underdevelopment creates 'breeding grounds' for 
terrorism, a logic that informs American foreign policy, development aid, and 
possibly the substantial investment in global HTV/AIDS responses by the US 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
More prevalent than this proposed link between terrorism and HIV/AIDS is 
the claim that HIV/AIDS presents a specific threat to military, police, and security 
forces of affected states. Whiteside et al., (2006) outline the four forms in which this 
assumption typically appears: first is that military populations are assumed to have 
a higher prevalence of HIV than civilian populations, due to the culture and sexual 
behaviour of soldiers; second is that the epidemic is endangering the functioning of 
national military forces; third is that war and conflict contribute to the spread of the 
virus, particularly because of sexual violence during war; and fourth is that "AIDS 
has the potential to disrupt national, regional and international security" (p.201). In 
2005, Garrett (2005) found "little evidence" (p.9) that HIV prevalence was higher in 
military rather than general populations, except where personnel were deployed 
away from their families for extended periods of time, and little evidence that HIV 
transmission increased during conflict except where rape was used as a weapon of 
war. In their "sober appraisal" (p.201) of the evidence, Whiteside et al., (2006) also 
concluded that a substantial revision of the military-HIV vulnerability claims is 
necessary. However, when HIV/AIDS was discussed by the UN Security Council in 
2000, it was partly because the Council were persuaded that its Peacekeeper forces 
were at high risk of contracting and spreading HIV when deployed on missions (see 
Chapter 6 for more detail). When links are made between military forces and 
infectious disease, such as the attribution of STI and HIV infection to Indonesian 
Peacekeepers in Cambodia in 1993, or the 2010 Haitian cholera outbreak that 
followed Peacekeeper deployment, the high profile nature of the actors and the 
innate fear of the external invasion that they inspire add traction to the military- 
disease threat claim.
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Despite their popularity, the HIV-security claims have not been uncontested. 
Critiques of the HIV-security linkage take two forms: those disputing the validity of 
empirical data or models on which these claims are based (e.g., Prins, 2004; Barnett 
& Prins, 2006) and those that concern the potentially negative outcome of HIV/AIDS 
securitization in practice (e.g., Elbe, 2006). Addressing the first of these critiques, it is 
im portant to note that despite a "paucity of strong field-work studies" and a lack of 
empirical evidence (Prins, 2004, p.932), there has been considerable financial 
investment in global HIV/AIDS responses that are based on the potential links 
between international security and the epidemic. During the course of this research, 
the author was told by one high-profile scholar who asked to remain anonymous 
that an academic paper submitted to UNAIDS was explicitly rejected because it 
underm ined the entrenched HIV-security links on which UNAIDS policy was 
based. Furthermore, that author was also told by a member of the CIA that 
challenging the HIV-security link risked undermining the continued US 
government support of PEPFAR, which was funded to address the supposed links 
between international security and the epidemic. Such experiences might lead 
scholars to question the ethical implications of challenging the purported links 
between HIV and traditional security, given the massive levels of financial 
investment that could be dependent upon them.
The potential benefits of securitizing HIV/AIDS are huge. Because 
securitization entails the prioritisation of a proposed threat above all others, it is an 
extremely effective way of mobilising resources with which to deal with an issue. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 6, securitization of HIV/AIDS has been employed by 
leading international organisation UNAIDS in order to mobilise a global response. 
The strategic inclusion of HIV/AIDS on the agenda of the United Nations Security 
Council served two practical purposes; first, it mobilised political support and 
attention, forcing states and political leaders to confront w hat might otherwise be 
regarded as a politically unsavoury health issue, or a topic of relevance only to 
"deviant" and marginalised groups (Holden, 2003, p. 17). Second, securitization of 
HIV/AIDS has mobilised more tangible, financial resources from the global 
community, originating from both private and government sectors. In 2013, the US
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PEPFAR fund alone contributed 6.5 billion USD to the global F1IV/AIDS response 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014). The Global Fund, which has invested over 17 
billion USD in the worldwide HIV/AIDS response (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014), 
was established following Kofi Annan's call for a 7 to 10 billion dollar "war chest" 
to tackle HIV/AIDS (Ferriman, 2001, p.1082). Annan made this statement at the a 
2001 special summit on AIDS that was convened following the seminal Security 
Council meeting in 2000 and it related explicitly to the securitization and the 
lobbying of UNAIDS and the UNSC (Piot, 2012, pp.289-290).
The unrivalled capacity for security issues to attract resources has been 
noted by hopeful securitizing actors and academics alike; Curley & Herington (2011) 
found that securitization of infectious disease "promises ... considerable resources 
for the defence of people's well-being; regardless of a state's attitude to public 
security" (p.142). Peterson (2002) outlines the prevailing logic that motivates many 
securitizing claims: "unless a link is drawn between epidemic disease and national 
security, not hum an security, security elites will pay little attention" (p.51). Garrett
(2005) and Piot (2000) both concluded that securitization is the most effective way to 
gain attention and financial resources for disease control; indeed, Piot's (2012) 
strategic employment of securitization rhetoric from his position as Director of 
UNAIDS was conducted on this premise, based on his assertion that "in 
international politics there are only two things that count: the economy and security. 
As they say in France, the rest is just literature" (p.248).
4.3. The Negative Effects of Securitizing HIV/AIDS
In addition to its benefits, there are also myriad dangers inherent to the 
securitization process. "Linking disease and security is a means of highlighting a 
dire problem, capturing scarce resources, and accelerating national, international, 
and transnational responses" (Peterson, 2002, p.50), but the influx of financial 
resources has been proposed as a source of poor management and other negative 
impacts. Pisani (2008) argues that "the sheer volume of money now available 
washes away the need to use what we have well" (p.269) and it has been noted that 
the exceptional response to HIV/AIDS might have served to "syphon off resources"
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from other im portant health and aid programs (England, 2007; Piot, 2012, p.263). As 
discussed above, securitization consists of prioritization and thus competition 
between issues, dem anding that those which are most persuasively articulated as 
security threats are awarded the greatest allocation of resources in response.
Elbe (2006) outlined five "ethical dangers" (p.132) of securitizing HIV/AIDS 
that, during fieldwork, emerged as useful indicators of securitization in practice. 
These 'dangers' stem from the realist understanding of security that is at the heart of 
securitization theory, by which survival and exceptionality are at the heart of the 
otherwise 'radical' framework (see Chapter 2). Stritzel (2007, p.367) also pointed out 
that the centrality of exceptionality and the logic of threat and defence may be 
ethically problematic. The dangers that Elbe (2006) identified, although largely 
theoretical rather than based on empirical study, also resonated closely with the 
fears and concerns raised by CSO and NGO leaders interviewed for this research in 
Thailand and Myanmar (see Chapter 7 and 8).
The first is the danger that framing HIV as a matter of state security risks 
pushing responses away from civil society and toward military and intelligence 
organisations that are not well suited to dealing with a health issue (Elbe, 2006). In 
empirical Chapters 7 and 8, these concerns are outlined as primary determinants 
that shaped the nature of the civil society-led response to HIV/AIDS in Thailand and 
Myanmar. In Myanmar, the distinction between state and security apparatus was 
largely immaterial for most of the late 20th century when HIV/AIDS appeared. The 
authoritarian military junta was entirely unsuited to deal with the sensitive and 
complex issues surrounding HIV/AIDS, particularly according to the prevailing 
knowledge norms, which hold that effective HIV/AIDS responses accompany 
progression in hum an development and hum an rights (UNAIDS, 2012a, pp.5-6). 
Whilst an authoritarian state may in theory be better suited than its liberal 
counterparts to implementing the emergency measures of a security-based response 
(Porapakkham, Pramarnpol & Athibhoddhi, 1995, p.3; Pisani, 2008, p.261; Tenni, 
2012), fieldwork in M yanmar revealed that the national response to HIV/AIDS had 
been led by CSOs (both domestic and international) precisely because they had 
rejected security-HIV links and downplayed securitizing rhetoric in order to
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maintain control over orchestrating the response (Chapter 8). This was done 
because, as Elbe (2006) hypothesised, CSO leaders and AIDS activists feared that the 
state would be unsuitable for coordinating a response and that massive violations of 
hum an rights would occur if they were to do so.
Related to this is the danger that securitization could make international 
responses to HIV/AIDS the "function of narrow national interest rather than of 
altruism" and could allow states to "prioritize AIDS funding for their elites and 
armed forces who play a crucial role in maintaining security" (Elbe, 2006, p. 119). In 
their study of Avian flu securitization in Southeast Asia, Curley & Herington (2011) 
note that, "instead of promoting the global public health agenda of the WHO, the 
securitization of H5N1 has actually promoted states to securitize in self-interested 
ways, prioritising domestic rather than transnational (referent object) concerns" 
(p. 165). A response based on the threat-defence logic of securitization, which 
favours the restrictive and narrow interests of the state, is not preferential to an 
altruistic response for two reasons; first, the threat-defence logic inspired by 
traditional conceptions of security hinders the potential for cooperation that is 
essential to dealing with infectious diseases, which are fundamentally transnational 
threats (Caballero-Anthony, 2008). Second, such a response undermines the ethical 
and hum anitarian responsibility of rich states to deal with health issues that affect 
only their poorer counterparts. Securitization of infectious disease, Peterson (2002, 
p.46) argues, allows a state to ignore diseases unless or until they present an 
immediate risk to security or other national interests. There is a danger that health 
and infectious disease, like other "global threats" past and present, will simply 
become another form through which rich and developed countries can manifest 
their fear of the poor, 'other' that is a source of physical and moral contagion 
(Ingram, 2008a, pp.75, 78). To mitigate such risks, Davies (2009) advocates a 
globalist rather than statist perspective on global health, arguing that the former 
"tends to acknowledge a broader variety of health concerns because it is primarily 
interested in the issues that affect most people rather than the health issues that 
could affect the security of the state apparatus" (p.29). However, like Peterson 
(2002), Davies (2009) notes that "in practice, little progress has been made without
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calling on traditional statist concerns and without representing health problems as 
potential threats to security and stability" (p.29). Despite the utility of securitization 
rhetoric in invoking a global response, Peterson (2002) also points out that students 
of global health should look to the case of environmental security to illustrate the 
potential negative consequences of securitizing non-traditional issues that transcend 
the usual geo-political boundaries of sovereign states, explaining that, "linking an 
urgent issue to security may raise awareness, bu t it likely also will hinder much of 
the cooperation that hum an security and public health advocates seek" (p.46).
A third potential danger of securitizing HIV/AIDS is that the invocation of 
exceptionality and emergency measures could lead to violation of the civil liberties 
of PLWHA (Elbe, 2006). As Davies (2009) explains, "there is an underlying tension 
in ensuring that health issues receive the attention of those engaged in 'h igh politics' 
w ithout compromising the needs and rights of individuals" (p.29). Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8, which detail the HIV/AIDS responses enacted in Thailand and Myanmar, 
reveal that this danger was a prim ary motivation for the mobilisation of civil society 
groups that have defined the national responses of both countries. Originally 
formed as self-help services made up  of PLWHA (Tenni, 2012; Swift, 2013), these 
CSOs assumed a vital role in providing information and support to people affected 
by HIV/AIDS, before their work progressed into rights-based activism. While the 
operational environment for CSOs and NGOs is markedly different in Thailand and 
Myanmar, both countries have benefitted from the work of dedicated rights-based 
organisations. These groups have mobilised to provide support and protection of 
civil liberties that would otherwise be threatened or neglected by the state.
Finally, Elbe (2006) concludes that the threat defence logic at the core of 
securitization relies on the portrayal of the virus as an "overwhelming threat" and 
in doing so, "works against ongoing efforts to normalize social perceptions 
regarding HIV/AIDS" (p. 120). A distinct feature of HIV/AIDS related CSOs is that 
often they are founded or staffed by PLWHA, in part because many groups were 
formed as support groups for PLWHA and later mobilised to undertake a wider 
remit of rights-based activism. Reflecting the centrality of their role, the Greater 
Inclusion of People with HIV/AIDS (GIPA) has been codified as principle or norm in
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the international response (UNAIDS, 2007a). As a result, civil society and activist 
groups are overwhelmingly orientated toward protecting or advancing the hum an 
rights of people with or affected by HIV/AIDS and the "goal of many of these 
groups has been to move away from the perception that people living with 
HIV/AIDS are dangerous 'outsiders' and a threat to society" (Elbe, 2006, p.130). Elbe
(2006) outlines the potentially detrimental effect that the HIV-security logic can have 
on these ambitions but, developing this concern, this thesis examines how framing 
HIV/AIDS as a security threat also amounts to a process of 'othering', whereby 
people with or affected by HIV are seen as abnormal and are stigmatized. The 
'othering' process undermines the effectiveness and ethicality of securitization 
based HIV responses; it is likely to am ount to an ineffective method by which to 
communicate messages about HIV/AIDS and it can lead to the stigmatisation of 
PLWHA, causing discrimination against them and violation of their hum an rights.
4.4. Problematizing Fear Appeals in Public Health
Concerning the first of these issues, Slavin, Batrouney & M urphey (2007, 
p.136) demonstrated that fear appeals used in HIV prevention messages can lead to 
'othering' which is shaming and judgemental and this acts as a mechanism by 
which fear messages are discounted by the audience, regardless of their actual risk. 
In this context, 'othering' is closely linked to shame about sexuality and HIV (Slavin 
et al., 2007, p.136). Essentially, fear appeals that link HIV/AIDS and security can lead 
to a denial of personal risk and aversion to HIV prevention measures. The use of 
fear appeals in public health is ethically fraught and practically complex. However, 
as outlined above, the suasive fear appeal is often utilised in public health messages 
in which abstinence from 'risky' behaviour is the intended goal. Early government 
responses to HIV/AIDS in the UK included a national campaign of fear appeal- 
based public health messages launched in 1987, which featured a tombstone and the 
slogan: "AIDS. D on't die of ignorance" (Appendix C). Television adverts were aired 
in which spectral music and gothic images were overlaid by a m an's voice intoning:
There is now a danger that has become a threat to us all. It is a deadly
disease and there is no known cure. The virus can be passed during sexual
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intercourse with an infected person; anyone can get it, man or woman. So far 
it has been confined to small groups but it's spreading. So protect yourself, 
and read this leaflet w hen it arrives. If you ignore AIDS it could be the death 
of you. So don 't die of ignorance. (UK Government Central Office of 
Information, 1987)
The advert refers to an accompanying leaflet sent by mail to every household in the 
UK, providing information about transmission of the virus. It is included in 
Appendix C. The rationale of these tactics is that such messages inspire fear in its 
productive form, motivating the subject to desist in harmful behaviour. But, as 
discussed above, fear is not always manifest in productive behaviour and can result 
instead in aversion and irrational, unproductive, or even actively destructive action. 
The subject blinded by terror cannot think in causal or linear terms about the 
eventual consequences of her actions; this is of use to M ontesquieu's awful despot 
who fears intellectual challenges that could undermine the status quo (Robin, 2004, 
p.62), but it is not productive when the intention is to inspire careful consideration 
of long-term health risks associated with certain behaviours, such as smoking or 
drug use.
Fear related to public health issues is problematic for three broad reasons; 
first are normative concerns that a population existing in a state of pervasive anxiety 
and dread is not, in fact, secure. This follows from the broad concept of security as 
freedom from fear which features in the logics of hum an security, but is also closely 
related to the second problem, that pervasive anxiety is not conducive to productive 
health behaviours, particularly in managing health issues with complex social 
dimensions such as HIV/AIDS. Finally, using fear in public health messages and 
governance is likely to result in stigmatisation of people affected by the disease. This 
logic informs the position adopted by the United Nations and is found in 
established knowledge norms in the field of HIV/AIDS management: that 
stigmatization and discrimination related to HIV is identified as a barrier to 
effective management of the disease (UNAIDS, 2009a; UNAIDS, 2012a).
Assessing the practical outcomes of the fear-appeal approach, Batrouney 
(2004) conducted an investigation into the lasting effect of fear appeals used by the 
Australian state in their early state response to HIV/AIDS. In an attempt to educate
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the public, the Australian government funded a series of television adverts that 
featured a solemn 'grim  reaper' figure representing death, not dissimilar to the 
strategy used in the 1987 British campaign. In the study, Batrouney (2004) 
concluded that,
Quite apart from the potential for a campaign like this to have devastating 
effects on the health and quality-of-life outcomes for people living with HIV, 
there is considerable empirical evidence to demonstrate that fear appeals in 
health promotion would not work, given the circumstances of the current 
epidemic, (p.l)
According to Slavin et al., (2007, p.136) fear appeals used for general HIV education 
may lead to scepticism about the safety, effectiveness, and tolerability of ARVs, 
possibly discouraging adherence to treatm ent regimens. In another study of fear 
appeals in HIV education, Blumberg (2000) finds that at the level of the individual, 
these appeals are capable of promoting subject disengagement and aversion rather 
than positive action and, more worryingly, can trigger the rejection of the message 
through "counter-argumentation" and "attention avoidance" (pp.787-789) 
responses. Empirical studies conducted by Witte & Green (2006), Terblanche-Smit & 
Terblanche (2010), Bastien (2011), and Soscia (2012) indicate a positive relationship 
between fear appeals and information delivery and behavioural change related to 
HIV prevention. However, high levels of fear related to HIV do not necessarily 
equate to safer sexual behaviour (Bell, Molitor & Neil, 1999), and Sherr (1990) found 
that using fear in HIV prevention increases anxiety among low risk groups, in this 
case HIV-positive men, but has little impact on (potentially) higher risk groups, in 
this case HIV-negative men.
The effectiveness and ethicality of using fear appeals in HIV prevention 
messages remains a contested issue, bu t when they are used fear appeals m ust be 
carefully designed and balanced in order to illicit a response that is productive for 
the objective of the campaign. Failure to achieve this balance can result in 
heightened levels of unproductive fear and has been linked to increases in risky 
behaviour among audiences (Batrouney, 2004). To be productive, fear appeals must 
be delivered by an authoritative, credible agent to an audience that feels susceptible 
to the proposed threat. The appeal should be accompanied by suggested responses
110
which the audience believes will mitigate the fear they experience. When 
accompanied by high efficacy messages and a perception of susceptibility w ithin the 
audience, there is empirical evidence to suggest that fear appeals can be effective in 
attitudinal change and information delivery in HIV prevention (Green & Witte, 
2006; Terblanche-Smit & Terblanche, 2010; Soscia, 2012). In their appraisal of fear 
appeals for HIV prevention in South Africa, where the epidemic remains a serious 
problem, Terblanche-Smit & Terblanche (2010) found that fear appeals were more 
effective than the prevailing informational appeals that sought to educate but not to 
induce fear among the audience. Their study concluded that when accompanied by 
high efficacy messages and high susceptibility of the audience, fear appeals could 
perform as a strong motivator, could influence attitudes about HIV/AIDS, and could 
improve knowledge about HIV (Terblanche-Smit & Terblanche, 2010).
Despite their potential benefits, fear appeals remain problematic for 
pragmatic and ethical reasons. The issue of audience susceptibility is particularly 
difficult; susceptibility of the audience is recognised as a significant variable in the 
success of fear appeals according to the dominant literature, but there is also 
evidence to suggest that employment of fear appeals in HIV messages can 
contribute to a process of 'othering', whereby the audience seeks to deflect the 
message away from themselves by denying their susceptibility or the severity of the 
threat. This 'othering' response has been recorded in the use of fear appeals for HIV 
prevention by Slavin et al., (2007) as a way in which audiences reject fear appeals 
through a process of "motivated reasoning" (p.131) in which they distance 
themselves from the distressing narrative of the fear appeal. This can occur in one of 
three ways, each correlating to the fear appeal impact variables identified above: in 
the first, audiences undermine communicator credibility or the authority of the 
enunciator; in the second, the information contained in that message is discredited; 
in the third, the audience discounts their own role through 'othering', positioning 
themselves as being 'not the intended' recipient of the fear appeal (Slavin et al., 
2007, p.131). In their study, Slavin et al., (2007) found that unproductive 
consequences arise from fear appeals featuring treatment side effects from ART 
medication; a process of audience 'othering' took place in which respondents
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declared that they were not the audience of the fear appeals but that some 'other' 
audience was. This process of 'othering' took place along a sero-divide between 
HIV+ and HIV- respondents, and the imagined, sero-positive 'other audience' was 
disparaged and envisioned as being irresponsible and threatening (Slavin et al., 
2007, p .135). One respondent refers to the imagined intended audience:
Yeah, but they're out there, there's quite a few actually. And, being able to 
look at this will make them think about w hat they're doing, if they're out 
there having unsafe sex, 'cause there are guys out there who are positive and 
who still don 't care. (Slavin et al., 2007, p.135)
In this example, the 'other' is constructed not only as the intended audience of the 
fear appeal, distancing the actual respondent from the informational message 
delivered, but also as an embodiment of the threat. A similarly unproductive 
outcome was recorded among HIV+ respondents; those who identified themselves 
as the intended audience of the message also "saw themselves being used as the 
message" and experienced a sense of disempowerment and loss of agency that 
resulted in their disengagement with the message; one respondent told Slavin et al.,
(2007) "I always feel very attacked by them, so I never pay any notice 'cause they 
piss me off having those three letters in front of you all the time, it's like 'yep, 
thanks for reminding m e'" (p. 135).
The 'othering' and aversion recorded by Slavin et al., (2007) lessens 
perceptions of susceptibility and efficacy, reducing effectiveness of the message and 
potentially exacerbating stigmatisation, shame, and self-stigmatisation of HIV+ 
people. Furthermore, the process of 'othering' underm ines the goals of many CSOs 
and AIDS activists who are working to normalise perceptions of PLWHA (as noted 
by Elbe, 2006), reinforcing widespread perceptions that HIV is something that 
happens to 'them ' and not 'us'. This logic exists also at the international level, where 
it can be found in a critical deconstruction of foreign policy, donor aid, and 
migration law concerning HIV/AIDS in the global arena (Ingram, 2008a, pp.76-77).
In addition to being potentially destructive, the use of fear appeals for HIV 
education may not be sustainable. Advancement in treatment and the advent of 
affordable, effective anti-retroviral medication has added a problematic dimension 
to this relationship between fear and HIV/AIDS; a growing complacency amongst
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people with, or at risk from, HIV has been observed and attributed to the 
availability of treatment (Slavin et al., 2007; Pisani, 2008, p.165). In San Francisco, a 
city that launched the safe-sex for gay men campaigns that came to define AIDS 
activism, condom use has fallen dramatically in recent years and Pisani (2008, 
pp .164-165) argues that this is because people are no longer scared of AIDS. 
HIV/AIDS is no longer a new threat and the lack of medical insight, testing or 
treatment that accompanied the first years (from its clinical discovery in 1981 until 
the mid-1990s when ART was developed) has been replaced by widespread 
availability of effective medication. Pisani (2008, p .165) reports a study in 2001 in 
which half of the men surveyed in San Francisco reported not using condoms 
despite being HIV positive, and a third said they d idn 't practice safe sex with a 
partner whose status they did not know; these figures have increased 20% since 
1998.
In Thailand, complacency toward risk of HIV infection emerged as a central 
theme of the data collected during fieldwork. Professor Praphan Phanuphak, the 
virologist who diagnosed Thailand's first cases of AIDS in 1985, is director of the 
Thai Red Cross AIDS Research Centre at Chulalongkorn University. In interview, 
Dr Phanuphak (2013) stated that the availability of anti-retroviral treatment in 
Thailand was linked to complacency among the population, explaining that in 2004, 
the government announced that it would introduce universal access to treatment 
and this created complacency among Thais, "which is also bad because everyone 
feels relief and most people have complacency nowadays ... that complacency is 
linked to the ability to take ARVs". Professor Maneerat Rattanamha (2013), of Kohn 
Kaen University, contributed to an evaluation of national AIDS policy in 2011 and 
reported that as visible symptoms reduce and treatm ent is more widely available, 
fear has reduced and complacency amongst the population has increased. UNAIDS 
Country Coordinator Michael Hahn (2013) rejected the link between increased 
complacency and the availability of treatment but accepts that complacency exists, 
arguing that it is linked to the duration of the threat and the initial employment of 
fear appeals in the early years of the epidemic; he explained that it was not
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sustainable to invoke fear and expect audiences to remain "on blood pressure 300" a 
decade later (Hahn, 2013).
Further to being an inefficient means by which to communicate educational 
messages about HIV/AIDS, or by which to reduce high risk behaviour, fear appeals 
in HIV discourse may also potentially fuel the stigma and discrimination attached to 
the epidemic and PLWHA. Stigma has been recognised by leading international 
agencies as one of the prim ary challenges in dealing with HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS, 
2012a). It negatively impacts on response efficacy by underm ining the ability of 
individuals to access services, causing governments to delay implementing or 
funding those services, and leading populations to tolerate this inaction (Peterson, 
2002, p.63). In 2011, UNAIDS Executive Director Michel Sidibe said that 
discrimination and stigma related to HIV/AIDS "are underm ining HIV responses 
across the world", amounting to a major barrier to effective national responses 
(UNAIDS, 2012a, pp.2-5). Former UNAIDS Director, Jonathan Mann, described HIV 
epidemics as "characterised by exceptionally high levels of stigma" that accompany 
political, cultural and economic responses to the disease; he told the Assembly that 
this stigma and the accompanying discrimination was "as central to the global AIDS 
challenge as the disease itself" (Parker & Aggleton, 2003, p .13). Peter Piot, founding 
Director of UNAIDS, has used the UN agency as a platform to reiterate claims that 
stigma is a primary and "continuing challenge" to effective epidemic responses 
(Piot, 2000). From the emergence of the epidemic in the 1980s, Piot (2012) had 
recognised the stigma attached to HIV/AIDS; in 2000, he told the United Nations 
that stigma remained top of the list of "the five most pressing items on this agenda 
for the world community" (p.145) in dealing with the epidemic and UNAIDS has 
continued to emphasise the im portant role of stigma in exacerbating the epidemic 
(Piot, 2000). In 2002 and 2003, HIV related stigma and discrimination was the focus 
of the World AIDS Campaign, which was then led by UNAIDS. The m ost recent 
strategic plan of UN AIDS, adopted in 2010, is the "Getting to Zero Campaign" 
which comprises three core goals: "Zero new HIV infections. Zero discrimination. 
Zero AIDS-related deaths" (UNAIDS, 2010a).
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This attention is warranted. As a result of its specific social dimensions, 
stigma is both intrinsic to HIV/AIDS epidemics and a uniquely destructive force in 
its management. At the core of effective HIV management are health care services 
that provide diagnostic services that precede treatment, w ith access to ARV 
medication that controls the virus and lowers rates of transmission, and with access 
to information, counselling and support that PLWHA to understand and effectively 
manage their condition. Crucially, these services and clinics also act as surveillance 
sites, reporting essential data on the epidemic to the state and to international 
agencies like WHO and UN AIDS. If these health care services do not exist, or are 
not used by the affected population (as in Myanmar, see Chapter 8), then effective 
HIV management is impossible.
Stigmatisation of HIV/AIDS and the key affected populations can reduce 
funding to these services and create a legal or social environment that hinders 
patient access. This is most explicit where harm  reduction practises are linked to 
criminality; one barrier to effective HIV prevention that has been reported in both 
Thailand and Myanmar is the police practice of citing possession of condoms as 
evidence of employment in commercial sex work, or possession of needles as 
evidence of drug use (Tenni, 2012; Aung, 2012). In Thailand, needle exchange clinics 
that provide harm reduction services (including HIV prevention and treatment 
services) to PWID became the target of police looking to arrest drug users (IRIN,
2012). During the government's "war on drugs" in 2003, state security forces 
routinely violated the hum an rights of drug users and suspected drug users, who 
were subject to detention and violence; following the "crackdown", the government 
reported that 2,245 suspects had been killed (Amnesty International, 2003, p.6). Fear 
resulting from this campaign is likely to have increased high risk behaviour in the 
form of needle sharing, as PWID are discouraged from seeking clean needles, harm 
reduction, or health services (Vongchak et al., 2005; Tenni, 2012). The UNAIDS 
(2012a) report on policy and stigma states:
Criminalization of people who are at high risk of infection, such as m en who 
have sex with men, sex workers, transgender people and people who use 
drugs, drives them underground and away from HIV services. This 
increases their vulnerability to HIV. (p.5)
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Socially, stigmatisation of people w ith HIV/AIDS and KAPs also creates a major 
barrier to the successful operation of HIV services. As a result of stigma and 
discrimination, "many people are afraid to get tested for HIV, to take up HIV 
prevention and treatment, to disclose their HIV status, and to participate in national 
HIV responses", in addition, "they also have little chance of getting legal redress for 
HIV-related harms" (UNAIDS, 2012a, p.5). Stigmatisation does not affect only the 
marginalised groups of PLWHA; in Thailand, a representative from the Ministry of 
Health observed that high-ranking individuals such as celebrities or "political 
officials and senior civil servants" are reluctant to register with the state as having 
HIV, as a "direct manifestation of the social stigma" that surrounds HIV/AIDS 
(Prakongsai, 2013). In Thailand, being HIV+ can have negative impacts on both 
personal and professional lives; Chapter 7 details how PLWHA face specific 
em ployment difficulties, for instance, candidates for judicial offices in Thailand 
m ust prove to the state that they are HIV negative (Ladapom, 2013). Personal 
feelings of shame and depression are also a source of serious harm at the individual 
level and reflect wider societal stigmas; data from the UN People Living with HIV 
Stigma Index show that 65% of HIV+ people surveyed in Thailand felt ashamed of 
their HIV status and 17% had felt recently suicidal as a result; in Myanmar, 61% 
reported feelings of shame and 25% reported suicidal feelings (UNAIDS, 2012a, 
p.2 7).
Studying the psychological impact of HIV/AIDS, Strong (1990) concluded 
that in the UK the viral epidemic was accompanied by an "epidemic of irrationality, 
fear and suspicion" (p.253) among both medical professionals and the general 
population. This anxiety am ounted to unproductive fear that was closely associated 
with "an epidemic of stigmatisation; the stigmatisation both of those with the 
disease and of those who belong to w hat are feared to be the main carrier groups" 
that "can begin with avoidance, segregation and abuse" but where "personal fear 
may be translated into collective witch-hunts" (Strong, 1990, p.253). Regarding the 
epidemic in Thailand, former senator Jon Ungphakorn (2012) explained that, "you 
find stigma and discrimination in the very professions it shouldn't be [in], for 
example the medical and legal profession". This view was corroborated by UNAIDS
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Coordinator Michael Hahn (2013), who reported that, "stigma starts in the health 
sector really". The UN Stigma Index surveys found that 20% of respondents from 
Thailand and 9% of those from M yanmar reported that they had been denied access 
to health services because of their HIV status during the previous 12 months 
(UNAIDS, 2012a, p.23). During the same period, 12% in Thailand and 18% in 
Myanmar had been denied access to sexual and reproductive health services 
because of their HIV status (UNAIDS, 2012a, p.27). Despite geographical differences 
in epidemics (The Lancet, 2004), stigmatisation of KAPs and people affected by 
HIV/AIDS always accompanies the virus and stems from the universal hum an fear 
of death, contagion, and of the unknown. However, the means by which to address 
and reduce this stigma are context-specific and vary according to cultural and social 
norms, contributing to the difficulty of combating this and other social barriers to 
effective management (Parker & Aggleton, 2003, p.14).
In addition to medical services, epidemic surveillance is also compromised 
by stigma, discrimination, and unproductive fear. At the international level, 
countries are reluctant to report infectious disease outbreaks to the WHO 
surveillance programme, fearing economic and political losses, such as travel 
restrictions, or loss of trade and tourism, that could be incurred as a result (WHO, 
2000). In 2003, the global SARS crisis had a brief but "substantial" negative impact 
on the economies of affected countries, resulting in an estimated 17.9 USD billion 
loss to the economy of China, or 1.3% of GDP (Price-Smith, 2009, pp.143-146). Had 
the pandemic lasted longer or been more severe, the impacts would have 
accelerated as labour forces were depleted by rising death rates and industrial 
export capacity reduced. These impacts arise from both the fearful quality of the 
affected state, which is imagined as a source of contagion to be avoided by others, 
and as a result of the actual loss of capacity as the population is affected with the 
disease.
Fear of HIV/AIDS also undermines surveillance and response at the national 
level. In interview with the Director of the International Health Policy Programme 
at the Thai Ministry of Health, it was reported that decentralisation of HIV/AIDS 
surveillance and reporting in Thailand had been affected by stigmatisation of the
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disease because Provincial Officers were sometimes reluctant to acknowledge an 
"HIV problem" in their locality for fear that it would affect tourism and the 
economy of their wards (Prakongsai, 2013). In addition, the official data from the 
Thai state is derived from a national database on which PLWHA m ust register in 
order to access subsidised antiretroviral treatment; Prakongsai (2013) reasons that 
m any people able to afford private purchase of their medication may choose to 
avoid registering their HIV status, thus skewing the national data. The WHO note 
that the quality of AIDS case-reporting varies significantly from country to country, 
reflecting differences in both the quality and extent of services and surveillance 
infrastructure, but also arising because "stigma and discrimination associated with 
the disease may contribute to the reluctance in diagnosing and reporting AIDS 
cases" (WHO, 2000, pp.109-110). In Myanmar, interviewees from leading CSOs that 
coordinated surveillance in the country uniformly reported the extreme difficulty of 
accurate reporting that arose from the lack of healthcare and service infrastructure. 
However, one INGO Country Director also spoke frankly about the danger of 
reporting too many cases of HIV/AIDS, for fear of "shaming" the government and 
inviting their retribution (Source 10, 2013).
In Thailand, the ASEAN Institute for Health Development (AIHD) National 
AIDS Responses Report in 2011 found that governmental budget support for 
surveillance and data collection had declined, contributing to problems with 
effective data use and reliability (AIHD, 2011, p.24). One CSO Director (Source 21,
2013), who asked to remain anonymous, suggested that clinics in certain political 
w ards and targeting key affected populations (particularly antenatal clinics for 
teenagers) were deliberately underfunded or closed because of the stigma attached 
to these populations; as a result, the decline in government funding for medical 
services to rural and 'a t risk' (stigmatised) populations had led to an artificial 
decline in reports of HIV and other STIs. Anonymous interviews with staff and 
agencies involved in the data collection for the AIHD report revealed an additional 
dimension to this problem; whilst working at a clinic reporting data directly to the 
AIHD office, staff were told by superiors that they had "better not" report the cases
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of HIV in monks who presented at the clinic, because monks are "supposed to be 
celibate" (Source 15, 2013).
Stigma can also lead to discrimination that constrains the practical responses 
of those dealing with HIV/AIDS and attempting to provide services to affected 
communities. Piot (2012) highlights the im portant work of UNAIDS in combating 
some of the practical constraints on CSO activism that arise from stigma against 
PLWHA and key affected groups, explaining that, "because of the enormous stigma 
of AIDS, groups of people with HIV could not even rent a space to meet, so the 
UNAIDS office created a safe space for all kinds of community groups" (p.351). This 
was supported by data collected from fieldwork. In interview in Bangkok, Surang 
Janyam (2013), Director of the CSO, Service Workers In Group (SWING), explained 
that discrimination against the commercial sex workers who make up the 
employees and clients of SWING meant that it was difficult to rent a property for 
their office. SWING exists "to educate and improve the quality of life of sex workers 
in Thailand by disseminating accurate and useful information" that includes the 
provision of training, facilitating access to healthcare services, and the distribution 
of condoms (Janyam, 2013). When it was established in 2004, SWING initially 
experienced problems in renting property in Bangkok. A rent agreement was 
originally made for a property in the commercial/residential street, Soi Convent, but 
the following day the "situation changed" and they were told "it cannot happen"; 
Surang suspects this was a result of complaints from other businesses and landlords 
in the area (Janyam, 2013). Instead, the SWING office was relocated to its current 
premises above the 'Super Pu$$y Bar' in Patpong 1, the nearby entertainment 
district that is popular with transgender commercial sex workers, who are 
themselves at high risk of HIV/AIDS (Janyam, 2013). The current office rental was 
possible only because Surang personally knows the landlord and the new location is 
in an area already popular with sex workers and their clientele (Janyam, 2013). In a 
different case, a care centre for HIV+ children in Kohn Kaen, northern Thailand, was 
required by local planning officials to install a costly water treatment facility on the 
site at which children would live. The officials were concerned that sewerage from 
HIV+ children should not mix with that from the general population; although it is
119
hard to rationalise a fear of contagion in this form, the CSO directors paid 
approximately three thousand USD to have the machine installed so that they could 
operate in the town (Dunck, R., 2013).
4.5. Conclusion
This chapter outlines the unique epidemiological characteristics of 
HIV/AIDS that facilitate its securitization and that concurrently contribute to the 
difficulty of implementing effective management and responses. The transmission 
of the virus through sexual intercourse and behaviours often associated with 'moral7 
values and 'deviation7 from social norms exacerbates the innate hum an fear of 
contagion and death that is invoked by the disease. In countries with restrictive 
legal environments, such as Thailand and Myanmar, punitive laws that target sex 
workers, PWIDs, and MSM, encourage stigmatisation and hinder efficacious 
responses to the epidemic. These measures also heighten vulnerability to hum an 
rights violations and viral prevalence among affected populations.
Fear appeals are often an ineffective means of communicating educational 
messages about HIV/AIDS or promoting behavioural change and risk avoidance. 
The utilisation of fear imbued rhetoric to describe or deal with HIV/AIDS can also 
enhance the processes of 'othering7 that exacerbates stigmatisation and 
discrimination against PLWHA. Linking HIV/AIDS to security is problematic 
because it invokes fear and perpetuates a framework in which people affected by 
the disease are stigmatised and imagined as a source of "threat7. Due to the social 
aspects of the disease epidemiology, stigmatisation is a "major barrier" to effective 
response (UNAIDS, 2012a). It also contributes to discrimination that constrains the 
practical responses of those dealing with HIV/AIDS and obstructs their attempts to 
provide services to affected or vulnerable communities. Stigma is found at all levels 
of society and its negative effects are pervasive in both institutional and individual 
management of the disease. It is directly exacerbated by the invocation of 
unproductive, poorly managed fear and any recourse to securitization rhetoric in 
the management of HIV/AIDS should consider these potentially detrimental effects. 
The ethical implications of the securitization of HIV/AIDS are im portant not just
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because of the potential to cause harm  and to hinder effective responses to the 
epidemic, but also because to securitize an issue is a political choice and thus the 
securitizing actor incurs a degree of responsibility for the decision to do so (Buzan et 
al., 1998, p.29). Fear innovation is linked to the exceptionality of HIV/AIDS and this 
is the subject of the following chapter, which details the efforts of marginalised civil 
society groups to mobilise a political response to the epidemic, paving the way for 
securitization and the unprecedented allocation of resources.
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Chapter 5: AIDS Exceptionalism
This chapter examines the political context in which securitization of 
HIV/AIDS took place and finds that popular perceptions of the virus, public health 
norms, and political activism all defined the era of 'AIDS Exceptionalism' that 
preceded the seminal meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 
2000. The early epidemic became subject to political mobilisation, contestation, and 
debate when civil society groups and 'AIDS activists' came to the forefront of 
coordinating national and international responses; it was this civil society-led 
response that would later be defined as "AIDS exceptionalism" (Bayer, 1991; 
England, 2008). The concept has evolved as hum an capacity to manage HIV 
improves, but although technological advances in treatment and testing have 
changed the epidemic, the narrative of HIV/AIDS as an exceptional and political 
issue has largely endured, eventually providing the conceptual framework for 
securitization of the disease (see Piot, 2005a; Smith & Whiteside, 2010). Through an 
examination of political, legal, and medical practice, the exceptionality of the disease 
is explored and critiqued in this chapter, concluding with challenges to the 
exceptionalist framework.
In terms of both policy attention and commitment of resources, the global 
response to HIV/AIDS has been unlike that of any other health issue; over 4.6 billion 
USD was spent by the American PEPFAR programme on HIV/AIDS specific 
interventions in 2013 alone (The United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief [PEPFAR], 2014; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014). This unique response is 
founded on the premise that the disease requires management "above and beyond 
'norm al' health interventions" (Elbe, 2009, pp.4-5; Smith & Whiteside, 2010, p.l). 
When it emerged in North America and Europe, AIDS affected homosexual men 
first and most visibly, followed by concentrated prevalence within other already 
stigmatised groups (Whiteside & Sunter, 2000, p .l; Ingram, 2013, p.437). Partly as a 
result of this initially concentrated prevalence, political leaders failed to act swiftly 
in addressing the emerging epidemic during the 1980s (Shilts, 1988). Instead, the 
response to HIV/AIDS was led by civil society groups and activists for whom the
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sensitivity and stigma of AIDS related issues (such as homosexuality) provided a 
focal point for political mobilization, rather than a barrier to action (Holden, 2003, 
pp. 17-18).
One origin of AIDS exceptionalism that is still evident in modern responses 
is the moralisation of viral transmission, which was identified early in the epidemic 
as occurring through sexual intercourse, leading to "sexualisation" of the disease 
(Prins, 2004, p.934). Facing political reticence but possessing significant capacity, 
civil society groups, and in particular those from the LGBTI community, were able 
to take a formative role and to advocate a specialist approach to HIV/AIDS. The 
response they advocated ensured that the epidemic was handled differently from 
other infectious diseases or public health issues and, in its early phase, AIDS 
exceptionalism meant that traditional public health responses to managing 
infectious disease were challenged and rejected by activists concerned by potentially 
invasive state-led responses. In particular, emphasis was placed on rights-based 
campaigns to oppose m andatory testing and reporting of infections, quarantine or 
restrictions on movement for PLWHA, and criminalization of transmission. AIDS 
exceptionalism therefore arose from a fear that the civil liberties of people with or at 
risk from HIV/AIDS would be violated unless the epidemic was addressed as a 
unique type of health issue in which hum an rights were prioritised over the 
adoption of traditional responses to infectious disease, in which the state 
implements restrictive policies informed by the threat-defence logic of traditional 
security paradigms. Below, the study of the early HIV/AIDS response in Thailand 
will illustrate the saliency of these concerns by examining the 1990 'AIDS Bill' that 
proposed the invocation of authoritarian control over people living with HIV/AIDS, 
including quarantine and border controls.
AIDS exceptionalism is an im portant concept that m ust be understood in 
order to investigate the global response and security claims related to the virus, but 
despite its centrality, there is little attention paid to the phenomenon in current 
securitization literature. This chapter examines initial responses to HIV/AIDS 
following its clinical discovery in Europe and North America, establishing the 
contextual social and political background against which the subsequent
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international securitization of HIV/AIDS occurred. Early AIDS exceptionalism is 
significant because through securitization an issue "is drawn into a particular 
(realist definition of a) mode of dealing with it which is marked by exceptionality" 
(Stritzel, 2007, p.366); in one sense, securitization of an issue represents an 
intensification of its political status, but in an equally im portant way, securitization 
is opposed to politicisation because it removes that issue from the "normal haggling 
of politics", instead dem anding that it "be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior 
to other issues" (Waever, 2003, p.12). In the following outline of AIDS 
exceptionalism, it becomes evident that early politicisation of the virus established 
the conceptual foundations that would later make possible the removal of the issue 
from the "normal bounds of political procedure" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24).
5.1. The Evolution of AIDS Exceptionalism
Since the clinical recognition of its first cases in 1981, AIDS has been handled 
differently than other infectious diseases (De Cock & Johnson, 1998, p.290). 
According to Bayer (1991) the public health protocol employed under normal, pre- 
AIDS circumstances would have entailed:
M andatory compulsory examination and screening, breaching the 
confidentiality of the [patient-doctor] clinical relationship by reporting to 
public health registries the names of those with diagnoses of 'dangerous 
disease', imposing treatment, and in the most extreme cases, confining 
persons through the power of quarantine, (p.1500)
In many ways, these forms of public health response reflect a traditional framework 
of security in which the state implements emergency measures over its population 
in order to ensure survival in the face of a threat. However, infectious disease and 
health issues in general are not often suited to these kinds of responses and this is 
particularly true of HIV/AIDS, where effective management requires a human- 
rights and development based approach in which stigma and discrimination is 
actively reduced rather than exacerbated by authorities (UNAIDS, 2012a). As 
documented in Chapter 4, restrictive legal and medical environments that penalise 
or disenfranchise PLWHA are a barrier to efficacious responses to the epidemic. The 
growing movement to promote "health as a hum an right" is premised on these
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same arguments, which hold that "public health programmes should be treated as 
potential burdens, even violations, of hum an rights until proven otherwise" 
(Davies, 2009, p .67). The traditional public health response, in which "limitations on 
the 'rights of the few' for the 'good of the m any' had often been used as a 
justification for infectious disease control" also undermine the attainment of holistic 
health, which comprises the "realization of three factors, physical, mental and social 
well-being" (Davies, 2009, p.67). In dealing with HIV/AIDS, activists and civil 
society groups feared that traditional public health responses would lead to 
discrimination and violations of the rights of PLWHA, undermining their health for 
the purported 'good of the many'. Writing a decade after the clinical discovery of 
HIV, Bayer (1991) observed a definitive rejection of public health tradition by civil 
society groups, in favour of a new style of response which he termed 'exceptional'. 
Thus, AIDS exceptionalism in its early form meant political movement and 
campaigns for "not invoking public health powers" that were traditionally used to 
deal with infectious diseases (Ingram, 2013, p.437). The enduring success of these 
campaigns and the rights-based logic of exceptionalism are exemplified by the 
anonymous surveillance systems and emphasis on clinical confidentiality that is still 
evident in contemporary responses to the virus (De Cock & Johnson, 1998, p.290).
The politicisation of the medical response to HIV/AIDS is regarded in itself 
as a mark of exceptionalism (Bayer, 1991) although it may be true that public health 
management of any disease has always required a political component, w ithout 
which wide-scale interventions would be impossible (Burris, 1994, pp.259-260). The 
politicisation of HIV/AIDS was an integral step in the construction of the AIDS 
exceptionalist framework. Through the early efforts of civil society groups, the 
epidemic was made a matter of public rather than private debate and became the 
subject of policy at the national and international level; essentially, from the 1980s 
onward HIV/AIDS was framed as an exceptional disease that warranted 
extraordinary measures in response, thus bringing the issue into the political sphere. 
This politicisation embodies the stage preceding the securitization of an issue when, 
according to the Copenhagen School, the matter becomes "part of public policy, 
requiring government decision and resource allocations" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.23).
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Politicisation is a less intense state than securitization, and at this level the issue is 
still "open" to discussion and the type of measures pursued remains "a m atter of 
choice" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.29). Here, politicisation was the first stage of 
exceptionalism and arose in response to the novel epidemiological characteristics 
and complex politics of the virus (Ingram, 2013, p.477), as well as fear within 
affected communities that their civil liberties would be at risk if they did not 
mobilise to reject a traditional public health approach.
In recent years, the appearance of HIV/AIDS on the global political agenda is 
indicative of its continued exceptionality (Ingram, 2013, p.436), manifest in the 
creation of disease-specific institutions such as UNAIDS in 1996, the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2002, and PEPFAR in 2003 (Smith & 
Whiteside, 2010). The progression of HIV/AIDS from national to international 
concern (and from exceptionalism to securitization) was facilitated by 
epidemiological and political conditions; in the 1980s and 1990s, the severity of the 
global epidemic became increasingly evident and shifted from concentrated to 
general populations; at the same time, conceptual understandings of security were 
opening up to include a broader range of definitions of security threat (see Vieira, 
2007, pp.143-145). However, the encroachment of politics and political concerns into 
the realm of health professionals has not been without critics and as Burris notes 
(1994), AIDS exceptionalism has been met with consternation by some in the 
medical establishment who lament: "why can't we just cut the politics and the rights 
talk and get back to the science, to w hat works...?" (p.252). This assumption, that 
the medical or scientific aspects of public health response can be separated from the 
societal and rights-based issues, is indicative of a traditional approach that has been 
challenged by the advent of AIDS exceptionalism and the growing movement in 
support of "health as a hum an right" (Davies, 2009, pp. 70-75).
Epidemiologically, the most problematic and exceptional characteristic of 
HIV is its mode of transmission, which occurs through the exchange of bodily fluid. 
Blood and semen are the most common routes of transmission so infection occurs 
primarily through sexual intercourse, meaning that people with a greater number of 
sexual partners are most at risk. Anal intercourse is the most likely to facilitate
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transmission (see, for instance, Whiteside & Sunter, 2000, p .ll) , so male to male 
sexual intercourse is a particularly high-risk behaviour and MSM are a key affected 
population with typically high prevalence of HIV/AIDS (WHO & UN AIDS, 2011). 
The most sexually active people within a population are typically most susceptible 
to HIV/AIDS and vulnerability is also linked to lower socio-economic status, which 
exacerbates both the risk of acquiring HIV and the negative impact of the disease on 
subject health (Holden, 2003, p.25). Often experiencing a combination of these 
vulnerabilities, sex workers and injecting drug users are at higher risk of infection 
than others (Holden, 2003, pp.25-26). The specific vulnerability of people who have 
multiple sexual partners and of MSM further complicates the social epidemiological 
aspects of the disease because both groups face stigmatization associated with the 
male heterosexual norm that is dominant in most societies. These epidemiological 
factors contribute to the moralisation and stigmatization of both the virus and its 
carriers.
Some advocates of AIDS exceptionalism regard the stigma attached to 
HIV/AIDS as indicative of its exceptionality (Piot, 2005a), but the novelty of this 
stigma remains contested. Historical analysis reveals similar types of popular 
reaction to other epidemic diseases which occurred in the developed world until 
recently, and which inspired collective reactions ranging from vilification to 
romanticisation (Sontag, 1989, p.23). As Burris (1994) notes, "in their prime, cholera, 
tuberculosis, and syphilis were all badges of vice and dissipation" (p.252) and as 
such, all inspired their own form of stigmatization or unique public perception. Nor 
is politicisation of disease novel to HIV/AIDS (Burris, 1994); sexually transmitted 
diseases were endemic during the last century and, although relatively little-known 
now, syphilis and gonorrhoea were subject to wide-scale public health interventions 
by the United States government during the 20th century. Interventions included 
modifying public drinking fountains and removing door handles from naval vessels 
in an attempt to reduce casual transmission (Sontag, 1989, p.27). However, 
following the politicisation of HIV/AIDS, this disease has assumed dimensions that 
are exceptional to contemporary public and global health responses, including the 
legislation and rights advocacy examined below.
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5.2. Civil Society
It has been established in the preceding chapter that the inherently social 
and political nature of HIV/AIDS is due in part to the epidemiological 
characteristics of the disease. When it emerged in the developed world and 
subsequently gained international recognition, HIV/AIDS affected gay male 
communities first and most visibly. The disease was initially misclassified as 
affecting only gay men and before the acronym AIDS was adopted by the American 
CDC in 1982, the terms "Gay Related Immune Deficiency Disease" (GRIDS), "gay 
plague", and "gay compromise syndrome" were widely used (Brennan & Durack, 
1981; Altman, 1982; W arner & Greene, 2007, p.94). As a result, the epidemic was 
"linked into existing discourses of protest and discrimination" from the gay 
community, whose recent politicisation had affected a successful struggle with the 
medical establishment over the psychiatric definition of homosexuality as a 
pathological disorder (Krieger & Fee, 1993, p.1478; Prins, 2004, p.934). With 
newfound agency and in response to AIDS (Holden, 2003, pp. 17-18), gay 
communities campaigned hard to create new protocols for dealing with HIV/AIDS 
in the medical context. Concurrently, the politicised nature of LGBTI civil rights at 
this time meant that HIV/AIDS was inextricably linked with a politicised discourse; 
perceptions of HIV/AIDS as an 'LGBTI issue' served as both a catalyst and a barrier 
for action.
In its early stages in the developed world, HIV/AIDS was exceptionalised 
and politicised due to the mobilisation of locally based, pre-existing activist groups 
primarily within LGBTI communities. Traditional or invasive public health 
responses were stridently opposed by "an alliance of gay leaders, civil libertarians, 
physicians, and public health officials [who] began to shape a policy for dealing 
with AIDS that reflected the exceptionalist perspective", concerned with protecting 
the rights and autonomy of individuals (Bayer, 1991, p.1501). Thus, civil society, 
sympathetic public health officials, and politicians created for HIV/AIDS a new type 
of epidemic response, driven by a fear of both the virus and the potential for 
traditional responses to violate hum an rights and become detrimental to those 
affected by the disease. The exceptionalist response that arose was designed to
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protect their civil rights, characterised by "making HIV a special case that 
dem anded confidentiality and discouraged routine testing and tracing of contacts" 
that would be typical of a normal public health response (England, 2008). The result 
was the creation of an exceptional response that would come to define HIV 
epidemics w ithin the most powerful institutions of the world (Smith & Whiteside, 
2010; Bayer, 1991; Oppenheimer & Bayer, 2009; Prins, 2004, p.93). So great was the 
role of these CSOs and activists in shaping the response that Ronald Bayer, the 
author who first coined the term  AIDS exceptionalism, declared that, "the embrace 
of exceptionalism must be understood in broad political terms, as representing in 
large measure, a singular victory on the part of gay men, their community based 
organisations and their allies" (cited in Smith & Whiteside, 2010, p.2).
The AIDS exceptionalism framework arose from a fear that state-led 
responses would rely on forms of traditional public health interventions that were 
neither suitable for dealing with the novel HIV virus nor compatible with Western 
liberal democratic values of hum an rights. This fear may have been unfounded; 
Bayer (1991, p.1500) observes that the most coercive types of public health response 
have rarely been implemented and it is questionable whether responses could be 
sustainable or effective without the tacit popular consent of the people they affect 
(which is unlikely to be gained if civil liberties are too much oppressed) (see also, 
Burris, 1994, p.5). However, there existed a viral epidemic that was "terrifying" and 
"mysterious" (Smith & Whiteside, 2010, p .l) and regardless of the likelihood of 
these coercive measures coming to fruition, the fear of draconian public health 
responses by state authorities was real enough to affect a unique form of response 
that was led by distinct groups (Bayer, 1991; Oppenheimer & Bayer, 2009).
Although AIDS activism has moved beyond the LGBTI community in which 
it started in the USA and Europe, civil society groups and people living with 
HIV/AIDS are a defining feature of the contemporary response throughout the 
world. The origins of this non-state, exceptionalist response are typically attributed 
to North America and Europe, from where it is thought to have spread globally 
through the influential knowledge-norm distributors of the UN and international 
aid networks (Vieira, 2007; Whiteside & Smith, 2010). The inclusion of civil society
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groups in high-level political discourse on the disease is now one signifier of the 
contemporary exceptionalism of HIV/AIDS; the formalisation of participation for 
civil society groups, PLWHA, and AIDS-activists in influential donor agencies is 
evident in the GIPA (Greater Inclusion of PLWHA) policies that are adopted by 
these institutions, including UNAIDS and regional networks (Asia Pacific Network 
of People Living with HIV/AIDS [APN], 2004; UNAIDS, 2007). However, data from 
Thailand and Myanmar indicate that the early responses to HIV/AIDS in both of 
these countries were shaped by the mobilisation of civil society groups that formed 
initially as support and self-help groups for PLWHA before adopting human-rights 
and political campaigns (Tenni, 2012; Swift, 2013). Their mobilisation was partly 
motivated by fear that a state-led response would lead to violation of hum an rights 
and the imposition of oppressive public health interventions. This is particularly 
noteworthy in Myanmar, where the epidemic and related activism emerged against 
a backdrop of repressive authoritarian rule in which human-rights campaigning 
and the organisation of civil society groups was extremely difficult and sometimes 
dangerous.
Responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic reveal disparity in social and economic 
power both at the domestic and international level. Although HIV/AIDS 
disproportionately affects developing countries, the international response and 
medical management of the HIV virus, (diagnosis, development of testing, and 
treatment), has been led by the resource-rich developed world, frequently referred 
to as the "global North" within development literature (Sachs, 2010, pp.xv-xx). 
AIDS, and the HIV virus that causes it, existed for decades prior to its identification 
by the American CDC in 1981, bu t its origins remain unknown; the virus was 
certainly present within the African continent during the 1970s, but it was not until 
visible cases appeared in American and European communities that diagnosis and 
global recognition occurred (Whiteside & Sunter, 2000, p.6). Despite their 
marginalised status, the gay men who first fought for HIV/AIDS exceptionalism in 
these affluent countries remained "vastly influential in comparison to the bulk of 
voiceless victims then proliferating, unheralded, in the poor world" (Prins, 2004, 
p.934); their agency and resources allowed gay civil rights groups to rise to
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prominence in the international response to HIV/AIDS and to demand political and 
medical attention for dealing with the emerging epidemic. However, the 
concentration of early infections within these communities also slowed and 
complicated political responses to the epidemic which, at the time, remained 
concentrated in groups of homosexual men, injecting drug users, migrants, sex 
workers, and a few "innocent" victims of contaminated blood transfusions (Holden, 
2003, p .17; Ingram, 2013, p.438). In the USA, the initial characterisation of HIV as a 
concentrated epidemic isolated from the general population gave rise to the term "4 
H 's", referring to "Heroin users, Haitians, Hookers and Haemophiliacs" (Gilman, 
1987, p.87). The visibility of AIDS within affected communities in the early 1980s, 
coupled with a dearth of information about the routes of transmission, bred 
widespread fear and raised the profile of the emerging epidemic both within and 
outside those groups most affected (see Shilts, 1988). As a result of the social 
conditions (namely stigmatization and marginalisation) surrounding the most 
severely affected groups, the fear invoked by HIV/AIDS did not refer only to the 
virus. Instead, people visibly affected by HIV and AIDS became the source of fear 
and stigma as their bodies and behaviours were perceived as threatening others.
Despite a sense of fear surrounding the new illness, political reluctance to 
mobilise an appropriate response stemmed from perceptions of AIDS as a disease 
linked to sexualised, "deviant", or "abnormal" behaviour (Holden, 2003, p.17). Prins 
(2004, p.933) observes that valuable time was lost in the critical early years of the 
epidemic, when there was a failure to act pragmatically with public health 
responses. Whilst this presented an opportunity for civil society groups to step into 
the forefront of the epidemic response, it also translated into a lack of official 
recognition of the issue and a lack of state investment to deal with the emerging 
epidemic (Prins, 2004, p.933). In Chapter 6, an interview with former UN AIDS 
Director Dr Peter Piot illustrates how these problems could be circumvented by the 
securitization of HIV/AIDS, which removes the responsibility for handling the virus 
from "the normal haggling of politics" and awards it immediate and urgent 
attention (Buzan et al., 1998, p.29). However, where governments did act on 
HIV/AIDS, their interventions were sometimes inappropriate responses that
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underm ined the work of civil society groups; state-funded responses that utilised 
fear appeals, such as the Australian 'grim  reaper' and UK 'tombstone' campaigns 
(detailed in Chapter 4 and included in Appendix C), are salient examples of fear- 
based securitizing messages that undermine the work of civil society groups 
attem pting to normalise perceptions of PLWHA and protect their civil liberties.
5.3. Exceptionalism in Practice
The early exceptionality of AIDS was illustrated by the unique conditions 
that accompanied blood testing for the disease (see Bayer, 1991; De Cock & Johnson, 
1998). Traditional public health protocol advocates testing of populations during an 
epidemic to facilitate a state-led response based on wide-scale reporting of 
prevalence, but from the creation of the first HIV tests in 1985, screening became a 
contested issue with legal and political complexities. Anti-testing activism in North 
America is a salient example; prior to the production of effective treatment, some 
rights groups doubted the value of sero-testing outside of the blood transfusion 
setting (Branson, Viall & Marum, 2013). At the 1985 International AIDS Conference 
in Atlanta, activists demonstrated loudly and distributed stickers, badges and 
posters that read "NO TEST IS BEST" (Berger, 1996, p.717; Jaffe, 2009, pp.229-30; 
Piot, 2012, p .149). Opposition to testing arose because diagnosis of HIV or AIDS at 
this time did little to serve the patient. W ithout recourse to treatment, medical 
professionals were unable to alleviate the chronic fungal infections, skin diseases 
and acute diarrhoea that were typical symptoms of late-stage disease progression; 
these conditions, that were often debilitating and dehumanising for patients, would 
not respond to pre-ARV treatment and, in addition to physical suffering, patients 
w ould experience the "psychological burden" of knowing their status in the absence 
of effective therapies (Oppenheimer & Bayer, 2009, p.989). Infected with a 
contagious and poorly understood virus, patients also faced discrimination and 
stigma from others, including the healthcare professionals employed to serve them. 
In 1989, Sontag (1989) wrote a moving account of the hopelessness felt during the 
pre-treatm ent epidemic, when "testing positive for HIV...is increasingly equated
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w ith being ill" (pp.32-33), and when being ill meant one was at risk of losing 
employment, losing the freedom to emigrate, and losing social status.
In Thailand, a Programme Officer for Raks Thai, a prom inent CSO, 
explained that prior to the production of affordable medication in 2006, "people 
finding out their HIV status had more negatives than positives. They couldn't 
receive treatment and they were going to be additionally stigmatised, as well as 
having all the health problems... and if you were a sex worker, then you w eren't 
allowed to work either" (Press, 2012). In this restrictive environment, w ith few 
productive outcomes from a positive test, Press (2012) asked, "why would you w ant 
to be tested?" The development of effective treatm ent and production of affordable 
generic medicines has been a seminal event in HIV/AIDS management, but despite 
an ongoing global campaign to increase access to treatment, in order for the UN to 
reach its goal of "universal coverage" by 2015, an additional 15 million PLWHA 
m ust still gain access to medication (UNAIDS, 2013c, p.5). Where access to 
treatm ent is not yet universal (defined at below 80% coverage), the same dilemmas 
regarding testing remain. In a study of migrants unable to access ARV treatm ent in 
the UK, Thomas, Aggleton & Anderson (2010) published a paper titled "If I cannot 
access services, then there is no reason for me to test", in which they critique the 
barriers to early testing and treatment that arise as a result of confusion about health 
care entitlements (by both migrants and care providers) and fear of deportation 
from the UK.
An additional barrier to uptake of testing is the criminalisation of HIV 
transmission that exists to varying degrees across the world, including in the UK 
and other parts of Europe where transmission from a person aware of their status 
can be tried in court as a case of 'grievous bodily harm '. In states where it is possible 
to take legal action against people deemed to have knowingly infected others, 
acknowledgement of one's own status can become physically as well as 
psychologically dangerous. The rationale behind criminalisation of transmission is 
to both discourage transmission and to provide recourse to justice for those infected 
by others, but there are myriad ethical dilemmas in determining cases of intent or 
negligence, or legislating to require subject disclosure of HIV status. Concerns over
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potential violations of hum an rights and the vilification of PLWHA contribute to the 
position taken by leading institutions, including UNAIDS, that do not endorse 
criminalisation (UNAIDS, 2013a). The issues at the centre of the criminalisation 
debate are consistent with those that informed early AIDS exceptionalism; specific 
legal protections designed to ensure privacy and autonomy, and to counter 
discrimination against PLWHA, are founded on the logic that HIV presents a special 
threat to the hum an rights as well as the physical health of the people it affects. The 
legal concessions working both Tor' and 'against' PLWHA have contributed to the 
exceptionality of the epidemic (Burris, 1994), as public health traditions and civil 
liberties are threatened or overridden.
Despite the advent of treatment, testing for HIV remains exceptional in 
public health tradition. The stigmatization of both HIV infection and the behaviour 
that puts people at risk (namely sexual contact, male to male sexual intercourse, 
injecting drug use, and commercial sex work), creates barriers to testing as people 
decline testing for fear of negative association with these behaviours (UNAIDS, 
2007a, p.9; UNAIDS, 2012a). This stigma is rooted in the same perceptions that 
Sontag (1989) identified in the pre-treatment years, when "'infected but not ill', that 
invaluable notion of clinical medicine...is being superseded by biomedical concepts 
which, whatever their scientific justification, am ount to reviving the antiscientific 
logic of defilement" (p.32). In practice, this fear of defilement leaves many people 
afraid to visit facilities where testing takes place for fear of being recognised by 
others, even if these facilities also provide the treatment they need. Social perception 
and stigma continue to present a significant barrier to the uptake of HIV testing, 
even in 2014 when early diagnosis can mean the difference between a chronic but 
treatable condition, or death (UNAIDS, 2007a; UNAIDS, 2012a). In interviews with 
health care providers in Myanmar, respondents told the author that HIV positive 
people living in poverty would incur considerable financial cost in order to travel to 
health care facilities outside of their local area in order to avoid the risk of 
identification within their community (Aung, 2012; de Groote, 2013). There may also 
be valid reason to doubt the confidentiality of services inside those facilities, as staff 
members are likely to include members of the local community (Aung, 2012). The
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'exceptional' legal protections and human-rights advocacy of AIDS exceptionalism 
are measures intended to reduce such barriers to testing and treatment (Burris, 1994, 
p.253; Davies 2009, pp.70-75).
Part of the AIDS exceptionalism response codified in the 1980s and 1990s is 
that norms and good practise for HIV testing advocate counselling for patients as 
part of the testing process, in some circumstances both before and after tests are 
administered (WHO & UN AIDS, 2007). The accepted best practice guidelines issued 
by international norm-setters WHO and UNAIDS regard counselling and testing as 
inseparable within the clinical setting, and state that: "Post-test counselling is an 
integral component of the HIV testing process. All individuals undergoing HIV 
testing m ust be counselled when their test results are given, regardless of the test 
result" (UNAIDS & WHO, 2007, p.39). This dem and arises because of the 
exceptional levels of self-stigmatization and psychological burden that are 
associated with diagnosis of HIV, but the advent of new forms of testing have 
challenged the logic of this approach. It is now possible for individuals to purchase 
tests from internet suppliers and to complete these tests in the privacy of their own 
home. This technology has the potential to increase uptake of testing, but it does 
mean that people testing for HIV are doing so w ithout the presence of a medical 
professional. In interview, the Country Coordinator of UNAIDS in Bangkok 
observed the way this has changed HIV testing in the contemporary context:
Look at China now; the whole [men who have sex with men] community are 
buying their HIV tests on the internet, people have more tools to operate, I 
don 't have to get all my courage and go to the doctor ... they look at me 
funny ... give me a lecture ... take blood ... I am told I have to come back in a 
week, I come back in a week. Now I just have to press a button and I get my 
HIV test by post and I pu t the stick in my m outh and in one minute I know if 
I am HIV positive or not. It has pros and cons. (Hahn, 2013)
Opinion on the use of home testing is divided. De Cock & Johnson (1998) wrote that 
"caution is clearly required" when addressing the (then new) technology that made 
home-testing possible, but also noted that "the reticence around the concept of self­
testing contrasts with modern approaches to self-diagnosis or screening for other 
conditions such as [breast cancer], home pregnancy testing, and melanoma
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awareness" (p.291). While some believe that self-administered tests are a way to 
increase awareness of HIV status amongst individuals (which has positive effect on 
personal and population-wide management of the disease), others are concerned 
about the application of testing w ithout access to counselling; Hahn (2013) points 
out the similarities with other sensitive health issues in the past:
People go nuts now if you say that we should have HIV tests in the 
pharmacy. I was a young doctor when they started selling pregnancy tests in 
the pharmacy and the same headlines ... women will be committing suicide, 
the husbands will kill the women if they find out they are p reg n an t... a huge 
negative campaign and nothing happened!
H ahn's response illustrates the evolving social and cultural sensitivities that govern 
our experiences of medical conditions, using female reproductive health as a salient 
example of changing societal attitudes in the 20th century. The sensitivity of the 
issues related to HIV, in particular the 'high-risk behaviour' through which many 
people are infected, fuels the exceptionality of the disease and further complicates 
treatment and prevention measures, including testing. Perceptions of people with or 
at risk from HIV/AIDS as being more vulnerable than people affected by other 
diseases may also impact on the types of responses that are adopted in epidemic 
management. This should be considered in future policy making, as social attitudes 
and medical technologies develop and as vulnerability and power shifts. For 
instance, in Hahn's anecdote about the vulnerability of women following a positive 
pregnancy test, the implied societal values of gendered power are quite obvious. 
But in the exceptionality of testing for HIV/AIDS, the need to critically evaluate the 
pow er and agency of PLWHA remains salient and in order for this to take place, the 
continued role of PLWHA in rights-based activism and policy-making is essential. 
Significantly, even civil society groups and activists who advocate normalization of 
PLWHA recognise the need to exceptionalise some aspects of the disease 
management, including testing and clinical confidentiality. From the Thai Network 
of People Living with HIV (TNP+) in Bangkok, activist Jui Kestkaew (2012) stated in 
interview: "they shouldn't have specific hum an rights protection for people with 
HIV/AIDS but there are some issues that are special [for PLWHA], like blood 
testing". This view, indicative of mainstream HIV responses among Thai and
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international CSOs, reveals the extent to which exceptionalism for AIDS remains 
em bedded in accepted responses to the epidemic, even amongst civil society groups 
w ho explicitly advocate normalisation of PLWHA.
5.4. Challenges to Exceptionalism
AIDS exceptionalism in its early stages was defined by the special 
circumstances surrounding testing and privacy and encouraged the rejection of 
traditional public health interventions in favour of protecting the autonomy and 
rights of people affected by HIV/AIDS. This framework was effectively challenged 
with the breakthrough in treatment to prevent mother-to-child transmission 
(MTCT) of the virus (Oppenhiemer & Bayer, 2009, p.989). By testing pregnant 
women for HIV and administering antiretroviral medication, it became possible for 
HIV+ women to give birth to HIV- children. Thus, testing became an im portant 
route by which to prevent transmission to children, and with the lives of unborn 
foetuses at risk, exceptionalist logic that reduced the likelihood of testing their 
parents came under intense criticism.
From the outset of the response, Bayer (1991) had predicted that AIDS 
exceptionalism in its original form would not be durable, as "the effort to sustain a 
set of policies treating HIV infection as fundamentally different from all other public 
health threats will be increasingly difficult" (p.1503). Bayer (1991) proposed that the 
decline of the early exceptionalist argument w ould arise in the face of medical 
advances such as MTCT prevention, increased treatment, the reduction of anxiety, 
and less-than-predicted fatalities. Both Bayer (1991) and Burris (1994) note that in 
terms of incurability and mortality, AIDS has not wreaked the death toll that many 
proponents of exceptionalism had predicted. Ingram (2013) also observes that levels 
of exceptionality and emergency related to HIV/AIDS are declining as the 
"stabilisation" (p.444) of the epidemic occurs. Improved knowledge of HIV and its 
modes of transmission have reduced fear of the virus, as understanding (in theory) 
allows individuals to manage their risk of exposure.8 Just as Bayer (1991, p.1503)
8 Education about modes of transmission and behavioural risk are crucial in reducing HIV 
prevalence, but do not alone constitute an effective response. Individuals who understand
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predicted that exceptionalism would decline if the epidemic affected only certain 
(marginalised) population groups, Burris (1994) also observed that when viewed as 
a result of behavioural risk and social conditions, HIV "seems much less exceptional 
than when we think of it as a sudden viral invader" (p.262). The fear and anxiety 
once inspired by the virus has declined, as understanding and management of the 
epidemic increases and particularly as new and more effective treatments become 
available.
Despite these challenges, AIDS exceptionalism has endured as a framework 
for positioning HIV on the policy documents and political agendas of governments 
because it is an effective route by which resources and power can be garnered to 
deal with an issue, and because the narrative of exceptionalism had become 
established within the discourse of AIDS activists. Before the Copenhagen School 
had codified its model of securitization in the late 1990s, Bayer (1991) summarised 
the campaigning of exceptionalist AIDS activists as a constructivist process that has 
distinct resemblance to the securitization process:
The broad political context within which decisions will be made about the 
availability of resources for prevention, research, and the provision of care 
will be affected by the changing perspective on AIDS. The availability of 
such resources has always been the outcome of a competitive process, 
however implicit. In the beginning, the desperate effort to wrest needed 
resources from an unresponsive political system in the context of a health 
care systems that failed to provide universal protection against the cost of 
illness compelled AIDS activists and their allies to argue that AIDS was 
different and required funding commitments of a special kind. (p. 1503)
The alliance to which Bayer (1991, p.1503) refers had constructed HIV as an 
exceptional issue in order to attract a share of the finite resources available. Leading 
UN AIDS, Piot would engage in the same process by constructing HIV as an 
exceptional disease unlike other health issues and as uniquely deserving of the 
money and attention of world leaders. The special significance of Dr Piot's
their exposure to risk may not be empowered to manage that exposure, for instance when 
sex workers risk infection through sex they must also be sufficiently empowered to negotiate 
condom use with male partners or clients and have access to those condoms and knowledge 
of how to use them effectively.
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campaign, which is discussed in Chapter 6, was that he identified an extraordinary 
platform  to which AIDS could be anchored: the United Nations Security Council. By 
linking HIV with security in this globally revered institution, Piot knew that he 
could engender the exceptional financial and political response that was required to 
tackle the epidemic (Piot, 2013).
The securitization process attracts resources because it positions the 
proposed threat at the apex of a hierarchy of priorities that otherwise concern the 
audience; in the case of HIV, securitization at the level of the UNSC required 
members to accept that HIV was of greater salience than other, non-securitized 
health issues such as malaria or breast cancer. To accept that security exists within a 
hierarchical framework of competing concerns, as according to the foundational 
logic the Copenhagen School, is to accept that those not achieving the prioritised 
status do not merit as many resources or as vigorous a response. Instead, resources 
are invested in dealing with perceived existential threats and can be diverted from 
other (perhaps equally compelling) issues that have not been successfully 
securitized. The diversion of resources from non-securitized health issues has raised 
concerns among many analysts in the global health arena (e.g., Elbe, 2006; Mclnnes 
& Lee, 2006; Davies, 2009). In the past decade, there has been a backlash against the 
exceptionality of the international AIDS response, with specific attention paid to the 
am ount of resources that this approach has engendered; according to critics, these 
are disproportionate to the burden of disease (England 2007, 2008; Smith & 
Whiteside, 2010). In his assessment of AIDS exceptionalism and the response it 
engenders, England (2008) states that disease-specific funding has detrimental 
impact on the organisational structures and economies of aid-recipient countries, for 
many of whom HIV aid "often exceeds total domestic healthcare budgets". It has 
also been argued that more than three decades into the epidemic, epidemiological 
data no longer supports the case for exceptionalism, with fewer people than 
expected falling ill or dying as a result of HIV (Bayer, 1991, p .1503; England, 2008).
After initial fears of an uncontrollable pandemic in the global North proved 
unsubstantiated, HIV/AIDS did not feature on the agenda of international politics 
until the creation of UNAIDS in 1996 (Smith & Whiteside, 2010, p.3). Despite early
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predictions of a widespread epidemic, prevalence in developed countries did not 
reach significant numbers within the general population, instead remaining 
concentrated within the easily distinguishable groups first identified as being at 
increased risk of infection (Beyer, 1991, p .1503). The proposed links between 
poverty, economic instability, and HIV have faced serious critique (England, 2008), 
and the empirical evidence underpinning HIV-security claims has been called into 
question (Barnett & Prins, 2006). Perhaps most convincingly, with m odem  
technological advancement in medicine the exceptionalist policies that complicate 
testing and diagnosis may now be widely regarded as hindering access to treatment 
and effective response rather than protecting people affected by HIV/AIDS (Smith & 
Whiteside, 2010, p.3).
In its contemporary state, the global HIV/AIDS epidemic may be best dealt 
w ith not through an exceptionalist framework but, conversely, with normalisation 
of the virus and of its treatment and diagnosis. From the outset, normalisation of 
people living with HIV/AIDS has been a foundational feature of civil society 
campaigns, even when their demands to exceptionalise legal protection for these 
people constituted the extraordinary. Normalisation of testing would contravene 
the early types of exceptionalism advocated by civil society and rights groups, but 
may be dem anded in coming years because, with medical advances in treatm ent 
and prevention, routine HIV/AIDS testing can now reasonably be expected to 
increase the number of people who know their status and are able to manage their 
condition, thus reducing the risk of infecting others (De Cock & Johnson, 1998; 
Pisani, 2008).
Testing as part of routine medical services offers significant potential 
benefits in terms of increasing early diagnoses (which lead to higher survival rates 
and less costly medical regimes) and acts as an effective intervention to prevent 
transmission. Recent research undertaken in the HIV Prevention Trials Network 052 
study shows conclusively that treatment is an effective method for prevention of 
new infections, as PLWHA who adhere to treatment regimens are able to lower 
their viral load so far as to make infection to others significantly unlikely (WHO, 
2012). Where it can be linked to provable reduction in transmission, normalisation
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of testing and routine testing of pregnant women for HIV/AIDS has been advocated 
by De Cock & Johnson (1998), and routine HIV testing for key affected populations 
and high risk groups may become an increasingly popular dem and among CSOs as 
well as epidemiologists (Pisani, 2008).
5.5. Conclusion
In conclusion, AIDS exceptionalism defined the political and social context 
which later facilitated the securitization of HIV/AIDS within the global community. 
This is particularly true within the professional, political and medical establishment 
that had been most involved with the exceptionalist campaigns. Following its 
emergence in the global North during the 1980s, HIV/AIDS was an epidemic that 
dem anded political attention, public health intervention, and specific policy. The 
disease was subject to a unique form of political mobilisation by civil society groups 
and non-state actors that has since come to define the global response. The result of 
this activism was initially a form of AIDS exceptionalism characterised by a 
rejection of traditional public health interventions, with new, disease-specific 
policies that emphasised patient autonomy, clinical confidentiality, special legal 
protections, and enhanced levels of privacy and rights protection for people living 
with or affected by HIV/AIDS. In its more recent form, AIDS exceptionalism has led 
to the creation of a well-funded disease-specific global response that, as explored in 
the following chapter, became the framework for the next stage of securitizing 
HIV/AIDS.
Exceptionalism has led to significant advances in the management of 
HIV/AIDS; it is an outcome of greater civil society involvement in public health 
m anagement and policy making and, since the 1994 Paris AIDS Summit, the greater 
involvement of people with HIV/AIDS has been formalised through the adoption of 
GIPA policies among international norm setters including the UN and Global Fund, 
w ith positive effect on the response in general (APN, 2004, p.3; UNAIDS, 2007). The 
exceptional public health approach employed to deal with HIV/AIDS has also 
helped to contain the epidemic within key affected populations and to raise 
substantial funds for dealing with the disease globally, helping to secure ARV
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access for millions of PLWHA who would be otherwise unable to afford treatment. 
Annual reports published by UNAIDS show that in many regions, rates of new 
infections have declined in recent years and access to treatment is increasing (e.g., 
UNAIDS, 2011a; UNAIDS, 2012; UNAIDS, 2012a; UNAIDS, 2013b).
Possible additional benefits of the exceptionalist approach include the de­
formalisation of medicine and the greater involvement of patients w ith their 
individual care, leading to a cultural shift in which patient-doctor communication is 
enhanced (De Cock & Johnson, 1998, p.292). Exceptionalism may also have 
contributed to greater patient autonomy, greater respect for informed consent 
(related to testing) and increased patient advocacy for HIV/AIDS as well as other 
diseases (De Cock & Johnson, 1998, p.292). As a precursor for securitization, 
exceptionalising HIV/AIDS amounted to politicisation of the virus, raising the 
profile of the disease and increasing the resources allocated to dealing with it. 
Because denial, reticence, and 'silence' borne from the sexualisation and 
stigmatization of the virus are significant barriers to effective programmes and 
policy making, this advocacy and awareness-raising has challenged some of the 
major barriers to dealing with the disease. In this respect, exceptionalisation can be 
considered a positive, or at least necessary, part of affecting an efficacious global 
response to HIV/AIDS. However, with medical advancement that enhances the 
quality of treatment and its effectiveness, claims to exceptionalism that are deemed 
too reliant on outm oded rationale, or that complicate or hinder access to tests and 
treatment, are not sustainable. The alternative and more recent manifestation of 
AIDS exceptionalism focuses on access to treatment and the allocation of funding 
and resources, and this features in the Chapter 6, which explores how 
exceptionalism has been successfully employed in the UN-led global response.
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Chapter 6: Securitization at the United Nations Security 
Council
It has been established in the thesis so far that fear is an essential component 
of security, which amounts to the construction of existential threats through the use 
of suasive speech acts, namely fear appeals. Chapter 3 concluded that fear can be 
productive or destructive and that existing literature on the psychology of fear 
appeals identifies a num ber of variables by which the productivity and success of 
appeals are determined. These variables are concurrent with the "facilitating 
conditions" of securitization theory that are proposed by the Copenhagen School 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p.31). The authority of the speech actor, the severity of the threat, 
and the inclusion of proposed evasive or defensive responses within fear appeals all 
increase the likelihood of the audiences' persuasion and, in instances of 
securitization, of their legitimation of extraordinary power or violation of normal 
boundaries in dealing with the proposed threat.
HIV/AIDS was the subject of a concise and strategic process of securitization 
that was led by UNAIDS Executive Director Dr Peter Piot, with US Ambassador 
Richard Holbrooke as its "architect", and US Presidential candidate Al Gore as an 
authoritative securitizing actor (Piot, 2013). The process culminated in January 2000, 
when the United Nations Security Council convened its 4087th meeting that was 
dedicated to addressing "the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa" 
(UNSC, 2000). By bringing HIV/AIDS to the Security Council, Piot and his 
colleagues had already succeeded in framing the epidemic as a security issue and 
had made an unprecedented link between health and traditional security. The 
meeting also served as a platform from which further securitization could occur and 
the following chapter examines how inclusion of HIV on the UNSC agenda 
mobilised the resources and attention of national leaders and heads of state. This 
mobilisation was Piot's intention and was made possible because his securitizing 
speech acts, and those of his supporters at the meeting, met the criteria for fear 
appeal and securitization success; they possessed the authority to articulate the
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claim and to convince the audience of the existence of the threat, they invoked fear 
of a threat that the audience perceived as severe and as threatening their own 
interests, and they offered a "way out" or solution, in the form of a three point 
efficacious response that included Peacekeeper troop mandates that were 
subsequently enacted (Buzan et al., 1998, p.33).
United Nations Security Council Meeting 4087 (UNSC 4087) signalled a 
"watershed" in the international response to HIV/AIDS, marking the first time that 
the Security Council had engaged with disease as a security issue (Elbe, 2006, p .121). 
UNSC 4087 both indicated the success of securitizing claims about HIV/AIDS 
(Mclnnes & Rushton, 2010, pp.227, 244) and acted as a platform from which further 
securitizing moves were made. At the meeting, HIV/AIDS was framed in terms of 
traditional, military security concerns and the Peacekeeping Operations for which 
UNSC Members are legally responsible were used as a "hook" to engage the 
Council with the non-traditional issue of health (Piot, 2013). Piot also employed the 
internal linguistic conditions of the speech act, using Peacekeeper Operations as the 
"possible way out" dem anded by the "grammar" of the securitizing speech act 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p.33). It had a significant impact; the meeting was the first time 
that a non-military issue had been awarded international security threat status by 
the UNSC (Vieira, 2007, pp .149-150). However, through a series of in-depth 
interviews and discourse analysis of policy documents, this chapter problematizes 
these securitizing claims and reveals complex motivations for bringing HIV/AIDS to 
the Security Council, beyond its dimensions as a security threat. It also examines the 
method by which Piot constructed the threat, outlining the way in which fear was 
invoked and managed through the provision of efficacious responses in order to 
ensure success of the securitizing process.
The process of framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue took place at the level 
of international institutions of global governance, led by the United Nations and the 
multi-lateral institutions and systems with which United Nations organisations 
work, including the World Health Organisation, the G8, and the World Bank. But 
while the first UNSC Meeting on HIV/AIDS can be regarded as an indication of 
accepted securitization of HIV/AIDS at the level of international political
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institutions, the translation of this rhetoric to domestic responses and the endurance 
of the security-HIV linkage have proven limited. The construction of HIV/AIDS as a 
threat to traditional concepts of security, (namely the stability of states, their 
economies, and their military forces) was effective enough to bring HIV/AIDS to the 
agenda of the UNSC and led to multiple HIV/AIDS related Resolutions and 
Presidential statements, including Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1308 on 
HIV/AIDS and Peacekeeping Operations in 2000, SCR 1325 in 2000, SCR 1820 in 
2008, SCR 1888, 1889, and 1894 in 2009, SCR 1960 in 2010, and SCR 1983 in 2011. But 
there remains doubt in the academic community that Member States were ever 
entirely convinced by these claims (Mclnnes & Rushton, 2010); Richard Holbrooke, 
then US Ambassador and key speaker at Meeting 4087, recalls that there was a lack 
of consensus among permanent members of the Council, particularly from Russia 
who, "didn 't w ant to violate the standard rules of the Security Council" by 
discussing an issue they considered to be only of internal concern to the state (PBS, 
2005). Piot (2013) also recalled this contestation in interview, when he noted that the 
opportune timing of the meeting during a quiet period of the UNSC schedule was 
crucial in securing the agenda and suggested, "Maybe if this had been in the middle 
of the year it could have been totally undermined by all the other members".
The issue of persuasion remains contested and it may be impossible to ever 
fully discern whether Members of the UNSC were convinced by the securitizing 
rhetoric of the meeting or whether they were motivated by humanitarian (or other) 
concerns. At the sub-state level, fear of HIV/AIDS is not solidified around the 
propensity of the virus to affect security but rather about the impact it has on 
personal health and societal stability, reflecting a framework more akin to that of 
hum an security. Data from key participants in the response to HIV/AIDS in 
Thailand and Myanmar, which is presented later in this thesis, suggests that 
securitization was not evident at the national level although its impact can be seen 
in the increased availability of resources from both internal and external donors. 
The findings from Thailand (detailed in Chapter 7) are particularly significant 
because Thailand has been close to the operations of the UNAIDS since it was 
established and has been lauded as a "visionary leader" and a "model" for the
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global response (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2004, p.29; 
UN AIDS, 2009; UN AIDS, 2012d). It could therefore be expected that if UN 
securitization of HIV/AIDS had disseminated from the supra-state to state level, it 
would appear in the policy and implementation of the Thai national response. This 
is not the case. Instead, both Thailand and Myanmar have ignored or rejected the 
proposed links between HIV and traditional security concepts that were discussed 
at the Security Council, favouring instead a hum an security and hum an rights 
orientated framework w hen dealing with the disease.
Studies on the securitization of HIV/AIDS typically identify UNSC Meeting 
4087 as a turning point in the global response, if not a mark of successful 
securitization of the virus (Feldbaum & Lee, 2004; Garrett 2005; Mclnnes & Lee, 
2006; Elbe, 2006); it was the first time the Security Council had convened a meeting 
solely about a non-traditional security issue. Mclnnes & Rushton (2010, p.227) note 
that as late as December 1999, Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan 
had rejected requests to bring HIV onto the agenda of the UNSC, yet less than two 
months later the Security Council convened on its first meeting of the millennium to 
discuss the virus as a “security threat of the greatest magnitude" (UNSC, 2000, p.2). 
There is currently no detailed examination of the diplomatic manoeuvring that led 
up to this seminal meeting or to the subsequent UN General Assembly Special 
Session (UNGASS) on HIV/AIDS in 2001. This chapter examines the political and 
social context in which UNSC securitization of HIV/AIDS was possible and awards 
particular attention to the facilitating conditions that allowed this to occur; for the 
suasive acts of securitization to succeed, the criteria outlined in Chapter 3 must be 
met. The tactical use of fear appeals and security rhetoric employed by Dr Piot at 
UNAIDS and the inclusion of efficacious measures in the securitizing claims that 
offered Council Members an actionable response are examined below.
Reviewing the literature and available documentation, which include 
detailed minutes and speech transcripts from these UNSC sessions, key actors 
involved in this process were identified and interviewed. After contacting Lord 
Malloch-Brown, who attended the meeting in his former capacity as Administrator 
of the United Nations Development Programme, Dr Peter Piot was identified as
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"the person most at the heart of it all" (Malloch-Brown, 2011). This was 
corroborated by UNAIDS Country Coordinator for Thailand, Michael H ahn (2013) 
w ho referred to Dr Piot as "the insider on what happened and why" and told the 
author that "he had the strategy, it was his idea, and he managed the whole thing" 
H ahn (2013) suggested that Dr Piot regarded this meeting and the subsequent 
UNGASS session to be "the big milestone" and the "jewel" in the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS. Dr Peter Piot was contacted for interview and the following explanation 
of the securitizing process leading up to the UNSC meeting is based on his account 
to the author and on the available records, including his memoir No Time To Lose 
(Piot, 2012, p.148).9
6.1. Construction of the Security Threat
The evolution of HIV from political issue to security threat did not occur 
until the mid-1990s. This thesis finds that UNSC Meeting 4087 was part of a specific 
strategy lead by Dr Piot to mobilise the extraordinary response needed to address 
the epidemic, although these responses were subsequently not always controlled by 
UNAIDS (the largest financial contributions to the global response are channelled 
through external bodies including PEPFAR and the Global Fund). After his 
appointm ent as Founding Director of UNAIDS in 1995, Piot began what he referred 
to as a "strategy" of promoting HIV/AIDS as a matter of urgency and priority for 
world leaders, building on the foundations of AIDS exceptionalism in order to 
frame his approach (Piot, 2013). In his memoirs he recalls, "I felt [UNAIDS] should 
become the world's advocate for AIDS, mobilising desperately needed resources" 
(Piot, 2012, p.220). His securitizing rhetoric is evident in a statement made in 1999, 
in which he used UNAIDS as a platform from which to prom pt action from the 
government of Myanmar, who were at that time reluctant to acknowledge their 
internal epidemic; at a press conference in Bangkok, Piot announced, "we need to 
concentrate our efforts on Burma, convince the government this is a matter not only 
involving the people but of national security" ("Burma Rejects UN Fears" 1999).
9 Piot's memoir includes a chapter titled, The T ipping Point, which details the process of 
taking HIV/AIDS to the Security Council in 2000.
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A lthough neither Myanmar nor Thailand adopted this rhetoric within their internal 
discourse on HIV/AIDS, the securitization of HIV/AIDS that Piot orchestrated at the 
international level did mobilise an unprecedented global response to HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS, 2012c, p.5; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014) and was made possible by 
the existing framework of civil society activism and theory of AIDS exceptionalism 
that was outlined above.
The model of securitization is linear, with 'security' as a status at the apex of 
priority and concern; accordingly, securitizing claims are built upon the foundation 
of the preceding politicisation of an issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p.29). Dr Piot is a vocal 
advocate of AIDS exceptionalism and has used the rhetoric and the established 
claims of AIDS exceptionalism to lobby global leaders for greater involvement and 
commitment to HIV/AIDS. This is a strategy that he credits with quantifiable 
output, concluding that the success of Uganda's epidemic response was due in part 
to, "the urgency of countrywide mobilization" (Piot, 2012, p.241). In keeping with 
the internal grammatical criteria of the speech act outlined above, framing the 
disease as a matter of absolute priority was a central tenet of Piot's securitizing 
moves and he remains explicit in his use of fear appeal rhetoric when speaking 
about HIV/AIDS; for example, in 2005 in his address to the UNSC, Piot (2005) told 
Members that "the threat posed by the AIDS epidemic has not dwindled. Indeed, it 
continues to outstrip our worst fears" (pp.2-3).
In order to deliver a successful suasive claim, fear appeal, or securitizing act, 
the enunciator m ust possess sufficient authority to convince the audience to accept 
that claim. In securitization theory, this authority, or "relationship between speaker 
and audience" is one of the "social conditions" that the Copenhagen School 
identifies as a facilitating condition (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 33). The literature on fear 
appeals finds that the authority of the message communicator affects the audience's 
perceptions about the credibility of the message, the severity of the proposed threat, 
and the efficacy of proposed responses. As Director of UNAIDS and a renowned 
virologist and social epidemiologist, Dr Piot possessed the authority with which to 
deliver convincing securitizing claims. However, his suasive speech acts were also 
disseminated through other authoritative actors and agents. In order to provide the
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level of resources deemed necessary by UNAIDS, Piot believed the disease would 
have to be addressed not only as a health issue but also as an issue of development, 
economics, and security, requiring UNAIDS to engage with international agents 
such as the World Bank and IMF, as well as national agencies within Member States. 
In addition to articulating the HIV-security link through UNAIDS, Piot specifically 
sought other authoritative platforms from which to deliver his securitizing appeals, 
and lobbied individuals with authority to act as securitizing actors.
In interview with the author, Dr Piot (2013) explained how he sought to 
identify a suitably authoritative multilateral institution with which to pitch his claim 
to more resources for HIV/AIDS. In one sense, UNAIDS provided this authority, but 
Piot also saw an opportunity to use UN AIDS, a new UN body, to construct an 
understanding of the virus that would be sustained in influential policy circles, 
explaining that "the key issue there is that it's the first serious body that takes it on 
that sets the tone, and then others will follow" (Piot, 2013). Piot hoped to influence 
actors beyond those already engaged with HIV/AIDS; in his written account of the 
formation of UNAIDS during the 1990s he states, "we had no chance to defeat the 
epidemic unless we pulled out [szc] of the 'ghetto' of AIDS doctors, researchers and 
activists, and built a broad coalition" (Piot, 2012, p.248). Being part of the UN system 
"gave UNAIDS legitimacy, potential access to top leaders, and a platform from 
which to deliver policy guidance" and Piot was aware of the importance of setting 
precedent and disseminating international norms for dealing with the epidemic. Of 
the USA, Piot (2012) wrote, "we knew the United States was key. It was both the 
most powerful and the richest nation in the world, and it set trends and framed the 
way other countries envisioned problems" (p.263). In locating an authoritative 
multilateral institution as a platform from which to launch his securitizing rhetoric 
and action, Piot viewed the UN Security Council as the only body with sufficient 
power and authority to enact change amongst UN members. He noted that the 
UNSC was set apart from other UN bodies that had "no teeth", because its decisions 
are, "in theory", binding (Piot, 2013). According to Piot (2013), the UNSC was the 
only institution "really taken more or less seriously".
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Piot identified not only authoritative platforms, such as the Security Council, 
and actors, such as the United States, but also individuals. UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan was identified in this capacity as, "one essential person...w e d idn 't just 
need him on board, we needed him to become the w orld's AIDS advocate" (Piot, 
2012, p.249). With authoritative figures speaking the language of security and 
HIV/AIDS, it was possible to disseminate the message to other influential actors; 
Piot notes that in 1999, "we also forced all the major aid agencies to discuss AIDS for 
the first time ... w ith African ministers, activists, and business leaders, at a meeting 
convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan" (Piot, 2012, p.271). This strategy 
worked, following the UNSC meeting on HIV/AIDS in 2000, Piot (2012) notes that 
"for years to come, presidents and prime ministers would tell me, 'if AIDS was 
debated in the Security Council, this must a serious problem '" (p.275).
UNSC meeting 4087 was arranged by then-US Ambassador to the UN, 
Richard Holbrooke. Although his central role in the meeting and as an AIDS activist 
is well documented (Sternberg, 2002; PBS, 2005; Barnett & Prins, 2006), research for 
this thesis reveals that Holbrooke was specifically targeted and lobbied by Dr Piot 
as part of his securitization strategy. Piot (2013) described Holbrooke as "a 
bulldozer" who could bring HIV/AIDS to the UNSC despite "enormous resistance 
from just about everybody" and targeted him as an authoritative individual who 
could advance the campaign to securitize HIV/AIDS.
Publically, Holbrooke attributed his commitment to high-level HIV/AIDS 
activism to two personal experiences; his observation of Peacekeeper troops buying 
commercial sex and "spreading AIDS" in Cambodia, and a trip to Lusaka, Africa in 
1999 (PBS, 2005). This latter trip was made in his capacity as US Ambassador when 
he visited the Great Lakes region in order to assess ongoing violent conflict. There, 
he was taken to visit the Fountain of Hope Day Care Centre for children with HIV 
and following this he recalls, "I came up with the idea that we should hold a special 
session of the Security Council on HIV/AIDS" (PBS, 2005). This personal experience 
is identified in the literature as a seminal moment in the securitization of HIV/AIDS; 
Campbell (2008) calls it the beginning of the "formal securitization of HIV/AIDS" 
(p.l) by the United Nations, and Mclnnes & Rushton (2010, p.227) refer to it as a
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starting point for the securitization of HIV at the UN. The newspaper USA Today 
reported an interview about the Lusaka tip with Holbrooke's travel companion, 
Senator Russ Feingold, who said, "what Richard Holbrooke did on that trip has to 
be one of the seminal events that led to an increased focus on AIDS in Africa" 
(Sternberg, 2002).
In interview for this thesis, Piot (2013) explained how he had recognised the 
influence of Holbrooke and had lobbied him individually in order to bring AIDS to 
the UNSC platform, as part of the UNAIDS strategy to promote HIV/AIDS:
I had met [Holbrooke] a few times and it kind of clicked between us and I 
think it was early November, he made a trip with Security Council members 
to the Great Lakes region because of all the war and all that was going on, as 
the Security Council does regularly. And I made sure that wherever they 
went, in every country, they would run into people living with HIV and 
AIDS activists or UNAIDS staff. It's a classic activist approach.
Piot's strategy, facilitated by his networks of people on the ground and civil society, 
had worked. As Holbrooke returned from Africa, convinced that HIV/AIDS 
dem anded the exceptional response advocated by UNAIDS, he contacted the 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan by phone. Senator Feingold told 
journalists, "I watched him call up the Secretary-General (Kofi Annan) and tell him 
we have to have a Security Council meeting on AIDS" (Sternberg, 2002). It is 
noteworthy that Annan was not initially convinced by the proposal and according 
to Feingold, he replied, "We can't do that. AIDS isn 't a security issue" (Sternberg, 
2002), indicating that, like the Russian contingent at the UNSC, the Secretary 
General was sceptical of the inclusion of a non-traditional security issue on the 
Council agenda. In interview with the author, Piot acknowledged this initial 
reluctance from Annan. However, within two months the Security Council would 
hold a meeting dedicated to HIV/AIDS. Piot (2013) recalled:
Then when they came back [Holbrooke] gave a press conference about the 
w ar and the unrest in the Great Lakes region but also he said, but there is 
one problem that kills even more people, and that's AIDS -  wherever we 
were, we came, we saw [AIDS].
The account given by Piot reveals his strategic influence that preceded Holbrooke's 
intervention. By confronting the Ambassador with the bodies of PLWHA, Piot had
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utilised a visual display of people suffering with HIV/AIDS in order to lobby 
Holbrooke and to gain his support as an 'HIV advocate'. In an epidemic 
characterised by biopolitical and socio-economic segregation, collapsing the 
distance between powerful people without HIV/AIDS and disenfranchised people 
w ith HIV can be achieved by the literal use of HIV+ bodies for political ends. This 
m ight be considered a form of fear appeal, although it is more likely that it invoked 
a humanitarian concern within Holbrooke that motivated his subsequent use of 
securitizing language at the UNSC.
6.2. Severity of the Threat
Piot advocated a multilateral response to HIV that from the outset addressed 
social as well as medical conditions as being fundamentally im portant to controlling 
the epidemic (Piot, 2012). In part, this was driven by the nature of UNAIDS as an 
institution; due to the myriad social and economic impacts of the virus, many of 
which are culture or gender-specific, HIV/AIDS featured on the agendas of multiple 
UN agencies before the creation of UNAIDS in 1996. Among others, UNICEF, 
UNESCO, and UNFPA were competing to take ownership of their niche area in the 
epidemic, and UNAIDS - the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS - was 
established in order to coordinate a unified response from the UN (Pisani, 2008, 
p .13; Piot, 2012, p.207). The potential of the newly created UNAIDS agency was to 
enact change on a global scale because, Piot (2012) reasoned, "making global 
recommendations was the sort of work that only a multilateral agency could do, as 
it is in principle not bound by the interests of a particular nation or industry" 
(p.204).
The suasive nature of a multisectoral, multilevel threat was utilised by Piot 
in his securitization campaign. Piot and Holbrooke presented HIV/AIDS as a threat 
to the Members of the Security Council by linking it to the concerns of the 
influential Member States, explaining that it was both in their interest to prevent 
insecurity in Africa and their legal responsibility to ensure that Peacekeeper troops 
did not spread or contract HIV. When HIV/AIDS became feared not just by those 
most vulnerable to infection (often the poor and marginalised), but by a wider
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population, this fear could stimulate the adoption of a proactive, resource-fuelled 
response. The perception that HIV affected people and institutions beyond the 
marginalised "other" allowed an effective practical response to take shape because 
it engaged a range of actors. These actors were motivated to respond not solely from 
compassion or hum anitarian concern for the 'other', but because they sought to 
alleviate their own fear of economic instability in markets, political unrest or civil 
disorder, or illness and disability among military recruits. As a fear appeal, this 
framing of HIV/AIDS as a multisectoral threat constitutes the persuasion of 
audience that the threat is severe and they personally are susceptible. In addition to 
increasing the likelihood of fear appeal success, by framing HIV/AIDS as a 
multisectoral security threat it was also possible to mobilise the wide range of actors 
that are needed to effectively tackle the epidemic.
From an epidemiological perspective, there is no 'single' HIV/AIDS 
epidemic but rather many epidemics that require tailored responses (Smith & 
Whiteside, 2010). The nature of HIV is that each geographically or demographically 
defined epidemic is shaped by the specific cultural and social conditions in which it 
exists and spreads, and therefore each has a "different dynamic and course, each 
varying from city to city, village to village, community to community" (The Lancet,
2004). Such complex circumstances raised the dem ands on any organisation 
attempting to orchestrate an effective response. The international institution that 
preceded UNAIDS was the W HO's GPA, which "never addressed AIDS solely as a 
medical problem" under the directorship of Jonathan Mann, w ho had worked with 
Piot in Zaire as part of Projet Sida (Knight, 2008, p. 15). Dr Piot's personal experience 
of social epidemiology, gained during the discovery of Ebola Zaire in the 1970s, 
informed his later position that HIV/AIDS was a multisectoral threat (Piot, 2012, 
p.69).10 Piot (2012) has stated that when designing an epidemic response, "anything
10 From the outset, the UN bodies established to address HIV/AIDS have dealt with social, 
political, demographic and cultural issues as well as the medical aspects of the disease. 
Social epidemiology places emphasis on the importance of social and behaviour conditions 
as affecting disease vectors and transmission: e.g., in his account of managing the first 
clinical response to Ebola Zaire, Dr Piot highlights the important breakthrough that came 
from assessing the reasons why funerals resulted in infection peaks. The epidemiological 
team found that corpse washing rituals provide a vector for transmission, and this culturally
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with the word only doesn't work in AIDS" (p.241) and he is a strong advocate for a 
multisectoral response. The official policy of UNAIDS is to frame HIV/AIDS as a 
multisectoral issue, a position that has been challenged in recent years for its 
effectiveness and empirical basis (England, 2008). However, the perception of 
HIV/AIDS as an issue requiring multisectoral and multilateral responses continues 
to inform mainstream epidemic management.
From his authoritative position as the Director of UNAIDS, Piot did not 
engage in securitization of HIV/AIDS because he believed the virus posed any 
immediate threat to military capability, contra to what was discussed in the UNSC 
minutes (Hahn, 2013). Instead, in his own words, Piot (2013) sought to "bring AIDS 
to where big decisions are made and where there is power". Recognising the 
potential authority and influence of the UNAIDS office, Piot and his team sought to 
engage the interest of world leaders and to bring the AIDS epidemic to their 
attention as an issue to be feared and as an issue with direct, negative consequences 
for their own interests. Elizabeth Pisani (2008), who worked as an epidemiologist 
with a background in journalism, was employed by UNAIDS in its initial years and 
detailed her experiences manipulating statistics in order to raise awareness of the 
epidemic. A chapter in her semi-autobiographical book on "the AIDS industry" is 
titled Cooking Up An Epidemic and explains how her journalistic training was used to 
"beat up" stories and data from epidemic, with the intention of lobbying more 
funds from "rich countries" by "infecting them with the same urgency" felt by the 
staff at UNAIDS (Pisani, 2008, pp. 20-21; see also, Smith & Whiteside, 2010).
After its launch, Piot directed UNAIDS to engage in explicitly securitizing 
HIV in order to attract funding, attention, and other resources from global leaders. 
Referring to this lobbying, Piot (2012) states, "in international politics there are only 
two things that count: the economy and security" (p.248). In the late 1980s, he had 
approached the World Bank to lobby for their investment in the global AIDS 
response, but had failed to convince them that the plan would be cost effective, or to 
sufficiently couch each intervention in terms of positive economic impact (Piot,
specific information both contributed to their understanding of the virus, and formed part of 
their successful containment response (Piot, 2012).
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2012, p.209). He described this as, "a mistake I tried not to make again" and his later 
success with the UNSC suggests that he became skilled at framing issues in the 
language that best appealed to their audience (Piot, 2013).
Securitization requires an audience to accept that an existential threat exists, 
to be fearful of the threat and its implications, and to accept that its severity and 
urgency warrants a break from normal procedure. In this case, the Security Council 
members had to be persuaded that HIV presented a threat to security so great as to 
w arrant the unprecedented inclusion of a health issue into the remit of the Council 
and of such severity that the resulting mobilisation of resources would be 
legitimated. The securitizing claims of Dr Piot, Ambassador Holbrooke, and their 
supporters, were that HIV/AIDS merited inclusion on the agenda of a body 
traditionally concerned with a narrow definition of security. It was widely 
understood by this time that, "AIDS w asn't just a health issue: it was a development 
crisis that was damaging the future of entire societies" (Piot, 2012, p.251) and the 
established links between development, poverty, and health were useful in 
facilitating the securitization of the virus, which had already transcended the 
domain of being "merely" a health issue (van Donks, 2008, p.245; Davies, 2009, 
p.72). This contextual knowledge of HIV/AIDS was buttressed by the rhetoric of fear 
and catastrophe employed at Meeting 4087, where World Bank President James 
Wolfensohn told Members that "AIDS is not just a health issue. AIDS is not just a 
development issue. It is also an issue that affects the peace and security of people in 
the continent of Africa and throughout the world" (UNSC, 2000, p.8). Illustrating 
the new, multisectoral nature of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, Wolfensohn was the 
first President of the World Bank invited to speak at a meeting of the Security 
Council.
Health, and specifically disease, were an exceptional and unprecedented 
meeting topic for the UNSC in 2000. In order to bring the disease to the UNSC 
agenda, Piot chose to frame the epidemic in terms of traditional security and 
appealed to the traditional understandings of security employed by the Council. 
Whilst this risks underm ining the legitimacy of hum an or health security as 
frameworks in their own right (Peterson, 2002; Elbe, 2006), it remains an effective
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way of fast-tracking a health issue onto the agenda of security concerns (Davies, 
2009, p. 19). Kofi Annan set the tone of the Meeting 4087 when he stressed the links 
between HIV and warfare in his opening address to the Council:
But nowhere else [outside Africa] has AIDS yet become a threat to economic, 
social and political stability on the scale that it now is in southern and 
eastern Africa. The impact of AIDS in that region is no less destructive than 
that of warfare itself. Indeed, by some measures it is far worse. (UNSC, 2000, 
p.4)
This approach was also employed by Wolfensohn, who likened the virus to war and 
linked it to state instability with ramifications for international security, telling the 
Council: "this problem is more effective than war itself in terms of destabilizing 
countries" (UNSC, 2000, p.8). Piot referred to war in his address, stating, "War is 
one of the instruments of AIDS, as rape is one of the instruments of war. Conflict 
and the resulting movements of people fuel the epidemic" (UNSC, 2000, p .ll) . 
Malloch-Brown also drew direct comparison between the traditional security 
concern of war and HIV/AIDS, telling the Council that:
Africa is under siege. Many times more people are being killed by the 
disease in sub-Saharan Africa each year than in all the w orld's wars. This is a 
new security front line and I congratulate Richard Holbrooke for the vision 
to go beyond old definitions to bring to this table a discussion of the world's 
most dangerous insurgency. (UNSC, 2000, p.9)
In addition to these explicit comparison or linkages, militaristic language and 
metaphor was also employed as an indirect way to invoke the framework of 
traditional security. Presiding over Meeting 4087, US Vice-President A1 Gore also 
referred to the "front line of defence" against HIV/AIDS and defended the inclusion 
of the disease on the Council agenda by saying that, "many have called the battle 
against it a sacred crusade. The United Nations was created to stop wars. Now we 
m ust wage and win a great and peaceful war of our time — the war against AIDS" 
(UNSC, 2000, p.7). Malloch-Brown, was also explicit in his use of the military 
metaphor, stating, "We m ust view this as a war on three fronts: first, the classrooms 
and clinics of Africa; secondly, the families of Africa; and, thirdly, international 
action — the critical support needed to back Africa's front line" (UNSC, 2000, pp.9- 
10).
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Military metaphors are often used to describe medical conditions and 
treatm ent and remain in use; at the African Summit on HIV/AIDS, TB and other 
infectious diseases in April 2001, Kofi Annan called for a "war chest" fund to tackle 
AIDS (Ferriman, 2001, p.1082). This rhetorical device fits with the threat-defence 
logic identified by Elbe (2006) in his study of securitization and corresponds to 
popular contemporary understandings of disease from the Western medical 
perspective; for instance, with cancer both individual treatments such as 
chemotherapy and public health campaigns to reduce 'unhealthy lifestyles' are 
described as 'w ars' and 'battles' fought against the disease. The w idespread use of 
military metaphor in medicine can be traced to the invention of optical microscopy 
and subsequent advances in cellular pathology in the 19th century, including the 
seminal discovery by Robert Koch that microorganisms are a source of disease 
(Sontag, 1989, p.9). Imagining the virus as a minute but deadly "external invader" of 
the healthy body is an enduring feature of epidemic responses to infectious disease 
and the traditional military metaphor may have assisted Piot in his persuasion of 
the Council in 2000.
6.3. Solutions and Efficacious Responses
Invoking the military metaphor is a useful way of stimulating fear of 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue, but this fear and attention m ust be managed in order 
to promote an effective response. As outlined in the chapters above, fear appeals 
that 'backfire' are liable to create an aversion or distancing effect in their audience 
rather than leading to productive behavioural change or the acceptance of suasive 
claims. Despite these risks, the need to provoke attention for HIV/AIDS is arguably 
greater than with other epidemics because the unique stigmatisation of HIV/AIDS 
leads to silence, denial and a lack of action. In m any ways, the existing fear of 
HIV/AIDS that stems from the epidemiological qualities examined above leads to an 
unproductive fear and aversion that can be countered by productive, well-managed 
fear appeals through securitization. For instance, Elbe (2006) identifies one of the 
benefits of securitizing HIV/AIDS as the ability to prom pt action from governments 
that would otherwise remain silent or immobile on the issue; securitization is a way
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of "breaking the wall of silence" (p. 132) that surrounds HIV/AIDS (see also, 
Ferriman, 2001, p .1082). Elbe (2006) argues that at the internal level, governments 
can be mobilised to deal with HIV/AIDS by shifting the issue to the security agenda 
because, "securitization of HIV/AIDS has also allowed some states to shift 
responsibility for addressing the issue from ministries with only very little political 
clout to political bodies with greater influence on the political process" (p.132). 
Breaking the silence was an explicit aim of the UNSC Meeting 4087, according to 
Meeting President A1 Gore, who told the Council that:
We know that the first line of defence against this disease is prevention, and 
prevention depends on breaking down the barriers against discussing the 
extent and risks of AIDS. That is one purpose of this historic Security 
Council meeting. Today, in sight of all the world, we are putting the AIDS 
crisis at the top of the w orld's security agenda. We must talk about AIDS not 
in whispers, not in private meetings alone, in tones of secrecy and shame. 
We m ust face the threat as we are facing it right here, in one of the great 
forums of this earth, openly and boldly, with urgency and compassion. Until 
we end the stigma of AIDS, we will never end the disease of AIDS. Let us 
begin by resolving to end the stigma associated with AIDS. (UNSC, 2000,
p.6)
Framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue rather than solely as a health concern allowed 
UNAIDS to influence the policy of high-level politicians and, at times, to override 
the position taken by Ministers of Health unwilling to address HIV. Where 
HIV/AIDS is wrongly attributed to distinct and isolated groups, the virus can be 
rejected as a potential source of fear via a process of 'othering'. At the individual 
level this can result in aversion to fear-based public health appeals in which 
audiences are alienated from the message, believing it to apply to some 'other' 
group, but not them (Slavin et al., 2007). A similar rationalisation can also occur at 
the level of policy discourse when political leaders claim that either the disease or its 
perceived vectors do not exist within certain populations. For instance, in 2007, 
Iranian prime minister M ahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed in an address to Columbia 
University that homosexuality did not exist among Iranian citizens; during the 
1990s South African President Thabo Mbeki maintained the controversial belief that 
the HIV virus was not linked to AIDS; and for a short period the military rulers of
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M yanmar claimed that HIV did not exist within their country, claiming instead that 
it was a "foreign" virus (Levy & Scott-Clark, 2002, p.360).
By framing the epidemic as a security issue at an authoritative UN 
institution, HIV/AIDS was awarded a level of urgency and importance and this 
allowed Piot to circumvent lower-level authority figures and to override their 
reluctance to deal with the politically sensitive issue. In interview, Piot (2013) 
recalls:
I wanted to go beyond health, because the body that is governing health in 
the multilateral system is the World Health Assembly, but most Ministers of 
Health in these days were dead set against doing anything about AIDS. So 
that was one of my biggest problems. So I had to go around that. And that's 
where the idea of the Security Council came in.
The Copenhagen School recognises that one potential benefit of securitizing an issue 
is that it becomes "so im portant that it should not be exposed to the normal 
haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders" (Buzan et al., 
1998, p.29) and the UNSC meeting of January 2000 was both a sign of successful 
securitization and an act for further securitization in itself; Dr Piot (2013) recalls:
That debate ... opened quite some doors, ironically because when I 
sometimes met with heads of state and so on, they say 'Oh [HIV] was 
discussed in the Security Council, it must be serious' I mean it's ridiculous 
but that's the way it goes.
The meeting, which included the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, US 
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, US presidential candidate Al Gore, and World 
Bank President James Wolfensohn, signified both that HIV was a matter of national 
and international security and also further legitimated this framing in the minds of 
others. By invoking a fear of HIV/AIDS as a security issue as well as a health issue, 
UNAIDS was able to motivate actors who would otherwise refuse to, or be unable 
to, respond to the epidemic.
It is outlined in Chapter 3 that to be productive fear appeals should include a 
set of proposed responses by which the audience can mitigate the fear or sense of 
threat they encounter. In the securitization of HIV/AIDS at the UNSC, Member 
States were presented with claims that HIV/AIDS posed a threat to national and 
international security, but that it could be avoided and managed through their
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efficacious actions. Piot's own address to the Council in Meeting 4087 was almost 
entirely dedicated to what he called the "good news" about HIV/AIDS, which was 
that "we know now w hat works: two decades of experience have identified the 
essential elements of effective strategy" (UNSC, 2000, p .11). Piot assured Members 
of their own efficacy, telling them, "we are far from powerless against this epidemic. 
In countries where strong political leadership, openness about the issues and broad, 
cross-cutting responses come together, the tide is turning, and clear success is being 
demonstrated" and, "Members of the Council, the challenge is formidable but so too 
are the technical, financial and political resources of the international community" 
(UNSC, 2000, p .11).
The strategy that was proposed to the Security Council had three 
components; first that HIV/AIDS was considered a security issue, despite its 'non- 
traditional' status. This had been achieved by the (albeit contested) inclusion of the 
disease on the Council agenda, but reiteration of the significance and importance of 
this inclusion exemplifies its importance; meeting President Al Gore told the 
Council:
The powerful fact that we begin here today by concentrating on AIDS has a 
still larger significance: it sets a precedent for Security Council concern and 
action on a broader security agenda. By the power of example, this meeting 
dem ands of us that we see security through a new and wider prism and, 
forever after, think about it according to a new and more expansive 
definition. (UNSC, 2000, p.2)
From the UNDP, Malloch-Brown spoke to "congratulate" Holbrooke for "the vision 
to go beyond old definitions [of security]" (UNSC, 2000, p.9). By including disease 
on the agenda of the UNSC, it was expected that essential resources and attention 
would be dedicated to the global response.
The second component of the response strategy proposed at UNSC 4087 was 
outlined by Piot, who gave four model examples of productive responses in place in 
Africa (UNSC, 2000, p i 2). The first was concerned with the "aggressive" protection 
and promotion of hum an rights and the reduction of stigma; second, the 
mobilisation of support to governments, civil society groups and "actions involving 
people living with HIV"; third, the prioritisation of HIV/AIDS and a significant
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increase in the commitment of resources and "more rational financing"; and fourth, 
the increased involvement of the private sector, which should "work in concert with 
Governments to balance the difficult issues of intellectual property rights with the 
urgent need to develop and make available life-saving drugs and other 
commodities" (UNSC, 2000, p. 12). This last point might reveal an im portant 
additional motivation for bringing HIV/AIDS to the UNSC, as explored below.
The third component of the HIV/AIDS response strategy that was presented 
to the UNSC was that of Peacekeeper Operation management. The UNSC is 
responsible for the mandates that govern United Nations Peacekeeping operations 
and Piot saw this as an opportunity to link HIV directly to the practical work of the 
UNSC. In interview for this research, Piot explained that he intended to appeal to 
the legal responsibilities of the Security Council for managing Peacekeeper forces; in 
his words, he used Peacekeepers as a "hook" with which to bring HIV/AIDS to the 
attention of the Members (Piot, 2013). The functionality of peacekeepers, a vital 
institution of the UN Security Council, was also framed as a referent object; their 
capacity and liability for infection became sources of fear in relation to HIV/AIDS.
Prior to UNSC Meeting on HIV/AIDS, there had been widespread criticism 
of the UN Peacekeeping operations following the deployment of troops (the largest 
ever contingent) to Cambodia in 1993. Peacekeepers had been blamed for a peak in 
HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases among the local population; 
concurrently, infection rates among troops also increased and were detected once 
these personnel had returned to their home countries (Soeprapto et al., 1995). 
Troops on this deployment were well paid and were encouraged to mix with locals, 
facilitating the rate of sexual interaction between the two groups (commercial and 
otherwise) (Soeprato et al., 1995, p .1304). After visiting the country, Ambassador 
Holbrooke condemned the drunkenness and employment of sex workers by troops 
and their conduct received extensive and unfavourable attention in the international 
media, particularly after the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs 
leading the mission, Yasuhi Akashi, dismissed criticisms by reportedly saying, 
"boys will be boys" (Independent, 1994; PBS, 2005; Lynch, 2005, p.A22). Security 
Council Members were aware of this recent criticism and, capitalising on this
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concern, Piot highlighted the detrimental impact that HIV prevalence could have on 
the military capacity of Member states; he also offered a pragmatic solution for 
managing the issue in future.
Piot's Peacekeeper-HIV linkage took three forms: peacekeepers as a vector 
for disease transmission and the legal and ethical responsibility of the UNSC to 
prevent this; Peacekeepers as being at risk from HIV and the impact on their 
military capacity; and Peacekeepers as a potential resource in HIV prevention 
programmes. In interview, Piot (2013) explained,
The Security Council is responsible for Peacekeeping operations and here 
the UN has a direct responsibility and liability about the behaviour, in a 
sense, of lots troops and I knew that at least there were accusations that in 
Cambodia Peacekeeping troops had contributed to the spread of HIV. ... So 
there were a number of hooks to bring that in. And also the combat 
readiness as they call it, for troops. And so I tried to put it in that framework.
It appeared evident from the situation in Cambodia that Peacekeepers were at risk 
from HIV/AIDS infection; prevalence rose from 0.5% to over 3.6% among troops 
following their deployment (Soeprapto, 1995, p.1304). These findings also fit with 
the prevailing (although not uncontested; see Bamett & Prins, 2006) knowledge 
norms that military personnel were at significantly higher risk of HIV than general 
populations, so their proposed role as a vector for transmission was persuasive (e.g., 
Singer, 2002). Al Gore explicitly repeated the link between Peacekeeper 
vulnerabilities in his address to the Council, stating that, "a single disease threatens 
everything from economic strength to peacekeeping, we clearly face a security 
threat of the greatest magnitude...[HIV/AIDS] strikes at the military and subverts 
the forces of order and peacekeeping" (UNSC, 2000, p.6).
Peacekeepers are an institution that defines the character of the UN Security 
Council and personnel are explicitly portrayed as the referent object in this speech 
act. Their proposed vulnerability to HIV/AIDS amounted to a weakening of the 
force of the Security Council and of the Member States from whose military forces 
they were sourced. In their individual speeches to the Council, Members reiterated 
the claim that HIV/AIDS presented an existential threat to Peacekeeper forces and 
thus to the security of the state; Mr Chowdhury, representing Bangladesh, stated:
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In many sub-Saharan countries, nearly half of the armed forces are affected. 
Civilian law enforcement is slumping as AIDS takes its toll on its personnel. 
This has threatened safety, security and law and order both within and 
beyond national boundaries. African military and civilian police personnel 
play a crucial role in peacekeeping. Their vulnerability to infection affects 
the defence of peace. (UNSC, 2000, p.16)
The solution that was offered to this Threat' was the employment of Peacekeeper 
forces in HIV/AIDS management and prevention programmes; Peacekeeper forces 
were framed as a potential resource in the war against HIV. Gore stated, 
"humanitarian aid workers and military and police forces that are well trained in 
HIV prevention and behaviour change can be a tremendous force for prevention as 
long as this is made one of their priorities" (UNSC, 2000, p .11). Dr Amathila, 
representing Namibia, agreed:
It is im portant that the training of the military and police forces covers 
HIV/AIDS prevention and understanding of how to protect themselves. 
Peacekeepers, military observers and relief workers need to be well briefed 
on the implications of HIV-risk behaviour, through education on prevention. 
(UNSC, 2000, p.14)
Thus, Peacekeepers became both a source of threat or insecurity and a potential 
route by which to manage and mitigate that threat. Subsequent events at the 
Security Council show that this response was accepted; following the meeting in 
January, the UNSC met in July 2000 and unanimously adopted Resolution 1308 on 
HIV/AIDS and International Peacekeeping Operations. In that Resolution, the 
Council recognised "the need to incorporate HIV/AIDS prevention awareness skills 
and advice" as part of training, and it expressed "concern at the potential damaging 
impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international peacekeeping personnel, 
including support personnel" (UNSC, 2000c, pp.1-2). The Council requested that 
Member States increase efforts, including international cooperation, "to assist with 
the creation and execution of policies for HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary and 
confidential testing and counselling, and treatment for personnel to be deployed in 
international peacekeeping operations" (UNSC, 2000c, p.2).
In July 2000, Ambassador Holbrooke stated that the US would refuse 
support to any Peacekeeping resolution that failed to take into account the risk of 
HIV/AIDS (Mclnnes, 2006, p.322). In October 2000, UNSC Resolution 1325 invited
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Member States "to incorporate ... HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national 
training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for 
deployment, and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian 
personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training" (UNSC, 2000d, p.2). 
Subsequent practice employed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNDPO) included the distribution of one million 'awareness cards' to all 
Peacekeepers, the appointment of a senior HIV officer to each UN peace support 
operation, and the establishment of awareness training programmes in more than 60 
countries by 2005 (Mclnnes, 2006, p.323). Evaluation of these programmes is 
available from UNAIDS document, On The Front Line; a progress report on HIV 
programmes with Peacekeepers prepared for the United Nations Security Council 
(UNAIDS & UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations, 2011).
The empirical evidence behind claims that armed forces are at exceptional 
risk of HIV infection have been called into question in recent years (e.g., Mclnnes, 
2006, pp.320-21; Whiteside et al., 2006). So too have claims that HIV is linked to a 
rise in criminality or instability within states, one of the principle arguments made 
for bringing HIV to the UNSC in 2000 (Mclnnes, 2006, p.318). However, in their 
critical analysis of securitization claims regarding HIV/AIDS, analysts identify that 
military forces have been particularly efficient in conducting HIV responses 
(Mclnnes, 2006; Whiteside at al., 2006, p. 209). Mclnnes (2006, p.321) observes that in 
Thailand, the armed forces have been active in preventing the spread of HIV. This 
suggests that although the securitizing claims employed by Piot to 'hook' HIV/AIDS 
into the UNSC agenda may not have been substantiated by recent evidence, the 
identification of Peacekeeper forces as a tool in the prevention and response 
programmes had genuine legitimacy.
6.4. Motivations and Contested Claims
Piot's motivations for bringing HIV/AIDS to the Security Council primarily 
concerned the direction of high-level attention and resources toward the epidemic, 
rather than any objectively real security threat. According to Hahn (2013), Piot
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intended the meeting to send a clear message about the multisectoral impact of 
HIV/AIDS and to let world leaders know that:
It's not health, it's a global issue that can be discussed in the Security 
Council. And that was the whole intention I guess ... It was never to say 'if 
you are not careful then all your armies will drop dead' he is too clever, he 
knew that w ouldn 't happen.
Regardless of whether the disease genuinely presented "a security threat of the 
greatest magnitude" as it was called in the January meeting (UNSC, 2000, p.2), the 
unanimous adoption of Resolution 1308 and the UN General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV/AIDS in 2001 served to further reinforce the security-HIV linkage 
that Piot would continue to resolutely and vocally advance (Piot, 2005a). Meeting 
4087 thus enhanced the authority with which future securitizing claims could be 
made about HIV/AIDS. Hahn (2013) suggests that:
I think for Peter it was the stepping stone to get it out ... of isolation ... He 
was fighting to keep [UNAIDS] alive and to expand it ... so for him  it was 
the biggest stepping stone to get it out and to be a global issue and a security 
issue.
Piot's concerted effort to bring HIV/AIDS to the Council supports the argument that 
Meeting 4087 was not a reflection of genuine acceptance of the HIV-security link 
(Rushton, 2010); in reality, some members were absent and others protested the 
agenda. Piot (2013) explained that, "the Chinese did not show up -  Russia remained 
silent, the Indian representatives said that this was absolutely not something to 
discuss at the Security Council. But on the other hand, you know, it happened".
The meeting was also possible due to its opportune timing; the sympathetic 
Democratic administration of the USA (see Vieira, 2007, p.150) held the rotating 
presidency at that time and achieved their own political gains by hosting a meeting 
dedicated to HIV/AIDS (discussed below). The organisational calendar of the 
United Nations also worked in favour of bringing HIV to the Security Council 
agenda because the meeting (held January 10th) was the first of the new millennium, 
close to the holiday season when many international diplomats were away from 
New York. Piot (2013) describes how this played to his advantage:
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Half of December and the end of the year, diplomats are all going home, in 
New York there is hardly anybody. So Holbrooke's office and me and a few 
colleagues in UNAIDS, we worked very hard between Christmas and New 
Year to organise [the meeting] and in a sense take quite a few people by 
surprise really when they came back.
Ultimately, the meeting was possible due to a combination of opportunity, skilful 
lobbying, and political manoeuvres by Piot at UNAIDS and his allies in the USA. It 
is noteworthy that after HIV/AIDS the UNSC did not repeat its commitment to any 
other single health issue, although it is possible that this reflects a failure of 
securitization, or conversely, the exceptionality of HIV/AIDS above other diseases. 
According to the Copenhagen School, the objective existence of the threat is not 
necessary for an issue to be securitized, although it is usually helpful (Buzan et al., 
1998, p.24). As Rushton (2010) and Mclnnes & Rushton (2012) demonstrate, there is 
doubt over the extent to which Council members were truly convinced by 
securitizing claims, the actual level of fear about HIV/AIDS that was invoked by the 
claims of Piot and others, or their willingness to open the Council to non-traditional 
security threats such as health. As is typical of securitizations in empirical studies, it 
is difficult to gauge the level of persuasion achieved by these fear appeals. Instead, 
analysts suggest, it is fruitful to look to the conditions under which persuasion was 
attempted (Balzacq, 2005).
In addition to the process of securitization, which amounts to generating fear 
of an existential threat and the proposal of responsive measures, this chapter 
suggests that there were other noteworthy factors that influenced the UNSC 
handling of HIV/AIDS. These relate to the involvement of private sector actors in 
the distribution of medicines, as mentioned by Piot in his UNSC speech above 
(UNSC, 2000, p.12), and to the ongoing Presidential campaign of US Vice-President 
Al Gore who, along with political supporter Ambassador Holbrooke, was 
instrumental in organising the seminal meeting in January 2000.
At the time of Meeting 4087 there was an ongoing campaign to secure 
affordable access to HIV/AIDS medication, which had been developed and 
marketed for the first time in 1996. Highly Active Antiretroviral Treatment (ARV) 
medication initially cost around one thousand US dollars per month, making it
166
unaffordable for most PLWHA outside the developed world (Fisher & Rigamonti,
2005). Following WHO approval of these medications, the international response to 
HIV/AIDS that was led by UNAIDS shifted to focus on securing access to new 
treatments for PLWHA, the majority of whom lived in poor communities or states. 
Intellectual Property (IP) law restricted the production of medicines to the licence 
holders, but under a peculiarity of domestic law, Indian pharmaceutical companies 
were able to produce and supply generic copies of patent protected medication in 
India. World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements on IP made it illegal to export 
these affordable generic medicines to other countries with high prevalence rates, 
and access to ARV treatment quickly became a flashpoint on which civil society and 
institutions converged. The campaign for access to treatment united activists from 
the developed and developing world (Ingram, 2013, p.439) and UNAIDS and UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan were actively engaged in this campaign, using their 
influence with the 'Big Pharma' licence holding companies to lobby in support of 
affordable access.
There was also a significant ongoing political campaign that defined the 
wider context in which this lobbying and the UNSC meeting took place. At the time 
of Meeting 4087, the USA was in control of the rotating Security Council presidency: 
a position that grants some control over setting the meeting agenda. There was also 
an ongoing US Presidential campaign in which Vice President Gore was a candidate 
for the incumbent Democrat Party and the Clinton administration. The political 
dynamics of the UNSC Meeting were undeniable; election campaigns were already 
underw ay when Ambassador Holbrooke, a prominent Democrat, visited Africa and 
there was speculation that if Gore won the presidency, Holbrooke would hold a 
senior position in his administration (Packer, 2009). The political career ambitions of 
both Gore and Holbrooke are noteworthy in considering their decision to bring 
HIV/AIDS to the Security Council in 2000 (see Mclnnes & Rushton, 2010).
Holbrooke had found in Gore a "willing supporter" for his campaign to 
bring HIV to the Security Council (Mclnnes & Rushton, 2010, p.227), but the Vice- 
President's election campaign had been marred in 1999 by bad publicity related to 
his record on HIV/AIDS. Contravening the US led TRIPS agreements that banned
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export of generic HIV/AIDS medicines, South Africa had made the decision to 
legislate for the distribution of cheap generic ARVs in order to tackle its severe and 
poverty-fuelled epidemic. In response, more than 40 pharmaceutical companies 
issued a legal challenge to the Government of South Africa in 1998 and successfully 
lobbied the Clinton administration, including Gore, to support their case. The USA 
subsequently applied pressure to South Africa, bringing the issue to high-level 
bilateral trade talks between the countries and placing South Africa on the Special 
301 'watch list' as a precursor to implementing trade sanctions (Fisher & Rigamonti, 
2005, p.7). This incited considerable negative attention from the media and media- 
savvy civil society activists at a time that was politically sensitive for the 
administration. Piot (2013) stated in interview:
I think the reality is that Clinton and Al Gore were lobbying ... the South 
African government to drop a law that would allow generics in South 
Africa, they did exactly the opposite. I mean they changed afterwards, but 
when they were in power they were absolutely lobbying for Big Pharma. In 
South Africa there was this case of pharmaceutical companies against ... 
they were suing Nelson Mandela. And you don 't have to be a genius in 
public relations to know that's not a brilliant idea.
Al Gore was serving as co-chairman of the United States/South Africa Bi-lateral 
Commission at this time and this, as well as his Presidential candidacy, m eant he 
became one of the "main targets" of AIDS activists who supported generic ARV 
distribution (Fisher & Rigamonti, 2005, p.8). During his campaign tour in June 1999, 
Gore was loudly heckled by AIDS activists; demonstrators from civil society groups 
interrupted his speech chanting, "Gore's greed kills" and told the Washington Post 
newspaper that "Vice President Al Gore is doing drug company dirty work" 
(Babcock & Connolly, 1999, p.A12).
Whilst major pharmaceutical companies had commercial interests in 
protecting patents on their newly developed medicines, the issue of access to 
treatment for the w orld's poorest PLWHA was soon widely perceived as a hum an 
rights issue (Ingram, 2013). Instrumental to this, a new concept of the "global 
politics of health" was emerging within the international campaign for ARV access 
and middle-income countries and NGOs began announcing their support for the 
generic imports (Davies, 2009, pp.70-75; Ingram, 2013, p.439). Al Gore and the
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incumbent Democratic administration were facing increasing opposition to their 
involvement in the South Africa lawsuit, fuelled by the media coverage and civil 
society activism that targeted Gore on his campaign trail. Inequity that arose due to 
treatm ent costs became an international hum an rights cause and the subsequent 
mobilisation of support and activism was labelled by Smith & Whiteside (2010, p.4) 
as an example of AIDS exceptionalism. For Gore and the US Democrat party, it 
meant that their position on the side of major pharmaceutical companies became a 
political crisis.
The response of the Democrats was to align with the humanitarian position 
favoured by their supporters and HIV/AIDS activists. In 1999, South Africa 
announced that the U.S. government would no longer apply pressure regarding the 
case, and civil society groups, activists, and the media claimed credit (Weissman, 
1999). In the same year, President Clinton told the WTO that the USA, "would 
adjust its trade policies to enable poor countries, such as South Africa, to gain access 
to essential medicines" (Fisher & Rigamonti, 2005, p.9). In light of this political 
manoeuvring, the opportunity to preside over a Security Council meeting where he 
"came out as being against AIDS ... in favour of more treatment ... attention and 
funds" allowed Gore to boost his credibility as a presidential candidate (David, 
2001, p.578). This was not em pty political posturing; the decision by the USA and 
Gore to convene Meeting 4087 also had potentially critical legal ramifications. 
Whilst the USA had announced an end to its policy of pressuring South Africa on 
the subject of generic drugs, the law suit brought by pharmaceutical companies 
against South Africa was ongoing. During this contest, the meeting of the Security 
Council on Africa and HIV/AIDS sent a clear message to the international 
community that world leaders and the United Nations regarded HIV/AIDS to be a 
security issue. Not currently discussed in the literature is the fact that this meeting 
had legal implications for the access to treatment campaign, because the definition 
of HIV as a security issue potentially voided the legal agreements on which this 
lawsuit was based.
The legal case filed by pharmaceutical companies was made on the grounds 
that generic drug production violated intellectual property law in international
169
trade, as codified in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) agreements of the WTO. Significantly, in his autobiographical account of 
this case, Lord Malloch-Brown (2011) wrote that:
A group of politicians and international officials lead by Kofi Annan at the 
UN and Bill Clinton at his foundation ... cleverly found a way out. They 
discovered a small provision in an international trade agreement (TRIPS) 
that allowed countries to break international copyright and manufacture 
locally w ithout licence, in an emergency situation like war or national 
disaster. It became a vehicle for allowing the local manufacture of affordable 
AIDS drugs, (p.143)
The clause to which Malloch-Brown refers is Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement, 
which details a num ber of ways in which governments can grant Compulsory 
Licenses that overrule patent protection laws. Article 31 states that "in the case of a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency", the requirement 
for a state to seek license for generic drug production from the patent holder is 
waived.
The inclusion of HIV/AIDS at the UNSC meeting in 2000 was a clear 
declaration, verified by Kofi Annan and the Member States, that HIV/AIDS 
constituted a national and international security threat. Declaration of HIV/AIDS as 
a security issue would further weaken the case of the pharmaceutical companies 
because, according to Article 73 of the TRIPS (1994) agreement:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed ... to prevent a Member from 
taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests ... taken in a time of war or other emergency in 
international relations [or] to prevent a Member from taking any action in 
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.
Thus, the inclusion of HIV/AIDS on the agenda of the UNSC in January 2000 had far 
ranging implications in the broader political and legal context and Meeting 4087 
represents a move by the United Nations to further the goal of universal access to 
treatment. The first coordinated campaigns for treatment by the United Nations 
were under the direction of Piot at UNAIDS, beginning with pilot programmes for 
the distribution of generic and donor-funded medication (Piot, 2012). UNAIDS was 
also engaged in lobbying executives from leading pharmaceutical companies,
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including Ray Gilmartin of Merck and Ken Wag from Bristol-Meyers Squibb, using 
the same strategies employed by Piot in his lobbying of Holbrooke prior to the 
Security Council Meeting of January 2000 (Piot, 2012, p.307). At an institutional 
level, the UN supports universal access as part of Millennium Development Goal 6 
and during his tenure as Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan 
vocally supported campaigns for access to medication and was personally in 
support of the South African government during their legal challenge; he 
congratulated South Africa when the pharmaceutical industry dropped the case in 
2001 and had brokered the negotiations with Merck and Bristol-Meyers Squibb that 
began the settlement process (Swarns, 2001). It is noteworthy that the main 
securitizing actors who spoke at the January 2000 Security Council meeting were 
also part of the w ider campaign to enhance universal access to ARV treatment. 
Whilst it may be impossible to prove which motivations most influenced the 
decision of Richard Holbrooke, Peter Piot, and Al Gore when they moved to address 
HIV at the Security Council, the impact of this meeting on the legal battle to secure 
access to affordable medication is significant. The literature to date does not engage 
with these external conditions against which UNSC 4087 was held, but they can 
advance our understanding of this watershed event in the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS.
6.4.1. Continuing the Rhetoric
Dr Piot continues to be a vocal advocate of AIDS exceptionalism and 
articulates fear appeals in which the epidemic is presented as an existential threat 
that warrants exceptional responses. In 2005, as Executive Director of UNAIDS, Piot 
delivered a speech titled "Why AIDS is Exceptional" to the London School of 
Economics (Piot, 2005a). W ithin the nine page transcript, he twice refers to nuclear 
weapons, telling the audience that the AIDS pandemic "needs to be recognised to be 
one of the most serious threats to our prospects for progress and stability -  on a par 
with such extraordinary threats as nuclear weaponry", and that "AIDS is 
exceptional in so many ways that only an equally exceptional response will succeed 
-  just as the exceptional threat posed by nuclear weaponry has led to the
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development of exceptional responses" (Piot, 2005a, p.2). Piot (2005a) employed the 
logic of securitization by stating that choice had been removed, telling the audience, 
"we have no choice but to act in exceptional ways" (p.9). This is significant 
according to the logic of Buzan et al., (1998), for whom the issue of choice 
demarcates the boundaries between a politicised and a securitized issue:
Politicization means to make an issue appear open, a matter of choice ... By 
contrast, securitization on the international level ... means to present an 
issue as urgent and existential, as so im portant that it should not be exposed 
to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top 
leaders prior to other issues, (p.29)
Piot (2005a) framed the epidemic as having reached a "tipping point" (p.3), 
explaining that "it sets off a chain of devastation, a toppling of dominoes" (p.9) that 
suggests the threat is out of control. In his closing remarks he told the audience, "we 
have only one option", and "our basic choice is only whether we act exceptionally 
right now or later, when many more millions have died" (Piot, 2005a, p.9). In 
keeping with the established criteria for fear appeal success and in order to invoke 
productive rather than destructive fear, Piot (2005a) included demands for a specific 
response by which the threat could be mitigated. This response entailed a break 
from "the normal bounds of political procedure", and included "setting aside public 
expenditure ceilings" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24; Piot, 2005a, p.8). Piot (2005a) also 
stated that UNAIDS has emphasised the "urgency" (pp.8-9) of this point, telling the 
audience that "this pandemic is now too globalized, its impact too large, and the 
barriers to prom pt action still too pervasive, for routine development approaches to 
suffice" (p.5).
6.5. Conclusion
In conclusion, Dr Piot orchestrated the inclusion of HIV/AIDS on the agenda 
of the United Nations Security Council in 2000 as part of his wider, UN-led 
campaign to raise the profile of the disease and to gain resources for an effective 
response. It was a calculated move designed to further his designs for a global 
response, rather than any reflection of the reality of HIV/AIDS as a security threat. 
In interview he explained:
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I thought okay, we need to get this on the Security Council agenda. And this 
was not based on any theoretical framework or vision in the sense of a 
political science analysis. Just on the base of the analysis ... where is the 
power? (Piot, 2013)
This securitization was an extension of the existing framework of AIDS 
exceptionalism that emerged through civil society activism when HIV/AIDS first 
appeared in the developed world. The primary securitizing actor, UNAIDS, was 
itself established on the premise that the disease is exceptional (England, 2008). Both 
the exceptionality and the proposed security dimension of HIV/AIDS face growing 
criticism (Barnett & Prins, 2006; Ingram 2013). For instance, Barnett & Prins (2006) 
propose that there exist "inverted triangles" (p.363) of discourse on HIV/AIDS and 
security, in which many claims are made on the basis of relatively little empirical 
evidence. Whiteside et al., (2006) have also challenged and dismissed the "accepted 
wisdoms" (p.217) that link HIV to military security, questioning the empirical 
evidence behind claims that military populations have a particularly high rate of 
HIV prevalence, that the epidemic endangers the function of military forces, that 
w ar and violent conflict exacerbate transmission of the virus, or that AIDS has the 
potential to disrupt national or international security. Mclnnes (2006) also questions 
the reliance on "limited evidence from the mid-1990s" (p.320) by those who claim 
that militaries are suffering significantly higher rates of infection. But despite these 
challenges or the lack of empirical evidence, the "narrow frame" of military security 
and HIV/AIDS facilitated the inclusion of the epidemic on the agenda of the 
powerful and influential Security Council; Dr Piot (2013) and his allies successfully 
presented HIV/AIDS to the Security Council by employing the logic of fear appeals 
and securitization, and used the Peacekeeper Operations of the Security Council as a 
"hook" with which to engage their attention.
In accordance with the Copenhagen authors, the objective existence of the 
HIV threat to security was not necessary for securitization to have taken place, 
provided that the securitizing actors possess sufficient authority to convince their 
audience that the threat exists, and that it is urgent, existential, and dem anding of 
extraordinary response. As the founding Director of UNAIDS, Piot possessed this 
authority and the diplomatic channels with which to lobby key members of the
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international political community. Although the framing of HIV as a security issue 
had some traction, the HIV-security link did not become the dominant framework 
by which the epidemic was subsequently conceptualised at the international or the 
domestic level, w ith only a few notable exceptions; in 2001 the International Crisis 
Group (2001) published a report titled, HIV/AIDS as a Security Threat, that framed 
the virus in terms of warfare and military conflict and in 2000, the US National 
Intelligence Council published a report in which HIV in Asia was presented as a 
potential threat to the security of the United States (Gordon, 2000). Ultimately, 
w idespread recognition or repetitions of the security-HIV links were lacking, as is 
evidenced in the rest of the thesis and in the data collected from w hat Malloch- 
Brown and Piot might call 'front line' responses in Thailand and Myanmar. Instead, 
where HIV did enter security related discourse it was increasingly linked to H um an 
Security and development issues, or subsumed into alternative dimensions of 
security.
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Chapter 7. The Response in Thailand
In 1985, Dr Praphan Phanuphak made the first diagnoses of HIV/AIDS in 
Thailand. He told the author that during those early years of the epidemic, the 
disease was perceived as a potential threat to national security because of its high 
death rate and visibility among military recruits (Phanuphak, 2013). In 
contemporary Thailand the situation is different; military recruits remain subject to 
routine surveillance, but the current climate is one of complacency and the initial 
fear invoked by HIV/AIDS has declined. There has been a concurrent decline in 
political attention and resources to deal with the epidemic, although fear-based 
stigmatization still exists and is a barrier to the responses currently in place 
(Phanuphak, 2013). Phanuphak (2013) identifies the advent of combination 
antiretroviral treatment (ARV) as a pivotal moment in Thailand; affordable 
treatment became widely available from 2005, when the government announced 
that ARV provision would be included in the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
scheme, but this has contributed to complacency about the risks of HIV infection 
(Phanuphak, 2013; Rattanamha, 2013). The provision of subsidised ARV treatment 
was a victory for civil society campaigners who had worked to secure universal 
access to the treatment since its development in 1996 (Tenni, 2012) and the Thai 
response has been defined by their efforts.
Despite declining general concern about the epidemic and "great strides" in 
scaling up access to treatment (UNAIDS, 2013, p.19), UNAIDS estimates that there 
are between 400,000 and 490,000 people living with HIV/AIDS in the country, of 
whom an estimated 205,000 have no access to ARVs (Hahn, 2013). Prevalence 
among the general population has been in decline since 1996, but rates of new 
infection continue to increase within certain populations; adolescents, pregnant 
women, free-lance (non-brothel-based) female sex workers, and new military 
recruits aged 20-24, are all subject to increasing rates of infection (NAPAC, 2009, p.2; 
AIHD, 2011, p.3). In key affected populations, infection rates among MSM remains 
very high and there is no decline in their national prevalence (NAPAC, 2009, p.3; 
AIHD, 2011, p.3). Although targeted intervention programs in Bangkok have
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reduced prevalence among MSM by 6% between 2007 and 2009, the figures are still 
disproportionately high; approximately 1 in 4 MSM in Bangkok are HIV+ (NAPAC, 
2009, p.3; UNAIDS, 2013, p.13). Surveillance conducted at detoxification centres for 
people who inject drugs reports prevalence of 30%-40% among this group (NAPAC, 
2009, p.3). International labour migrants who work in commercial sex or fishing 
industries are also at high risk of infection and vulnerability is exacerbated by 
barriers to accessing services, such as Thai illiteracy and limited education (NAPAC, 
2009, p.3).
During the early 1990s, state-led responses targeted the high-risk female sex 
worker population with acclaimed success (e.g., the '100% Condom Use 
Programme'), but over time viral incidence has increased among the partners of 
these and other "high risk" individuals, signifying the advancement of the epidemic 
into the "general population" (Press, 2012); in 2005, 18.4% of newly reported HIV 
infections were related to sex work, but 43% occurred within the heterosexual "low 
risk" population (7.3% in people who engage in casual heterosexual sex or their 
partners) (Gouws, 2006, p.53). The spread of infection through heterosexual 
intercourse highlights realities about sexual behaviour in Thailand that do not fit 
with the image of chastity and sexual conservatism that typified "Western" research 
in the 1990s, when the epidemic first emerged (Fordham, 2004, p.144). 
Contemporary epidemiological data reveals behaviours that distinctly diverge from 
the traditional values of chastity, purity, and (female) virginity until marriage which 
are often extolled as being part of the idealised Thai national identity, but which 
more accurately reflect a "Western-derived morality" that characterises early Thai 
AIDS discourse (Fordham, 2004, p.144). Evident in recent data is the growth of HIV 
and STI infection prevalence amongst youth populations, consistent with reported 
increases in risk behaviour amongst youth, including sex-partner mixing among 
both males and females and sexual intercourse w ithout condoms (Fordham, 2004, 
pp.147-149; National AIDS Committee [NAC], 2012, p.2). After marriage, infection 
from HIV and other STIs remains a significant risk and UNAIDS predicts that 1 in 
every 3 new HIV infections in Thailand in 2012 will occur within intimate 
partnerships (NAC, 2012, pp.xxi). Vulnerability is exacerbated by the widespread
176
availability of commercial sex that is "considered a normal activity for the majority 
of men" in some regions at least (Fordham, 2004, p.146). The practice of visiting sex 
workers, facilitated by the division of labour between rural and urban areas and the 
common practice of working away from home for long periods of time, makes 
commercial sex work a significant area of concern for HIV management in Thailand 
(Kestkaew, 2012; Nacapew, 2012; Press, 2012).
Thailand has been praised within the international community for its 
response to HIV/AIDS; following initial hesitancy during the 1980s, the government 
invested a significant am ount of its domestic budget to dealing with HIV in a 
response atypical of other developing countries at the time (Ford & Koetsawang, 
1991). In 1989, 90% of the total expenditure on HIV/AIDS was from overseas 
development assistance, compared to less than 28% by 1991, and 5% by 1996 
(UNDP, 2004, pp.16-17). The potential economic losses arising from the effect of 
HIV/AIDS have been one reason for the state's early recognition and action on the 
epidemic. At UNAIDS, H ahn (2013) observed that "people were worried about 
image [of Thailand], because they rely on tourism", although this did not always 
translate into greater attention or resources from the state; for instance, following 
the coup of 1991, Health Ministry officials claimed that the previous administration 
had overstated the scale of the national epidemic and had "seriously affected 
tourism" as a result (Ford & Koetsawang, 1991, p.406; Clements, 1992, p.211). It has 
also been noted that regional government officials might be tempted to down play 
the size of local epidemics in order to avoid damaging their tourist industry 
(Prakongsai, 2013).
Data collected during elite-interviews in Thailand revealed that the state 
response was affected more often by economic concerns than by any other concept 
of security. However, the primary influence was that of the powerful and "vibrant" 
civil society organisations concerned with protecting the hum an rights of PLWHA 
(Tenni, 2012). There is a "strong history" of civil society in Thailand and HIV/AIDS 
activists and CSOs have mobilised to define the current epidemic response (Hahn, 
2013). With the support of international donors including UNAIDS and the Global 
Fund, mainstream CSOs in Thailand reject the fear-appeals of early HIV/AIDS
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campaigns and are working instead to normalise perceptions of PLWHA and to 
increase access to medication and healthcare services (Tenni, 2012). These 
campaigns are enacted around the new global movement that frames health as a 
universal hum an right (Davies, 2009; pp.70-72; Tenni, 2012).
7.1. The Early Response in Thailand
When HIV/AIDS was first identified in Thailand, the initial response of the 
government was to implement the type of public health measures outlined by Bayer 
(1991) and to utilise fear-based public health campaigns to raise awareness about the 
disease (Ungphakorn, 2012). The state adopted the logic of "imposing public 
health": a rationale by which they sought to "do what's best for public health 
regardless of w hat's best for the individual" (Press, 2012). The Ministry of Public 
Health adopted policies between 1988 and 1990 that gave little merit to the human 
rights of people with or affected by HIV/AIDS, instead modelling its legal and 
medical solutions on classical contagious disease control methods (Porapakkham et 
al., 1995, pp.8-9). In 1990, legislation known informally as the 'AIDS Bill' was 
drafted, proposing to introduce traditional public health responses including 
criminalisation of HIV transmission, compulsory testing, and restrictions on the 
movement of PLWHA (Ainsworth, 2003, p.15). Quarantine was proposed through 
the creation of "therapeutic communities" for infected persons, not dissimilar to the 
detention centres used in Cuba until 1994, which were based on guidelines from the 
American CDC for controlling leprosy or other communicable disease 
(Porapakkham et al., 1995, p.5).11 It was also proposed that commercial sex workers 
would be tested and issued with "AIDS-Free" identity cards (Porapakkham et al., 
1995, p.5).
Jon Ungphakorn (2012) a former Senator and leading AIDS activist in 
Thailand, recalled that the Bill would sanction detention of "uncooperative" HIV
11 During the 1980s, the Cuban government tested the population for HIV and detained 
those found to be positive in 'sanatoria' centres. In addition to violating the human rights of 
detainees, this approach requires a high degree of governmental control, repeated 
population-wide testing, and testing for any person entering the country (see, e.g., Whiteside
& Sunter, 2000, p.18). The response has contributed to the continuing low prevalence of HIV 
infections in the country to date.
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positive people for up to six months. He also observed that the Bill was problematic 
because it was unclear whether the intention was to quarantine or penalise people 
with HIV/AIDS (Ungphakorn, 2012). The proposed AIDS Bill required new cases of 
HIV to be reported to the state within 24 hours; allowed for members KAPs to be 
tested without their consent; and made it a crime for an HIV positive person to 
donate blood, engage in prostitution, have sex w ithout a condom, or have medical 
procedures w ithout informing medical staff of their infection (World Bank, 2000, 
p.8). According to Ungphakorn (2012), these laws were "actually concerned, 
primarily, with restrictions [of PLWHA]" despite being framed under the pretext of 
securing "AIDS rights" and ensuring public safety. The draft bill represented what 
Bayer (1991) called the "traditional practises of public health" (p.1502), which curtail 
civil liberties through measures exemplified by mandatory testing, restrictions on 
movement, and quarantine. The danger of the threat-defence logic that underpins 
these proposed measures is that the virus and people living with HIV become 
conflated in perceptions of threat, increasing stigmatisation and underm ining the 
efforts of civil society to protect hum an rights and normalise people living with 
HIV/AIDS (Elbe, 2006, p.120). The criminalisation of HIV and PLWHA also reflects a 
willingness by the state to extend its sovereign power by using penal sanctions and 
legislation for medical intervention, invoking the Foucauldian concept of 
biopolitical control through governance (see, Elbe, 2009). In effect, the proposed 
restrictions both violated the civil liberties of PLWHA and contributed to the 
epidemic of stigma and unproductive fear that accompanies HIV/AIDS (Strong, 
1990).
The AIDS Bill faced popular opposition largely due to the efforts of newly 
mobilised civil society groups. These groups were supported by a num ber of 
government officials during the political administration of Prime Minister Anand 
Panyarachun (Ungphakorn, 2012), who was selected by the military to govern 
following the coup of 1991. At the start of the 1990s, the epidemic had "burst" into 
the general population in Thailand and public perceptions of the virus and of 
susceptibility shifted significantly (Porapakkham et al., 1995, p.12); as AIDS 
increasingly came to be seen as a threat to everybody, and not just to KAPs, civil
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society groups gained traction with their rights-based and awareness-raising 
campaigns. As the epidemic shifted into the general population and awareness 
spread through media coverage of the disease, perceptions of susceptibility to the 
threat increased (Ainsworth, Beyrer & Soucat, 2003, p. 15). Around this time, the 
"comprehensive national AIDS prevention and control program" for which 
Thailand is lauded by the UN began to take shape (Porapakkham et al., 1995, p.3; 
NAPAC, 2009). Following an initial period of denial about the emerging epidemic 
(UNDP, 2004, pp.7-8), the state under Prime Minister Anand prioritised AIDS 
intervention and implemented pragmatic policies, including an unprecedented 
inclusion of AIDS activists and CSOs within high-level policy-making circles to 
collaborate in the national epidemic response. It is noteworthy that whilst many 
Ministries of Health resisted the multisectoral approach that was advocated by the 
United Nations, Thailand was an exception and under Anand, the government 
orchestrated a "strong multisectoral response" (Knight, 2008, p.18). It has been 
suggested that this pragmatic response and A nand's decisive action was possible 
because the military-backed post-coup Prime Minister did not face "democratic 
constraints" or rely on support from lobby groups (Porapakkham et al., 1995, p.3).12
In 1991, prominent AIDS activist Mechai Viravaidya, who had earned the 
nickname 'M r Condom' for his sexual health advocacy work in Thailand, was 
appointed by Anand in the newly created post of Minister for Tourism, Information 
and AIDS (Ainsworth et al., 2003, p. 16). A series of highly publicised and pragmatic 
HIV/AIDS policies followed and when A nand's political successor reduced the 
HIV/AIDS budget by almost 50%, Mechai successfully lobbied for its reinstatement 
to almost the original am ount (Clements, 1992; p.211). Mechai's appointment 
reflects the increasing cooperation between the state and HIV/AIDS civil society 
groups and activists, as well as the growing influence of these groups and their 
inclusion into the formal systems of government in the early 1990s. After multiple 
public meetings on the proposed AIDS Bill, the legislation was rejected thanks
12 Following the coup which ousted democratically elected Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra in 2006, epidemiologist Elizabeth Pisani (2008) noted that "ironically", the 
military were able to implement a "more human approach" to HIV reduction programmes 
among IDUs, because they were "less beholden to voters, who are do often squeamish about 
doing nice things for injectors" (p.261).
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largely to the campaign by the Ministry of Public Health, civil society, and AIDS 
activists, who had won support from the increasingly sympathetic media (UNDP, 
2004, p.10). The failure of the AIDS Bill amounted to a response that fits definition of 
classical "AIDS exceptionalism" outlined by Burris (1994, pp.271-271), in which 
traditional public health measures of the state are rejected as part of broader 
movement to protect people from health-based legal discrimination. In 2007, a 
similar attem pt was made to impose legal restrictions on PLWHA, under the 'The 
Act on Protection of HIV-Infected Persons and AIDS Patients'. The proposal was 
met with a comparable response from civil society and NGOs, including Foundation 
for AIDS Rights (FAR), which led a successful campaign against the law.
Arguably the most famous of Thailand's HIV/AIDS policy successes is the 
'100% Condom Use Programme'. The programme was launched under the 
leadership of Anand and Mechai Viravaidya in 1991, to ensure that brothel-based 
female sex workers used condoms during transactional sex acts (Porapakkham et 
al., 1995, p.15); it is applauded by UNAIDS and contributes to w hat the UN calls an 
"impressive and admirable" response in the country (UNAIDS, 2000a, p.3; NAPAC, 
2009, p.35). However, as one high-level CSO activist explained, "a lot of people 
hailed it as a great response ... but it really w asn't very rights based" (Press, 2012). 
Interviews with CSOs in Thailand revealed the controversial nature of the 100% 
Condom Programme, which is criticised for disempowering sex workers and 
violating their hum an rights (Press, 2013; Tenni, 2012; Janyam, 2013). One senior 
technical adviser on HIV/AIDS policy referred to the programme as "disastrous" 
(Tenni, 2012). Despite reducing visible levels of HIV infection among sex workers in 
brothels (UNAIDS, 2000), the policy is problematic for rights campaigners. It was 
enforced by police who attempted to purchase sex w ithout condoms at brothels and 
fines were imposed on the brothel owner if this was found to be possible (Renard,
2012). In practice, "owners were basically forced to implement m andatory testing 
for STIs and HIV and if the woman was found positive, she w asn't allowed to work, 
and if there was an increase in STIs, the employer was penalised for not having 
women use condoms" (Press, 2013). So the implementation of the policy was 
"incredibly top-down" and am ounted to supporting the control exercised by
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owners and police over the women employed at brothels; it also underm ines the 
empowerm ent and rights-based approach to condom use and sexual health 
intervention that is advocated by leading CSOs (Tenni, 2012; Janyam, 2013). 
Furthermore, it is significant to note that despite the magnitude of the industry, 
prostitution and solicitation remains illegal in Thailand (Ford & Koetsawang, 1991) 
and informal involvement by police forces does not help to protect the rights of sex 
workers who are at risk of exploitation by brothel owners and clients; instead, "the 
government used criminalisation of the sex industry as a tool" by which to coerce 
sex workers into complying with the law (Tenni, 2012). As one interviewee (Source 
21, 2013) stated:
Sex workers don 't know the meaning of 100% Condom Use policy. We 
laugh amongst ourselves. ... It would be okay if it was a good programme, 
with free condoms and education ... but [we] get nothing from this 
programme. A lot of people get money for research and reporting on the 
100% programme and [they] make promises, but where are they now? ... 
We are very hurt.
Where the 100% Condom Use Programme might have had a lasting positive 
outcome is in inciting behavioural change amongst the clients of sex workers. At 
UNAIDS, Michael Hahn (2013) observed that police intervention in sex work and 
condom use has resulted in lasting behavioural change among men who buy 
commercial sex, who are now more likely to use condoms despite the decline in 
policy enforcement.
According to Hahn (2013), when the 100% Programme was implemented 
during the 1990s, the Thai state-led national response focused around two key 
messages that used fear-appeals. The first was that, "HIV is a death sentence [and] 
that there is no cure, only prevention" (Hahn, 2013); this was also referred to as the 
"AIDS = Death" campaign by Jon Ungphakorn (2012). The second message was that, 
"if you don 't use a condom you can't go and have sex with a sex worker" (Hahn, 
2013). These messages invoked the fear of death in order to deliver information 
("there is no cure, only prevention") and behavioural change ("if you don 't use a 
condom, you can't go and have sex with a sex worker") (Hahn, 2013). Fear has 
always been an "undercurrent" of the HIV/AIDS response in Thailand, originating
182
from the "early days" when the language of combat and of external threats was 
invoked to communicate messages about the epidemic (Press, 2012), but this has 
proved a problematic strategy; of the two messages above, the first is outdated since 
the advent of treatment and the second undermines stigma reduction efforts and 
normalisation.
7.2. Military Metaphors and Moral Contagion
As illustrated in the discourse of UNSC Meeting 4087, framing HIV as an 
external threat and utilising military metaphors is an effective way to invoke the 
fear and urgency usually associated with traditional security threats, partly because 
it enables the state to deal with a sensitive health issue in more familiar terms (Elbe, 
2006, p. 130). In Thailand, initial perceptions of the virus were that it presented a 
threat "alien to Asian culture", possibly because early cases were related to sexual 
contact with people living outside the country (UNDP, 2004, p.7). Some government 
representatives actively encouraged the idea that AIDS only affected marginalised 
populations and that it was a "foreigner's disease" associated with "lifestyles" 
unlikely to affect "good" or "decent" Thais (Ford & Koetsawang, 1991, p.406; 
Porapakkham, 1996, p.5; UNDP, 2004, pp.7-8). These framings facilitated the idea 
that HIV/AIDS was an external threat that arose from an infected 'other' to threaten 
the Thai nation and this is reflected in early policy; in 1989, the Ministry of Interior 
amended the 1979 Immigration Act to include AIDS, with the intention of 
preventing foreigners with HIV from infecting Thais by barring their entry into the 
kingdom and by deporting infected non-Thais from the country (Porapakkham, 
1996, p.5). Perceptions of AIDS as a strictly external threat facilitated a "strain of 
militancy" in early Thai responses, and "some decision-makers pushed for stern, 
even punitive measures, to try and stop HIV at country borders" (UNDP, 2004, p.8). 
These types of responses are regarded now as being neither effective nor ethically 
sound, although travel restrictions and deportation of PLWHA remain in force 
throughout the world.13
13 In 2009, President Obama repealed long-standing legislation that barred the immigration 
or entry to the USA of anyone living with HIV/AIDS, telling the media that the ban, which
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Perceptions of HIV/AIDS as an external or military-like threat exacerbate the 
barriers to implementing an effective response. The logic that underpins these 
framings is one of 'threat and defence', in which the state is best suited to securing 
the survival of its internal population (Elbe, 2006). This was reflected in the 
language used to describe HIV/AIDS in popular campaigns; at Raks Thai, Brahm 
Press (2012) reported, "one of the main messages was "Fight HIV, Fight AIDS". ... 
They use these aggressive terms, and it's not really positive". Whilst this approach 
may help to mobilise government support for a politically sensitive issue such as 
HIV/AIDS, it might also engender state-led responses that are best suited to 
traditional security threats. For instance, securitization could lead to intervention 
from state rather than civil society or health care professionals. The military, police, 
or security forces of a state may be ill-equipped to deal with a situation in which the 
proposed threat is an invader virus carried within the bodies of non-combatant 
individuals (Elbe, 2006, p. 139). However, it should be noted that the power held by 
military leaders might also facilitate positive responses to HIV/AIDS in Thailand. As 
stated above, the success of the HIV/AIDS response under Prime Minister Anand 
may have been possible due to his freedom from "democratic constraints" 
(Porapakkham et al., 1995, p.3). Tenni (2012) also noted that the introduction of 
generic ARV medicines, opposed by powerful international pharmaceutical 
companies, was headed by an ex-military health Minister, Mongkal Na Songkhla, 
who may have had greater autonomy due to his position within a military-led 
government.
Although fear of HIV/AIDS in Thailand might have been exacerbated by 
early fear-based messages from the state, Press (2012) proposes that it is also due to 
the assumption that the virus is a form of "moral threat". Thai responses to 
HIV/AIDS reveal culturally specific understandings of morality in relation to the 
virus; notions that are directly related to the centrality of Buddhism to national 
identity and the causal influence of karmic law, by which HIV infection and other
had been imposed during the 1980s, was based in "fear rather than fact" (Preston, 2009). The 
ban also jeopardized the 2012 World AIDS Conference to be held in Washington DC, which 
traditionally serves as a platform for CSOs, PLWHA, NGOs, and AIDS activists as well as 
representatives from pharmaceutical and medical industry, political leaders, and high 
profile international institutions including UNAIDS.
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inauspicious events can be attributed to the accumulation of bad karma (Fordham, 
2004, p.75). Discussing the stigmatisation of PLWHA in Thailand, Press (2012) 
reports that Raks Thai has dealt with multiple cases in which parents have protested 
against the attendance of HIV+ pupils at their children's school. Press (2012) 
explains that "parents are afraid of their children getting HIV, but it's deeper than 
that. The assumption is that the parents [of the HIV+ child] had done something 
wrong, to give their children HIV. It's not just a disease, it's a moral contagion". 
This assumption also exists at the highest levels of the state. A member of the 
National H um an Rights Commission, Khun Ladaporn (2013), explained how some 
government departments require HTV testing as part of employment applications, 
even where "HIV is not harmful or dangerous for work". The National Human 
Rights Commission has recently dealt with two cases involving testing-related 
complaints, one from the Royal Thai Police Force (in 2010) and another from the 
Office of the Judiciary (2009). In the latter, a complaint was lodged by the CSO, 
Foundation for AIDS Rights, regarding the requirement for applicants to take an 
HIV test before applying to become a judge. The Commission found that the test 
was part of a process in which applicants had to prove to an official committee that 
they are "good" and was accompanied by a criminal record background check 
(Ladaporn, 2012). The Office of the Judiciary claimed their ban on HIV positive 
judges was due to "the short life expectancy" of PLWHA, but the Commission 
reported that it was part of a requirement to prove adherence to social norms and 
reflects the w idespread perception that PLWHA were promiscuous (Ladaporn, 
2012).
In the 1980s and 1990s, the "natural instinct" of the Thai state was to use fear 
in its campaigns about HIV/AIDS, which manifest in the two messages outlined 
above: first, that AIDS is an incurable disease which leads to death; second, that 
HIV/AIDS is associated with immoral behaviour (Ungphakorn, 2012). Here, the first 
fear-appeal invoked the threat of death and the accompanying "morality messages" 
advocated avoidance responses such as, "if you don 't play about w ith sex or 
needles, you w on't get AIDS" (Ungphakorn, 2012). These messages were often 
displayed alongside images of attractive women in revealing clothes, in an attem pt
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to visually represent immorality (Ungphakorn, 2012). In addition to the problematic 
and patriarchal overtones of this type of imagery, the representation of danger 
using hum an bodies leads to fear of people assumed to be associated with 
HIV/AIDS and the fear of certain groups (i.e., sex workers, PWIDs, PLWHA, or 
women), rather than of the virus itself. Press (2012) recalls that early campaigns 
from the state and civil society groups would use:
Images using cartoons, personified viruses, caricatures of HIV as devils or 
demons. It was supposed to be HIV as the disease, but people associated 
that with the people who caught HIV ... it ends up translating into T ight 
people with HIV'.
Some PLWHA groups claim that they were "traum atised" by the early fear 
campaigns which fuelled stigmatisation and discrimination against them 
(Ungphakorn, 2012) and this sentiment, coupled with a lack of understanding 
among the general public, led to the formation of self-help support groups by 
PLWHA during the early 1990s. As the epidemic stabilised without national 
devastation, government interest in HIV/AIDS declined and these activists and 
CSOs assumed an increasingly powerful role in shaping the national epidemic 
(Tenni, 2012).
The development of effective antiretroviral treatment in 1996 had a massive 
impact on civil society activism in HIV/AIDS. Comprised largely of PLWHA, 
activist groups unified around the campaign for access to treatment and members 
were able to contribute more, and for longer, as their own HIV became manageable. 
These groups campaigned on hum an rights issues related to HIV/AIDS and sought 
to address discrimination against PLWHA in its social and legal forms; in 1997, the 
Thai Network of PLWHA (TNP+) was formed as a national coalition of CSOs in 
order to strengthen their capacity. Anan Muangmoonchai (2013), a veteran activist 
with TNP+, explained that whilst general understanding about HIV/AIDS may have 
increased over time, discrimination still creates barriers to employment and 
violations of hum an rights; for instance, compulsory HIV testing as part of private 
sector employment has declined, but the practice still exists. Muangmoonchai (2013) 
also reports that some companies that enforce annual testing of staff blood samples 
do so w ithout revealing the nature of the tests to staff and there have been
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num erous recent cases in which HIV+ employees claim they were pressured into 
resignation once their sero-status was discovered. The Foundation for AIDS Rights 
dealt recently with a case in which the retail company HomePro was the subject of 
complaint after testing employees for HIV and dismissing anyone found positive 
(Nacapew, 2012). At the time of interview, the Foundation was also dealing with a 
complaint against a Christian university in which a nursing student had been tested 
for HIV without informed consent; on finding the student HIV positive, the 
University informed the student's parents w ithout his permission and dismissed 
him from the programme (Nacapew, 2012). As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
conditions of HIV testing are a good indicator of the status of HIV/AIDS related 
rights campaigns and exceptionalist frameworks. Outside Bangkok, a CSO caring 
for HIV+ children and young adults reported that one resident in their care had 
been dismissed from working in a local food outlet by an "apologetic" manager 
who explained that, while he did not fear HIV+ people himself, he would lose 
customers who did fear contamination (Dunck, R., 2013). Another resident had 
secured a job in an international food chain but her guardians believed that it this 
was because she had not disclosed her HIV+ status (Dunck, R., 2013).
These cases of discrimination arise in part because the fear invoked by early 
responses to HIV/AIDS has endured, although the initial message that "AIDS = 
Death" is now outdated (Ungphakorn, 2012; TNP+, 2012; Hahn, 2013). As Hahn 
(2013) observes, "nobody tried to correct this" and even medical professionals retain 
outdated and potentially harmful perceptions of HIV/AIDS. H ahn (2013) reported 
that:
There is no big campaign saying 'discordant couples can easily have 
children' ... The counsellors were trained 10 years ago, so now if an HIV+ 
woman goes to the counsellor the first thing she says is 'you should have an 
abortion, you shouldn't have got pregnant in the first place', because nobody 
invests in giving them a different knowledge either. They are stuck there.
Education to reduce these damaging perceptions and to promote effective 
HIV/AIDS prevention and management strategies is a primary focus of leading 
CSOs, including Foundation for AIDS Rights, Access, Raks Thai, Mercy Bangkok, 
and the TNP+ coalition. Their normalisation efforts typically focus on educational
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campaigns to reduce misinformation and fear, as well as providing essential 
information about health; TNP+ reported that in some schools in which they 
operated, their lessons were the only sexual health education offered to pupils 
(Muangmoonchai, 2013). Despite the concerted efforts by many groups, including 
the Red Cross which lobbied school administrators to install condom vending 
machines (Phanuphak, 2013), sexual and reproductive health education in Thai 
schools remains poor (Hahn, 2013). This is partly due to social norms which dictate 
that "it is unacceptable for teachers to talk about use of condoms and sexual 
relations" as well as a lack of appropriate state policies (Muangmoonchai, 2013). The 
result is a perpetuation of myths and misinformation about the transmission of 
HIV/AIDS and other STIs, which leads to fear of contagion or counterproductive 
assumptions about the morality of PLWHA. Inadequate sexual health education 
also leads to higher rates of sexually transmitted diseases among young Thais and is 
linked to the rising levels of teenage pregnancies in the country (Hahn, 2013).
The reduction of fear associated with HIV/AIDS and PLWHA has been the 
focus of mainstream HIV/AIDS civil society groups and activists since the mid- 
1990s, with a few notable exceptions. One of these is the temple Wat Phra Baht Nam 
Pu. Located near a rural town 180km north of Bangkok, the Wat purports to be an 
educational facility but was heavily criticised by former Senator Jon Ungphakorn, 
the National H um an Rights Commissioner Visa Benjamano, and the Director of 
Foundation for AIDS Rights Supatra Nacapew, for exhibiting the mummified and 
dismembered bodies of HIV+ people to visitors.14 At TNP+, activists explained that 
the display of corpses within the 'AIDS body parts' museum and the 'Life museum ' 
at the Wat amounted to a fear-appeal because:
They try to make people to be afraid, or to scare people [to say] don 't get 
HIV. ... So that's why they do the Life Museum, to tell people, 'if you are 
doing like [this], this is the end of your life, you [get] HIV/AIDS, you're 
going to die.' (Kestkaew, 2012)
14 See  also Wery (2011) for an autobiographical accou nt  o f  a former medical vo lunteer  at th e  tem p le ,  
in which th e  author m akes a l legations o f  serious patient abuse  and substandard medical care, and  
Turner & Sirisupluxana (2012) for further details  o f  th e  organisational structure o f  th e  facility.
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The display of HIV+ bodies as a visitor attraction was problematic for the rights- 
based CSO groups interviewed in Bangkok and in 2009 a coalition of CSOs lodged a 
formal complaint against the Wat with the National H um an Rights Commission. In 
December 2009 when the Commission visited the site to investigate, 19 bodies were 
on display at the Life M useum with accompanying photos and information about 
the patients that included their name and career (Benjamano, 2012); in one case a 
corpse was labelled as "sex worker: Lady Boy" (Marshall, 2008; NHRC, 2012, p.5). 
One of the complainants, TNP+, explained their belief that the displays reflected a 
discriminatory logic at the heart of the temple's approach, telling the author that 
"this is from the bad attitude about people with HIV. They believe that bad 
behaviour is the cause of HIV. Bad person, bad behaviour, is like [sic] sex worker or 
drug user" (Kestkaew, 2012). The attribution of disease to socially marginalised 
behaviour is problematic because moralisation of the virus both stigmatises 
individuals and complicates intervention and management programmes.
There is a tension between the efforts of leading CSOs to normalise 
perceptions of PLWHA and the current UN guidance advising that responses 
should be targeted to KAPs. The concern raised by some observers is that selecting 
specific groups for intervention exacerbates stigmatisation by associating them with 
higher levels of the disease; the fear is that this logic of targeted responses is 
reminiscent of the early perceptions of HIV/AIDS that PLWHA did so much to 
counter (and which now fuels the normalisation campaigns) (Nacapew, 2012). 
However, Hahn (2013) explains that with limited resources and extremely high 
prevalence concentrated in certain population groups, the need for a targeted 
response is inevitable. Whilst prevalence in the general population is declining in 
Thailand, around 1 in 4 MSM surveyed by UNAIDS in Bangkok were HIV+ and 
prevalence was also higher among transgender sex workers (UNAIDS, 2013, p.13). 
H ahn (2013) reports that only 6% of current PLWHA in Thailand are outside of the 
KAPs and according to recent modelling by his office, "you [would] have to invest 
in about 123,000 tests to find one HIV+ in the general population", making this 
approach financially inefficient. With careful management, targeted responses can 
be implemented in a way that does not invoke unproductive fear or exacerbate the
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stigmatisation of affected groups (Tenni, 2012; Hahn, 2013). A key campaign in the 
current response is to educate people that "AIDS can be treated" (Tenni, 2012) and 
this message should encourage testing by those at risk; this message should mitigate 
levels of unproductive fear in audiences by explaining that through testing and 
access to medical services there is a productive response by which the threat can be 
controlled. It also aligns with the hum an rights orientated approach favoured by 
CSOs and INGOs.
Despite much success, there still remain significant challenges to 
implementing the hum an rights framework in Thailand. The Universal Health 
Coverage scheme, through which subsidised ARVs are available, is premised on the 
concept of health as a hum an right (Bhakeecheep, 2013), but this principle is not 
shared with other Government Offices. The National H um an Rights Commission 
explained that the Offices of the Royal Police Force and Judiciary "do not 
understand hum an rights" and this is why they require HIV testing for potential 
staff (Ladaporn, 2013). One activist reported that even prosecutors w ith whom 
HIV/AIDS advocacy groups worked were routinely testing their own staff for 
HIV/AIDS (Source 6, 2012). Former Senator Jon Ungphakorn (2012) observed that, 
"you find stigma and discrimination in the very professions it shouldn't be in, for 
example the medical profession and legal profession"; the UN Stigma Index 
reported that 20% of HIV+ Thai respondents had been denied access to health 
services because of their HIV status during the previous 12 months (UNAIDS, 2013, 
p.23). The CSO, Access, established by Ungphakorn in 1991, has dealt with cases in 
which surgeons have refused to treat PLWHA and has successfully opposed plans 
by the prestigious Chulalongkorn medical institute to routinely test all medical 
students for HIV/AIDS (Ungphakorn, 2012).
Elbe's (2006) concern that framing HIV/AIDS as a national security issue 
might lead to the violation of civil liberties has been reflected by the activism of 
CSOs in Thailand; CSOs mobilised both in order to provide support for PLWHA 
and to seek protection of their hum an rights (Tenni, 2012). In this capacity, the role 
of civil society in Thailand remains salient for as long as HIV/AIDS is a matter of 
political or security discourse, because CSOs act as a check against the infringement
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of PLWHA autonomy and rights. As Dr Phanuphak (2013), Director of the Thai Red 
Cross AIDS Research Centre, explained:
HIV has been a hum an rights issue from the beginning ... I don 't think 
politicising HIV will affect hum an rights ... because the hum an rights people 
here in Thailand are very strong, [they work] to protect the rights of the 
affected and infected.
Asked whether the revitalisation of the government's 'w ar on drugs' by Prime 
Minister Yingluck could lead to a repeat of the extra judicial killings seen in 2003, 
Supatra Nacapew (2012) replied that is was unlikely, "because the hum an right 
defenders and hum an rights organisations work a lot about this and this is a big 
issue".
Since the initial responses to HFV/AIDS in Thailand, in which state 
institutions and fear-appeals featured predominately, there has been an evolution in 
the framework that people use to address HIV and a shift toward a more hum an 
rights based approach to the epidemic. This reflects a wider paradigm shift in global 
understandings of the epidemic that has been noted by Rushton (2010), in which 
hum an rights and development discourse are increasingly dominant; this shift was 
facilitated by the advent of effective ARV treatm ent and the campaign to bring 
about access to medicines as part of the universal right to health (Davies, 2009, 
pp.70-75; Press, 2012). In Thailand, the rise of HIV/AIDS related civil society groups 
has led to the contemporary epidemic response that is defined by its hum an rights 
orientation and which has sought to redress the stigma and discrimination that 
surrounds the disease. These campaigns have arisen in part because of the early use 
of fear-appeals in prevention and education messages which may have exacerbated 
the stigma inherently associated with the disease due to its epidemiological 
conditions. W hat remains to be seen is whether the Thai national response reflected 
the UNSC securitization of HIV/AIDS that was codified in Meeting 4087 and how, 
or to w hat extent, the security-HIV link has been made in Thailand.
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7.3. Assessing the Impact of UNSC M eeting 4087
Thailand was at the forefront of the UN-led global response to HIV and Thai 
political leaders, activists, and civil society groups have been included in high-level 
working groups from the outset of the UNAIDS response; for example, AIDS 
activist and politician Mechai Viravaidya was included in Dr Piot's team from 1999. 
Given this close and long-standing relationship between Thailand and UNAIDS, it 
would be reasonable to expect that the securitization of HIV/AIDS at the UNSC 
w ould be reflected in the policy, rhetoric, or practice of the Thai national response to 
the epidemic. However, it emerged conclusively during fieldwork that this has not 
been the case. The author conducted an in-depth interview with the UNAIDS 
Country Coordinator for Thailand about the national response and the impact of the 
HIV-security links made at the UNSC meeting in 2000. In a statement that 
characterises the general response of key interviewees throughout 13 months of 
fieldwork, Michael H ahn (2013) told the author:
I think that [Meeting 4087] was the first time that a Security Council in the 
UN discussed a health issue at all, so I think in terms of advocacy purposes, 
in terms of giving HIV a different position, in a global response, it was a 
good move. But I don 't think that countries have necessarily changed 
anything really because of this.
The inclusion of HIV/AIDS on the agenda of the Security Council did not directly 
translate into securitization of HIV within national responses. However, it won 
attention and resources from the international community and earned the epidemic 
legitimacy amongst some actors who may not have otherwise been convinced. 
Speaking at the UN Security Council in 2005, Piot highlighted the im portant role 
played by the Council in holding the first meeting on HIV/AIDS five years earlier:
The Security Council, through resolution 1308 (2000), has transformed how 
the world views AIDS. I say 'transformed' because many now view AIDS as 
a threat to national security and stability, in addition to being a threat to 
development and public health alone. While today it sounds normal to place 
AIDS in that context, it was definitely a very bold step five years ago. 
(UNSC, 2005, p.5)
H ahn (2013) shared this view, stating that HIV was given a "different position" by 
its inclusion in the UNSC agenda and at the subsequent UN General Assembly
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Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) in June 2001. At this UNGASS meeting, the 
Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was established; an organisation 
that would directly contribute $344,264,374 (US) to Thailand by 2012 (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2014). During the Special Session, Thailand alone spoke about HIV in 
terms of international security (Rushton, 2010, p.500), where the Deputy Prime 
Minister referred to the UNSC meeting on HIV/AIDS saying, "HIV/AIDS is a silent 
global menace which threatens not only development and hum an security, but also 
international security, to the extent that the global nature of the threat has already 
been acknowledged by the Security Council" (UNGASS, 2001, p .7).
However, H ahn (2013) explained that after these meetings in 2000, HIV had 
not been dealt with as a security issue in Thailand, even within the bureaucratic 
framework of the UNAIDS office itself:
Because I don 't think it is one really, it was a reminder that ... it's a very 
complex issue now, but don 't forget this was in 2001 [sic], so we are wiser 
now and things thankfully haven't developed as they looked like [they 
would] at the end of the 1990s. By that time I think it was a reminder that 
epidemics and global health issues can also be a threat, a principle threat, to 
the security of countries.
Interviews with key informants from early and current responses, at both ground- 
level and in policy-making circles, corroborate this statement. The national epidemic 
response was driven in Thailand by the prominent role of CSOs and activists like 
Mechai and his peer, Ungphakorn, who early on secured a place in government 
policy making as well as being centrally involved in the UN-led international 
response. As a result, state policies were shaped by domestic as well as international 
agents, including UNAIDS and the Global Fund. Thailand benefitted from the 
resources mobilised by Piot's securitizing move at the UNSC, but although the HIV- 
security linkage had appeared in the documents of the United Nations and 
transformed the way the world viewed HIV/AIDS, there is little evidence that these 
claims endured in the discourse or policy that defined the Thai response on the 
ground.
Dr Phusit Prakongsai (2013) at the Ministry of Public Health stated that, 
whilst HIV/AIDS was thought about as a security issue in the past when morbidity
193
was high, this perception has declined following the delivery of subsidized 
antiretroviral treatment to c.250,000 people in Thailand since 2005. Before treatment 
became available in Thailand, HIV was more apparent in the population and 
invoked fear as an untreatable disease because it manifested in visible symptoms 
and a high death-rate among HIV+ people. Other facilitating conditions that 
contributed to the HIV-security framing in Thailand included the politicisation of 
the epidemic through AIDS exceptionalism, which was well established in the 
international community at this time, and the securitizing process led by the 
UNAIDS that was underway. Dr Praphan Phanuphak, Director of the Thai Red 
Cross AIDS Research Centre, diagnosed the first cases of AIDS in Thailand in 1985 
and has been a prominent AIDS activist since. He told the author:
HIV was presented as a threat to national security during the early 1990s, up 
until 1997 or '98 because at that time, according to the statistics, there was 
one death in the village in the Upper North every week. Which most of them 
are young people [sz'c] and also there were about 100-150,000 new infections 
... [and] almost 100,000 deaths per year ... and the prevalence of HIV among 
young military recruits ... was as high as 7% among those recruited or 
drafted from the North. So at that time everyone said that this is a national 
security threat. (Phanuphak, 2013)
When asked to clarify who was making these securitizing claims, Phanuphak (2013) 
explained, "UNAIDS, you can say, the National AIDS Committee, and all the 
advocacy people talking about it. There was a document from UNAIDS saying that 
AIDS can affect national security, [with] which everyone agrees". But the frame of 
exceptionalism, fear, and security did not endure in Thailand. In addition to the 
influential campaigns of CSOs who fought to normalise perceptions of PLWHA, a 
number of other factors combined to reduce the fear of HIV/AIDS and thus reduce 
the persuasiveness of the HIV-security link. One of the major contributing 
conditions was the introduction of effective ARV treatment, which turned 
HIV/AIDS from a fatal disease into a "chronic condition that can be treated" (Hahn,
2013). With treatment, the established message that "AIDS = Death" was no longer 
true (Hahn, 2013). Phanuphak (2013) also identified this as definitive moment in the 
rejection of HIV-security claims in Thailand, stating that, "I think it changed when 
more people got treated. Especially starting [in] 2004 ... because it's the year that the
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Thai government announced [there would be] universal access to AIDS treatment 
and ARV treatment".
The introduction of treatment has contributed to the reduction of HIV 
related stigma and discrimination in both direct and indirect ways; first, by turning 
HIV/AIDS into a "chronic medical condition, not a death sentence" (Hahn, 2013), 
the unproductive fear of HIV/AIDS is reduced and treatment offers an efficacious 
response with which the threat can be managed. Second, through adherence to 
treatm ent the visible symptoms that once characterised HIV/AIDS are no longer 
present. This removes a significant source of stigmatisation for people living with 
HIV and gives them far greater control over whether or not they disclose their sero- 
status to others. In Thailand and internationally, HIV/AIDS has been historically 
linked to chronic, visibly symptomatic disease; early HIV/AIDS campaigns often 
used visual displays of bodies affected by AIDS in fear-appeals about the disease 
and it was the emotive display of HIV affected bodies to US Ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke that helped to convey the severity of the epidemic and to mobilise 
resources at the global level (Muangmoonchai, 2013; Chapter 6). The importance of 
visible symptoms and their reduction through treatment was recounted repeatedly 
by interviewees, who stressed that the association of HIV with visibly ill bodies was 
not an effective route to sustainable prevention or management responses (Press, 
2012; Hahn, 2013; Muangmoonchai, 2013; Ungphakorn, 2013). However, both Dr 
Phanuphak (2013) and Professor Rattanamha (2013) reported that whilst treatment 
had a positive impact on health and reduction of stigma, it was also responsible for 
a growing complacency about the threat posed by HIV. Dr Phanuphak (2013) notes 
that complacency about the Thai epidemic now exists among the general public, 
policy makers, and the international community, and it is linked to the new "ability 
to take ARVs".
The decline in priority and a growing complacency is also a result of the 
unsustainable nature of fear appeals. Hahn (2013) recalled similar "lessons" from 
Europe where the use of fear in public prevention campaigns included "skeletons 
on the tramways and buses and [messages that] 'AIDS Kills'"; these fear appeals 
created aversion in the audience, who did not perceive themselves to be the
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intended audience of the message and who were not convinced of their own 
susceptibility. As Hahn (2013) observed, "young people go to the disco and no one 
looked like [those images]". In Thailand, Hahn (2013) noted the decline in fear over 
time is also present, explaining that "fear is not a good strategy to use" because, 
"you expect that ten or twelve years later people are still on blood pressure 300. 
They are not".
The provision of state-funded ARVs in Thailand is coordinated by the 
National Health Security Office (NHSO) that manages the Universal Healthcare 
Coverage (UHC), or '30 Baht Healthcare' scheme that has been in place since 2001. 
The UHC has included provision of ARVs since 2006, following the campaigns of 
CSOs and international NGOs to allow the provision of generic pharmaceuticals 
(Tenni, 2012). Dr Sorakji Bhakeecheep (2013), Manager of the NHSO, told the author 
explicitly that HIV was not regarded as an issue of national or economic security. 
Asked during the interview if there was a relationship between health and other 
security areas, Dr Bhakeecheep (2013) answered "no", and stated, "I've never seen 
any link between security and health/HIV". He went on to clarify that, according to 
the NHSO, "health is not a security issue ... unless you mean social security. ... 
Health security is a part of hum an security, and hum an protection and social 
protection" (Bhakeecheep, 2013). According to the NHSO, the aim of the institution 
is "to provide health security for every Thai person"; security which, concerning 
HIV/AIDS, consists of "health prevention and promotion, treatment and care" 
rather than a more traditional or statist interpretation (Bhakeecheep, 2013).
Dr Bhakeecheep coordinates the Thai government's budget for provision of 
HIV/AIDS medication under the UHC, which remains separate from that of other 
medicines. Asked whether this was a sign of the exceptionality of HIV/AIDS, he 
dismissed the link and explained that separation was due to the cost of ARV 
medication, which remains high compared to other treatments, stating, "we are not 
sure if the budget will be enough, we are worried that if it is going to be too big it 
will invade budget of other disease. Chronic liver disease also has a separate 
budget" (Bhakeecheep, 2013). Here again, pragmatic economic interests might be at 
the heart of an otherwise apparently exceptional response to HIV/AIDS, rather than
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any genuine perception that the virus poses a threat to security. Brigitte Tenni (2012) 
from TNP+ supported the proposal that Thailand's national response to HIV was 
fuelled primarily by economic rather than security concerns, reasoning that 
Thailand was "concerned less about national security and more that HIV was going 
to get expensive, to affect people in the prime of their lives". This reflects an 
approach to conceptualising HIV/AIDS that emerged as typical of the Thai response 
and that Ingram (2013) referred to as locating HIV within "discourses of scarcity" 
(p.437). The discourse of scarcity infers that "HIV/AIDS programm ing is 
increasingly assessed in terms of calculations of cost, impact, and efficiency" rather 
than the exceptionality and urgency of securitization (Ingram, 2013, p.437). 
Recalling the early response to HIV/AIDS in Thailand and internationally, Tenni
(2012) explained that:
In the past [HIV] was couched in a national security theme ... I think they 
interpret that in a couple of ways ... you need to provide care or treatment 
for your population because if you get to a certain prevalence ... if your 
defence personal, or your police, or your army become infected and there's a 
proxy for your general population ... then the security of your country is at 
risk. ... I think that's how it was couched as a national security issue. But I 
did never hear that [sic] specifically for Thailand, although there were a lot 
of army conscripts ... infected and that's how they do surveillance, to 
measure prevalence in the general population ... Thailand were concerned 
less about national security and more that HIV was going to get expensive, 
to affect people in the prime of their lives. People were dying in the prime or 
their working lives.
Tenni (2012) also recalled that the decision by the Thai government in 2007 to issue 
Compulsory Licenses for the production of generic HIV/AIDS medication was 
based on a cost-benefit assessment of the treatment:
They decided to go ahead and issue the compulsory licenses. It was also 
recommended by the World Bank Report, because it would save so much 
money. That was Mr Mongkol Na Songkhla ... For him it was about cost- 
effectiveness, because the government had already committed to providing 
ARV treatment through the government health system. And they could only 
do that because they could produce generics here, in country, through the 
government pharmaceutical organisation which is not-for-profit. They did 
the math to work out that they could afford to make this commitment.
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Thailand's seminal decision to offer its population subsidised and affordable access 
to generic antiretroviral medication was a direct benefit of the securitization of the 
disease that had contributed to overriding patent laws and legalising generic 
production. However, the manifestation of these legal concessions by Thailand, to 
provide treatment under the Universal Healthcare Scheme managed by the National 
Health Security Office, did not invoke the HIV-security link; instead, as shown in 
the statements made by the Director of the NHSO above (Bhakeecheep, 2013), this 
link is explicitly rejected at the institutional level. In general, the qualitative data 
collected during fieldwork indicates that HIV/AIDS is not treated as a security issue 
in Thailand and where the security-HIV framework did exist, it did not endure 
beyond initial responses to the epidemic. One exception to this is the issue of 
migration, which is examined below.
7.4. Where HIV/AIDS is Security: The Immigration Issue
Where HIV/AIDS has been framed in terms of national security this is 
specifically in the context of other, more traditional threats. Professor Rattanamha 
(2013) collaborated on the 2011 Evaluation of the National AIDS Response in Thailand 
(AIHD, 2011) report with the Ministry of Public Health and said that when HIV is 
framed by the government in terms of national security, it is as part of the state 
campaign against recreational narcotics. Muangmoonchai (2013) reported that there 
were no clearly defined policies on national security and HIV and that immigration 
is the only issue that intersects security and HIV at the policy level. The dominant 
perception of interviewees was that HIV/AIDS was likely to be linked to security 
related to immigration and specifically to the social and economic issues associated 
with employment of m igrant workers from neighbouring states, including 
Myanmar.
The perception that immigrants to Thailand pose a threat to the nation is 
well established culturally and politically. In particular, hostility tow ard people 
from Myanmar is rooted in contemporary economic conditions as well as historic 
relations. This was noted by Dr Sid Naing (2013) from Marie Stopes International in 
Yangon, when he told the author that poor relations between Thais and Burmese
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hindered potential cooperation on HIV/AIDS responses and was rooted in historical 
animosity stemming from armed conflict between the two countries. In the 
contemporary context, economic hardship in Thailand has negatively affected 
perceptions of migrant workers and, as is common in the securitization of 
immigration, political leaders can frame migrants as a convenient scapegoat for 
w ider economic difficulties (e.g., Wishnick, 2008, pp.89-92). In 1998, in the aftermath 
of the Asian financial crisis that began with the collapse of the Thai Baht, Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai implemented a series of policies to discourage employers 
from hiring migrant workers rather than Thai nationals. Leekpai's decision to 
deport one million, mainly Burmese, migrant workers was based on economic and 
"security" concerns, according to a statement made by the Army Commander-in- 
Chief, General Chetta Thanjaro (Human Rights Watch, 1998, p. 17). In 2013, the 
Director of Thai Action Committee for Burmese Democracy (TACBD), M yint Wai 
(2013), told the author that a TACBD school for the children of Burmese migrants 
was closed by the Thai government who cited "national security concerns" over its 
location in central Thailand. Premjai Vungsiriphisal (2013), professor in the 
Chulalongkorn University Migration Research Centre, also reported that security 
concerns regarding migration are well established in Thai political rhetoric and that 
HIV was framed as a migration-related security issue, presenting an external threat 
to the Thai population. Vungsiriphisal (2013) explained that:
Not only Burma migrants, bu t also Cambodia and Laos ... illegal migrants 
especially are a concern. We don 't know who they are, how many they are. 
This issue [is] considered a security issue because of [the] administration 
structure. National security includes migrant workers as a threat to national 
security.
The impact of this perception is evident at the level of government and foreign 
policy. Hahn (2013) observed that since the start of the epidemic, "labour migration 
was often seen as part of the national security" and this affects the way in which 
migrants can be incorporated into the HIV/AIDS response within Thailand, given 
the sometimes overt hostility toward them. A Minister Counsellor of the Royal Thai 
Embassy in Yangon told the author that as a result of these concerns within the 
government, informal but "very close" cooperation between M yanmar and
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Thailand includes regular meetings between the Ministers of Health in each country 
(Vipattipumiprates, 2012). These meetings are especially im portant for "healthcare 
in the border regions because we don 't w ant people who cross the borders bringing 
in disease, we don 't want it in Thailand. So there has been very intense cooperation" 
(Vipattipumiprates, 2012). Of course, HIV does already exist in Thailand, but 
prevalence among migrant workers is higher than in the general Thai population 
(UNAIDS, 2013, p .ll) .
Supatra Nacapew (2012) confirmed that the Thai government continued to 
talk of labour migration as presenting a security threat in traditional economic 
terms. Nacapew (2012) noted that her CSO's campaign to extend state-subsidised 
antiretroviral treatment to non-Thai, immigrant workers faced opposition due to the 
financial cost this would incur. This resistance was damaging she explained, 
because "if you want to control the spread of HIV you should be working with 
everybody, not only for some ... not only for Thais. Because the disease is not 
asking, 'Uhh are you Thai?"' (Nacapew, 2012). The reluctance of the state to extend 
subsidised antiretroviral treatment to migrants workers was, CSO representatives 
believed, due to a fear that to do so would encourage an unmanageable influx of 
HIV+ immigrants in search of medication (Nacapew, 2012; Tenni, 2012). This may be 
a salient concern, given that an estimated 65% of PLWHA in Myanmar do not have 
access to treatment (Swe, 2012; de Groote, 2013). At the Ministry of Health, Dr 
Prakongsai (2013) also stated his concerns about the future of the epidemic and the 
government's ability to sustain the provision of treatment in the face of growing 
drug resistance and increasing numbers of PLWHA. However, it is likely that the 
real reasons for opposing extension of treatment and for controlling migration are 
more complex and it is noteworthy that the HIV-security-migration framework fits 
neatly with the conception of HIV as a foreign or external invader.
H ahn (2013) suggests that migration and HIV might be perceived as a threat 
to the referent object of Thai national identity, explaining that, "when it was a 
security issue, it is all together with the idea of protecting Thai cultural identity. 
Normally it's a mixture, protecting the culture, the integrity, the unborn children". 
When HIV/AIDS was linked with security in contemporary discourse on the
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epidemic, in H ahn's (2013) view this was a "hangover" from the early response in 
Thailand which positioned HIV as an additional dimension to the supposed 
"threat" posed to Thai national identity by migration from Southeast Asian states.
If you look at labour migration, for example in the Thai context, it was also 
defined as security, and labour migration was often seen as part of the 
national security. Now it is slowly, slowly changing, bu t a lot of policy 
issues around labour migration have to do with the fact that it was seen as a 
security issue for Thailand. (Hahn, 2013)
Ultimately, whilst there is evidence that HIV/AIDS has been invoked as an 
additional dimension of the 'threat' posed by migration into Thailand, security is 
not the dom inant framework with which the epidemic has been perceived or 
handled. As Hahn (2013) concluded, "I don 't think that HIV ever got the status of a 
security threat, and rightly so".
7.5. The Future of the Thai Epidemic
Some medical professionals and scholars are worried about a second wave 
in the Thai epidemic; Professor Rattanamha (2013) suggested that changing youth 
behaviour and growing complacency about the dangers of HIV/AIDS in a post-ARV 
era would fuel a resurgence in prevalence among adolescents, while UN data 
indicate rising STI infection and HIV prevalence among Thai youths (NAPAC, 2009, 
p.3). However, at UNAIDS Hahn (2013) notes that rising sexual activity among 
adolescents might be responsible for a decline in HIV infection linked to commercial 
sex, which has traditionally been one of the primary vectors for transmission. Hahn 
(2013) observes that in the past:
Young Thai men had no way to have sex with a young Thai girl so the first 
sexual initiation was with prostitutes. That has changed now. ... Young 
people have less sex with prostitutes ... young people sleep with everybody. 
Because they can do this actually, it prevents them from contracting HIV 
because if you sleep with a normal average Thai girl, you have very little 
risk of HIV. But if you sleep with a sex worker then you have a totally 
different risk potential.
Hahn (2013) rejected the idea of a "second wave" of the epidemic, although he 
cautioned that he may be "too optimistic" on this issue. Prakongsai (2013) was also 
concerned about the role of youth populations in driving the current epidemic,
201
although looking to the future his primary concern was about treatment efficacy; he 
told the author, "I foresee that we will have a second wave ... w ith an HIV/AIDS 
strain that is drug resistant".
Governance is a crucial issue affecting the future of the epidemic in 
Thailand; health spending in each of the 76 provinces is the responsibility of the 
Provincial Health Office (PHO) and this decentralised system leads to an 
underfunding of health projects that are less likely to offer "visible" rewards than 
road building or other popular projects (Prakongsai, 2013). HIV/AIDS programmes 
might be politically unpopular if they are seen as diverting resources to stigmatised 
populations and a lack of epidemic awareness among elected leaders can exacerbate 
the problems associated with marginalisation (Prakongsai, 2013). Worryingly, both 
Dr Prakongsai (2013) and Professor Rattanamha (2013) reported that health and 
HIV/AIDS policies were not prioritised by PHOs because they offered less 
opportunity for "graft" or corrupt financial gain than construction or commercial 
development. Prakongsai (2013) also noted that Chiefs of Provincial Offices were 
reluctant to adopt policies which might indicate that their province had "an HIV 
problem", in case it negatively affected trade or tourism in the area. In some cases, 
HIV/AIDS intervention had been adopted by PHOs under the guise of a campaign 
to reduce teenage pregnancy because this is a less stigmatised public health issue 
(Prakongsai, 2013). Thailand's concern about its image and reputation, which is 
linked to national prestige as well as the economically im portant tourist trade, 
might also serve as a motivation for the country to address its epidemic; H ahn
(2013) noted that this was the case in the first years of the epidemic and at the 
National Hum an Rights Commission, Ladaporn (2013) also suggested that 
international pressure applied to Thailand might help reform some of the 
institutionalised stigma that affects employment and hum an rights violations in the 
country.
While political attention is important, unpublished epidemiological data 
indicate that the healthcare infrastructure central to the Thai response may not be 
functioning as well as previously thought. Figures due to be published by the 
International Health Policy Programme show that in 2008, 51% of HIV+ people
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registering for ARV treatment for the first time had a CD4 count of less than 100 
(Prakongsai, 2013). According to WHO guidelines, treatment should start when 
CD4 counts fall below 500 (WHO, 2013, p.92). A CD4 count less than 100 reflects 
advanced progression of the virus and approximately 20% of adults reporting at this 
stage would not respond to treatment; for younger people (aged 15-35) the success 
rate is even lower (Prakongsai, 2013). The significance of this data is that they 
indicate people living with HIV/AIDS are not detected or treated until, in many 
cases, it is too late. In addition to higher mortality, late detection also facilitates 
higher rates of transmission, as outlined in Chapter 4. The problem also appears to 
be increasing; in 2012, the num ber of people reporting for first use of ARVs with a 
CD4 count below 100 had risen by 11%, meaning that 62% of all new cases had 
advanced infection (Prakongsai, 2013). As Dr Prakongsai (2013) observed, if the 
epidemic response in Thailand in functioning well, how have so many people 
"slipped through the net" for so long? These data indicate that prevalence could be 
higher than currently reported and that it may be increasingly quickly.
7.6. Conclusion
There is a need for change in Thailand; data collected in this research indicates that 
whilst the state made a proactive and early intervention on HIV/AIDS as it emerged 
in the 1980s and 1990s, in recent years there has been a decline in the priority or 
attention awarded to the epidemic. Early policy responses have been critiqued by 
hum an rights campaigners and the rise in HIV among non-brothel based sex 
workers, PWIDs, and MSM indicates that there is still a significant problem to 
address (NAPAC, 2009). Complacency about the epidemic has been linked to the 
availability of antiretroviral treatment (Phanuphak, 2013; Rattanamha, 2013) and to 
an inevitable decline in the levels of fear that were invoked during initial responses 
(Hahn, 2013). Exacerbating this decline in attention, the stigmatisation of KAPs and 
PLWHA still exists and is evidenced by the complaints of rights-based CSOs and 
the reports of discrimination by PLWHA that are included in this chapter. At the 
institutional level, stigma and lack of awareness about HIV/AIDS has contributed to
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the under-funding of responses and decentralisation of health care spending has 
exacerbated this problem.
Civil society groups continue to undertake essential work to protect and 
further the rights of PLWHA and to provide essential support, including access to 
healthcare services and harm  reduction services (e.g., the Foundation for AIDS 
Rights and the Sex Workers In Group). They will remain vital to the effective 
ongoing management of HIV/AIDS in Thailand, providing both practical and 
advocacy support to PLWHA. At the Foundation for AIDS Rights and in the 
National Hum an Rights Commission, interviewees noted that it is hard to change 
the direction of policy that is driven by entrenched elites and interviewees 
(Nacapew, 2012; Ladaporn, 2013), but it is possible that in the future a change in 
generational attitudes toward KAPs and sexual health might facilitate the advocacy 
work of CSOs who seek to address stigma at an institutional level. Past attempts to 
frame HIV/AIDS as a threat to national security have not become the dominant 
framework for dealing with HIV/AIDS, although the rhetoric of 'othering' and the 
threat defence logic of military and foreign invasion remain present. If rights-based 
activism continues in its current vibrant form in Thailand, the danger of hum an 
rights violation will be checked, although complacency, stigma, and neglect of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is now a serious concern. Worrying data that indicate increased 
vulnerability among youth and MSM should be given political attention and, just as 
early interventions targeted female sex workers, addressing the current 
epidemiological trends will require pragmatism. For instance, an effective response 
now dem ands a confrontation of sexual health issues that affect MSM and youths, 
who could be educated in school in order to reduce their risk of infection. 
Significant investment in these politically sensitive groups does not currently exist 
and the country risks ignoring a potential resurgence that would quickly spread to 
the wider, general population. W ithout this renewed attention, as Rattanamha 
(2013) stated, "it may no longer be appropriate to use Thailand as a model for 
HIV/AIDS responses, although they were once effective".
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Chapter 8. The Response in Myanmar
Using data collected during fieldwork in Yangon, Myanmar, this chapter 
presents an overview of the national response to HIV/AIDS and assesses the extent 
to which the epidemic has been framed as a security issue. Analysis of the prim ary 
data concludes with two significant findings: first, that the national epidemic 
response in Myanmar has been implemented by civil society groups that comprise a 
mixture of national and international non-govemmental organisations. Despite 
restrictive and sometimes dangerous working conditions (Panzeri, 2013), these 
groups have mobilised in order to fill a gap in healthcare provision left by a state 
that has not, until recently, dem onstrated an intention to engage effectively with 
management of the national epidemic. As outlined in the preceding chapters, 
HIV/AIDS related CSOs are often comprised of PLWHA and as such are unlikely to 
advocate the use of fear appeals or securitizing rhetoric that could exacerbate 
stigmatisation and discrimination toward their members. This approach is 
reinforced by influential international NGOs and donors operating in Myanmar, 
including UNAIDS and Medecins Sans Frontier (MSF), that advocate action to 
reduce stigmatisation and promote the normalisation of PLWHA. With a dearth of 
government investment in health services in Myanmar, these CSO and INGO 
policies have defined the national response to the epidemic; the second finding of 
this chapter is that, as a result of this CSO-led action, the language of security and 
fear appeal has been largely absent.
Inaction by the state has facilitated the growing involvement by CSOs in 
healthcare and HIV/AIDS responses, which is possible only because the 
authoritarian, military-led government has perceived HIV/AIDS as a non-political 
and non-securitized issue that does not warrant its attention or investment of its 
limited resources. Since gaining independence in 1948, rulers of M yanmar have 
been preoccupied with more traditional existential threats to the state, including 
those posed by separatist groups in the northern borderlands. Following the 
installation of military rule in 1962, security remained the "preserve of a small elite", 
that are concerned with a narrow, traditional array of perceived threats to their
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pow er (Muang Than, 1998, p.391). Although there is evidence of a shift tow ard more 
"holistic security" since 2000 (James, 2005, p .57), a narrow and traditional security 
perspective has shaped the contemporary state. The determination of the Burman 
majority military regime (Beyrer, 1998, p.36) to protect their power base and 
preserve the unified state has characterised the rule of the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) 
and has led to pervasive injustices against civilians and a legacy of civil conflict 
since 1948 (James, 2004). The prioritisation of traditional statist security has also de­
prioritised non-military sectors of society and healthcare systems have been 
systematically neglected since 1962 (Beyrer, 1998, p.38). Under this security 
paradigm, internal threats to the ruling party (perceived or real) have been violently 
suppressed, leading to condemnation and economic sanctions from the West, led by 
the USA; the brutal repression of the 1988 popular uprising for democracy, the 
enforcement of a one party system since 1964, and the systematic repression of the 
National League for Democracy until 2010 are among the most well-documented 
instances of state violence orchestrated under the pretext of national security.
In this environment, the government has viewed civil society groups as 
potential threats to the survival of the state, even when those CSOs are ostensibly 
apolitical. As a result, CSO working conditions have been extremely restrictive and 
often dangerous (Panzeri, 2013). However, despite the "fear" that pervades civil 
society and the population in general, CSOs have mobilised to provide essential 
services for hundreds of thousands of people with HIV/AIDS (Lancelot, 2013). 
Interviews with leading activists and CSO representatives reveal that the continued 
operation of these CSOs has been possible only because they have strategically 
avoided actions that would be antagonistic to the state. To do so requires an explicit 
rejection of any securitizing language or policies that could lead to HIV/AIDS being 
interpreted by the government as a political or security issue. Indeed, one INGO 
representative notes that the Ministry of Health, which remains the only Ministry 
staffed by non-military professionals, has "fought" to remain a civilian institution 
(Herzbrusch, 2013). Until political reform began in 2010, the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
had been neglected, ignored, and at times denied by the military leaders of
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M yanmar and public health in the country appears to have been subsum ed by 
dominant, traditional, security concerns. Whilst this de-prioritisation of health has 
led to endemic underfunding and the corrosion of a once world-class healthcare 
system, it has also allowed the formation of an ostensibly politically 'neutral space' 
in which civil society groups could operate, during even the most oppressive years 
of authoritarian rule.
8.1. A Note on Data
W hat follows in this chapter is an overview of the epidemiological situation, as far 
as is possible given the context in which it was collected. It should be noted that, in 
light of recent political reforms, many international institutions are reviewing the 
available data for the country; for example, the World Bank notes that they "are re­
engaging with the Myanmar government" in an effort to "address the scarcity of 
reliable data for the country" (World Bank, 2014). This chapter is compiled using 
current quantitative data published by leading IOs and CSOs with a presence in the 
country and qualitative data collected through interviews with these organisations 
in 2012 and 2013. Official data on Myanmar are acknowledged to be of questionable 
validity and subject to manipulation (Beyrer, 1998, p.36; Steinberg, 2010, p.153; 
Ware, 2012, p.21). Ware (2012) describes a "paucity" (p.22) of reliable data that 
stems from a lack of surveillance and reporting capacity that was steadily eroded 
following the exit of the British administration in 1948. Major barriers to the 
collection of reliable empirical data include limited resources for surveillance and 
analysis; a lack of comprehensive state control over some parts of the territory 
(namely those in the border areas in which protracted violent conflict limits access 
and hinders development and security); and the manipulation of data for political 
reasons (Ware, 2012, p.22). This has direct implications for HIV/AIDS responses, 
particularly at the monitoring and evaluation stage of project implementation, and 
in the restricted operational environm ent of Myanmar, "it is not easy to verify 
results" of HIV/AIDS interventions (de Groote, 2013).
All agencies dealing with HIV/AIDS use forecasting models based on the 
available data to predict wider epidemiological patterns; in this way, limited data
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samples can be used to predict national prevalence figures (de Groote, 2013). This is 
standard protocol and supported by international organisations, including UN 
agencies, as a method of best practise in research (Murphey, 2013). M yanmar now 
has in place a number of effective institutions that provide data and reporting of the 
national epidemic, as well as pragmatic coordination and implementation of 
response. Since 2008, the Myanmar Country Coordination Mechanism (MCCM) has 
overseen the national response to HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB, and has coordinated a 
num ber of state and non-state partners that undertake their own surveillance, 
including UNAIDS. Data from both the MCCM and UNAIDS were generally 
regarded as "good" or "reliable" by interview respondents (Lancelot, 2013; Naing, 
2013), but all interviewees expressed concerns about the reliability of data on the 
epidemic overall; as the representative from MSF explained, it is a "very difficult" 
subject (de Groote, 2013). From an operational perspective, CSOs face considerable 
political barriers in both gathering and reporting data. For example, Dr Sid Naing is 
a Burmese activist and country coordinator for Marie Stopes in Myanmar and 
represents civil society at the MCCM; according to Naing (2013), at times during the 
epidemic the government had become so sensitive to HIV/AIDS that mentioning the 
disease or epidemiological data could cause "serious problems", because it was 
interpreted by the military regime as an attack on their reputation and a sign of 
failure in governance. From Population Services International (PSI), Anne Lancelot 
(2013) reiterated this concern, reporting that operational targets for CSOs that were 
set by the government had created an environment of fear amongst civil society 
groups and were likely to lead to "blind lies" in an attempt to achieve compliance.
CSOs and organisations who do collect data, or who have the capacity to do 
so, face institutional challenges and disincentives to accurate reporting; one country 
representative from a high-profile international NGO operating in M yanmar 
explained how the organisation was routinely under-reporting infection prevalence 
in order to remain operational and that accurate figures were "not often" reported
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to the government (Source 10, 2013).15 This mis-reporting was part of a strategy 
em ployed by the institution to ensure its own survival; after many years working in 
the field, and as Burmese nationals, staff came to believe that the military regime 
was particularly sensitive to the issue of HIV/AIDS, in part because of its association 
w ith politically sensitive issues including drug use.16 As a result, the organisation 
intentionally exaggerated its non-HIV related work and underreported its 
involvement with HIV/AIDS responses, out of fear that to be associated with the 
HIV/AIDS response could antagonise the military government (Source 10, 2013). 
Following his extensive em bedded fieldwork in the country, Ware (2012) notes that 
"there are also widespread suggestions that deliberate misinformation has been a 
regime survival strategy" (p.22), indicating that erroneous data reporting is 
institutionalised in both NGOs and official government discourse.
8.2. The Country Response to HIV/AIDS
UNAIDS estimates that around 216,000 people are currently living with 
HIV/AIDS in M yanmar (National AIDS Programme [NAP], 2012, p.4). The country 
has an estimated prevalence rate of 0.53%, compared to 1.1% in Thailand (NAP, 
2012, p.4) but despite reportedly fewer disease instances, Myanmar is far behind 
Thailand in the efficacy of its national response to HIV/AIDS. The epidemic is 
concentrated and transmission occurs primarily in sex workers and their clients, 
MSM, and the sexual partners of these key affected groups (NAP, 2012, p.4; 
Lancelot, 2013; Murphey, 2013). Data obtained from the Ratana Metta Organisation 
(RMO) (Aung, 2012; Swe, 2012) indicate that of the current HIV+ population in 
Myanmar, 9.6% are sex workers, 7.8% are MSM, and 2.9% are injecting drug  users; 
these figures correlate with the KAPs identified in Thailand and elsewhere (NAC
15 In the literature, Beyrer (1998) reports the case of a medical doctor in Yangon who was told 
by his superiors in 1994 to "stop being so thorough" (p.51) when reporting cases of AIDS, 
which were becoming alarming high.
16 In addition to its legal and social prohibition, drug use and production in Myanmar is 
intrinsically linked to the ongoing conflict between the Burman majority state and ethnic 
minority groups that have historically used narcotic production and trafficking as a means 
of negotiating and resisting the military state in armed conflict, with trans-border 
implications also arising from refugee migration to neighbouring states (see Levy & Scott- 
Clarke, 2002; Steinberg, 2010, p.46).
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2012, pp.43-51; NAP, 2012, p. 12). Civil society organisations attempt to target their 
interventions in order to make best use of their limited resources, according to the 
CSO consortium, Alliance (Swift, 2013).
The state infrastructure has not traditionally been conducive to effective HIV 
management; until 1993 condoms were illegal in Myanmar (Beyrer, 1998, p.47), 
needles for injecting remain illegal, and healthcare is poor (Levy & Scott-Clarke, 
2002, p.362; de Groote, 2013). Following years of chronic underinvestment and the 
politically motivated destruction of the higher education system (Beyrer, 1998, p.37), 
M yanm ar's once exemplary healthcare system is now among the lowest ranked in 
the world, second only to Sierra Leone (Tandon et al., 2000, p.21). This decline began 
with the installation of military rule in 1962, as Beyrer (1998) observes, "between the 
loss of talented people to emigration, incarceration, and execution, and the drying- 
up of funds for public health, what many argue had been the finest medical system 
in Asia froze in time and then slid backwards" (p.38). Although there is evidence of 
state investment and cooperation with civil society in recent years (James, 2005, 
p.62), between 70% - 95% of health expense is out of pocket for individuals, making 
even basic treatment unaffordable for many of the population (de Groote, 2013; 
Murphey, 2013). It is estimated that just 35% of HIV+ people in Myanmar have 
access to ARV medication (Swe, 2012; de Groote, 2013), leaving around 140,400 
people w ithout (the lowest prediction of incidence reported to this researcher was 
from Peter Paul de Groote, Head of Mission at MSF in Myanmar: MSF reports the 
actual figure could be as low as 70,000, with up to 48,000 people receiving 
treatment). In 2011, an estimated 18,000 people died from AIDS-related illness 
(NAP, 2012, p.4). Research for this thesis indicates that new data on Myanmar, 
which should become available as the country 'opens up ' as a result of ongoing 
political reform, may reveal higher prevalence concentrated in currently restricted 
regions.
The first cases of HIV/AIDS were formally identified in Myanmar between 
1988 and 1991 (Beyrer, 1998, p.40; Swe, 2012; Naing, 2013). At this time, the initial 
data was not used to make substantial models to predict national prevalence, 
possibly contributing to an early under-estimation of the epidemic (Naing, 2013).
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The response of the military regime was to look first to blame neighbouring 
Thailand, who recorded their first case of HIV/AIDS in 1984, and to identify 
Thailand's prolific commercial sex industry and its associated American military 
clientele as the source of HIV in Myanmar (Naing, 2013). The military leaders of 
M yanmar under the State Law and Order Restoration Council regarded the USA as 
a threat to their own political survival and frequently employed anti-American 
rhetoric to bolster their tenuous legitimacy among the domestic population (Philp & 
Mercer, 2002, pp.1592-1594; Steinberg, 2010, p.141). The traditional animosity 
between Thailand and M yanmar (Beyrer, 1998, p.36), which is fuelled by historical 
conflicts, economic disparity, and migration, also reinforced the 'us vs. them ' logic 
in which HIV/AIDS was framed as a foreign disease (Naing, 2013). This was 
reinforced when Health Minister Ket Sein (in office from 1997-2003) declared that 
HIV was "a disease caused by foreigners" (Levy & Scott-Clark, 2002, p.360).
There has been a limited HIV surveillance system in place in Myanmar since 
1992 ("Burma's Secret Plague", 1997; UNODC, 2006, pp.5-6)17. By 1996, HIV/AIDS 
was "a big problem" in Myanmar, but one on which the government remained 
largely silent (Seng Raw, 2012). By this stage, the government had "left it too late to 
address the issue", and the country was experiencing high prevalence and serious 
social problems as a result (Seng Raw, 2012). In 1998, epidemiologist Chris Beyrer 
(1998) reported that clinical care and treatment for PLWHA was "essentially non­
existent" (p.47). This inaction by the state was likely caused in part by the 
marginalisation and stigmatization of key affected population groups, whose very 
existence presented a political embarrassment; in 1997, The Irrawaddy reported that 
Myanmar 'preferred to deny that promiscuity and commercial sex thrive in a 
Buddhist society' rather than acknowledge the epidemic ("Burma's Secret Plague", 
1997), and in April 1999, the SPDC reacted angrily to warnings from INGOs that 
M yanmar faced an HIV/AIDS crisis that was affecting neighbour states, claiming 
instead that the country, "does not have a sex industry and the number of drug 
users compared to other countries is much less ... it is very difficult to understand
17 Although Chris Beyrer (1998, p.40) reports the first screening programmes began in 1985.
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how the HIV/AIDS epidemic could spread from Burma to neighbouring countries as 
alleged by certain quarters" ("Burma Rejects UN Fears", 1999).
Early reports indicate that the state was aware of high prevalence among 
inmates of the "notorious" Insein prison (Beyrer, 1998, p.40), in which "never fewer 
than 10,000" prisoners were detained; these prisoners were known to be at 
extremely high risk because of the systematic reuse of needles in the prison hospital 
("Insein Prison", 1997). Although famous for the detention of political prisoners, 
Insein and other prisons were also used to incarcerate injecting drug users as a 
result of the "counterproductive" criminalisation of drug use, which increased 
exposure within the prison population ("Burma's Secret Plague", 1997). Despite 
claiming to have been aware of the epidemic since 1985 ("Burma Rejects UN Fears" 
1999), the military government did not actively invest in effective prevention 
strategies or redress punitive laws that targeted drug users or sex workers (Aung,
2012). Nor did they publicly acknowledge the presence of a serious epidemic in 
M yanmar until the late 1990s ("Burma's Secret Plague", 1997). This recognition 
came amid growing international concern; in 1999, UN AIDS Director Peter Piot 
employed his securitizing rhetoric in an attem pt to provoke action from the 
government, telling a press conference in Bangkok that, "we need to concentrate our 
efforts on Burma, convince the government this is a matter not only involving the 
people but of national security" ("Burma Rejects UN Fears" 1999).
Following this announcement, the situation changed significantly when the 
Ministry of Health created a strategic plan on HIV/AIDS in 2000. Their reporting 
efforts were hindered by a lack of accurate data on the epidemic and complicated by 
a combination of stigma and lack of healthcare infrastructure that underm ined the 
quality of epidemic surveillance (Swe, 2012), but their action did attract the attention 
of the US. Despite trade sanctions; in 2002 a team from the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention travelled to Yangon in order to assess the potential for a 
collaborative intervention involving CSOs and the Ministry of Health, but the 
endeavour was halted by the US Administration for political reasons (Cohen, 2003, 
p .1654).
212
This would not be the only time that the anti-democratic rule of the SLORC 
would prevent international investment on HIV/AIDS; in 2004, the Global Fund 
entered Myanmar in order to address growing HIV prevalence and the concordant 
epidemic of TB. The Global Fund had allocated 98.4 million USD to be utilised 
during a five year programme of involvement, but left after disbursing only 11.8 
million USD (Swe, 2012; Parry, 2005). Ratana Metta reported that the withdrawal 
was due in part to the inoperable environment in the country which left the Global 
Fund unable to implement, monitor, or evaluate the programmes in which it 
invested (Swe, 2012). Following the departure of the Global Fund, the Three 
Diseases Fund (3DF) was established by a consortium of international donors 
(Denmark, Australia, the European Commission, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
and the UK) to coordinate and implement funding into the country from 2006, 
where it remained until 2012 providing ARVs, harm reduction services (including 
needle and syringe distribution), condom distribution, and coordination of 
international aid. Between 2005 and 2006, UNAIDS estimated a country-wide HIV 
prevalence of 600,000 people (Parry, 2005). As surveillance and access to medicine 
improved, this figure dropped to the current UN estimation of approximately 
216,000 PLWHA (NAP, 2012, p.8). Despite these figures, in 2005 and 2006 the 
military led government remained reluctant to recognise the significance of the 
epidemic or to award particular priority to any particular health issue (Lancelot, 
2013).
It is unlikely that the government was convinced by the securitizing rhetoric 
of Piot in 1999 or by the UNSC Meeting 4087 in 2000 to consider HIV/AIDS as a 
threat to national security. From the 1990s onward, the state was increasingly 
cooperating with foreign and domestic NGOs to provide essential healthcare 
services, including in HIV/AIDS management (James, 2005, pp.62-65); the apolitical 
status of health is evidenced in the state's toleration of health related civil society 
activity and in their cooperation with domestic and foreign groups providing 
HIV/AIDS services in the country, many of whom were interviewed for this 
research. Whilst the securitizing rhetoric may have been ignored or rejected, due to 
the persistence of the Ministry of Health and CSOS and continued investment by
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INGOs, the national response did begin to take shape. In 2006, the first National 
Strategic Plan on HIV and AIDS was enacted with the support of UNAIDS and 
there are now ongoing intervention programmes targeting PWIDs, sex workers, and 
MSM that combine government and non-government agencies (NAP, 2012, pp. 18- 
21).
In 2008, the M yanmar Country Coordinating Mechanism was established in 
order to allow Myanmar to qualify for Round 9 Global Fund support (NAP, 2012, 
p.4). The MCCM is multi-sectoral and hosts both state and non-state actors; from the 
MCCM, UNAIDS Country Coordinator Eamonn Murphey, Birke Herzbruch from 
Malteser International, U Myint Swe from RMO, and Dr Sid Naing from Marie 
Stopes were interviewed for this research. Reporting on the epidemic in 2012, U 
Myint Swe (2012), President of the RMO, reflects that the country is, "far ... left 
behind" the achievement of the UN coordinated Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), which include halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS and 
achieving universal access to treatment by 2015. UN AIDS notes that the MDG goals 
to cut new infections by 50%, and to achieve universal (>80%) access to ARVs, can 
only be achieved through "extraordinary commitment and efforts" by all 
stakeholders (NAP, 2012, p .15). Whilst attainment of the MDGs by 2015 is unlikely, 
with the "opening up" of M yanmar since 2010-11, the national response to 
HIV/AIDS in Myanmar has shifted gear and political reforms have to some extent 
"forced" the new quasi-civilian government to acknowledge the issue (Seng Raw,
2012). Increasing the mom entum of the response, leading democratic politician and 
national figurehead, Aung San Su Kyi, has championed the rights of PLWHA and 
spoken out against the stigma attached to the disease; in 2012, UNAIDS appointed 
her a 'Global Advocate for Zero Discrimination' (UNAIDS, 2012b, p.3). A num ber of 
newly elected MPs have campaigned on HIV/AIDS alongside Aung San Suu Kyi, 
including Phu Phu Thin, an NLD youth group leader who runs a hospice and 
shelter for PLWHA in Yangon. A recent increase in the national health budget from 
the Ministry of Health allocated the equivalent of one million USD for ARV 
treatment, reflecting a growing recognition of the severity of the epidemic in both
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elite and general populations as well as a growing commitment of state funds 
(Htung, 2013).
8.3. Civil Society
The national response to HIV/AIDS in Myanmar has been led by civil society 
organisations and international non-governmental organisations. In accordance 
with international norms and the principles of stigma reduction that are outlined in 
Chapter 4, CSOs don 't use fear or fear appeals in their HIV/AIDS interventions. In 
both M yanmar and Thailand, CSOs came to the forefront of the epidemic response 
because they were able to deliver essential rights-based services and support for 
PLWHA that the state did not provide. In Thailand, CSO mobilisation was driven in 
part by a fear that state-led responses would undermine civil liberties and hum an 
rights, through policies exemplified by the proposed AIDS Bill of the 1990s, and by 
the need to provide services and support for PLHWA that would not otherwise 
exist. They were facilitated by the formal inclusion of CSOs in state-led responses 
that began under Prime Minister Anand (see Chapter 7). In Myanmar, CSOs were 
driven primarily by the desire to provide a front line response to HIV/AIDS, 
including medical services, that was neglected almost entirely by the state. Since the 
military coup of 1962, government investment in the health system had essentially 
ceased to exist, according to one senior INGO staff member (Source 31, 2013). It is 
extremely difficult to access reliable data on both government and NGO spending in 
Myanmar, but MSF (de Groote, 2013) estimates that 0.5 USD per person per year 
was spent on healthcare by the state in 2008, with international aid amounting to 5 
USD per person per year compared to 50-70 USD in Cambodia or Laos. In the past 
decade, this funding has started to marginally increase but still, according to the 
INGO representative, it "is not enough" (Source 31, 2013). In this section, an 
overview of the political and cultural context of M yanmar is outlined in order to 
explain how CSOs and INGOs came to the forefront of the national HIV/AIDS 
response, and to demonstrate how the traditional security agenda of the military-led 
state allowed the rise to prominence by health related CSOs.
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As a result of systematic and prolonged chronic underinvestm ent by the 
state, Myanmar lacks both the personnel and the physical resources needed to 
sustain a good standard of health care or HIV/AIDS response. Put bluntly by one 
participant, "primary healthcare is not good" (de Groote, 2013). The Hospital 
Initiative, a recent program coordinated by HIV/AIDS INGOs and CSOs in country, 
found that of the 200 available staff positions in one major hospital, only 80 were 
filled (Source 31, 2013). The director of another leading NGO reported that in one 
township in which they operated, the entire population (approximately 40,000) was 
served by just 1 medical officer and 2 to 3 nurses (Source 14, 2012). Where staff are 
employed in government run hospitals, they typically provide services on-site only, 
making access impossible for those unable to reach the facility. Children are also 
unable to access child-specific treatment and in the entire country only two INGOs 
can provide medication suitable for infants (Aung, 2012). In the 1990s, the National 
AIDS Programme reported that only 65% of blood used in transfusions was 
screened for HIV; outside Yangon this is likely to be much lower, particularly 
among armed insurgents who have no access to such facilities but for whom battle­
field blood transfusions are used frequently during conflict (Beyrer, 1998, p.46).
A shortage of personnel and medical facilities has both direct and indirect 
consequences. For example, the lack of ARV medication is the source of serious 
social problems and where treatment is available, it is usually concentrated in urban 
areas; this shortfall in distribution has created a new type of internal m igrant as 
HIV+ people relocate to towns and cities in the hope of receiving medication (Swe,
2012). Interviews were conducted at an RMO healthcare clinic in a township of 
Yangon that is severely affected by the epidemic; here, U Myint Swe and doctors 
working with patients reported the social effects of this disparity in treatment 
provision. These include "psychological trauma" and the likelihood of "more risky 
behaviour" among affected individuals, leading people to "destroy themselves or 
their community" (Swe, 2012; Aung, 2012). The physical and psychological 
consequences of untreated HIV infection are outlined in Chapter 4 and in Yangon, 
RMO staff observed a link between lack of ARV access and increased alcoholism 
amongst PLWHA, leading to crises within families and communities (Swe, 2012). U
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M yint Swe (2012) also reports that he has raised concerns with government officials 
that, w ithout access to ARVs, the resulting mortality amongst technical 
professionals could have negative consequences at the country level.
In the place of adequate professional health services, alternative and 
substandard forms of medicine have flourished and, partly as a result, there is a 
widespread distrust of healthcare systems that frequently fail to deliver appropriate 
treatment. Between 70% and 95% of healthcare in Myanmar is funded "out of 
pocket" by individuals (de Groote, 2013), but often "patients go to quacks" who are 
not qualified or able to provide proper treatment (Murphey, 2013). Quality of 
healthcare in the private sector is extremely variable but frequently extremely poor. 
H erzbruch (2013), of Malteser International, reported that many practitioners are 
not certified and in some cases do not disclose test results to HIV + patients, giving 
them only a limited supply of ARV treatment in order to provide an immediate but 
unsustainable alleviation of symptoms. This approach is extremely dangerous for 
both the patient and for the wider population because it accelerates the mutation of 
drug-resistant strains of HIV. The reason for such negligence, Herzbruch (2013) 
explains, is that unqualified medical practitioners often do not know about drug 
adherence, counselling, and follow up protocol for HIV patients, nor do they have 
access to up-to-date information on the disease. To compound these difficulties, 
there is a cultural expectation that certain forms of treatment should be delivered by 
medical professionals. UNAIDS Country Coordinator Eamonn M urphey (2013), 
explained that "patients expect needles and multi-coloured pills, so this is w hat the 
doctors provide". The Head of Mission for MSF in Myanmar, Peter Paul de Groote 
(2013), also reported a popular belief that "white pills can never be good". 
Furthermore, there is "a cultural respect for needles" that makes medication or 
treatment with needle and syringe more appealing to the healthcare consumer (de 
Groote, 2013; Murphey, 2013). Linter (2012) reported that there is a "mysticism" 
surrounding needle use; this encourages people to share limited supplies of needles 
for injecting medicines and narcotics and also reflects the poor levels of general 
education about healthcare. One INGO currently funds a local private sector 
General Practitioner to educate his patients about the fallacy of the "multi-coloured
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pill" myths, showing patients instead that alternative treatments may be 
appropriate, that needles are not always "better", and that doctors should be 
expected to examine and question patients about symptoms before prescribing 
treatm ent (Source 31, 2013).
In addition to a loss of confidence in inadequate healthcare providers, 
stigmatisation of patients and violations of patient confidentiality are major barriers 
to effective HIV/AIDS responses that accompany low-capacity services (UNAIDS, 
2007a). Confidentiality is not assured in state-run or even private sector facilities in 
M yanmar (Source 14, 2012) and, as discussed in Chapter 5, w ithout access to 
treatm ent HIV testing is an ethically problematic issue. As Swe (2012) reported, 
"most people with HIV/AIDS don't want to go to government hospital because 
there is no treatment and they don 't want to have their status disclosed". Fearing 
that their HIV+ status will be disclosed at government hospitals, "those with money 
get ARVs from the private sector", but "even those ARVS are of dubious quality" 
(de Groote, 2013). Some CSOs and INGOs that provide medical services are able to 
"build trust" among PLWHA by ensuring their own services are confidential and 
that HIV+ people are treated with respect (Swe, 2012), but are not able to extend 
their services to all who need them.
State-run facilities are perceived to offer inefficacious and sometimes 
harmful services, but there are further barriers that prevent people from accessing 
government hospitals; although they cannot legally refuse admission to suspected 
HIV patients (Naing, 2013), government hospitals do restrict access based on a 
num ber of stigma-related factors, including religion. One INGO reported that they 
were "unable" to refer Muslims to state hospitals because they w ould be 
"threatened" for doing so and that the patients would not be treated if they did 
(Source 48, 2013).18
While a lack of adequate healthcare services is a direct barrier to HIV/AIDS 
prevention and management, lack of information and awareness about the disease
18 In February 2014, MSF, which provides a significant cohort of the available ARV 
medication in Myanmar, was temporarily banned from operating within the country after 
reporting evidence of a massacre of Rohingya people, a Muslim ethnic minority group, in 
Rakhine State. The nationwide ban on MSF has been lifted but remains in force in Rakhine, 
illustrating the sensitivity of the government to religious issues, even post political reform.
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can also exacerbate stigma. Misinformation and stigma attached to the virus and to 
KAPs was reported even among elite populations; Herzbrusch (2013) noted that the 
Ministry of Health made statements denying the existence of men who have sex 
with men in the country. Due to the nature of the epidemic in Myanmar, which is 
concentrated within key affected populations (NAP, 2012, pp.18-21), it is reasonable 
to expect that awareness amongst the general population is variable, particularly 
because the limited resources available for intervention and education programmes 
are focused on key affected populations and high risk groups (Htung, 2013). In 
addition, unlike Thailand, Myanmar employed no significant public health 
campaign in the early stages of the epidemic. Based on data collected from 
interviews, it was difficult to reach a conclusive outcome regarding general 
awareness on HIV/AIDS; as one respondent observed, participants for this research 
were selected on the basis of their experience in the health and HIV sector and 
therefore their personal estimation about general awareness may be biased (Uhrig,
2013).
One area in which data was consistent was the subject of sexual health 
discourse among youth, which appears to be 'opening up' as a result of 
technological and cultural reforms. Traditional cultural and social norms mean that 
most people "cannot talk openly about sex and related issues" (Rahman, 2013), but 
Daw Seng Raw (2012), founder and former Executive Director of the Burmese Metta 
Development Foundation, offered an optimistic insight, noting her surprise at the 
new candidness she witnessed amongst young people who were using traditionally 
conservative religious meetings to informally discuss matters about sex and 
sexuality. She stated, "I never thought Burmese young people would be so open ... 
[it is] not a subject to be discussed in Church, bu t in the young people's Christian 
meetings afterwards it is okay" (Seng Raw, 2012). Jamie Uhrig (2013), a prominent 
HIV/AIDS activist and CSO representative, observed similarities between the 
"opening up" of M yanmar and that of Vietnam; in both countries political reform 
and the advent of telecommunications and internet technology have facilitated 
discourse on sex and sexuality that includes conversation about sexual health. Uhrig 
coordinates an online information service to provide professional health
219
information to Burmese people via an English and Burmese language blog that 
focuses on HIV/AIDS. The "conversation" about sex and sexuality, he says, is 
"needs based":
[we] were starting to get a lot of questions on sex and sexuality so they got 
people to answer those questions on sex and sexuality and you could see 
them on the blog entries ... So they've started to do that informal service, to 
the community at large ... They started that as a community service. There's 
no other place ... you can learn from pom, I suppose. But it's not like sex or 
sexuality is taught in school. (Uhrig, 2013)
In lieu of formal education or alternative providers of information, this type of 
anonymous, internet-based service can be the only source of sex education for some 
people. He points out:
There no sex education. It's not like there's books they can read. Not English 
books they can read. English language books are prohibitively expensive. 
And very limited choice. So the internet is it. That's how young people can 
learn. So we as health professionals have a responsibility to make sure there 
is quality information there about sex and sexuality. (Uhrig, 2013)
As a result of the inadequate state healthcare infrastructure, CSOs and international 
donors have become the dominant influence in defining the HIV/AIDS response in 
Myanmar, where they have mobilised to "fill the gap" in HIV/AIDS programing 
(Seng Raw, 2012). An estimated 75% of all HIV/AIDS services in Myanmar are 
provided by INGOs and CSOs, and almost all ARV treatment in the country is 
financed by the Global Fund (Htung, 2013). By filling a gap in service provision, 
CSOs are establishing themselves as the authoritative voice in the HIV/AIDS 
response and are using this position to educate according to the principles of fear- 
reduction, stigma reduction, and normalisation. These CSOs do not use fear appeals 
in their HIV/AIDS campaigns (Seng Raw, 2012) because, as in Thailand, they are 
often comprised of PLWHA who have mobilised as support or rights-based groups 
(Murphey, 2013; Swift, 2013). Similarly, international donors and INGOs are guided 
by the GIPA policies and "best practice" guidelines of the UN and other 
international norm setters, which advocate rights-based em powerment strategies 
and responses that reduce unproductive fear in order to combat HIV-related stigma. 
The international donors are the most significant influential actors in determining
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the national HIV/AIDS response; even government funded national programs are 
sub-recipients of the Global Fund (Htung, 2013).
8.4. State and Security in Myanmar
CSOs and international actors did not advocate the use of fear appeals in 
HIV/AIDS responses in M yanmar for practical and ethical reasons, but the state and 
its official institutions also refrained from fear-based education or interventions to 
deal with the epidemic. Unlike CSOs, the state rejected fear appeals and securitizing 
rhetoric not because they sought to reduce stigmatization or enhance rights of 
PLWHA, but because they did not consider HIV/AIDS to be a matter of security, or 
of 'high-polilics'. Since seizing power in a coup d-etat in 1962, the security concerns 
of the military (the Tatmadaw) in M yanmar have historically been restricted to 
traditional, statist referents rather than non-traditional issues such as HIV/AIDS. In 
their security agenda, the regime has followed a pattern typical to post-colonial 
states in the developing world in which "the twin poles of sovereignty" were 
national security and national unity (James, 2005, p.19). M yanmar won 
independence from British colonialism in 1948 amid calls for separatism; ethnic 
minorities in the borderlands campaigned both politically and militarily to be 
granted autonomous control over their traditional lands (see Steinberg, 2010). The 
Tatmadaw is majority Burman ethnicity (Beyrer, 1998, p.37) but the revered General 
Aung San (father of Aung San Suu Kyi) was able to negotiate with minority ethnic 
leaders to secure a trial period of unified independence in the post-colonial state. 
However, following the assassination of Aung San, this unity collapsed and conflict 
between ethnic groups has remained a defining feature of national politics. After 
independence, democratic rule under Prime Minister U Nu was m arred by 
factionalism and ongoing separatist campaigns, leading to his effective ouster by 
General Ne Win in 1958 and in 1962.19 In the latter coup, the military cited its
19 The civilian government lasted from independence in 1948 to 1962, with a period of 
military rule from 1958-1960. On the eve of democratic elections in 1958, a group of military 
leaders under Defence Minister Gen. Ne Win told Prime Minister U Nu that a military coup 
was necessary in order to avoid fragmenting the union and dissolution into civil war; "faced 
with an illegal coup", U Nu was left with little choice other than to invite the military to
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intention as securing the state against the separatist movement in order to legitimate 
its ousting of the democratically elected leader. Thus, from the birth of post-colonial 
Myanmar, the state has been the primary referent object for security in the country, 
with the Tatmadaw, or military, as its self-proclaimed protector or "guardian" 
(Maung Than, 1998, pp. 390, 394).
In 1988, the military suppressed popular democratic protest now known as 
the '8888 Uprising'. The political power of the Tatmadaw was solidified with the 
establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council, under which violent 
oppression of opposition parties and activists continued. Internal opposition to the 
SLORC included groups advocating advancement toward democracy and ethnic 
militia still engaged in violent conflict for separatism and survival. Reflecting the 
internal threats to its regime, the Tatmadaw's conception of security remained 
"overwhelmingly domestic, focused primarily on survival of the regime, national 
unity, and law and order" (Maung Than, 1998, p.390); the slogan of the government, 
recorded by Maung Than in 1998, reads:
O ur Three Main National Causes: non-disintegration of the Union; non­
disintegration of national solidarity; perpetuation of sovereignty. We reject 
any scheme to break up the Tatmadaw. No matter who tries to divide us, we 
will always remain united. Anyone who tries to break up the Tatmadaw is 
our enemy, (p.390)
M aung Than refers to security in Myanmar as "the preserve of a small elite", 
reflecting the system of governance in which power is held by a small num ber of 
individuals occupying the official position of authority (Muang Than, 1998, p.391; 
Steinberg, 2010, p.150). This system of power holding is based on the traditional 
Buddhist understanding of power that radiates from the celestial centre, and that is 
finite and thus reduced by delegation or power-sharing (Steinberg, 2010, p.150). In 
its contemporary form, this system of elite governance means that:
assume control of the country, which they held for 18months until U Nu won leadership 
again by election (Steinberg, 2010, p.55). U Nu remained Prime Minister until a second 
military coup led by Gen. Ne Win in 1962, following which Ne Win's socialist party retained 
power until the 1988 "coup of consent" which constituted a military transfer of power 
(Steinberg, 2010, p.81).
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The discourse on security has been monopolized by the defense 
establishment. Intellectual analysis, media coverage, and public debate of 
security issues are virtually absent. All along, the polity has accepted its own 
exclusion as well as the inexorable logic of state security, which has 
subsum ed societal interests. (Muang Than, 1998, p.391).
This has translated into a political system in which people who are not employed in 
official positions of authority are trivialised, exacerbating fear and the erosion of 
civil liberties (Aung San Suu Kyi, 2010). From the perspective of the Tatmadaw, the 
prim ary threats facing the state of M yanmar were those to the survival of the regime 
itself, which it viewed as inextricably linked to the state, and of the nation in its 
unified form. However, there is evidence of a shift in policy since the late 1990s. 
M yanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 whilst actively seeking reintegration with the 
international market and World Bank; in order to further these goals, the military 
rulers adopted the rhetoric of "holistic security" that included "health for all" and 
that considered poverty alleviation as an im portant part of economic development 
(James, 2005, p.57).
In recent years, with an eye on its neighbouring countries of Southeast Asia 
M yanmar has adopted the view that state security and economic security are 
mutually constitutive (James, 2004, p.532). Since gaining full membership to ASEAN 
in 1997, M yanmar has outw ardly expressed its intention to open its national 
economy and to achieve full market status in order to facilitate integration and trade 
with the global community; an integral part of this economic development is a shift 
toward democracy and pluralistic governance (James, 2004, p.531). This democratic 
and economic reform has come to fruition most markedly since the election of 
opposition NLD party representatives to parliament in 2011 and with the recent 
relaxation of sanctions from the West that previously restricted foreign investment 
from this quarter. However, international aid agencies have raised concerns that this 
new wave of foreign investment is contributing to the militarisation of conflict- 
affected areas, environmental degradation, and a resurgence in "land grabs" by 
state-supported foreign business in the industry of resource extraction (Buchanan, 
Kramer & Woods, 2013). If true, these reports would support James' (2004) 
proposition that M yanmar's shifting national security strategy is founded on a
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concept of security as a means of economic success rather than humanitarian 
concern.
In addition to its impact on health and hum an security, HIV/AIDS is also 
linked to threats that reflect a more traditionalist security framework, including the 
production of opium that has been regarded as a security concern by the Tatmadaw 
since its rise to power. This is not a reflection of hum an or societal security concerns 
related to the economic or health impact of injecting drug use, rather, it reflects the 
relationship between narcotic production, trafficking, and the financing of ethnic 
militias in the contested border territories; for decades, opium production has been 
used to fund armed resistance groups in Myanmar, in a practice analogous to that of 
the poppy production of the Afghan Mujahideen (Beyrer, 1998, p.40-41). In 2000, an 
estimated 90% of Southeast Asian heroin production took place in M yanmar (Beyrer 
et al., 2000, p.77), although there is evidence that narcotic production has shifted 
now to amphetamines, which are more popular in neighbouring Thailand and 
easier to manufacture covertly (Linter, 2012). Production of these drugs is linked to 
a number of internationally known individuals, many of whom have direct links to 
ethnic militia groups and control significant regions of the upland country (Levy & 
Scot-Clark, 2002). Prior to its political reforms, it had been claimed that M yanmar 
was a "narco-state" in which the SPDC administration profited directly from opiate 
production (Steinberg, 2010, p.103). Although this claim is contested, the 
administration did acknowledge that "drug lords" routinely invest significant 
amounts in the formal economy, in a practice that the USA refers to as "money 
laundering" but in areas that the SPDC called "development projects" (Steinberg, 
2010, pp. 103-4).
There is also evidence to suggest that the Tatmadaw has profited from direct 
involvement in the distribution of heroin within the country. In their investigative 
report on mining in the northern region of Hpakant, Levy & Scott-Clark (2002) 
found that key figures in the military were responsible for systematically providing 
heroin to workers in government mines, sometimes in lieu of monetary wages, with 
devastating results on the health of these populations. Endemic heroin use within 
M yanmar existed prior to the first cases of HIV/AIDS, which were diagnosed within
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PWIDs in Yangon (Beyrer, 1998, p.40). In 1988, the street name for heroin in 
M yanmar was "freedom from fear"; this was also the slogan of the democracy 
m ovement and the title used for a book of Aung San Suu Kyi's essays published in 
1991, when the NLD leader was under house arrest in Yangon (Beyrer, 1998, p.45). 
Studying a state approved scientific abstract from 1996, Beyrer (1998) observes that:
A deluge of cheap and widely available heroin flooded Burma after SLORC 
took control in 1988, and they have confirmed this ... Is the SLORC directly 
involved in heroin availability? If not, they have managed to control every 
aspect of life in the country, every sector of the economy, save the most 
profitable one. (p.45)
Heroin does not infect users with HIV, but sharing contaminated needles to inject 
the drug does. Myanmar continues to enforce the 1914 Needle and Syringe 
Possession Law that makes possession of either a criminal offence. Punitive 
measures such as this exacerbate the risk of HIV infection among PWIDs by 
encouraging needle-sharing and restricting access to harm-reduction services. In 
areas with high rates of injecting drug use, the widespread availability of heroin 
combined with a limited supply of clean needles increases the chance of exposure to 
HIV/AIDS. Prevalence among PWIDs is known to be very high: in 1995, HIV 
prevalence in PWIDs in Yangon was 74%, in M andalay 84%, and in Myitkyina (a 
city nearer to H pakant and other mining regions), 91% (Beyrer et al., 2000, p .77). In 
1997, 61% of PWIDs interviewed in a detoxification centre in Myktyina reported 
needle-sharing, although only 14% reported that they used the most high-risk 
method of 'blow pipe' injection, whereby heroin is blown into the vein by another 
person using a rubber pipe and a shared needle device (Morineau, 2000). A shortage 
in needle availability is exacerbated by the diversion of limited medical supplies to 
military services and has led to "a uniquely Burmese heroin culture" that revolves 
around the sharing of needles to inject heroin as a public commercial enterprise, 
sometimes in teahouses or in "shooting galleries" ("Burma's Secret Plague", 1997; 
Beyrer, 1998; p.45; Levy & Scott-Clark, 2002, pp.347-349).
Despite reforms and easing restrictions on travel in the country, it will be 
difficult for international observers to formally monitor the scale of the epidemic 
until all regions are fully accessible. Currently, travel between states is subject to
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government restrictions and some areas are closed to foreign visitors. There is an 
expectation among experts that once the politically sensitive regions, or "black 
holes", are opened up by the state (de Groote, 2013), they may reveal large numbers 
of previously undetected HIV+ drug users (Linter, 2012; Renard, 2012; Lancelot,
2013). Previously, reporting from these regions was impossible and sometimes 
dangerous; one French NGO faced expulsion from the country after publishing a 
report that linked HIV and injecting drug use to mining (Naing, 2013). Despite 
reports of an extremely severe epidemic associated with mining towns in the North 
(Beyrer, 1998, p.52; Renard, 2012; Linter, 2013), the official response of the state has 
been only to close access to these areas and to censor data rather than to im plement 
interventions. INGOs with the capacity to provide HIV/AIDS services are denied 
entry to the mining areas because of political restrictions on their movement 
(Herzbrusch, 2013).
In addition to the political sensitivity of narcotics and associated issues 
(Naing, 2013), civil society organisation has also been framed as a potential threat to 
the state. Prior to 2006, the government feared all civil society organisation or 
mobilisation and particularly that which they perceived as related to movements for 
democracy or other forms of political opposition (Rahman, 2013). The military 
government has been accused of deliberately breaking down collective action of the 
people in order to safeguard its own power and CSOs wishing to remain in 
M yanmar must learn to operate despite distrust by the state (Ware, 2012, p .116). 
Herzbrusch (2013) stated that implementation of health programs by Malteser 
International had been difficult in the past due to government "suspicions" about 
their activities and the regime has guarded against the possibility of INGOs 
collecting information about the state by restricting access to its government 
hospitals. The UNODC (2006) also noted that the government have been "extremely 
suspicious of external agencies conducting research" (p.5), which complicates work 
in areas related to HIV/AIDS and IDU. At CESVI, Panzeri (2013) explained that 
relationships m ust be carefully built with key government officials, because "they 
need to trust that you're not doing political activities" (Panzeri, 2013). The 
complexity and lack of transparency about operational rules and regulations
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contributes to the pervasive fear among local activists and staff, who are aware of 
the military government's traditionally negative perception of civil society groups 
(Panzeri, 2013; Lancelot 2013). In this environm ent of fear, there is a need for 
"personal trust" among CSO staff and between CSOs and government officials 
(Panzeri, 2013). One INGO Country Representative explained that personal 
relationships were integral in the structure of CSOs, including in employment, 
because "open recruitment for vacancies would lead to hiring a government spy" 
(Source 49, 2013).
This environm ent of fear and distrust appears to be easing. By 2006, the 
government had stopped routinely blocking the work of HIV/AIDS CSOs, partly 
due to the advocacy work of the United Nations that secured the right of these 
groups to provide essential health services (Rahman, 2013). The INGO CESVI also 
reported that it now "works together [with] rather than despite" government 
officials (Panzeri, 2013). Together, these developments may reflect an adoption of 
the "holistic security" and "health for all" agenda outlined by James (2005). Political 
reforms have already begun to ease some of the operational restrictions on CSO 
operations; in 2013, the government announced plans to allow registration of 
domestic CSOs that would allow these groups to formally receive international 
investment and funding (Rahman, 2013). An additional reason for the relaxation of 
state restrictions is the growing recognition among government officials that the 
presence of health related INGOs and CSOs is needed in Myanmar because the state 
alone cannot independently provide adequate services. At the Yangon office of PSI, 
Anne Lancelot (2013) explained the enduring operation of her programme as the 
fact that it was "too big to fail" and that it helped "too many people" to be expelled 
from the country. International groups like PSI also bring in a considerable amount 
of funding and, w ithout legal registration of local CSO groups, INGOs were a 
prim ary source of healthcare spending.
8.5. Health as a Neutral Space
The Ministry of Health in M yanmar is a civilian ministry, differentiating it 
from other government institutions (Aung, 2012; Herzbruch 2013). Public health in
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the country appears to have been subsumed by dominant, traditional, security 
concerns that occupied the military-led SPDC and SLORC, leading to sustained 
underinvestm ent in public health and leaving the Ministry "too weak" to provide 
services (Lancelot, 2013). However, whilst this approach led to chronic and 
sustained neglect of healthcare services by the military state, it also allowed the 
Ministry of Health to retain some level of autonomy from the state by maintaining a 
non-politicised stance. This has become a strategy of both the Ministry of Health 
and CSOs operating in Myanmar, who have created in health an ostensibly 
politically neutral space in which they can provide essential health related services 
w ithout attracting unwanted attention from the Tatmadaw. The Ministry has fought 
to retain its position as a civilian institution by distancing itself from politics and 
from politically sensitive issues. The Minister in charge has issued official 
statements declaring that health should not be a political issue and, prior to political 
reforms, the Ministry has been wary of aligning itself too closely with foreign NGOs 
that were viewed with suspicion by the state (Herzbruch, 2013).
The Tatmadaw has traditionally been suspicious of external agencies 
operating within Myanmar, but "so many" INGOs have been working on 
HIV/AIDS and other health issues that were previously "ignored or denied", that 
the Ministry has been prom pted to cooperate with these groups (Herzbruch, 2013). 
Although it might be a concern that INGOs are operating without supervision, it 
was reported by interviewees that the Ministry, which is staffed mainly by medical 
professionals, is motivated largely by humanitarian principles and is aware that 
collaboration with INGOs and CSOs can be advantageous to its own service 
provision (Aung, 2012; Lancelot, 2013). As was also evident in Thailand, the INGOs 
and domestic civil society groups of Myanmar mobilised on the issue of HIV/AIDS 
to "fill a gap" in healthcare and services for PLWHA that the state did not provide. 
The Ministry of Health recognised the im portant role played by these non­
governmental groups, and despite initial concern, has now come to rely on these 
agencies as a "stop gap" until its own capacity is strengthened (Swift, 2013). One 
INGO (Swe, 2012) stated that political desire to meet the UN Millennium 
Development Goals might also motivate the Ministry of Health's cooperation with
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INGOs working on improving child and maternal health (Goals 4 and 5), and 
reducing HIV/AIDS and other diseases (Goal 6) (United Nations, 2012).
INGOs and CSOs in Myanmar also found that depoliticisation of health was 
an effective, if not essential, strategy for their operations. Lancelot (2013) explained 
that, “hidden behind health you could do a lot". PSI's Targeted Outreach 
Programme team wanted to deliver advocacy services to sex workers and men who 
have sex with men, and Lancelot (2013) reports that in order to do so, it framed the 
projects in terms of health rights for sex workers, when in reality they were about 
employment rights. This approach was also reported by the TACBD that works 
with (Burmese) labouring migrants in Thailand; Director Myint Wai (2013) reported 
that Thai employers would not let labour union representatives meet with their 
migrant employees but were likely to comply with requests from CSOs who wanted 
to discuss health and HIV/AIDS prevention. In practice, HIV/AIDS groups would 
collaborate with legal aid and labour unions in order to help them gain access to 
migrant workers, enabling them to deliver rights-advocacy services under the guise 
of politically-neutral health education (Wai, 2013). This was corroborated by Premjai 
Vungsiriphisal (2013) from the Chulalongkom Migration Research Centre, who 
confirmed that HIV is used as a "facade" to discuss labour rights with migrants 
from M yanmar working in Thailand.
8.6. The Future in Myanmar
The Ministry of Health in Myanmar now has "four times the budget" of the 
pre-reform era, although Herzbruch (2013) and M urphey (2013) both noted that 
previous investment was so low that it does not require much to make a substantial 
improvement. However, this investment does indicate a prioritisation of HIV/AIDS 
not only for the health sector but also on the political agenda of the state (Htung,
2013). H tung (2013) reported that since the reforms of 2011, there has been an 
increase in HIV/AIDS awareness at different levels of government, including among 
complementary stakeholders such as police and immigration officials. Whereas a 
previous lack of information held back multisectoral mobilisation, growing 
awareness amongst these groups has changed the national response "quite
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substantially" (Htung, 2013). HIV/AIDS now features in the rhetoric of prominent 
(opposition) political leaders; in 2012, Daw Aung Sang Suu Kyi was appointed by 
UNAIDS to represent its work, and national MP Phu Phu Thin has used her 
HIV/AIDS activism as a platform for election campaigns. This emerging 
politicisation of HIV/AIDS, coupled with democratic reform, may prove conducive 
for the creation of state-led efficacious policy responses in the future.
Civil society groups have "survived" extremely difficult working conditions 
in M yanmar by declaring to the military state that "we are not here to do policy 
change" (Panzeri, 2013). Panzeri (2013) reported that during the 1990s and 2000s the 
government perceived health-related INGOs and domestic CSOS as a "risk" to their 
power and that there was little trust between the state and these groups, resulting in 
an "especially high risk for local [CSO] staff". Now, the way in which INGOs and 
CSOs operate is changing. Foreign donors, that have always been present but that 
have operated "under the radar" through informal influence, are now able to 
formalise their operations (Campbell, 2013) and Myanmar is attracting more INGOs. 
Although there has been "a lot of support for NGOs for years" (Campbell, 2013), in 
the post-reform environment there is the opportunity for these groups to work 
openly in policy advocacy, to build the capacity of local CSOs, and to increase levels 
and types of funding now that sanctions restricting investment have been lifted 
(Campbell, 2013).
A num ber of INGO Country Representatives interviewed in Yangon noted 
that the capacity of domestic CSOs to cope with the inevitable increase in donors, 
investment, and hum anitarian assistance to the country could be problematic 
(Lancelot, 2013; Htung, 2013; de Groote, 2013). Whilst the ground-level civil society 
groups and community agencies that shaped the HIV/AIDS response might have 
been well-placed to deliver health services to marginalised KAPs, they lack the 
capacity that a state-supported institution would have; decades of oppressive 
authoritarian rule have led to the systematic erosion of personal agency and 
organisational capacity. Lancelot (2013) refers to this as "fear and silence" that has 
"left enormous scars" and that has created an institutional culture in which capacity 
for "risk taking" or decision making is non-existent. H tung (2013) noted that fear
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was a major problem affecting staff capacity, "especially when it comes to decision 
making", and Peter Paul de Groote (2013) reported that "people are still scared to 
act differently". Although CSOs are increasingly prominent in INGO-led 
collaborations with state-health services, there is a significant need to increase their 
agency. At UNAIDS, M urphey (2013) reported that local CSOs might have a lot of 
"informal" influence but at Committee meetings they are "often quiet" and remain 
"passive", instead using these collaborations as opportunities to network "on the 
side". The internalised culture of hierarchal power distribution may remain a 
barrier to effective CSO participation with state authorities until capacity in these 
CSOs is improved (Murphey, 2013). This will prove problematic in the forthcoming 
decentralisation of power that will follow political reforms and the politically 
'neutral' space that once allowed CSOs and INGOs to work on HIV/AIDS under the 
authoritarian regime may now hinder their effective engagement with policymakers 
and high-level political discourse in a more inclusive democratic era.
8.7. Conclusion
In conclusion, the national response to HIV/AIDS in M yanmar has three 
defining characteristics. First, that the state has neglected and quite possibly 
exacerbated the epidemic. This has occurred indirectly through the systematic 
corrosion of the healthcare and educational infrastructure of the country, as well as 
the disem powerm ent of civilians and the failed economic policies that drove so 
much of the population into poverty. The active interventions of the state to restrict 
civil society organisation and the operation of INGOs have also acted as barriers to 
the implementation of effective responses. These are exacerbated by the restriction 
of access to politically sensitive geographical areas and the economic sanctions 
imposed by the West that curtailed formal investment in health and development 
programmes. The national security paradigm  in M yanmar has, since independence, 
been one of traditional, statist security which preserves the unity of that state with a 
small elite and the Tatmadaw at its centre. As a result of the oppressive and 
neglectful leadership of the Tatmadaw, HIV/AIDS is a serious problem in the 
country. W ithout access to comprehensive data from all areas, it will remain
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difficult to fully assess the status of the current epidemic but the evidence outlined 
above portrays a worrying indication of what soon might be revealed. The second 
defining characteristic of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Myanmar is that it is severe; 
many people have already lost their lives to a virus about which they have no 
knowledge and many more remain infected with no recourse to treatment. Whilst it 
is impossible to assess the extent to which Tatmadaw (elite) populations were 
provided with healthcare and ARV treatment in closed military hospitals, a survey 
of the available data and accounts from leading INGOs and CSOs reveals that the 
civilian population is ill equipped to manage or protect themselves from HIV/AIDS. 
The final distinguishing feature of the epidemic is that, despite the m agnitude of 
these challenges, civil society and INGOs have mobilised to provide essential 
services to hundreds of thousands of PLWHA.
The work of civil society organisations in Myanmar, conducted by both 
foreign and local staff, has defined the current epidemic response. In the absence of 
meaningful investment by the state, CSOs and INGOs have provided practical 
services and support to PLWHA and saved many lives. If the trend of political 
reform toward democratisation continues, it may be possible for more of these 
groups to affect policy change through formal advocacy, in addition to providing 
front line support. CSOs and INGOs have faced myriad barriers to their operation 
and in order to maintain their essential services and continue their presence in 
Myanmar, they have been part of a concerted effort to distinguish health as a 
politically neutral space. This framing has also been part of the rhetoric of the 
Ministry of Health, which fought to retain its unique position as a civilian institution 
within the military state. It is established through this thesis that health, and the 
provision of HIV/AIDS services, is not apolitical. However, for the Tatmadaw in 
Myanmar the distinction between political and military security has been obsolete, 
so it was possible for healthcare providers to operate under the pretext of neutrality. 
Ultimately, because the state did not consider health to be their concern, INGOS and 
CSOs were able to claim this neglected territory as a space in which they could 
operate and assist the people of Myanmar.
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Chapter 9. Conclusion
The prim ary objective of this research has been to determine, through 
empirical study, the extent to which the securitization of HIV/AIDS has taken place 
in Thailand and M yanmar following the seminal UNSC Meeting 4087. In order to 
assess w hether and how securitization had occurred, it was necessary to critically 
engage with the theory and the first part of this thesis examines the conceptual logic 
that underpins the Copenhagen School's analytical framework. A preliminary 
review of the literature establishes the mechanisms of securitization so that the 
process can be identified within the empirical case studies. It was established that 
the ethical dangers of HIV/AIDS securitization outlined by Elbe (2006), and detailed 
in Chapter 1, could act as indicators of securitization and these indicators were 
subsequently developed into lines of inquiry for use in data collection, in which elite 
actors involved in the HIV/AIDS responses in Thailand and M yanmar were 
interviewed to assess the extent to which securitization had occurred. After 
assessment of the data, this thesis draws two major conclusions about securitization 
theory from the cases studied: the first is that securitization is about the construction 
of the existential threat, which requires the invocation of fear among an audience 
and the utilisation of suasive fear appeals. The conceptual and empirical chapters 
show that fear, and therefore securitization, are particularly problematic when 
applied to HIV/AIDS. By identifying fear as the essential but under-studied 
component of securitization processes, and by applying this new indicator of 
securitization to empirical studies, the thesis reveals that securitizing rhetoric has 
been proposed and opposed in the case study countries. This leads to the second 
conclusion of the thesis: that securitizing HIV/AIDS is not the preferable framework 
by which to deal with the epidemic.
This final chapter begins w ith an assessment of w hat can be learned about 
securitization theory in light of these studies and moves on to a summation of key 
findings from the case study chapters. The tensions between hum an rights and 
security frameworks are then explored in the context of the data, which delivered 
in-depth insight into the formulation and operation of civil society responses to
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HIV/AIDS. Finally, using reflections from these case studies, this chapter outlines 
evidence in support of using fear with caution when dealing with HIV/AIDS and 
elucidates the issues of unproductive and productive fear that were raised in 
Chapter 3 with examples from the empirical data.
9.1. Reflections on Securitization Theory
This research adds to the growing body of literature on securitization and 
contributes much needed empirical study of the applied framework in real-world 
settings, outside the liberal democratic systems from which it originated. 
Securitization, and the threat-defence logic at its conceptual core, offers a formulaic 
tool that can be applied to a wide range of referent objects and potential threats in 
order to frame a necessary response; in theory, anything can become a security issue 
if it is both successfully constructed and understood as being such (Buzan et al., 
1998, p.36). The realist core of the theory, which dem ands that the logic of survival 
and defence remain the defining feature of security, maintains the intellectual 
coherence of a model that was designed to "lay to rest" the argum ent between those 
who favour a narrow interpretation of security and those who dem and a broader 
definition (Buzan et al., 1998, p.195). In many ways the framework does bridge the 
gap between the traditional and newer, broader, meanings of this essentially 
contested concept, but in application to the non-traditional issue of health as 
security, the realist dem and for an existential threat becomes problematic.
In its conceptual chapters, this thesis finds that the construction of existential 
threat comprises the invocation of fear through suasive appeals made by an 
authoritative actor; this fear undermines effective epidemic responses by inclining 
audiences toward traditional dichotomous understandings of risk that centre on 
logics of threat and defence, us vs them, and good vs bad. Fear invocation poses 
significant challenges to the implementation of an ethical and efficacious response 
to HIV/AIDS which dem ands a rights-based approach and which promotes the 
health (in its comprehensive meaning) of all peoples with or w ithout the virus. The 
case study chapters show that the 'dangers' of HIV/AIDS securitization outlined in 
Chapter 1 were recognised and resisted by civil society groups concerned with the
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normalisation of societal attitudes toward PLWHA. The application of securitization 
theory to these case studies provided an im portant departure point for in-depth 
contextual analysis in these studies, which revealed new insight into both the 
country responses and into the conceptual framework.
The Copenhagen School theory of securitization is thus both conceptually 
and empirically useful. In addition to providing a formulaic tool for w idening the 
definition of security, the School also delineates the ways in which security is 
socially constructed using subjective understandings of threat and defence, whereby 
panic politics and suasive fear appeals are utilised. These constructions are value­
laden and context driven although, as detailed in Chapter 2, the original 
formulation of the theory has been criticised for not adequately addressing the 
importance of these external conditions. Normatively, the Copenhagen School warn 
against securitization, which facilitates securitizing actors in breaking free from 
"procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by", and the School 
imbues in actors the responsibility for invoking the existential threat (Buzan et al., 
1998, p.25). The theory also implicitly promotes a hierarchical structure of threat 
prioritisation. As shown in Chapter 2 (section 2.2), this ethos of hierarchy favours 
the invocation of traditional security rhetoric at the risk of marginalising non- 
traditional issues or subsuming them into the framework of state-centric security 
articulated by established powerful elites. The realist core of securitization thus 
extends beyond the centrality of the existential threat to also include the type of 
actor which is favoured; as highlighted by Hansen (2000) and explored in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3, securitizing actors are likely to be authoritative power-holders able 
to speak the language of security and articulate the necessary fear appeals.
Perhaps the primary attraction of securitization, to both speech actors and 
scholars, is that its application offers the opportunity to attract power and resources 
for dealing with a proposed threat; an authoritative speech actor who articulates a 
threat, invokes fear, and proposes a response is well placed to wield the 
extraordinary power that comes from dealing with an issue which, by definition, 
warrants the breaking of normal procedures (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24). In addition to 
political power, securitization also delivers tangible resources, as evidenced by the
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strategic utilisation of securitization by Piot in Chapter 6. However, in the domestic 
responses of Thailand and Myanmar, the logics of securitization and fear appeals 
have been explicitly rejected by civil society groups; echoing Elbe's (2006) concerns 
about the dangers of securitization, these groups feared that securitization and a 
break from normal politics could have detrimental effects on their well-being. With 
this power comes responsibility and the Copenhagen School clearly demonstrate 
that inherent to their model of 'security as socially constructed' is the concept of 
security as choice: the choice of the securitizing actor to create it as being such 
(Buzan et al., 1998, p.29). The subject of choice, coupled with the preference for 
desecuritization, is indicative of the normative values of the Copenhagen School 
(Waever, 2003, p.12).
The School's conceptual logic displays a normative bias toward the liberal 
democratic model of governance and, as discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, is 
arguably constrained by a "Westphalian straitjacket" which affects its application to 
empirical studies outside the West (Wilkinson, 2007, p.10). By adopting Thailand 
and Myanmar as case studies, this thesis offers a useful empirical application of the 
theory outside the Western liberal democratic norm, but it also acknowledges the 
limitations inherent to this approach, particularly those that arise during data 
collection which are discussed in the introductory chapters. The political and 
cultural conditions of each state defined the type of discourse and actor that could 
be studied, but in both case studies the national response to HIV/AIDS have been 
definitively shaped by CSOs to which it was possible to gain access. It should also 
be noted that the candid accounts of HIV/AIDS responses offered by the CSO 
representatives might provide a more reliable assessment of the epidemic than those 
presented by the state, whose officials are more likely to be accountable to superiors 
or have vested interest in promoting a positive image of the governmental response. 
Throughout fieldwork, the identification and extrapolation of culturally specific 
mechanisms that affected data was an ongoing development that both revealed 
limitations and benefits of the empirical study; in particular, examination of these 
conditions adds depth to the qualitative data collected and in this way securitization
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theory performed as a departure point for broader analysis of the contextualising 
conditions, as suggested by Curley and Siu-lun (2008).
The case-study approach is able to address an enduring critique of the 
Copenhagen Securitization framework: the inability of the framework to focus 
adequate analytical attention on contextual conditions that affect securitization 
processes (McDonald, 2008, p.580). This limitation is a result of the narrow approach 
employed by the School, which undervalues the situatedness of the speech act by 
investing too heavily in the conceptualisation of security as a discursive act (Stritzel, 
2007). Suggested correctives to remedy this shortcoming include Balzacq's (2005) 
proposition that securitization is reconceptualised as an audience-centred process 
that is context dependent, as discussed in Chapter 2, but context also becomes more 
central to analysis through the application of the framework to 'real-w orld' studies. 
In his outline of HIV/AIDS securitization norms (HASN) Vieira (2007) illustrates 
that localised conditions are not adequately addressed by the securitization 
framework, which risks missing deeply influential "strategic environmental factors" 
as a result (p.141). This can be addressed through application of the framework to 
real world settings; using securitization as a methodology for empirical study in this 
thesis revealed complex and nuanced social and political conditions in each country, 
which is of value in itself, and also delivered rare insight into the operationalization 
of desecuritization as a strategy.
In his own empirical example, Vieira (2007) uses the regime of former South 
African President Thabo Mbeki who, with the support of his health Minister, 
'M anto' Tshabalala-Msimang, restricted access to life-saving medication in South 
Africa and promoted the theory that HIV and AIDS were unrelated conditions, 
contra to international norms. This rejection of the international HIV/AIDS 
securitization norm  can also be observed in a different form in Thailand and 
Myanmar, where the rhetoric of existential threat and security were rejected, 
although the mobilisation of resources was not (with far better epidemiological 
outcomes than the approach adopted by Mbeki and Manto). The application of the 
Copenhagen School framework to these diverse cases reveals the limitations of an 
approach which focuses "almost exclusively on the subjective practices of
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discourse" at the expense of "structured social and power contexts in which these 
practices take place" (Vieira, 2007, p.141); w ithout treating the framework as a 
"departure point" for a wider analysis, the im portant detail of these studies w ould 
be missed (Curley & Siu-lun, 2008, p.5). At the conclusion of this thesis, it is evident 
that securitization is a complex process and its application to real world settings is 
both challenging and necessary. In addition to exploring the im portant critiques 
above, empirical application has revealed some of the benefits of securitization, as 
well as the manifestation of the 'dangers' and their real-world consequences.
Importantly, this thesis also shows us that application of securitization 
theory to empirical case studies requires the delineation of w hat that securitization 
would look like in practice, which dem ands the development of the Copenhagen 
School model to counter the "too-static" focus on discursive speech acts (Stritzel, 
2007, p.364). The identification of Elbe's (2006) dangers as practical indicators of 
securitization was essential to the fieldwork and without these, the im portant 
nuances and details of securitization-in-action would be lost. The official political 
discourse, policy reports and rhetoric of both UNAIDS and the Thai state suggests 
that the security-HIV link is more salient than it appears on the ground. In reality, 
those leading and delivering the response have rejected the security framework. In 
Myanmar, access to political documents is heavily restricted, official data is often 
misleading (see 8.1), and more reliable data is available from non-governmental 
agencies or international organisations which are at the frontline of HIV/AIDS 
responses; if the application of securitization as a methodology above had restricted 
data collection to the official rhetoric in either country, the true face of the 
HIV/AIDS response would have been lost.
9.2. The Case Studies
Recognising the value of empirical application, the second part of the thesis 
applies securitization to real-world settings, beginning with an account of the 
external and facilitating conditions that affected the process of HIV/AIDS 
securitization at the UNSC. Chapter 5 examines the era of 'AIDS exceptionalism' 
that preceded UN-level securitization, when civil society groups and activists
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mobilised in response to the emerging epidemic in the 1980s and 1990s. These early 
years of the epidemic were marked by fear and panic aroused by a novel, violent, 
and ultimately fatal disease for which no efficacious treatment existed. Fear was 
exacerbated by a lack of information about the virus and uncertainty regarding its 
modes of transmission. In this environment, civilians, PLWHA, and medical 
professionals mobilised to protect the civil liberties of people with, or at risk from, 
HIV/AIDS and began a form of politicised and civil society-led responses that 
w ould come to define the global epidemic.
Epidemiologically, HIV/AIDS displays a number of qualities which facilitate 
this form of civil society response. The most im portant of these is the specific 
vulnerability to HIV/AIDS that is experienced by members of marginalised 
population groups, including MSM, sex workers, PWID, women, people who lack 
access to education, and people living in poverty. As a result, stigma and 
discrimination are inherently linked to the epidemic and have been identified as 
major barriers to ending the epidemic (UNAIDS, 2007a; Parker & Aggleton, 2003, 
p. 13), but this has also served as a catalyst for action. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
MSM communities in North America were among the first to mobilise on HIV/AIDS 
in the 1980s. These groups had previously organised politically as part of the LGBTI 
civil rights movement and were able to respond with the same tactics to HIV/AIDS, 
when it was both the virus and draconian public health responses that they feared. 
This form of activism, which was started among people directly affected by HIV, 
continues with great strength not only due to the mobilisation of existing 
(marginalised) communities, but also because the epidemiology of the disease 
enables this; the second condition of HIV/AIDS which facilitates civil society 
responses is that the virus creates a Tong-wave' epidemic in which infection can be 
asymptomatic for years, allowing people with the virus to undertake the labour of 
activism.
The early politicisation of HIV/AIDS by activists established a niche 
framework known as 'AIDS exceptionalism', a concept with multiple definitions but 
which rests on the logic that HIV/AIDS has unique qualities that dem and an 
extraordinary form of response. This exceptionalism did not take the form of
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traditional public health responses that recommend quarantines and other invasive 
measures by the state (although these have arisen in manifestations of a 
discriminatory approach atypical of the global norm, e.g., in Cuba, detailed in 
Chapter 7). Instead, these responses were explicitly rejected by civil society groups 
comprised largely of PLWHA and AIDS exceptionalism has become synonymous 
with forms of public health response designed to protect the rights of PLWHA, to 
em power patients, and to attract financial and political resources for dealing with 
the disease.
At the UNSC, then-UNAIDS Director Peter Piot evoked this exceptionalism 
in order to mobilise resources to deal with the epidemic at the global level. Just as 
LGBTI groups in North America had mobilised to dem and their communities were 
neither neglected nor persecuted in the response to HIV/AIDS, Piot performed as an 
elite-level authoritative actor to persuade global leaders to address a health issue 
they might otherwise ignore. In both cases, activism was motivated by a concern 
that stigmatisation and marginalisation of people vulnerable to HIV could lead to 
poor management of the response; taking HIV/AIDS to the Security Council was a 
way to counter devastating under-investment from political leaders and policy 
makers who believed themselves to not be at risk from or affected by the virus. Piot 
recognised the 'hook' needed to engage the concerns of his influential audience at 
the Security Council and framed HIV as an international security issue. The 
mechanisms by which Piot achieved this, and the details of his strategic approach, 
are outlined in Chapter 6, which also links seminal Meeting 4087 with the campaign 
led by Piot's peers to curtail international trade agreements and scale up the 
distribution of affordable, essential, antiretroviral treatment (Chapter 6). Framing 
HIV/AIDS as a security threat at the Council did achieve im portant results, not least 
the continued attention of global leaders and subsequent investment of practical 
resources. However, the level to which leaders were genuinely convinced, and the 
accuracy and durability of the HIV-security link, have been extensively questioned 
in the literature outlined above (Chapter 4); the case studies in this thesis further 
add to that critical scholarly voice
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9.3. Human Rights and Security
For HIV/AIDS activists and civil society leaders, the motivation to act is 
founded on the perception that health is at risk from both the HIV virus and from 
the societal stigma associated with it, including stigmatisation of the social 
conditions and behaviours which place people at higher risk of transmission. In the 
speech acts of UNSC Meeting 4087, HIV was proposed as threatening state security, 
economic stability, and development. Although concern for hum an rights was 
manifest in the invocation of "women and girl refugees", victims of war time rape, 
and "teenage girls...subject to the scourge of AIDS" by speakers, this does not 
constitute a call for a rights-based response (UNSC, 2000, p.8, 13). By contrast, civil 
society responses orchestrated by PLWHA do frame HIV as an issue primarily of 
hum an rights. This has become the dominant approach internationally, in part 
because these groups constitute a transnational movement unparalleled in resources 
or scale; the securitizing acts articulated at UNSC 4087 were no serious challenge to 
this civil society led response, which was well established by 2000 and which Piot 
and his peers supported. The dominance and internationalism of civil society is 
evident in the two case study countries: in Thailand, civil society plays a 
determining role in the provision of services and the negotiation of state policy to 
deal with HIV/AIDS and in M yanmar the direct work of Burmese and international 
civil society groups ensures the provision of HIV services, although limited, to the 
civilian population.
In recognition of the essential role of PLWHA in effective responses, the 
principle of GIPA (greater inclusion of people with HIV/AIDS) has become a global 
norm, as discussed in Chapter 4. At the heart of this mobilisation is the belief of 
activists that w ithout their voices and agitation, these vulnerable groups would be 
victim to societal discrimination ranging from outright persecution in the form of 
draconian health interventions to the hazardous neglect of their specific needs. This 
persecution is a manifestation of the first and second dangers identified by Elbe 
(2006) as inherent to the securitization of HIV/AIDS: first, that security responses 
could be pushed away from civil society toward state institutions less equipped to 
deal with health and more suited to traditional security endeavours; and second,
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that this approach could lead to the violation of civil liberties. Through analysis of 
the qualitative data collected from elite interviews in Thailand (Chapter 7) and 
M yanmar (Chapter 8), it is found that in both countries there has been a rejection of 
threat-defence logics and instead, civil society groups comprised largely of PLWHA 
have taken the lead in shaping national responses. In collaboration with 
international donors and INGOs, these groups have defined HIV/AIDS as a rights- 
based issue in which people living with the virus are positioned as the recipients of 
support and protection rather than being framed as a source of threat to a larger 
'norm al' majority.
In M yanmar the dangers of securitization have been clearly recognised, and 
averted, by civil society in a process which provides a significant insight into the 
country-specific environment as well as the mechanics of securitization. Here, civil 
society groups and INGOs feared that securitization of HIV could provoke the 
Tatmadaw to affect a response to the epidemic; given the propensity for violence of 
this regime, outlined in Chapter 8, PLWHA and hum an rights advocates had 
substantial reason to believe that a state-led response would be coercive and 
punitive. The survival of civil society groups and externally funded healthcare 
programmes depended on the framing of health as a politically neutral issue distinct 
from the security interests of the state and securitizing rhetoric has been specifically 
rejected in order to ensure the continued operation of essential INGOs and CSOs 
dealing with PLWHA. Although recently celebrating hard-won political reforms, for 
decades M yanmar has been defined by the secretive, isolationist policies of the 
authoritarian regime that neglected healthcare and the needs of much of its 
population. Whilst it had devastating humanitarian consequences, the political 
distancing of state from health did enable civil society to orchestrate a limited 
response to HIV/AIDS in the country and it was possible to study this during 
fieldwork only because the response was owned by local civil society groups and 
INGOs autonomous from the political regime. The 'neutral space' carved out by 
civil society and INGOS to provide health services has also been positive for the 
development of civil society capacity, which can be used to mobilise support for 
other rights-based issues; this is illustrated in Chapter 8, where an exiled Burmese
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civil society leader detailed how labour-rights education was delivered to 
undocum ented migrant workers in Bangkok under the guise of HIV prevention 
messages.
In Thailand, the fear that civil liberties could be at risk from harmful state 
responses has also driven the globally renowned Thai civil society groups in their 
HIV/AIDS campaigns. Unlike its neighbour, Thailand has a comparatively secure 
democratic political system modelled on that of Western liberal democracies 
imagined by the Copenhagen School. At an early stage, the state recognised the 
emerging epidemic and its potential impact on the economy and societal security. 
Despite some reactionary measures (see section 7.1), initial attempts to utilise 
traditional and restrictive public health measures, or to dismiss the epidemic as 
isolated within marginalised groups, were largely rejected in favour of a more 
pragmatic and inclusive approach. This was due to the efforts of PLWHA who 
mobilised as support and self-help groups before campaigning for advocacy and 
rights issues, continuing Thailand's tradition of vibrant civil society activism into 
the era of HIV/AIDS. With political and popular support, these groups were able to 
establish a leading position in the national response and subsequently secured their 
formal inclusion in influential policy making arenas, particularly within UNAIDS. 
Thailand is celebrated regionally as a champion among its Asian partners for 
implementing effective epidemic responses but, as discussed in Chapter 7, there are 
serious concerns about the degree to which key policies, including the 100% 
Condom Programme, were rights-based and sustainable. However, the leadership 
of the state and civil society is duly recognised. In particular, the inclusion of 
affordable ARV treatment under the state Universal Health Coverage scheme was a 
major victory for civil society and has saved many lives; around 240,000 of the 
445,000 PLWHA in Thailand currently have access to state-subsidized antiretroviral 
medicine (Hahn, 2013).
The future in both countries remains uncertain, although this thesis raises a 
num ber of pressing concerns about epidemic management in the coming years. In 
Myanmar, as the state continues to politically reform and move toward democracy, 
there will be a need for future research to monitor new data on the epidemic as it
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emerges. Epidemiological data from previously restricted geographical locations, 
including the mining regions discussed in Chapter 8, will present analysts with a 
more comprehensive picture of the epidemic, but there may also be a chance to 
study the official policy that has been employed by the state to deal with HIV/AIDS, 
should this eventually become freely available. With the 'opening up ' of the 
country, we can hope that existing aid networks will grow and that this, in addition 
to state investment, will deliver sustainable development of domestic systems and 
resources through capacity building of local healthcare providers and related staff. 
Whilst there is cause for great optimism in Myanmar, the data collected from 
Thailand shows cause for concern; the initial vitality of the HIV/AIDS response may 
be declining in Thailand, potentially as a result of decreasing fear and growing 
complacency now that ARV treatment is widely available. Chapter 7 concludes with 
a warning that the work of CSOs remains crucial and, in contrast to those in 
Myanmar, their role is not to provide frontline essential services but to ensure that 
the epidemic response is neither neglected nor ignored. A failure to closely monitor 
the ongoing epidemic in Thailand and to combat growing complacency could have 
devastating consequences.
9.4. Using Fear with Caution: Lessons from the Field
For those concerned by the future of the epidemic in Thailand, there is now a 
challenge to evoke renewed interest to deal with the disease and attract resources, 
w ithout creating unproductive fear. This thesis employed a normative view in its 
assessment of HIV/AIDS as an epidemic which should be mitigated through rights- 
based policies and it concludes that fear should be used cautiously to this end, 
despite the potential benefits. This is based on the key findings from both parts of 
the research: first, from conceptual engagement with securitization theory in 
Chapter 2, 3, and 4, where it is it established that fear invocation is at the heart of 
securitization and that this is problematic in the establishment of an effective, rights- 
based HIV/AIDS response. In the second part, the empirical case studies reveal that 
the dangers of securitization, which can be attributed to this essential component of 
fear and 'othering', were recognised and rejected by civil society and PLWHA. This
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rejection has led to a disjuncture between securitization occurring at the UN and 
national levels.
In its conceptual engagement with securitization theory, this thesis 
established that securitization is comprised of fear appeals in the construction of 
subjective understandings of threat. The invocation of fear related to HIV/AIDS is 
problematized in Chapter 4 where the social and epidemiological nature of the 
disease is explored, outlining the unique ways in which the epidemic both incites 
fear and is exacerbated by that fear. Ultimately, it is the fear at the heart of 
securitization which has led to its rejection by civil society groups that define 
responses to the disease in both Thailand and Myanmar. Whilst the many potential 
benefits of fear appeals include behavioural change and risk-avoidance, the dangers 
of unproductive fear leading to stigma, discrimination, and 'othering' of PLWHA 
are too great to warrant meaningful adoption of this approach by influential 
response leaders. The security framework has also been weakened by challenges to 
the empirical claims that link HIV to state-centric security, as discussed in Chapter
4.
The case study chapters 6, 7, and 8 show that the construction of HIV/AIDS 
as a security threat can have positive effects by mobilising resources, but after 
appraisal of the evidence, this thesis favours ethical and efficacious rights-based 
frameworks that are advocated by mainstream civil society groups. Whilst this 
normative approach to HIV/AIDS is at the heart of the thesis, the theoretical 
limitations of securitization as a methodology are acknowledged and, as discussed 
in the opening chapters, these include the inherent difficulty of establishing 
causality in securitization studies. As it is difficult to determine conclusive causal 
relationships between securitization and real world effects (Mclnnes & Rushton, 
2010, p.240), it may not be possible to make statements about the value of 
securitization in generalised contexts. However, it is proposed that through the 
application of the framework to specific cases, insight can be gained into its complex 
risks and benefits and, despite the complexity of the task, application of 
securitization in this way is an academically rewarding endeavour that can 
illuminate both the study environment and the mechanics of the securitization
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framework. Following extensive data collection and conceptual analysis of 
securitization, this thesis can conclude that fear should be used with caution in the 
context of HIV/AIDS. It also finds that Elbe's (2006) proposed dangers are salient 
and that there are substantial risks associated with HIV/AIDS securitization, which 
are outlined in Chapter 4 as manifestations of unproductive fear generated by 
suasive fear appeals, and which were recognised by the civil society groups studied.
9.4.1. Productive and Unproductive fear
Fear has both productive and destructive qualities and fear appeals are 
recognised as powerful motivators for action; in addition to its role in security and 
political discourse, fear can provide an effective stimulus for public health 
campaigns when audiences are persuaded by an authoritative actor that a credible 
threat to their health exists. However, w ithout careful management, fear can 
underm ine these campaigns and lead to destructive processes of stigmatisation, 
'othering', and distancing by the audience. The implementation of effective and 
ethical responses to HIV/AIDS dem ands that the civil liberties and rights of people 
affected by the disease are protected; following an examination of the psychology of 
fear appeals in Chapter 3, this thesis urges caution in the use of fear, highlighting 
the dangers of its manifestation in an unproductive form.
For securitization claims and fear appeals to be productive they m ust meet a 
series of criteria, explicated in Chapter 3, which include the need for the claim to be 
articulated by an authoritative source, for a threat to be perceived as credible and 
severe, and for the audience to have recourse to efficacious responses through 
which they can mitigate their fear. Chapter 6 identifies the presence of facilitating 
conditions at UNSC 4087 through which these criteria were met, including the 
provision of efficacious responses by which to deal with the proposed threat; the 
result was a positive resource mobilisation and prioritisation of HIV/AIDS at the 
global level. However, when these criteria are not met, fear invoked can manifest in 
an unproductive process of 'othering' in which the audience attempts to alleviate its 
fear by distancing itself from the message and from the proposed threat. Through 
this process, the fearful audience imagines itself as distinct and separate from the
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intended audience of the message (see section 4.4); in the case of HIV/AIDS, 
'othering' can reinforce the popular misconception that the virus affects only an 
isolated population, such as gay men, sex workers, drug users, or 'immoral people'. 
It can also discourage people from altering their personal behaviour in ways that 
m ight minimise their risk or vulnerability to HIV, as evidenced in the discussion of 
stigmatising fear appeals in public health in Chapter 4.
The logic of fear-based 'othering' features in Elbe's (2006) dangers of 
securitizing HIV/AIDS that are introduced in Chapter 1, where securitization of 
HIV/AIDS is linked to potential hum an rights violations, neglect of comprehensive 
responses, and exacerbated stigmatisation of PLWHA. The 'othering' of HIV/AIDS, 
KAPS, and PLWHA shares the distinct logic of threat and defence which is at the 
heart of securitization theory and which the Copenhagen School itself has identified 
as being problematic (Buzan et al., 1998, p.29). Reflection on this theory using data 
from the case studies reveals the saliency of Elbe's (2006) concerns; in Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8, the association of HIV/AIDS with distinct groups of the 'other' has 
featured in the early political discourse of Thailand and Myanmar, where the virus 
was presented as a threat arising from an external source and as a 'foreign' disease.
From both a hum an rights and epidemiological perspective, framing HIV as 
a disease of the 'other' is not unproductive and potential harmful. 
Epidemiologically, political rhetoric that employs 'othering' risks ignoring the 
possibility of a generalised epidemic which is, conversely, more likely to occur 
when a state neglects HIV/AIDS by imagining it as an isolated disease of the foreign 
'other'. Fear of PLWHA is also exacerbated by the rhetoric of 'u s vs. them ' that 
accompanies the threat-defence logic and which reduces the efficacy of public health 
responses that rely on accurate risk perceptions and non-stigmatising services in 
order to function effectively. In addition to the epidemiological rationale, there are 
extensive hum an rights-based arguments against 'othering', which informed the 
position of civil society groups and which are covered in detail in this thesis. The 
concern for hum an rights is also evident at the theoretical level, leading Elbe (2006) 
to hypothesise that the securitization of HIV/AIDS could give rise to the violation of
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civil liberties and a de-prioritisation of high risk groups that are perceived as being 
distinct and separate from the HIV negative, 'norm al', population.
Chapter 4 details a number of cases in which groups at high risk of 
HIV/AIDS have been subject to discrimination and violations of their hum an rights, 
including the Thai 'w ar on drugs' in which injecting drug users were killed by state 
security forces (section 4.4). At the policy level, the 'othering' of key affected groups 
facilitates the implementation of discriminatory practices toward them, which has 
negative social and epidemiological impact. At the individual level, discrimination, 
criminalisation, and stigma (including self-stigmatisation) can act as a barrier to 
testing for HIV, heightening first personal vulnerability to the virus and then risk at 
the wider societal level. Concurrently, stigmatisation at the societal level can 
underm ine popular support for HIV prevention services perceived to be serving 
only socially marginalised groups. In chapters 4 and 7, civil society organisations 
report the difficulty of gaining funding for harm reduction services, such as needle 
exchanges or sex worker health clinics, because, as Pisani (2008) notes, not many 
people w ant to do "nice things" (p.261) for drug users. It is evident that fear of 
people living with HIV is unproductive fear and effective HIV responses take 
specific measures to tackle this, utilising an approach which Elbe (2006) refers to as 
"normalizing societal attitudes regarding people living with HIV/AIDS" (p. 130).
HIV prevention requires that the needs of key affected populations are met 
and therefore PLWHA are well-placed to advocate for this approach to the 
epidemic. Needs-based responses include the provision of inclusive and targeted 
harm  reduction services providing condoms, education, sterile needles, and more 
broadly, providing support and empowerm ent for vulnerable people to enable them 
to reduce their risk and vulnerability. Financing and 'allowing' these services to 
operate is dependent on the existence of an enabling legal, policy, and social 
environm ent which requires both the resources and political will to do so. The study 
of the SWING (Service Workers In Action Group) organisation that was denied 
tenancy for an office in Bangkok (Chapter 4) illustrates the discrimination against 
essential frontline operations which provide services to stigmatised client groups. 
This is also evident in the difficulties experienced by the Mercy care facility in Kohn
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Kaen; when staff requested permission from local planners to open a residential 
facility for children with HIV, they faced significant resistance from the community 
(Chapter 4). In Thailand, cases of discrimination against PLWHA in the judiciary 
and in leading medical institutions are documented and challenged by the same 
civil society groups that rejected state attempts to use fear appeals and 'othering' in 
the early stages of the epidemic; here, PLWHA rejected the rhetoric of securitization 
because they recognised that a fear based approach would risk their own health and 
wellbeing (Chapter 7). The political and epidemiological landscape in Thailand has 
now  changed considerably. Progression in treatment, changes in social attitudes, 
and advances in the state healthcare system have made remaining in the home or 
community possible for PLWHA; outreach rather than in-patient care is the model 
of choice for most healthcare providers and mainstream care providers have shifted 
the focus of their HIV programmes from treatment to prevention. Some service 
providers, including the Mercy Centre in Bangkok, have closed their AIDS hospice 
facilities entirely (Mongkul, 2013). Providing community based care and outreach 
services is cost efficient and serves to empower PLWHA to live normal, healthy, and 
productive lives regardless of their sero-status; these are defining goals of the 
hum an rights-based HIV framework which advocates the normalisation and social 
em powerm ent of PLWHA (Mongkul, 2013). The relationship between normalisation 
rights protection is cyclical, with advances in one area both dependent on, and 
contributing to, advances in the other.
The fourth danger of securitization identified by Elbe (2006) is that by 
framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue, limited resources will be invested in 
protecting the elite, at the expense of protecting other groups who are more 
vulnerable to HIV. This danger is the manifestation of unproductive fear which, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, can lead to audiences distancing themselves from the threat 
and failing to employ efficacious behavioural changes as a result. This unproductive 
fear and distancing are particularly likely to occur with HIV and other highly 
stigmatised health issues, w ith potentially damaging effects. As illustrated in the 
case study chapters, stigma associated with HIV and key affected populations has 
complicated the political response and had negative impacts at both societal and
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policy levels. One of the more famous slogans of the response is 'SILENCE = 
DEATH', a phrase popularised by the predominantly LGBTI 'ACT UP' activist 
group formed in 1987. In 2014, more than three decades since the public decried 
AIDS as a 'gay plague', their call to action still resonates; today, civil society 
activism remains integral to tackling the criminalisation of HIV transmission, of 
men who have sex with men, intravenous drug users, sex workers, and other key 
affected populations.
The stigma associated with HIV/AIDS frequently manifests in political 
reticence to address an issue that is connected with problematic notions of socially 
and legally prohibited behaviour (see, Elbe, 2006, p.132) and the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS at UNSC 4087 was a decisive blow to the wall of silence that surrounds 
the disease. The need to provide powerful assistance and an authoritative voice on 
HIV/AIDS motivated Piot to take HIV/AIDS to the Security Council where it could 
command the attention of world leaders. The UNSC is an elite and high-level 
international organisation which possesses the authority and credibility to articulate 
securitizing claims and to influence world politics. Piot recognised the Council as an 
effective platform for his campaign; in interview he was explicit about his intention 
to frame HIV/AIDS as a security issue in order to mobilise an international 
response, to gain resources for dealing with the epidemic, and to bring the disease 
to the attention of influential and powerful actors (Piot, 2013). The seminal UNSC 
meeting and subsequent UNGASS session were a victory for Piot and a UNAIDS 
colleague suggested that this was "the big milestone" in the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS (Hahn, 2013); UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was also explicit about 
the value of Meeting 4087, telling members that "the first battle to be won in the war 
against AIDS is the battle to smash the wall of silence and stigma surrounding it" 
(UNSC, 2000, p.5). At this level and articulated by HIV activists from among the 
political elite, the risk of generating unproductive fear of HIV was remote. Instead, 
the meeting served as an im portant platform from which to articulate securitizing 
messages that would resonate with world leaders and potential financiers of the 
international response.
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The inclusion of HIV/AIDS on the Security Council agenda facilitated further 
securitizing speech acts at high-level platforms, including the 26th UN General 
Assembly Special Session that was dedicated to the disease and in which Piot was 
instrumental. In addition to gaining a platform within more traditional security 
dialogues, taking HIV/AIDS to the UN also allowed Piot to solidify the position of 
the new UNAIDS agency of which he was Director; the presence of UNAIDS at the 
Security Council table established its prominence as an organisation that dealt with 
issues of the highest priority and which could become an international norm  setter 
in global public health, akin to the WHO. UNSC Meeting 4087 also preceded the 
creation of other extremely im portant bodies, including the Global Fund in 2002 and 
PEPFAR in 2003, which coordinate the allocation of billions of dollars spent 
annually on dealing with HIV/AIDS (see, Chapter 4).
The importance of the billion dollar aid investment in the response cannot be 
underestimated. However, despite the rhetoric of AIDS exceptionalism which Piot 
continues to utilise (Chapter 6), it must be noted that this investment, and the work 
of UNAIDS, is focused on supporting groups and responses which adhere to the 
global norm of GIPA. Piot was a champion of the civil society and GIPA principles, 
and he established UN AIDS as an organisation determined by the participation and 
partnerships of PLWHA. Given this, and the dominance of civil society groups in 
the norms and implementation of the global response, it is questionable whether 
securitization at UNSC could have led to any outcome other than renewed support 
for the existing systems of rights-based epidemic responses. This thesis also 
proposes that securitization of HIV/AIDS at the UNSC was part of a political 
strategy employed by Piot at UNAIDS, and in Chapter 6 it presents evidence to 
suggest this strategy was part of a wider campaign to secure access to life saving 
medication to millions of PLWHA, contra to the property law of pharmaceutical 
conglomerates (see, section 6.4).
9.5. Conclusion
In its delineation of the identifying features by which to study securitization 
in the field (Chapter 1), this thesis found the dangers proposed by Elbe (2006) to be
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effective indicators of securitization in practice. During the fieldwork it was found 
that at the national level in Thailand and Myanmar securitization did not occur 
despite the Security Council rhetoric which mobilised world leaders and resources. 
Through analysis of these studies, the thesis concludes that the UN securitization of 
HIV/AIDS was not influential in either country because the prevailing framework 
for conceptualising HIV/AIDS at a national level has been that of HIV as a hum an 
rights issue. This approach has dominated because of the influential activism of civil 
society groups and campaigners who provide essential services, support, and 
leadership in the epidemic. Leaders of these frontline responses to HIV/AIDS have 
identified the fear and threat defence logics of security as threats to their wellbeing 
and fought against them in their campaigns to provide efficacious responses to 
HIV/AIDS. As a result, there is a disjuncture between the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS that took place at the global level, marked by UNSC Meeting 4087, and 
the in-country responses of the two case study countries. This disjuncture reveals 
the complexity of securitization in practice and highlights the importance of its 
application to empirical case studies. By studying securitization in practice, it is 
possible to contribute to both the conceptual development of the theory and to 
better understand the context and conditions of the case studies.
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Appendix A: Interview Participants
Almost all interviewees requested that some of their remarks be used only 
anonymously. Some interviewees requested that they not be identified at all. There 
follow two lists; the first is a list of participants who agreed to be identified in 
research; the second is a list of all interview participants in randomised order, with 
anonymous reference numbers by which their comments are identified in text (e.g., 
Source 1).
List of Interview Participants who gave consent to be identified:
1. Aung, Nyi Nyi. 2012. Expert staff, Ratana Metta Organisation (CSO). Personal 
interview, September 9 2012, Yangon.
2. Benjamano, Visa. 2012. Commissioner (Government Official), National 
H um an Rights Commission. Personal interview, November 16 2012, 
Bangkok.
3. Bhakeecheep, Sorakji. 2013. Manager (Government Official), National Health 
Security Office Fund for HIV and TB. Personal interview, March 27 2013, 
Bangkok.
4. Campbell, Fiona. 2013. Country Representative, Merlin (INGO). Personal 
interview, March 12 2013, Yangon.
5. Chantavanich, Supang. 2012. Director (Academic), Chulalongkorn 
University Asian Research Center for Migration. Personal interview, August 
31 2012, Bangkok.
6. Chonwilai, Sulaipom. 2012. CSO Activist, Thai NGOs on Aids network (CSO). 
Personal interview, November 23 2012, Bangkok.
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7. De Groote, Peter Paul. 2013. Country Representative, Medecins Sans Frontieres 
(INGO). Personal interview, March 11 2013, Yangon.
8. Dunck, Jean. 2013. Director, The Mercy Centre (CSO). Personal interview, 
January 26 2013, Kohn Kaen.
9. Dunck, Rob. 2013. Director, The Mercy Centre (CSO). Personal interview, 
January 26 2013, Kohn Kaen.
10. Hahn, Michael. 2013. Thailand Country Coordinator, Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (UN Agency). Personal interview, 
February 13 2013, Bangkok.
11. Herzbruch, Birke. 2013. Country Representative, Malteser International 
(INGO). Personal interview, March 15 2013, Yangon.
12. Htung, Zarni. 2013. Country Representative, Aide Medicate Internationale 
(INGO). Personal interview, March 8 2013, Yangon.
13. Janyam, Surang. 2013. Director, Service Workers In Group (SWING) (CSO). 
Personal interview, January 30 2013, Bangkok.
14. Kestkaew, Jui. 2012. CSO Activist, Thai Network of People Living with 
HIV/AIDS (TNP+) (CSO). Personal interview, November 12 2012, Bangkok.
15. Kittakul, Chatermsat (Jockey). 2013. CSO Activist, AIDS Access Foundation 
(CSO). Personal interview, November 12 2012, Bangkok.
16. Ladapom, K. 2013. Government Official, National Human Rights Committee. 
Personal interview, January 17 2013, Bangkok.
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17. Lancelot, Anne. 2013. Country Representative, Population Services 
International Targeted Outreach Programme (INGO). Personal interview, March 
13 2013, Yangon.
18. Lintner, Bertil. 2012. Journalist. Personal interview, August 24 2012,
Bangkok.
19. Malloch-Brown, Mark. 2011. Former Administrator, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) (UN Agency).Written correspondence, 
October 4 2011, London.
20. Marshall, Andrew. 2013. Journalist, Reuters. Personal interview, January 18 
2013, Bangkok.
21. Mongkul, Moe. 2013. Expert staff, The Mercy Centre Klong Toey (CSO). 
Personal interview, February 21 2013, Bangkok.
22. Muangmoonchai, Anan. 2013. CSO Activist, Thai Network of People Living 
with HIV/AIDS (TNP+) (CSO). Personal interview, February 7 2013, Bangkok.
23. Murphey, Eamonn. 2013. Myanmar Country Coordinator, Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (UN Agency). Personal 
interview, March 11 2013, Bangkok.
24. Nacapew, Supatra. 2012. Director, Foundation for AIDS Rights (CSO).
Personal interview, August 22 2012, Bangkok.
25. Naing, Sid. 2013. Country Representative, Marie Stopes International (INGO). 
Personal interview, March 11 2013, Yangon.
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26. Panzeri, Daniele. 2013. Country Representative, CESV1 Foundation (INGO). 
Personal interview, March 13 2013, Yangon.
27. Phanuphak, Praphan. 2013. Director, Thai Red Cross AIDS Research Centre 
(INGO). Personal interview, March 18 2013, Bangkok.
28. Piot, Peter. 2013. Former Director, Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (UN Agency). Telephone interview, July 3 2012, Exeter.
29. Prakongsai, Phusit. 2013. Director (Government Official), International Health 
Policy Program at the Ministry of Public Health. Personal interview,
February 4 2013, Bangkok.
30. Press, Brahm. 2012. Programme Manager (Expert staff), Raks Thai (CSO). 
Personal interview, November 15 2012, Bangkok.
31. Rahman, Habib. 2013. Former Director, Population Services International 
Targeted Outreach Programme (INGO). Telephone interview, March 1 2013, 
Bangkok.
32. Renard, Ronald. 2012. Academic. Personal interview, August 20 212, 
Bangkok.
33. Rattanamha, Maneerat. 2013. Academic, Kohn Kaen University. Personal 
interview, January 21 2013, Kohn Kaen.
34. Swe, U Myint. 2012. Director, Ratana Metta Organisation (CSO). Personal 
interview, September 10 2012, Yangon.
35. Swift, Audrey. 2013. Country Representative, International HIV/AIDS Alliance 
(INGO). Personal interview, March 15 2013, Yangon.
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36. Tenni, Brigitte. 2012. Consultant (Expert staff), Thai Network of People Living 
with HIV/AIDS (TNP+) (CSO). Personal interview, August 29 2012, Bangkok.
37. Thabchumpon, Naruemon. 2012. Academic, Chulalongkorn University. 
Personal interview, August 31 2012, Bangkok.
38. Uhrig, Jamie. 2013. Consultant, Three Millennium Development Goal Fund 
(INGO). Telephone Interview, March 19 2013, Bangkok.
39. Ungphakorn, Jon. 2012. Former Director, AIDS ACCESS Foundation (CSO). 
Personal interview, May 10 2012, Bangkok.
40. Ungphakorn, Jon. 2012a. Former Director, AIDS ACCESS Foundation (CSO). 
Telephone interview, November 28 2012, Bangkok.
41. Vungsiriphisal, Premjai. 2013. Academic, Chulalongkorn University Asian 
Research Center for Migration. Personal interview, March 20 2013, 2013.
42. Wai, Myint. 2013. Director, Thai Action Committee for Burmese Democracy 
(CSO). Personal interview, February 1 2013, Bangkok.
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Appendix B: List of all Interview Participants
Anonymous sources in randomised order
Source 1. 2013. CSO Activist. Personal interview. February 2013. Bangkok.
Source 2. 2012. CSO Activist. Personal interview. November 2012. Bangkok.
Source 3. 2012. Expert staff at a CSO. Personal interview. November 2012. 
Bangkok
Source 4. 2013. Country Representative for an INGO. Personal interview. 
March 2013. Yangon.
Source 5. 2013. Former Director for an INGO. Telephone interview.
March 2013. Bangkok.
Source 6. 2012. Former Director for a CSO. Personal interview. May 2012. 
Bangkok.
Source 7. 2012. Director for a CSO. Personal interview. August 2012. 
Bangkok.
Source 8. 2013. Journalist. Personal interview. January 2013. Bangkok.
Source 9. 2012. CSO Activist. Personal interview. August 2012. Bangkok.
Source 10. 2013. Country Representative for an INGO. Personal interview. 
March 2013. Yangon.
Source 11. 2012. Director for an INGO. Personal interview. August 2012. 
Bangkok.
Source 12. 2013. Country Representative for an INGO. Personal interview. 
March 2013. Yangon.
Source 13. 2012. Academic. Personal interview. August 2012. Bangkok.
Source 14. 2012. Director for a CSO. Personal interview. September 2012. 
Yangon.
Source 15. 2013. Academic. Personal interview. January 2013. Kohn Kaen.
Source 16. 2012. Government Official. Personal interview. August 2012. 
Bangkok.
Source 17. 2013. Former Director for an INGO. Telephone interview.
July 2013. Exeter.
Source 18. 2013. Government Official. Personal interview. Bangkok. 
January 2013.
Source 19. 2013. Expert staff at an INGO. Telephone interview. March 2013. 
Bangkok.
Source 20. 2013. Country Representative for an INGO. Personal interview. 
March 2013. Yangon.
Source 21. 2013. Director for a CSO. Personal interview. January 2013. 
Bangkok.
Source 22. 2011. Former Director INGO. Personal correspondence.
October 2011. London.
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Source 23. 2013. Country Representative for an INGO. Personal interview. 
March 2013. Yangon.
Source 24. 2013. Director for a CSO. Personal interview, February 2013. 
Bangkok.
Source 25. 2012. Academic. Personal interview. August 2012. Bangkok.
Source 26. 2012. Journalist. Personal interview. August 2012. Bangkok.
Source 27. 2012. Expert staff at an INGO. Personal interview. August 2012. 
Bangkok.
Source 28. 2013. Academic. Personal interview. March 2013. Bangkok.
Source 29. 2013. CSO Director. Personal interview. January 2013. Kohn Kaen.
Source 30. 2013. Country Representative for a UN Agency. Personal 
interview. February 2013. Bangkok.
Source 31. 2013. Country Representative for a UN Agency. Personal 
interview. March 2013. Yangon.
Source 32. 2012. Expert staff at a CSO. Personal interview. September 2012. 
Yangon.
Source 33. 2012. Director for a CSO. Personal interview. June 2012. Bangkok.
Source 34. 2012. Former Director for a CSO. Telephone interview. November 
2012. Bangkok.
Source 35. 2012. CSO Activist. Personal interview. November 2012. Bangkok.
Source 36. 2012. Expert staff at a CSO. Personal interview. October 2012.
Lop Buri.
Source 37. 2012. Academic. Personal interview. August 2012. Bangkok.
Source 38. 2013. Country Representative for an INGO. Personal interview. 
March 2013. Yangon.
Source 39. 2012. CSO Activist. Personal interview. November 2012. Bangkok.
Source 40. 2012. Academic. Personal interview. August 2012. Bangkok.
Source 41. 2013. Expert staff at an INGO. Personal interview. March 2013. 
Yangon.
Source 42. 2012. Expert staff at a CSO. Personal interview. February 2013. 
Bangkok.
Source 43. 2013. Government Official. Personal interview. February 2013. 
Bangkok.
Source 44. 2013. Government Official. Personal interview. March 2013. 
Bangkok.
Source 45. 2013. Director of an INGO. Personal interview. March 2013. 
Bangkok
Source 46. 2013. Expert staff at a UN Agency. Personal interview.
January 2013. Bangkok.
Source 47. 2012. Government Official. Personal interview. November 2012. 
Bangkok.
Source 48. 2013. Country Representative for an INGO. Personal interview. 
March 2013. Yangon.
Source 49. 2013. Country Representative for an INGO. Personal interview. 
March 2013. Yangon.
Source 50. 2013. Director for a CSO. Personal interview. January 2013. 
Kohn Kaen.
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Appendix C: UK Tombstone Campaign Materials
Figure C l. Tombstone poster.
Poster taken from the UK 'Tombstone Campaign'. (Kelly, 2011)
Figure C2. Tombstone leaflet.
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W H Y A R E  
YOU BEING 
SENT THIS 
LEAFLET
?
1
rim It-.iflot i* bring so lit lo every 
household in the country, it is 
about \II)S  Ami everyone now 
needs to know the facts II explains 
w h a t the d is ra te  is How it is 
spread  Mow serious. <i threat it is 
Ami how it run  »*• avoided,
lifiutiMt it has to deal with 
m atters of health ami sex. vou may 
bud Home o f the inform ation dis 
tu ihuig . Ih. I please m ake sure that everyone who 
may’ need this wlvicr reads this leaflet.
T he m ore people know about AIDS, the loss 
likeh il is to lie spread
S o  if  vou h av e  c h ild re n ,  th in k  care fu lly  w h at 
thev  ne«*d to  know  W h e th e r  \ ihi a p p ro v e  o r n o t, 
niaiiv  te e n a g e rs  d o  h ave  m *x an d  so m e  limy 
(len t w ith  d ru g s .
n if vou think vinir children d o n 't, they will 
t*d advice I h h u u s c  th e v  m a y  have friends who 
courage them  to.
i vper
K>
WHYSHOULD
YOU BE
CONCERNED 
ABOUT AIDS
Anv inan or wom an can get ihe 
\  I IT's virus depending  on then 
behaviour It is not pisi a hom o 
sexual disease
T h ere  is n o » u re  And it kills 
liv the tim e you read this, pud* 
ah h  *ilM) people will hav< d ied  in 
this counliv ft is believed that a 
further Mi.IKHIcjirn lln u r u i  I bis 
num ber is rising and wiil continue lo
l iv e  un less  w o  a l l  ta k e  p re c a u tio n s
AIDS is i a  used bv a virus lh isW H A T  l i h  attack the Itudy tiHVuri vyytriTi
which norniallv helps light oil 
lw diseaM-s and  infections
A  I  [ \  O  XihI I tins hupprmx p eo p le1 an
? itself I hev become ill and die fromm o i f ig h t  o i l
HOW DO 
YOU 
BECOME 
INFECTED
Be* a Use the v ii u> call be pi event 
in sem en and  vaginal thud, this 
m eans for nu»st people* I he only real 
d a n g e i ru n ie s  i l iio u g h  h av in g  
sexual intercourse with an infected 
person. I his m eans vaginal or anal
0 cart be riskv parlicidarlv if sem en ts 
H taken tutu the mmith )
■ ■ J So the virus ra il In* passed from
man to m an, rnan to w om an and woman to man 
Kor those who infect drugs, there  IS the added 
risk from  slurring needles or equipm ent w iibsom e 
one who is infected.
Iintdlv. iiabies buiF lo ino theis w ho are in 
ferivd have <i high chance ot being hot •» with the
H O W  CAN
YOU PROTECT 
Y O U R S E L F  
F R O M  A IDS
VI«»s! people who have the virus 
loit’t even know it I hev mnv look 
ini feel m m pleteiv well S.. you 
annol know who is iiife<l«*d and
In protect VOlllsPlI 
follow these guidelines 
O  I fie inorv sexual parfn eis  you
_ li.ivr. especially male partnei s. tin
w Itlore i h .naevo ii have of having sex
  w i l l l  so m e o n e  w !h > is in le i ’le t l  I l l s
! to stick to one hnthfui pai tnei 
FEWER PARTNERS. LESS RISK
I Tnlc*s you uu* sure o f your partner, alw.n 
.i condom  i she ill; or rubber) This w ill redut 
risk o f  catching the virus.
USE CONDOMS FOR SAFER SEX
It's.dsn best to us*-,»y\ ,iu*i bused lubric atiriggC 
with the condom  Oil-based g«ds ta n  w eaken the 
Mibbei Ask voui chem ist lot advice
Tile contraceptive pill is no protection aguinst\1I)S
Anyone who m isuses drugs should not iiip*v; 
If vou ever d«». never share equipm ent {nm llrv , 
svringes. m ixing I »ow Is r|* You i ould b em p i ting 
tin- vnus straight into vouf blood stream  It is 
ext ren  idv da tiger m is .
DON'T INJECT NEVER SHARE
IF YOU 
THINK
YOU ARE
INFECTED
If vou think vou niuv be m bs ted 
go io vciur family doctor lor ndvii »• 
about huv n»g a text t b go direct to 
.4 i linn for w xuidlv transm itted 
lllH«*.isesldrc<»ldidenli«ilailv icealnl 
a l o t  if you wish If you have the 
virus, they'll let vou know and give 
you help  and supjio ii
PIER C E
T H E  SK IN
It  tv HOt sa le t*> i *<|UipiiM*rit
 ; p irrrm g , tattooing
THINGS THAT puncture unless you know il is 
*<l oi has been stei lined Not 
iv it safe to share  n toothbrush or 
r,r/or ol som eone w ho is infected. 
"I’lle»e things i ould give vou the 
virus through infected blood
Leaflet taken from the UK 'Tombstone Campaign' (UK Government Central Office 
of Information, 1987).
264
Reference List
Abrahamsen, R. (2005). Blair's Africa: The politics of securitization and 
fear. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 30(1), 55-80. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/030437540503000103
Ainsworth, M., Beyrer, C., & Soucat, A. (2003). AIDS and public policy: The lessons 
and challenges of 'success' in Thailand. Health Policy, 64(1), 13-37. doi: 
10.1016/s0168-8510(02)00079-9
Altheide, D. L., & Michalowski, R. S. (1999). Fear in the News: A Discourse of 
Control. The Sociological Quarterly, 40(3), 475-503. doi: 10.11 ll/j.1533- 
8525.1999.tb01730.x
Altman, L. K. (1982, May 11). New homosexual disorder worries health 
officials, The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com
Amnesty International. (2013) Thailand: Grave Developments - Killings and Other 
Abuses. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org
ASEAN Institute for Health Development. (2011). Summary report "Evaluation of 
the national AIDS response in Thailand". Retrieved from 
http  ://w ww.hlsp. org/
Asia Pacific Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS. 2004. APN+ Position Paper 2 
GIPA. Bangkok: APN+.
Atkinson, R., & Flint, J. (2001). Accessing hidden and hard-to-reach populations: 
Snowball research strategies. Social Research Update(33).
Aung San Suu Kyi. (2010). Freedom from fear. London: Penguin.
Austin, J. L., & Urmson, J. O. (1962). How to do things with words. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
265
Avert. (2013). HIV Opportunistic Infections. Retrieved 12 January, 2014, from 
http://www.avert.org/hiv-opportunistic-infections.htm
Babcock, C. R., & Connolly, C. (1999, June 18). AIDS activists badger gore
again. The Washington Post. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com
Baldwin, D. (1997). The concept of security. Review of International Studies, 23(01), 5- 
26. Retrieved from http://journals.cambridge.org
Balzacq, T. (2005). The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and 
context. European Journal of International Relations, 11(2), 171-201. doi:
10.1177/1354066105052960
Barnett, T. & Dutta, I. (2008) HIV and state failure: Is HIV a security risk? (7). New 
York, NY: AIDS, Security and Conflict Initiative.
Barnett, T., & Prins, G. (2006). HIV/AIDS and security: Fact, fiction and evidence —a 
report to UNAIDS. International Affairs, 82(2), 359-368. doi: 10.1111/j.l468- 
2346.2006.00536.x
Bastien, S. (2011). Fear appeals in HIV-prevention messages: Young people's
perceptions in northern Tanzania. African Journal of AIDS Research, 10(4), 
435-449. doi: 10.2989/16085906.2011.646659
Batrouney, C. (2004). Fear-based appeals in HIV prevention. Sydney: National Centre 
in HIV Social Research.
Bayer, R. (1991). Public health policy and the AIDS epidemic: An end to HIV
exceptionalism? New England Journal of Medicine, 324(21), 1500-1504. doi:
10.1056/NEJM199105233242111
Bell, R. A., Molitor, F., & Flynn, N. M. (1999). Fear of AIDS: Assessment and
implications for promoting safer sex. AIDS and Behavior, 3(2), 135-147. doi: 
0.1023/a:1025488007373
266
Benson, A. C. (1914). Where no fear was. London: Smith, Elder & Co.
Berger, P. B. (1996). Hope and caution: report from the XI International Conference 
on AIDS. Canadian Medical Journal Association, 6(155), 717-721. Retrieved 
from http://pubmedcentralcanada.ca
Bernard, R. H. (2006). Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches (4th ed.). Oxford: AltaMira Press.
Beyrer, C. (1998). War in the blood: sex, politics and AIDS in Southeast Asia. London; 
New York, NY: Zed Books.
Beyrer, C., Razak, M. H., Lisam, K., Chen, J., Lui, W., & Yu, X.-F. (2000). Overland 
heroin trafficking routes and HIV-1 spread in south and south-east 
Asia. AIDS, 14(1). doz:10.1097/00002030-200001070-00009
Bilgin, P. (2011). The politics of studying securitization? The Copenhagen School in 
Turkey. Security Dialogue, 42(4-5), 399-412. doi: 10.1177/0967010611418711
Blumberg, S. J. (2000). Guarding against threatening HIV prevention messages: An 
information-processing model. Health Education & Behavior, 27(6), 780-795. 
doi: 10.1177/109019810002700611
Booth, K. (1991). Security and emancipation. Review of International Studies, 17(04), 
313-326. doi:10.1017/S0260210500112033
Branson, B. M., Viall, A., & Marum, E. (2013). Expanding HIV testing: Back to the 
future. JAIDS Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, 63 ,117-121. 
doi: 10.1097/QAI.0b013e3182986f25
Brennan, R. O., & Durack, D. T. (1981). Gay compromise syndrome. The Lancet, 
22(2), 1338-1339. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
267
Buchanan, J., Kramer, T., & Woods, K. (2013). Developing disparity: Regional
investment in Burma's borderlands. Transnational Institute & Burma Centre 
Netherlands: Amsterdam.
Burke, E. (1792). Philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and 
beautiful. Basel: J.J. Tourneisen.
Burma rejects UN fears of AIDS epidemic. (1999, April 12). The Nation.
Burma's secret plague. (1997, August). The Irrawaddy, 4(4/5). Retrieved from 
www2.irrawaddy.org
Burris, S. C. (1994). Public health, 'Aids exceptionalism' and the law. John 
Marshall Law Review, 27(2), 251-272.
Buzan, B. (1983). People, states and fear: The national security problem in international 
relations. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.
Buzan, B. (2007). People, states and fear: An agenda for international Security Studies in 
the post-Cold War era (2nd ed.). Colchester: ECPR Press.
Buzan, B., & Waever, O. (2003). Regions and powers: The structure of
internationalsSecurity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buzan, B., Waever, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A  new framework for analysis. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.
Caballero-Anthony, M. (2008). Non-traditional security and infectious diseases in 
ASEAN: Going beyond the rhetoric of securitization to deeper 
institutionalization. The Pacific Review, 22(4), 507-525. doi: 
10.1080/09512740802294523
Case Collective. (2006). Critical approaches to security in Europe: A networked 
manifesto. Security Dialogue, 37(4), 443-87. doi: 10.1177/0967010606073085
268
Campbell, D. (2008). The visual economy ofHIV/AIDS: Report for the AIDS, security 
and conflict Initiative. Retrieved from http://www.visual-hivaids. org
Ciuta, F. (2009). Security and the problem of context: a hermeneutical critique of 
securitisation theory. Review of International Studies, 35(02), 301-326. doi: 
10.1017/S0260210509008535
Clements, A. (1992). Reprieve for Thailand's AIDS campaign. British Medical Journal, 
305(6847), 211-212.
Cohen, J. (2003). The next frontier for HIV/AIDS: Myanmar. Science, 301(5640), 
1650-1655. doi: 10.1126/science.301.5640.1650
Corey, R. (2004). Fear: The history of a political idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Curley, M. G., & Herington, J. (2011). The securitisation of avian influenza:
International discourses and domestic politics in Asia. Review of International 
Studies, 37(01), 141-166. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000537
Curley, M. G., & Siu-lun, W. (2008). Introduction: Applying securitisation theory to 
unregulated migration in Asia. In M. G. Curley & W. Siu-lun (Eds.), Security 
and migration in Asia: The dynamics of securitisation (pp. 3-18). London; New 
York: Routledge.
Darlington, Y., & Scott, D. (2002). Qualitative research in practice: Stories from the field. 
St Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin.
David, M. (2001). Rubber Helmets: The Certain Pitfalls of Marshaling Security
Council Resources to Combat AIDS in Africa. Human Rights Quarterly, 23(3), 
560-582. doi: 10.1353/hrq.2001.0033
Davies, S. (2009). The global politics of health. Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press.
269
De Cock, K. M., & Johnson, A. M. (1998). From exceptionalism to normalisation: A 
reappraisal of attitudes and practice around HIV testing. British Medical 
Journal, 316, 290-293. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.316.7127.290
Dillard, J. P. (1994). Rethinking the study of fear appeals: An emotional perspective. 
Communication Theory, 4(4), 295-323. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2885.1994.tb00094.x
Edwards, M. J. (1999). Security implications of a worst-case scenario of climate
change in the South-west Pacific. Australian Geographer, 30(3), 311-330. doi: 
10.1080/00049189993602
Eichelberger, L. (2007). SARS and New York's Chinatown: The politics of risk and 
blame during an epidemic of fear. Social Science & Medicine, 65(6), 1284-1295. 
doi: http://dx.doi.Org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2007.04.022
Einstein, A. (2007). The world as I see it. London: The Book Tree.
Elbe, S. (2005). HIV/AIDS: The international security dimensions. In E. Krahmann 
(Ed.), New Actors and New Issues in International Security (pp. I l l  -130). 
London: Palgrave.
Elbe, S. (2006). Should HIV/AIDS be securitized? The ethical dilemmas of linking 
HIV/AIDS and security. International Studies Quarterly, 50(1), 119-144. doi: 
10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00395.x
Elbe, S. (2008). Risking lives: AIDS, security and three concepts of risk. Security 
Dialogue, 39(2-3), 177-198. doi: 10.1177/0967010608088774
Elbe, S. (2009). Virus alert: Security, governmentality, and the AIDS pandemic. New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Ellin, N. (1997). Architecture of fear. New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press.
Emmers, R., Greener, B. K., & Thomas, N. (2008). Securitising hum an trafficking in 
the Asia-Pacific: Regional organisations and response strategies. In M. G.
270
Curley & W. Siu-lun (Eds.), Security and migration in Asia: The dynamics of 
securitisation (pp. 59-82). London; New York, NY: Routledge.
Enemark, C. (2007). Disease and security: Natural plagues and biological weapons in East 
Asia. London: Routledge.
England, R. (2007). The dangers of disease specific aid programmes. British Medical 
Journal, 335, 565. doi: http://dx.doi.Org/10.l 136/6m/.39335.520463.94
England, R. (2008). Writing is on the wall for UN AIDS. British Medical 
Journal 366(7652), 1072. doi: 10.1136/bmj.39569.497708.94
Faugier, J., & Sargeant, M. (1997). Sampling hard to reach populations. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 26(4), 790-797. doi: 10.1046/j.l365-2648.1997.00371.x
Fee, E., & Krieger, N. (1993). U nderstanding AIDS: Historical interpretations and 
the limits of biomedical individualism. American Journal of Public Health, 
83(10), 1477-1486. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.83.10.1477
Fekete, L. (2009). A suitable enemy: Racism, migration and Islamophobia in Europe. 
London; New York, NY: Pluto Press.
Feldbaum, H., & Lee, K. (2004). Public health and security. In A. Ingram
(Ed.), Health, foreign policy and security: towards a conceptual framework for 
research and policy (pp.19-28). London: The Nuffield Trust.
Ferriman, A. (2001). UN calls for $10bn to wage war on AIDS. British Medical
Journal, 322(7294), 1082. doi: http://dx.doi.Org/10.1136/bmj.322.7294.1082/b
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political 
change. International Organization, 52(04), 887-917. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789
271
Fisher III, W. W., & Rigamonti, C. P. (2005). The South Africa AIDS Controversy A  
Case Study in Patent Law and Policy, 12-13. Retrieved from 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf
Fontana, A., & Frey, J. H. (1994). Interviewing: The art of science. In N. K. Denzin & 
Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 361-376). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Ford, N., & Koetsawang, S. (1991). The socio-cultural context of the transmission of 
HIV in Thailand. Social Science & Medicine, 33(4), 405-414. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(91)90321-3
Fordham, G. (2004). A new look at Thai AIDS: Perspectives from the margin. New York; 
Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Freimuth, V. S., Edgar, T., & Hammond, S. L., (1987). College students' awareness 
and interpretation of the AIDS risk. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 
12(3/4), 37-40. doi: 10.2307/689380
Furedi, F. (2005). Politics of fear. London; New York, NY: Continuum International.
Garrett, L. (2005). HTV and National Security: Where Are the Links? New York, NY: 
Council on Foreign Relations.
Geach, P. (1981). The religion of Thomas Hobbes. Religious Studies, 17(04), 549-558. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500013305
Gilman, S. L. (1987). AIDS and syphilis: The iconography of disease. October, 43, 87- 
107. doi: 10.2307/3397566
Goldacre, B. (2009). Bad science. London: Harper Perennial.
Gordon, D. F. (2000). The global infectious disease threat and its implications for the 
United States. Washington: US National Intelligence Council.
272
Gouws, E., White, P. J., Stover, J., & Brown, T. (2006). Short term estimates of adult 
HIV incidence by mode of transmission: Kenya and Thailand as 
examples. Sexually Transmitted Infections, 82(suppl. 3), iii51-iii55. doi: 
10.1136/sti.2006.020164
Green, E., & Witte, K. (2006). Can fear arousal in public health campaigns
contribute to the decline of HIV prevalence? Journal of Health Communication, 
11, 245-259. doi: 10.1080/10810730600630306
Greene, W. C. (2007). A history of AIDS: Looking back to see ahead. European 
Journal of Immunology, 37(S1), S94-S102. doi: 10.1002/eji.200737441
Hakim, C. (1987). Research design: Strategies and choices in the design of social research. 
Allen & Unwin: London.
Hammond, D., Fong, G. T., Borland, R., Cummings, K. M., McNeill, A., & Driezen, 
P. (2007). Text and graphic warnings on cigarette packages: Findings from 
the international tobacco control four country study. American Journal of 
Preventive Medicine, 32(3), 202-209. doi: 
http ://dx. doi. or g/10.1016/j. amepre .2006.11.011
Handley, P. M. (2006). The King never smiles: a biography of Thailand's Bhumibol 
Adulyadej. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.
Hansen, L. (2000). The Little Mermaid's silent security dilemma and the absence of 
gender in the Copenhagen School. Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies, 285-306. doi: 10.1177/03058298000290020501 29:
Hedges, C. (2010). Death of the liberal class. New York, NY: Nation Books.
Hewgill, M. A., & Miller, G. R. (1965). Source credibility and response to fear- 
arousing communications. Speech Monographs, 32(2), 95-101. doi: 
10.1080/03637756509375436
273
Hill, D., Chapman, S., & Donovan, R. (1998). The return of scare tactics. Tobacco 
Control, 7(1), 5-8. doi:10.1136/tc.7.1.5
Hobbes, T., & Gaskin, J. C. A. (1651/1998). Leviathan. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Holden, S. (2003). AIDS on the agenda: Adapting development and humanitarian 
programmes to meet the challenge of HIV/AIDS. Oxford: Oxfam.
Holstein, J. A., & Gubrium, J. F. (2004). The active interview. In D. Silverman
(Ed.),Qualitative research: Theory, method and practice (2nd ed., pp. 140-161). 
London: SAGE.
H um an Rights Watch. (1998). Bearing the brunt of the Asian economic crisis: The impact 
on labour rights and migrant workers in Asia (Vol. 10, No.2C).
Huysmans, J. (1998). Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the creative development of a 
Security Studies agenda in Europe. European Journal of International Relations, 
4(4), 479-506. doi: 10.1177/1354066198004004004
Huysmans, J. (2011). W hat's in an act? On security speech acts and little security 
nothings. Security Dialogue, 42(4-5), 371-383. doi: 10.1177/0967010611418713
Ingram, A. (2008). Domopolitics and disease: HIV/AIDS, immigration, and asylum 
in the UK. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26(5), 875-894. doi: 
10.1068/d2208
Ingram, A. (2008a). Pandemic anxiety and global health security. In R. Pain, S. J. 
Smith & S. Smith (Eds.), Fear: Geopolitics and everyday life (pp. 75-85). 
Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
Ingram, A. (2013). After the exception: HIV/AIDS beyond salvation and scarcity. 
Antipode, 45(2), 436-454. doi: 10.1111/j.l467-8330.2012.01008.x
274
Insein prison: HIV headquarters? (1997, August). The Irrawaddy, 4(4/5). Retrieved 
from www2.irrawaddy.org
International Crisis Group. (2001). HIV/AIDS as a security issue. Retrieved from 
http://www.crisisgroup.org
IRIN. (2012). Thailand: Ambivalent about needle exchanges. Retrieved A ugust 25, 
2012, 2012, from www.irinnews.org/report/95984/thailand-ambivalent- 
about-needle-exchanges
Jaffe, H. W. (2009). Increasing knowledge of HIV infection status through opt-out 
testing. Bioethical Inquiry, 6, 229-233. doi: 10.1007/sl 1673-009-9147-4
James, H. (2004). M yanmar's international relations strategy: The search for 
security. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26(3), 530-553. doi: 
10.1353/csa.2011.0113
James, H. (2005). Governance and civil society in Myanmar. Oxon; New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Janis, I. L., & Feshbach, S. (1953). Effects of fear-arousing communications. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 48(1), 78-92. doi: 10.1037/h0060732
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2000). Evaluation of the 100% 
condom programme in Thailand. Retrieved from
http://data.unaids.org/publications/IRC-pub01/jc275-100pcondom_en.pdf
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2000a). HW -NAT the HIV
Netherlands Australia Thailand Research Collaboration: A  model for HIV-AIDS 
clinical research in a developing country (UNAIDS/00.19E). Geneva: UNAIDS.
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2007). Policy brief: The Greater 
Involvement of People Living with HIV (GIPA). Retrieved from 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2007/jcl299-policybrief-gipa_en.pdf
275
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AID. (2007a). Reducing HIV stigma and 
discrimination: A  critical part of national AIDS programmes: a resource for 
national stakeholders in the HIV response (UNAIDS/07.32E / JC1420E). Geneva: 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2009). Thailand: Country situation 
2009. Retrieved from http://www.unaids.org/ctrysa/ASITHA_en.pdf
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2009a). UNAIDS annual report
2009: Uniting the world against AIDS (UNAIDS/10.08E /  JC1869E). Retrieved 
from http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2010/2009_annual_report_en.pdf
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS & World Health Organisation. 
(2011). Guidelines on surveillance among populations most at risk for HIV  
(WX147). Geneva: WHO Press.
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2011a). UN AIDS World AIDS Day 
report 2011 (UNAIDS / JC2216E). Geneva: Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS.
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2012). Global report: UNAIDS report 
on the global AIDS epidemic 2012 (UNAIDS / JC2417E). Geneva: Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2012a). Key programmes to reduce 
stigma and discrimination and increase access to justice in national HTV 
responses (UNAIDS / JC2339E). Geneva: Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS.
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2012b). Results: UNAIDS World 
AIDS Day report 2012. Geneva: Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS.
276
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2012c). Securing an AIDS free 
future: Practical lessons about security and AIDS in conflict and post-conflict 
settings (UNAIDS/ JC2402). Geneva: Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS.
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2012d). Thailand launches new 
AIDS strategy to 'Get to Zero'. Retrieved August 28, 2012, from 
http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2012/june/20 
120622thaizero/
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2013). HIV in Asia and the Pacific: 
UN AIDS report 2013 (UNAIDS / JC2558). Geneva: Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS.
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. (2013b). Global report: UNAIDS
report on the global AIDS epidemic 2013 (UNAIDS / JC2502/1/E). Geneva: Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.
Jones, L. (2011). Beyond securitization: Explaining the scope of security policy in 
Southeast Asia. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 11(3), 403-432. 
doi: 10.1093/irap/lcr002
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2014). Total global fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria: Cumulative disbursements (US$). Retrieved January 16, 2014, from 
www.kff.org/global-indicator/total-global-fund-disbursements/
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2014a, January 22). U.S. Federal Funding for HIV/AIDS: 
The President's FY 2014 Budget Request. Retrieved January 28, 2014, from 
http://kff.org/global-health-policy/fact-sheet/u-s-federal-funding-for- 
hivaids-the-presidents-fy-2014-budget-request/
Kelly, J. (2011, November 28). HIV/Aids: Why were the campaigns successful in the 
West. BBC News Magazine. Retrieved March 19, 2013, from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15886670
277
Knight, L. (2008). UNAIDS: The First 10 Years 1996 -  2007 (UNAIDS/07.20E / JC1262) 
Retrieved from
http://data.unaids.org/pub/report/2008/jcl579_first_10_years_en.pdf
Knight, L. (2008). UNAIDS: The First 10 Years 1996 -  2007 (UNAIDS/07.20E / JC1262) 
Retrieved from
http://data.unaids.org/pub/report/2008/jcl579_first_10_years_en.pdf
The Lancet (2004). HIV/AIDS: Not one epidemic but many. The Lancet, 364(9428), 1- 
2. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(04)16603-8
Levy, A., & Scott-Clark, C. (2002). The stone of heaven: the secret history of imperial 
green jade. London: Phoenix.
LoBue, V., & DeLoache, J. S. (2008). Detecting the snake in the grass: Attention to 
fear-relevant stimuli by adults and young children. Association for 
Psychological Science, 19(3), 284 - 289. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02081.x
Lynch, C. (2005, March 13). U.N. faces more accusations of sexual misconduct. The 
Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com
MacGregor Marshall, A. (2011). Thailand's moment of truth: A  secret history of 21st 
century Siam. Retrieved from www.zenjournalist.com
Malloch-Brown, M. (2011). The unfinished global revolution: The road to international 
cooperation. London: Penguin.
Marshall, A. (2008, April 13). The temple of doom. The Sunday Times Magazine.
Marvasti, A., B. (2004). Qualitative research in sociology. London; Thousand Oaks,
CA; New Delhi: SAGE.
Maung Than T., M. (1998). Myanmar: Preoccupation with regime survival, national 
unity, and stability. In M. Alagappa (Ed.), Asian Security Practice (pp. 390- 
416). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
278
Maykut, P., & Morehouse, R. (1994). Beginning qualitative research: a philosophic and 
practical guide. London; Washington, DC: Falmer Press.
McDonald, M. (2008). Securitization and the construction of security. European 
Journal of International Relations, 14(4), 563-587. doi: 
10.1177/1354066108097553
McGuire, W. J. (1968). Personality and attitude change: An information-processing 
theory. In A. G. Greenwald, T. Brock, & T. M. Ostrom (Eds.), Psychological 
Foundations of Attitudes (pp. 171-196). London; New York, NY: Academic 
Press.
Mclnnes, C. (2005). Health, security and the risk society. In A. Ingram (Ed.), UK 
global health programme. London: The Nuffield Trust.
Mclnnes, C., & Lee, K. (2006). Health, security and foreign policy. Review of 
International Studies, 32(01), 5-23. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210506006905
Mclnnes, C., & Rush ton, S. (2010). HIV, AIDS and security: Where are we now? 
International Affairs, 86(1), 225-245. doi: 10.1111/j.l468-2346.2010.00877.x
Mclnnes, C., & Rushton, S. (2012). HIV/Aids and securitization theory. European 
Journal of International Relations, 19(1), 115-138. doi: 
10.1177/1354066111425258
Mcsweeney, B. (1996). Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen 
school. Review of International Studies, 22(01), 81-93. doi: 
10.1017/S0260210500118467
Montaigne. (1577, trans. 1877). Essays of Montaigne: Translated by Charles Cotton (Vol. 
1). London: Reeves and Turner.
279
Morineau, G., & Prazuck, T. (2000). Drug-related behaviour in a high HIV
prevalence rate population at Myktyina drug treatment centre, Kachin State, 
northern Myanmar (Burma). AIDS, 14(14). doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00002030-200009290-00018
National AIDS Committee (2012). Thailand AIDS response progress report 2012:
Reporting period 2010-2011. Nonthaburi: National AIDS M anagement Center.
National AIDS Prevention and Alleviation Committee (2009). UNGASS Country 
Progress Report Thailand: Reporting Period January 2008 - December 
2009.Retrieved from http://whothailand.healthrepository.org
National AIDS Programme. (2012). Myanmar global AIDS response progress report 2012. 
Yangon: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.
National Human Rights Commission (2012). wam5wmm™/k><s<s<s [Investigation report 
2012: Human rights case in the Life Museum, Wat Prabatnampu].
Ohman, A. (2000). Fear. In G. Fink (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of stress: E-M (Vol. 2, pp. 111- 
116). London; San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Oppenheimer, G. M., & Bayer, R. (2009). The rise and fall of AIDS exceptionalism. 
American Medical Association Journal of Ethics, 11(12), 988-992. doi: 
10.1001/virtualmentor.2009.11.12.mhstl-0912
Packer, G. (2009, September 28). The last mission, The New Yorker. Retrieved from 
www.newyorker.com
Parker, R., & Aggleton, P. (2003). HIV and AIDS-related stigma and discrimination: 
A conceptual framework and implications for action. Social Science & 
Medicine, 57(1), 13-24. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(02)00304-0
Parry, J. (2005). Global Fund withdraws grants to Myanmar. Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization, 83(10), 724-725. doi: /S0042-96862005001000004
280
PBS. (2005). The age of AIDS: Interview with Richard Holbrooke. Retrieved 
December 10, 2013, from
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/aids/interviews/holbrooke.html
Peterson, S. (2002). Epidemic disease and national security. Security Studies, 12(2), 
43-81. doi: 10.1080/09636410212120009
Philp, J., & Mercer, D. (2002). Politicised pagodas and veiled resistance: Contested 
urban space in Burma. Urban Studies, 39(6), 1587 -1610. doi: 
10.1080/00420980220151673
Piot, P. (2000). Report of the third ad hoc thematic meeting of the Programme 
Coordinating Board of UNAIDS: Rio de Janeiro, 14-15 December 2000 
(UNAIDS/PCB(10)/00.6). Retrieved from
http://data.unaids.org/governance/pcb02/pcb_10_00_06_report_en.pdf
Piot, P. (2005). Statement to the United Nations Security Council by Dr Peter Piot, 
UNAIDS Executive Director and Under Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, New York, July 18, 2005. Retrieved from 
http://data.unaids.org/Media/Speeches02/sp_security_18july05_en.pdf
Piot, P. (2005a). Speech given at the London School of Economics by Dr Peter Piot, 
UNAIDS Executive Director and Under Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, London, February 8, 2005 "Why AIDS is exceptional". Retrieved 
from http://www.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/pdf/20050208-PiotAIDS2.pdf
Piot, P. (2012). No time to lose. London; New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
Pisani, E. (2008). The wisdom of whores. London: Granta.
Porapakkham, Y., Pramarnpol, S., & Athibhoddhi, S. (1995). The Evolution of 
HIV/AIDS Policy in Thailand: 1984-1994. Bangkok: ASEAN Institute for 
Health Development M ahidol University.
281
Preston, J. (2009, October 30). Obama lifts a ban on entry into U.S. by H.I.V positive 
people. New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com
Price-Smith, A. (2002). The health of nations: Infectious disease, environmental change, 
and their effects on national security and development. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Price-Smith, A. (2009). Contagion and chaos: Disease, ecology, and national security in 
the Era of Globalization. London; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Prins, G. (2004). AIDS and global security. International Affairs, 80(5), 931-952. doi:
10.1111 /j.1468-2346.2004.00426.x
Profile: Bureaucrat at large in the Balkans: Yasushi Akashi, almost painfully
diplomatic UN envoy. (1994, April 30). The Independent. Retrieved from 
www.independent.co.uk
Quaritch Wales, H. G. (1931). Siamese state ceremonies: Their history and function. 
London: Bernard Quaritch Ltd.
Quilliam, S. (2009). Pollyanna or Fright Night? Over-optimism versus negativity in 
the sexual health setting. The journal of family planning and reproductive health 
care/Faculty of Family Planning & Reproductive Health Care, 35(4), 253-254. doi: 
10.1783/147118909789587132
Ruiter, R. A. C., Abraham, C., & Kok, G. (2001). Scary warnings and rational 
precautions: A review of the psychology of fear appeals. Psychology & 
Health, 16(6), 613-630. doi: 10.1080/08870440108405863
Rushton, S. (2010). AIDS and international security in the United Nations 
System. Health Policy and Planning, 25(6), 495-504. 
doi: 10.1093/heapol/czq051
Sachs, W. (2010). The development dictionary: A  guide to knowledge as power. London; 
New York, NY: Zed Books.
282
Seckinelgin, H., Bigirumwami, J., & Morris, J. (2010). Securitization of HIV/AIDS in 
Context: Gendered Vulnerability in Burundi. Security Dialogue, 41(5), 515- 
535. doi: 10.1177/0967010610382110
Sherr, L. (1990). Fear arousal and AIDS: Do shock tactics work? AIDS, 4(4), 361-364. 
doi: 10.1097/00002030-199004000-00013
Shilts, R. (1988). And the band played on:Politics, people, and the AIDS epidemic. New 
York, NY: Penguin Books.
Shklar, J. (2004). The liberalism of fear. In S. P. Young (Ed.), Political
liberalism: Variations on a theme (pp. 149 -166). New York, NY: SUNY Press.
Singer, P. W. (2002). AIDS and International Security. Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, 44(1), 145 -158. doi: 10.1080/00396338.2002.9688546
Sjostedt, R. (2008). Exploring the construction of threats: The securitization of 
HIV/AIDS in Russia. Security Dialogue, 39(1), 7-29. doi:
10.1177/0967010607086821
Slavin, S., Batrouney, C., & Murphy, D. (2007). Fear appeals and treatment side-
effects: an effective combination for HIV prevention? AIDS Care, 19(1), ISO- 
137. doi: 10.1080/09540120600866473
Smith, J. H., & Whiteside, A. (2010). The history of AIDS exceptionalism. Journal of 
the International AIDS Society, 13(47), 1-8. doi: 10.1186/1758-2652-13-47
Soames Job, R. F. (1988). Effective and ineffective use of fear in health promotion 
campaigns. American Journal of Public Health, 78(2), 163-167. doi:
10.2105/AJPH.78.2.163
Soeprapto, W., Ertono, S., Hudoyo, H., Mascola, J., Porter, K., Gunawan, S., & 
Corwin, A. (1995). HIV and peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. The 
Lancet, 346(8985), 1304-1305. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140- 
6736(95)91910-4
283
Sontag, S. (1989). AIDS and its metaphors. London: Penguin.
Soscia, I., Turrini, A., & Tanzi, E. (2012). Non Castigat Ridendo Mores: Evaluating 
the effectiveness of hum or appeal in printed advertisements for HIV/AIDS 
prevention in Italy. Journal of Health Communication, 17(9), 1011-1027. doi: 
10.1080/10810730.2012.665416
Steinberg, D. (2010). Burma/Myanmar: What everyone needs to know. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press.
Sternberg, S. (2002, June 10). Former diplom at Holbrooke takes on global 
AIDS. USA Today. Retrieved from www.usatoday.com
Sternthal, B., & Craig, C. S. (1974). Fear appeals: Revisited and revised. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 1(3), 22-34. doi: 10.2307/2488776
Stritzel, H. (2007). Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond. 
European Journal of International Relations, 13(3), 357-383. doi:
0.1177/1354066107080128
Strong, P. (1990). Epidemic psychology: A model. Sociology of Health & Illness, 12(3), 
249-259. doi: 10.1111/1467-9566.epll347150
Swarns, R. L. (2001, April 20). Drug makers drop South Africa suit over AIDS 
medicine, The New York Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com
Tandon, A., Murray, C. J. L., Lauer, J. A., & Evans, D. B. (2000). Measuring overall
health system performance for 191 countries. (GPE Discussion Paper Series: No. 
30). Retrieved from http://www.who.int/healthinfo/paper30.pdf
Taylor, R. H. (2008). Finding the political in Myanmar, a.k.a. Burma. Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 39(2), 219-237. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022463408000180
284
Terblanche-Smit, M., & Terblanche, N. (2010). The effect of fear appeal HIV/AIDS 
social Marketing on Behavior: Evaluating the Importance of Market 
Segmentation. Theoretical and Applied Economics, 11(552), 79-90. Retrieved 
from http://econpapers.repec.org
Thai. Const. 2007. § 35
The United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (2014). Shared
responsibility- strengthening results for an AIDS- free generation: Latest 
PEPFAR funding. Retrieved from
http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/189671.pdf
Thomas, F., Aggleton, P., & Anderson, J. (2010). "If I cannot access services, then 
there is no reason for me to test": the impacts of health service charges on 
HIV testing and treatment amongst migrants in England. AIDS Care, 22(4), 
526-531. doi: 10.1080/09540120903499170
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (1994).
Turner, K., & Sirisupluxana, P. (2012). Wat Pra Baht N am  Phu: The Buddhist 
temple that cares for full blown AIDS patients. In P. Suwannarat 
(Ed.), Thailand's Health Workforce: Local initiatives to address workforce 
challenges (pp. 56-64). Nonthaburi: Health Systems Research Institute.
UK Government Central Office of Information, (Sponsor) & Air Edel Associates Ltd 
(Producer). (1987). AIDS: Don't die of ignorance [Television advertisement]. 
Available from http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk
UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations & Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (2011). On the front fine: A  review of programmes that address HIV 
among international peacekeepers and uniformed services 2005-2010. Geneva; 
New York, NY: United Nations.
285
United Nations Development Programme. (2004). Thailand's response to HIV/AIDS: 
Progress and challenges. Retrieved from www.un.or.th
United Nations General Assembly. (2001, June 25). General Assembly Twenty-sixth 
special session, 2nd meeting. (A/S-26-PV.2)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2006). Myanmar: United Nations
Regional Task Force on Injecting Drug Use and HIV/AIDS in Asia and the Pacific 
Baseline Assessment. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org
United Nations Security Council. (2000, January 10). Security Council 55th Year, 4087th 
meeting. (S/PV.4087).
United Nations Security Council. (2000d, October 31) Resolution 1325. (S/RES/1325)
United Nations Security Council. (2005, July 18). Security Council 60th Year, 5228th 
meeting. (S/PV.5228)
United Nations. (2012). The millennium development goals report 2012. New York: 
United Nations.
US Central Intelligence Agency. (1987). Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications of the AIDS 
pandemic (SNIE70/1-87). Retrieved from
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DO
C_0000579295.pdf
van Donk, M. (2008). Consolidating developmental local government: Lessons from the 
South African experience. Cape Town: UCT Press.
Vieira, M. A. (2007). The Securitization of the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a norm: A
contribution to constructivist scholarship on the emergence and diffusion of 
international norms. Brazilian Political Science Review, 1(2), 137-181.
Retrieved from http://socialsciences.scielo.org
286
Vieira, M. A. (2011). Southern Africa's response(s) to international HIV/AIDS
norms: the politics of assimilation. Review of International Studies, 37, 3-28. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000306
Vongchak, T., Kawichai, S., Sherman, S., Celentano, D. D., Sirisanthana, T., Latkin, 
C., ... Aramrattana, A. (2005). The influence of Thailand's 2003 'w ar on 
drugs' policy on self-reported drug use among injection drug users in 
Chiang Mai, Thailand. International Journal of Drug Policy, 16(2), 115-121. 
Doi: 10.1016/j.drugpo.2004.11.003
Vultee, F. (2010). Securitization: A new approach to framing the "war on
terror". Journalism Practice, 4(1), 33-47. doi: 10.1080/17512780903172049
Vuori, J. A. (2008). Illocutionary logic and strands of securitization: Applying the 
theory of securitization to the study of non-democratic political 
orders. European Journal of International Relations, 14(1), 65-99. doi:
10.1177/1354066107087767
Waever, O. (1995). Securitization and desecuritization. In R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), On 
security. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Waever, O. (2003). Securitisation: Taking stock of a research programme in Security 
Studies. Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved from 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/906178/securitization-diagram
Walt, S. M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies 
Quarterly, 35(2), 211-239. doi: 10.2307/2600471
Ware, A. (2012). Context-sensitive development: How international NGOs operate in 
Myanmar. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.
Weissman, R. (1999). Aids drugs for Africa: Grassroots pressure overcomes U.S.-industry 
"full court press" to block South Africa's affordable medicine program, 20(9). 
Retrieved from www.multinationalmonitor.org
287
Wery, P. Y. (2011). Chronicle of a Thai hospice. Retrieved from www.lulu.com
Whiteside, A., & Sunter, C. (2000). AIDS: The challenge for South Africa. Cape Town: 
H um an & Rousseau Tafelberg.
Whiteside, A., De Waal, A., & Gebre-Tensae, T. (2006). AIDS, security and the
military in Africa: A sobering appraisal. African Affairs, 105(419), 201-218. 
doi: 10.1093/afraf/adil04
Wilkinson, C. (2007). The Copenhagen School on tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is
securitization theory useable outside Europe? Security Dialogue, 38(1), 5-25. 
doi: 10.1177/0967010607075964
Williams, M. C. (2003). Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international 
politics. International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), 511-531. doi: 10.1046/j.0020- 
8833.2003.00277.x
Wishnick, E. (2008). The securitization of Chinese migration to the Russian Far East: 
Rhetoric and reality. In M. G. Curley & W. Siu-lun (Eds.), Security and 
migration in Asia: The dynamics of securitisation (pp. 83-99). London; New 
York, NY: Routledge.
Witte, K. (1998). Fear as motivator, fear as inhibitor: Using the extended parallel 
process model to explain fear appeal successes and failures. In P. A. 
Andersen & L. K. Guerrero (Eds.), Handbook of communication and emotion: 
research, theory, applications, and contexts (pp. 423-450). San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press.
Witte, K., & Allen, M. (2000). A meta-analysis of fear appeals: Implications for
effective public health campaigns. Health Education & Behavior, 27(5), 591- 
615. doi: 10.1177/109019810002700506
World Bank. (2000). Thailand's Response to AIDS: Building on Success, Confronting the 
Future. Retrieved from www.worldbank.org
288
World Bank. (2014). Myanmar. Retrieved February 13, 2014, from 
http ://w w w. worldbank. or g/en/country/ my anmar
World Health Organisation & Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. 
(2007). Guidance on provider-initiated HIV testing and counselling in health 
facilities (WC 503.1). Geneva: WHO Press.
World Health Organisation. (2000). WHO report on global surveillance of epidemic- 
prone infectious disease. (WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/2000.1). Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/surveillance/WHO_CDS_CS 
R_ISR_2000_l/en/
World Health Organisation. (2007). WHO case definitions of HIV for surveillance and 
revised clinical staging and immunological classification of HIV-related disease in 
adults and children (WC 503.1). Geneva: WHO Press.
World Health Organisation. (2012). Antiretroviral treatment as prevention (TasP) of 
HIV and TB: 2012 update (WHO/HIV/2012.12). Geneva: WHO Press.
World Health Organisation. (2013). Consolidated guidelines on the use of antiretroviral 
drugs for treating and preventing HIV infection: Recommendations for a public 
health approach June (WC 503.2). Geneva: WHO Press.
Ygram-Peters, G.J., Ruiter, R. A. C., & Kok, G. (2012). Threatening communication: 
A critical re-analysis and a revised meta-analytic test of fear appeal 
theory. Health Psychology Review, 7(suppl.l), S8-S31. doi: 
10.1080/17437199.2012.703527
289
